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“The Community legal system is characterised by the simultaneous application of provi-
sions of various origins, international, Community and national; but it nevertheless seeks to 
function and to represent itself to the outside world as a unified system. That is, one might 
say, the inherent nature of the system, which, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the re-
alities of States and of individual interests of all kinds, also seeks to achieve a unified modus 
operandi. Its steadfast adherence to that aim, which the Court itself has described as an ob-
ligation of solidarity, is certainly lent considerable weight by the judicial review mechanism 
which is defined in the Treaty and relies on the simultaneous support of the Community court 
and the national courts.” 
 
Giuseppe Tesauro, Advocate General,  
(in case C-53/96 Hermès [1998] ECR I-3603, para. 21) 
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Preface  
This thesis is the outcome of a research project on the constitutional implications of the 
decade-long Banana conflict undertaken at the European University Institute Florence from 
1996 to 2001. In a first step of this project, the most important single conflicts, which form 
“puzzlepieces”, as it were, of the overall conflict, were analysed separately in several pre-
liminary studies. These include the articles “From Pont d’Avignon to Ponte Vecchio. The 
Resolution of Constitutional Conflicts between the European Union and the Member States 
through Principles of Public International Law” (YEL 18 (1998), 415), “All bark, and no bite 
- A Review Essay on the German Federal Constitutional Court‘s Banana Decision” (ELJ 7 
(2001), 95) and “A Theoretical Reconstruction of WTO Constitutionalism and its Implica-
tions on the Relationship with the EU” (EUI WP Law 5/2001). These studies gradually led to 
the insight that the various interconnections of the three constitutional levels – international, 
European and national – might be meaningfully viewed together in an overall multi-level 
constitutionalist framework. This plan gave rise to the basic structure of this thesis: The 
status quo of the interconnection of the three constitutional levels with all its contradictions 
and weaknesses is presented in a first part. This analysis reaches the conclusion that the exist-
ing contradictions and tensions are largely structural, as each constitutional order’s legal po-
sition is equally plausible and coherent from its own perspective. Consequently, it is argued 
that a proposal for a more harmonious interconnection of the three constitutional levels 
should go beyond a legal-doctrinal analysis and resort to a theoretical elaboration of the 
status and function of each level in the overall setting. Accordingly, in the second part of this 
thesis, several theories providing answers to this question – realism, functionalism, neo-
liberalism and multi-level governance – are examined and tested with respect to their ability 
to provide solutions to the legal conflicts between the three constitutional levels. Opting for 
an approach based on multi-level governance theory, the third part of this thesis will be de-
voted to elaborating concrete proposals in positive law on the relationship of GATT/WTO 
and European law as well as European and national constitutional law, in which the result of 
the earlier studies are refined, extended and put together.  
The completion of this project would not have been possible without the intellectual, lo-
gistic and financial support by several persons and institutions. My warmest thanks go to my 
supervisors Christian Joerges and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann for their ongoing intellectual and 
moral support and inspiration, including several critical reviews of parts of this thesis. For 
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other helpful discussions, I owe gratitude to Carol Harlow, Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Agustin 
Menéndez Pelayo, Bruno Simma, Francis Snyder and Joseph Weiler. Gráinne De Búrca, 
Joanne Scott, Rudolf Streinz and the Hanns Martin Schleyer Stiftung gave me the opportu-
nity to discuss parts of this thesis in conferences organised by them. Thomas Cottier, Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann and Dagmar Coester-Waltjen kindly agreed to join the jury and to travel 
to Florence for the defence of this thesis on 25 January 2002. Dagmar Coester-Waltjen also 
loyally accompanied my academic career as a “habilitation supervisor” at the University of 
Munich since my second state exam in 1995. The financial support for this thesis was pro-
vided by a grant from the Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht e.V. and a Marie Curie Fellowship 
of the European Commission. Moreover, I wish to thank the Robert Schuman Centre, in par-
ticular its directors, Yves Mény and Helen Wallace, for generously accommodating me in the 
charming environment of the Villa La Fonte. Final and very special thanks go to Navraj 
Singh Ghaleigh and Chris Engert, who corrected the English of this thesis. 
I am dedicating this work to my wife, Stephanie, and our children, Sophia Valentina and 
Miriam Raphaela. 
 
Fiesole, 6 December 2001 
Christoph U. Schmid 
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Introduction 
 “The emergence of transnational governance structures goes beyond the horizon of tradi-
tional constitutional theory, according to which a fully developed and specialised State 
power, distinct from society and specialised in the conclusion of collectively binding deci-
sions, formed the very pre-condition for the operation of a constitution. Who sticks to this 
Nation State-dependent understanding of a constitution will hardly appreciate the idea of 
constitutionalising governance structures of the non-statal European and international sys-
tem. Yet, given the factual significance of these structures, which grows further as the ero-
sion of the Nation State progresses, this attitude comes close to abandoning the fundamental 
idea of both constitutionally binding and constraining the exercise of public power alto-
gether.” 
Christian Joerges1 
 
It is the characteristic feature of the present “post-national”,2 or “global”, constellation 
that a significant number of economic, social and political phenomena are increasingly tran-
scending the borders of our Nation States and, consequently, can no longer be controlled and 
regulated autonomously by them. On the one hand, this development has significantly de-
creased the political margin of manoeuvre and the problem-solving capacity of the Nation 
State and brought about the proliferation of spontaneous orders, the most prominent of which 
is the international economy. On the other hand, the globalisation process has, though slowly 
and as yet barely effective in many policy areas, also led to the establishment and up-grading 
of international structures aimed at taming and regulating markets, with a view to recouping 
at least some measure of control, which formerly existed nationally, at the international 
level.3 
These developments massively alter the nature of international relations. The traditional 
style of international co-operation was international in the true sense of the word, in that Na-
tion States participating in international agreements and organisations could essentially be 
                                                 
1
 “Das Recht im Prozeß der Konstitutionalisierung Europas”, in M. Jachtenfuchs and B. Kohler-Koch (eds.), 
Europäische Integration, 2nd ed. 2001, 73 (except where indicated, translations are my own).  
2
 See J. Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation, 1998. 
3
 For an impressive variety of perspectives, see the contributions in G. Bermann, M. Herdegen and P. Lindseth 
(eds.), Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political Prospects, 2000. 
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said to maintain the control over their external activities and policies. Also, the competencies 
of such organisations were mainly quite narrow in scope, and did not, generally, encompass 
economic and social core functions, which are absolutely vital to the well functioning of their 
Member States. Institutionally, this state of affairs was often expressed in veto rights and the 
right to exit from international arrangements pursuant to classic general treaty law. By con-
trast, the new international structures reflect the increasing diffusion, complexity and transna-
tional character of the task of regulating and controlling markets and their social implica-
tions. They are commonly denominated supranational or transnational structures of govern-
ance, with this term indicating that “governing” takes place without a government in the clas-
sical sense. Covering fundamental economic, social and political functions of their Members, 
they enjoy an increasing amount of autonomy and, to a significant extent, escape the effec-
tive influence and control of single Member States. These developments materialise in su-
pranational governance structures being delegated ever wider fields of competence, in the 
establishment of equivalents to classic State institutions, i.e., governments, courts and par-
liamentary assemblies, and in important changes such as the introduction of qualified major-
ity-voting in decision-making bodies. Also, together with the regulatory problems them-
selves, the surrounding know-how, often both scientific and administrative, has moved to the 
international plane as well. Under these conditions, the option of exit, often still existing 
formally, becomes increasingly illusory for Member States in reality. As a result, suprana-
tional governance structures have become new political subjects which exercise public, for-
merly national, power. Nation States have become by no means superfluous, but have entered 
into relationships of ever increasing interdependence with them, which is analytically cap-
tured by the term “network governance”. 
As all new supranational governance structures are legal creatures, devoid of the cultural, 
historical or ethnical bonds that hold Nation States together, this fundamental change in the 
nature of international co-operation has massively affected the nature of international law, 
too.4 Traditional international agreements often possessed only a weak normative character 
and were used as a tool of diplomacy; even though they were obeyed by “most States in most 
cases most of the time” (Louis Henkin), they could also be disregarded without major conse-
quences when important national values and interests were at stake. Similarly, traditional in-
ternational organisations were typically governed by relatively loose legal frameworks which 
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were rarely enforceable before courts. Only recently, in the wake of the collapse of Commu-
nism, has the emergence of a broader liberalist consensus contributed to a stronger status of 
international law. But supranational governance goes well beyond this development. As it 
covers important regulatory policies, the respect for mutual commitments has become abso-
lutely vital for the Member States. As a result, such structures have required different and 
more effective legal instruments, institutions and enforcement tools in order to overcome the 
huge problems of co-ordination and collective action which the presence of several or even 
many Member States necessarily entails. 
Active in international trade, a traditionally strong field of international co-operation 
which has seen a further proliferation through globalisation, the European Union (EU) and 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) may be said to represent two extremes: the former be-
ing a quite rudimentary while the latter is a very advanced form of supranational governance 
structures. The WTO is the outcome of the Uruguay Round of negotiations on global trade 
liberalisation and took effect on 1/1/1995. It has the basic objective of offering a forum for 
world-wide trade co-operation, co-ordination and arbitration, thus transforming international 
trade relations from a power-based system into a rule-based one, rooted in fundamental prin-
ciples such as non-discrimination, and most-favoured nations treatment, from which indi-
viduals benefit at least indirectly. Whereas its predecessor, GATT '47, was a provisional and 
fragmented arrangement characterised by intergovernmental negotiations and weakened by 
national veto powers in important institutional settings, the WTO constitutes a more solid and 
comprehensive order of world trade. Besides its establishment as a formal international or-
ganisation, important innovations include the regulation of new areas such as trade in ser-
vices and intellectual property rights in the GATS and TRIPS agreements, as well as several 
changes in the trade of goods area in the reformed GATT agreement. These include the de-
mise of former national reservations to GATT rules such as the “grandfather clause” and the 
refinement of the exceptions and safeguards regimes. Finally, the whole organisation is en-
dowed with a largely revised, more effective, compulsory legal dispute settlement mecha-
nism. This now comprises a two-tier adjudicative system composed of panels and an appel-
late body, whose reports no longer depend on political consensus to be adopted and which 
has relatively effective enforcement devices at its disposal. The new WTO adjudicative bod-
ies have the difficult task of rendering the often deliberately vague and general legal rules of 
                                                                                                                                                       
4
 See C. Tietje, “The Changing Legal Structure of International Treaties as an Aspect of an Emerging Global 
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the WTO agreements concrete. It is up to them to balance free trade versus competing non-
economic values such as provisions for social or environmental protection. Thus, the WTO 
qualifies as a supranational governance structure mainly through its independent and power-
ful adjudicative bodies. 
Compared to the WTO, the European Union is a much further developed association of 
States aiming at an ever closer economic, social and political integration. Its most important 
component, the European Economic Community, was founded in 1958 with the purpose of 
bringing about political integration via economic integration, thus rendering future wars in 
Europe impossible. Over the years, the EU has gradually taken over a wide range of political 
competencies from its Member States, and has come to form a fully-fledged supranational 
polity above them, which now resembles a federation. It is endowed with its own administra-
tive and legislative institutions which are similar to those of a Nation State, and possesses a 
huge body of secondary law which is directly applicable and supreme to national law, and 
thus confers judicially enforceable rights and duties on individuals. The EC has set up a 
common market of goods, services, labour and capital, and a system of undistorted competi-
tion. Moreover, it pursues a considerable number of further policies beyond the market such 
as social policy, consumer protection, industrial policy, gender equality, environmental pro-
tection, regional cohesion and several others. In the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, its fields of ac-
tivity were extended to a monetary union, and – albeit in a first step under the more tradi-
tional intergovernmental infrastructure of the European Union - to foreign and security poli-
cies, justice and home affairs. Yet, the Community’s progress in integration has not only 
been brought about by legislation, which until the 1986 Single European Act could be 
blocked by national veto rights, but also by the activist jurisprudence of its court, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, which has, since its beginnings, been the EU’s “most supranational” 
institution. 
As legal creatures, the WTO and the EU are frequently said to possess their own constitu-
tions. Yet, this multi-faceted term may boast a variety of meanings which need to be distin-
guished. In a traditional understanding, it refers to a “constitutional moment” or constitu-
tional rupture which defines the founding or refounding of coherent polities. Such a constitu-
tion acquires the status of a popular symbol which “heightens the sense of participation by 
                                                                                                                                                       
Governance Architecture”, GYIL 42 (1999), 26. 
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the many”, and whose legitimacy is based on a huge popular consensus.5 In this sense, con-
stitutions are normally linked to Nation States based on common history, language, culture 
and often even ethnicity. A rather polar understanding may be found in international law. The 
term constitution is generally understood there as the set of substantive, long-term basic 
rules6 and principles upon which a specific international regime is based – with the conse-
quence that even the most insignificant and weak international organisation might claim to 
possess its constitution. Both understandings may, however, be deemed inadequate to capture 
the essence of supranational governance structures. Whereas the first is too narrow, exclud-
ing phenomena of gradual constitutionalisation of non-statal polities such as the EU, the sec-
ond is too wide and “inflationist”, awarding the predicate “constitution” to almost any inter-
national structure. When everything is somehow constitutional, nothing is any longer truly 
constitutional, and the term loses its eminent significance. Focusing precisely on the core 
function of constitutions, which is to guide, legitimise, and control the use of public power, a 
constitutional perspective should, instead, be adopted whenever and wherever any meaning-
fully powerful governance takes place, be it in a Nation State or beyond.7 Only such an un-
derstanding can do justice to governance’s fundamental requirement of legitimacy. Assuming 
that supranational governance structures are gradually substituting the regulatory capacities 
which the Nation States are losing in the globalisation process, it is normatively desirable, in 
order to compensate for an otherwise existing vacuum, that those structures also come to as-
sume constitutional functions, namely those of establishing effective and democratically le-
gitimate governance beyond the Nation State. This is, of course, a formidable task, in which 
the understanding of democracy will need to be taken well beyond its traditional State-
oriented limits, and for which new experimentalist constitutional arrangements need to be 
tested. However, if democratically legitimate governance is to continue in the age of global-
isation, there is no alternative. 
Yet, adopting a constitutional perspective towards each individual emerging supranational 
governance structure does not fully render justice to the real situation. Just as these structures 
have melted with the Nation States into an overall multi-level system of network governance, 
the overall constitution is also composed of a compound of national, European and interna-
                                                 
5
 R. Howse and K., Nikolaidis, “Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a 
Step too far”, 9.  
6
 Definition by E.-U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Problems of International Economic Law, 218. 
7
 See, similarly, U. Di Fabio, “Eine europäische Charta”, JZ 2000, 737. 
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tional constitutions which need to be read together. Dealing with this constitutional com-
pound, which may be termed “multi-level constitutionalism”, is the subject of this thesis.8 It 
involves the fundamental task of the harmonious interconnection of the different levels, since 
“constitutional conflicts” among them might otherwise endanger the well functioning, and 
ultimately the very viability, of the overall system.  
This task meets crucial difficulties. Unlike federal States, there is no highest level or insti-
tution that has the uncontested prerogative of co-ordinating the others and of deciding on 
their sphere of powers (“Kompetenz-Kompetenz”). Also, precise rules, recognised by all 
sides, on the relationship of the different orders are, in the main, missing. This is particularly 
so with respect to the European and national level, whose interplay was not determined in the 
European Treaties at all, but left to the Courts to decide. Even though the relationship of the 
WTO and the EU is governed by some provisions in both agreements, the crucial question of 
the internal status of WTO law and decisions is also left to the adjudicators of both sides. 
This situation is in itself hugely conflict-prone. When deciding on the relationship with other 
systems, experience shows that courts do not usually adopt the perspective of the overall sys-
tem and pursue the objective of its well functioning, but, instead, defend the competencies 
and powers of the constitutional level to which they belong against the others, whose effects 
are frequently resented as intrusions which endanger the own identity and autonomy. This is 
understandable legally and psychologically, as the defence of their own constitution is pre-
cisely the mandate of each of the constitutional courts, and its judges are even sworn to up-
hold it. Furthermore, for the institutions of one level, the relationship with the others is usu-
ally a highly sensitive matter, as the loss of autonomy becomes particularly clear and painful 
whenever another system claims superiority and tries to impose its rules against one’s own 
constitution. 
Against this background, it is clear that the task of interconnecting the three levels cannot 
be considered a purely legal-doctrinal exercise. The central guideline should, instead, also be 
the objective of constitutionalism, namely that of establishing the framework conditions for 
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 The term was coined by Ingolf Pernice, who does not, however, include the WTO level; see “Constitutional 
Law Implications for a State Participating in a Process of Regional Integration”, in E. Riedel (ed.), German Re-
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form, 1999. 
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effective and democratically legitimate governance. In this endeavour, one faces the core 
democratic problem that, as with national sovereignty in general, national constitutions are 
being eroded by the constraints of globalisation, whilst the emerging supranational constitu-
tions continue to be relatively remote from the citizens thus making it difficult to see how 
popular sovereignty can be realised at that level. In sum, the massive problems actually exist-
ing in the relationship among the three constitutional levels reflect both the technical difficul-
ties of interconnecting legal systems and the underlying legitimacy questions. 
To do justice to this task, this thesis tries to reconstruct the interconnection among the 
three constitutional levels in three steps. First, the status quo and its problems will be pre-
sented. This includes the well-known final arbiter conflict between the ECJ and the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht and the problems related to the status to be granted to GATT/WTO law 
within the European legal order. As an illustration, the conflict on the European Banana im-
port regime, in which the three constitutional orders clashed in an unprecedentedly wide, 
complex and serious way, will be presented. This analysis will show that the existing diver-
gences are largely structural, as the legal positions of all three constitutional systems are 
equally coherent and plausible from their own internal point of view. From this insight, the 
fundamental conclusion is drawn that any proposal for reading the three constitutions to-
gether as a meaningful whole and for interconnecting them in a more harmonious way should 
resort to theoretical models on the functions of the three levels. To this end, in the second 
part of this thesis, various theoretical concepts - realism, functionalism, neo-liberalism and 
multi-level governance - are examined and tested with respect to their ability to provide use-
ful guidelines for the interconnections of the three constitutional levels. Opting for an ap-
proach based on multi-level governance theory, the third part of this thesis will be devoted to 
elaborating concrete proposals in positive law based on this theoretical framework. 
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Part I: The Status Quo of the Relationship between the National, European 
and International Constitutions and Their Clash in the Banana Conflict 
Chapter I: The Relationship between National and European Law 
“European law enters Germany only over the bridge of the national ratification statutes. 
To the extent that this bridge is not able to carry it, it does not deploy any legal validity on 
German ground. When, then, European institutions enact regulations or directives, their va-
lidity in Germany will also depend on their finding their legal basis in the EC Treaty, which 
means that they, too, will have to be transported over the bridge of the national ratification 
statutes.” 
Paul Kirchhof, Former Judge of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.9 
 
I. Introduction  
In 1974, in the famous Solange decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG),10 a 
serious conflict between the EC-Treaty and the German Grundgesetz became visible for the 
first time. It remains unresolved and greatly threatens the good relationship between the two 
legal orders and their highest courts.11 On the German side, the BVerfG, in its role as the 
guardian of the Grundgesetz and in line with its jurisprudence on foreign and security policy 
in general,12 claimed for itself the exceptional competence to review any European law to be 
applied on German territory in the light of the constitutional “integration clauses” (imposing 
basic requirements on the participation of Germany in the EC and the EU). On the European 
side, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had always regarded such competence as incom-
patible with its own jurisdiction as enshrined in the EC Treaty. Even though the BVerfG 
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 “Die Kooperation zwischen Europäischem Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht”, 130. 
10 Solange I, BVerfGE 37, 271. 
11 For a comprehensive survey of the relationship of European and national Courts, see A.-M. Slaughter, A. 
Stone Sweet and J. Weiler (eds.), The European Courts and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence: 
Legal Change in its Social Context, 1998. 
12 The overall coherence of the BVerfG’s jurisprudence is well illustrated by H. Schwarz, Die verfassungs-
gerichtliche Kontrolle der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 1995. 
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raised the threshold conditions for its “activation” in the Solange II decision,13 it still contin-
ued to insist on the existence of such competence.14 In the dispute regarding the EC Banana 
import regime, the conflict surfaced again The Verwaltungsgericht (administrative court) 
Frankfurt requested the BVerfG to review some provisions of the EC banana regime,15 which 
it considered to be at odds with the fundamental economic freedoms enshrined in the 
Grundgesetz.16  
Rather dramatically, the relationship between the ECJ and the BVerfG has been compared 
to the “Cold War” logic of “mutual assured destruction”.17 Unlike a mere threat, a decision to 
actually set aside a European act as unconstitutional would be very hazardous since other 
States could follow this example (creating a “domino effect”) relying on a rationale of recip-
rocity, thus putting an end to legal uniformity, which is a basic requirement of the rule of law 
within the EC. With regard to the constraints of globalisation, this could generate fatal eco-
nomic and geopolitical consequences even for the disobedient Member State itself.18 Against 
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 For a contrary view, see M. Kumm, “Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?”, CMLR 36 
(1999), 351, with a reply by this author, CMLR 36 (1999), 519. According to Kumm, even an annulment of EC 
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this background, dissuasion becomes the essential criterion that determines the relationship 
among the Courts. Clearly, the submission by the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt was ulti-
mately rejected by the BVerfG in its last Banana decision of 7 June 2000.19 However, since 
the BVerfG only raised the threshold for the admissibility of a submission, the conflict re-
mains unresolved, and could still develop into a massive danger for the two legal orders and 
their highest courts when economically or legally more important issues are at stake. On the 
whole, even though this Cold War scenario of mutual destruction and dissuasion has worked 
in a makeshift way up to now, it may be argued that it generates not only a high degree of 
legal uncertainty which is unacceptable in a highly integrated polity such as that of the EC, 
but also, to a large extent, hinders fruitful inter-institutional co-operation.  
Finally, it should be noted that, whereas the BVerfG, which is usually considered the most 
dangerous rival of the ECJ, seems to be perfectly aware of the stakes of legal unity in 
Europe, as shown in the final Banana decision, the same might not be true for other European 
                                                                                                                                                       
legislation by a national court might have mainly positive consequences since it would even put the EC under 
pressure to increase the democratic quality of decision-making and the ECJ to take delicate issues like legisla-
tive jurisdiction and human rights more seriously. Thereby, national Courts would play a significant role as con-
tributors to and facilitators of democratic deliberations. This assessment is submitted to be misleading. The sta-
bility of the EC essentially depends on the Rule of Law which, for the considerable lack of political consensus 
at EC level, is known to be much more important there than within the Member States. This stability constitutes 
the very basis of the existing liberal constitutionalist consensus and is grounded on the implicit fundamental 
assumption that no Member State may unilaterally set aside a European act by invoking any internal law. This 
is even true for a piece of legislation concluded under a majority regime which an outvoted State is bound to 
implement even against its government’s will. If such a piece of legislation were actually set aside by a national 
court, it would seem completely unrealistic that a satisfactory political solution would now be available even 
though there was no consensus when the act was concluded. Nor is it to be expected that such a step would lead 
to a constructive deliberation process between the courts and the EC legislator increasing the quality of EC leg-
islation and that of judicial review by the ECJ in the future. First, setting aside a controversial EC act typically 
involves an economic advantage for the State doing so and a disadvantage for others. Second, even if a State 
invokes its own constitution as the basis of such action, this would hardly be met with comprehension by other 
Member States whose constitutions do not contain any obstacle against the act in question (or which do not pos-
sess constitutions with a comprehensive substantive law standard at all). As a consequence thereof, other Mem-
ber States’ courts, relying on a sort of reciprocity rationale, might also feel inclined to avoid EC acts entailing 
serious economic disadvantages for their States. In addition, States which do not possess constitutional review 
might feel greatly disadvantaged. All in all, the avoidance of an EC act by a national court might at least bring 
about a return to the unanimity requirement and thus a painful setback for integration. 
19
 NJW 2000, 3124. 
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constitutional or high courts. The danger of a first blow would seem to be particularly high 
after the Eastern enlargement of the EC. Not only are the legal orders of the Eastern Euro-
pean candidates for membership less stable and less resistant to political pressure, but they 
also enjoy a lesser degree of convergence on substantive values and standards in comparison 
to the economically further developed Western European countries, which might render con-
flicts more likely and decreases the chances of compromise solutions. Moreover, Eastern 
European States seem primarily attracted by the economic side of the EU, whereas they are 
apparently less aware of the membership condition of limiting their own, only recently re-
couped, sovereignty in favour of a supranational community - a conviction which developed 
in Western Europe only after two catastrophic World Wars. Under these conditions, it may 
seem quite plausible that a new or recently strengthened constitutional court in Eastern 
Europe will prove an overzealous pupil of the Western European constitutional courts. Cor-
respondingly, following the doctrinal lines developed by them in detail, it might actually set 
aside an EC act as being fundamentally incompatible with its constitutionally protected eco-
nomic interests, for example in agriculture or mining.  
II. The National Perspective: The Integration Clauses of the Grundgesetz and their Su-
pervision by the BVerfG 
According to the Grundgesetz, the transfer of State sovereignty to the EC through the 
German statutes ratifying the EC Treaties is subject to entrenched conditions. In contrast to 
the new Article 23 Grundgesetz, the old Article 24 Grundgesetz - which is still relevant for 
the EC Treaties and any secondary law based on them - does not name these explicitly. In-
stead, they must be defined pursuant to common methodological principles. Accordingly, it 
must first be recognised that this provision, which gives constitutional authorisation to inte-
gration, may not be regarded as a breach of the constitution – and it would actually entail 
such, if European norms authorised by it to enter the national legal order were allowed to 
violate the Grundgesetz. Instead, the integration clauses should be read in the light of the 
other provisions of the Grundgesetz, particularly the so-called “eternity clause” of Article 79 
(3) Grundgesetz.20 This contains a reference to human dignity and the value of human life 
(Article 1 Grundgesetz) as well as the fundamental federal, democratic and social principles 
on which the Federal Republic of Germany is based (Article 20 Grundgesetz) and which may 
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not even be set aside by the constitutional legislator acting by unanimity. In cases of conflict, 
the competing constitutional principles must be balanced so that each of them retains the 
highest possible degree of effectiveness (the so-called device of “praktische Konkordanz”, 
i.e., optimisation).21 The new Article 23 Grundgesetz, introduced before the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty, now explicitly incorporates these limits to integration. Thus, it may be 
understood as an abstract balancing formula along the lines of the doctrine of “praktische 
Konkordanz”. 
Like any other constitutional provisions, the integration clauses in Article 23 and former 
Article 24 Grundgesetz have to be monitored by the guardian of the Grundgesetz, the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht (hereafter BVerfG). This is a clear, inescapably binding obligation of 
the Court from which it cannot dispense itself. Therefore, in the light of German constitu-
tional law, the BVerfG does not have any alternative but to exercise a control over EC law to 
be applied in Germany. Since direct judicial review is not provided for procedurally, such 
control can only be exercised in an indirect way, i.e., over the “bridge” of the review of na-
tional ratification statutes: to the extent that a European act exceeds the limits of the integra-
tion clauses, the ratification statute (having the status of ordinary law, inferior to the constitu-
tion) is void, and as a result, the European act is devoid of legal force on national ground.22  
The BVerfG’s approach has frequently been criticised as a violation of community and 
public international law, and as an attempt to subjugate the ECJ under its own control. Yet, 
whilst it is widely known that other European constitutional courts have, in the meantime, 
developed similar approaches, in part certainly inspired by the BVerfG,23 it seems, up until 
now, to have widely escaped commentators’ attention that the ECJ opted for a practically 
identical approach as regards the relationship of the EC law with international law treaties.24 
To ensure formal and substantive compatibility of international treaties with the EC Treaty, 
Article 300 (6) EC provides for a priori control by means of an opinion of the ECJ, which 
may be requested by the Council, the Commission or a Member State. To date, the ECJ has 
come to the conclusion of incompatibility on three occasions, whereafter the EC Treaty had 
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to be amended before the ratification of the agreement in question.25 In the case of the EEA 
opinion, the ECJ even found the agreement as threatening to the foundations of the EC (as it 
provided for the establishment of a court system which potentially competed with the ECJ), 
with the effect that the agreement was re-negotiated and substantially modified before ratifi-
cation by the EC. This construct of a possible hard core of EU law which might not even be 
changed by the EC legislator was viewed by some as similar to the eternity clause in Article 
79 (3) GG.26 However, in cases where a priori supervision via an Article 300 (6) EC opinion 
is not exercised, the ECJ has also declared itself competent to exercise a posteriori supervi-
sion. Thus, in 1991, France successfully brought an action for a declaration that the Agree-
ment signed on 23 September 1991 by the Commission and the US regarding the application 
of their competition laws was void, the main argument being that the Commission was not 
competent pursuant to Article 300 (1) EC to conclude the agreement.27 In its decision, the 
ECJ actually decided whether, under its formal requirements the EC was competent to con-
clude the agreement concerned, and whether the correct procedure had been followed. It 
stressed that “the exercise of the powers delegated to the Community institutions in interna-
tional matters cannot escape judicial review (…) of the legality of the acts adopted.”28 Fur-
thermore, in April 1995, Germany brought an action for the partial annulment of the Council 
decision concluding the Uruguay round of the WTO negotiations, in so far as the Council 
thereby also approved the conclusion of the Framework Agreement on Bananas with Costa 
Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.29 The ECJ, extending its review even to substan-
tive requirements of EC law, found that part of the agreement violated the general EC law 
principle of non-discrimination, and annulled the act whereby the Community institution 
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sought to conclude the agreement (not the agreement itself). As a consequence, the Court 
held that the relevant part of the Framework Agreement was deprived of any effect within the 
Community legal order;30 the international law implications of this finding were not dealt 
with the ECJ. The parallel to the BVerfG’s approach which reviews the legality of the Ger-
man ratification statues of the EC treaties is all too obvious, and should lead to more under-
standing for the national situation. 
III. The European Side: Unconditional Supremacy of EC Law 
By way of contrast to Article 23 Grundgesetz, the EC Treaties did not, and do not, tackle 
the interface between EC and national law. Instead, all the related questions remained to be 
resolved by the jurisprudence of the ECJ. To this end, this court developed over the years the 
well-known doctrines of autonomy from international law,31 direct effect, supremacy, pre-
emption, consistent interpretation (also called interprétation conforme or indirect effect) and 
State liability. As is well known, these doctrines, which constitute a supranational conflict of 
laws body,32 have gradually been generally accepted by European courts. They have resulted 
in the “constitutionalisation of the Treaties”, thereby promoting integration even during years 
of political stagnation.33  
However, some elements turned out to be in potential conflict with national constitutions: 
the unlimited supremacy of EC law as a result of the alleged emancipation of the EC from its 
basis in international law and national constitutional law. This potential conflict surfaced as 
early as 1962, when the ECJ defined its conception of the nature of the EC in the classic Van 
Gend en Loos case: 
“The conclusion to be drawn (...) is that the EC constitutes a new legal order of international law 
for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and which binds both their nationals and themselves.” 34 
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In the same judgment, EC law was also qualified as an “independent source of law” - this 
being referred to as the concept of the “autonomy” of EC law. As is well known, it is from 
these findings that the Court inferred that such EC law provisions as are sufficiently precise, 
unconditional and not in need of further implementation should, in principle, have direct ef-
fect. Beyond this, in the equally famous Costa v. Enel case, the autonomy of the “new legal 
order” was also construed to imply that EC law should not be subject to restrictions by the 
internal law of the Member States. In other words, EC law should enjoy supremacy vis à vis 
conflicting provisions of national law: 
“The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive from the EC and 
more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a cor-
ollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted 
by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal 
system. The law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of 
its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, 
without being deprived of its character as EC law and without the legal basis of the EC itself be-
ing called into question (...)”35 
 The formula “domestic legal provisions, however framed” clearly shows that the ECJ had 
in mind the primacy of EC law with respect to any national law, including constitutional law. 
So, from the ECJ’s perspective, supremacy would also encompass the integration clauses of 
national constitutions and the limits to integration stated by them. The sole reference to the 
need for ratification in Article 313 (formerly 247) EC does not incorporate such national con-
stitutional requirements into EC law. This conclusion was confirmed expressis verbis in the 
case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft in 1970:36  
“Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity of measures 
adopted by the institutions of the EC would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and effi-
cacy of EC law (...) Therefore the validity of an EC measure or its effect within a Member State 
cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated 
by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.” 
Interestingly, Advocate General Warner advocated the contrary position, the so-called 
Hypothekentheorie (“mortgage theory”), some years later:  
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“The court has already said in general terms that is cannot uphold measures incompatible with 
fundamental rights recognised and protected by the Constitutions of Member States (...) I would 
be inclined to refine on [sic] this and to say that a fundamental right recognised and protected by 
the Constitution of a Member State must be recognised and protected also in EC law. The reason 
lies in the fact that, as has often been held by the Court (...), EC law owes its very existence to a 
partial transfer of sovereignty by each of the Member States to the EC. No Member State can, in 
my opinion, be held to have included in that transfer power for the EC to legislate in infringe-
ment of rights protected by its own Constitution. To hold otherwise would involve attributing to 
a Member State the capacity, when ratifying the Treaty, to flout its own Constitution, which 
seems to me impossible (...)”37 
However, in the Hauer judgment, the Court strongly opposed this view by confirming its 
former judgment, which has since constituted the basis of its jurisprudence.38 
“As the Court declared in its judgment Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the question of a pos-
sible infringement of fundamental rights by a measure of the EC institutions can only be judged 
in the light of EC law itself. The introduction of special criteria for assessment stemming form 
the legislation or constitutional law of a particular Member State would, by damaging the sub-
stantive unity and efficacy of EC law, lead inevitably to the destruction of the unity of the Com-
mon Market and the jeopardising of the cohesion of the EC.”39  
Contrary to what was argued by one author in the literature,40 it may be added that the 
democratic homogeneity of the EC and its Member States, and particularly the fact that the 
fundamental principles enshrined in Article 79 III Grundgesetz are also acknowledged in the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence, do not mean that these principles are relevant to the EC in exactly the 
form they have been given by the BVerfG. The fact that the ECJ has often had recourse to 
national constitutional provisions in order to develop EC law, especially human rights, does 
not prove the contrary. For, in this sense, national constitutional law is not a proper legal 
source of EC law, but merely a “law-finding source”. 
Another chapter in the history of the supremacy doctrine is provided by the Protocol on 
the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the Treaty of 
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Amsterdam.41 In this protocol, the Council tried to protect the doctrine from challenges based 
on these principles: 
“The application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality shall respect the general 
provisions and the objectives of the Treaty, particularly as regards the maintaining of the acquis 
communautaire and the institutional balance; it shall not affect the principles developed by the 
Court of Justice regarding the relationship between national and EC law, and it should take into 
account Article F(4) of the Treaty on European Union, according to which the Union shall pro-
vide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies”.  
In the German literature, it was argued that this provision (“shall not affect the principles 
developed by the Court of Justice regarding the relationship between national and EC law”) 
was meant to limit the competence of control exercised by national constitutional courts by 
virtue of their constitutions.42 One commentator even expressed the fear that the BVerfG 
could be disempowered by this provision and recommended that ratification of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam be postponed until this provision was amended.43 However, it should be noted 
that even an explicit statement by the Community legislator as to the unlimited primacy of 
European law would not change the constitutional conflict in any way, since its origin in na-
tional constitutional law would remain unaffected. For this very reason, if German represen-
tatives voted for such a provision in the Council, this would clearly violate Article 23 
Grundgesetz by rendering the control of the minimum requirements set forth in this provision 
by the national constitutional court impossible. 
The most recent discussion on supremacy has been triggered by the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, which was approved by the European Council in the final round of the IGC 
in Nice on 13-14 October 2000. It is true that the Charter has, so far, only the character of a 
“solemn declaration”, which is not legally binding. However, the prospect of its becoming 
so, possibly by its inclusion in a future European constitution, renders the question of its po-
tential impact on the Community legal system highly relevant.44 Art. 53 of the Charter, which 
is one of the general provisions set out in the last chapter of the Charter and which contains a 
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safeguard clause which may often be found in international treaties, might be read as imply-
ing a general and far-reaching restriction on the supremacy of Community law. This provi-
sions reads as follows:  
“Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of application, by Union law 
and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all 
the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.”  
Indeed, the last passage “by the Member States’ constitutions” might be interpreted in the 
sense that, when the level of protection offered against a Community measure by a national 
constitutional right is higher than that offered by European law, an individual may rely on the 
national human right before a national court. The apposition, “in their respective fields of ap-
plication”, which was, apparently, inserted on the initiative of the Commission in order to 
exclude any impact on supremacy, does not, however, solve the problem. For, as it is well 
known, the borderline between national and European competence is generally difficult to 
draw, and many areas in which human rights violations may occur are characterised by an 
overlap of national and Community competence. Yet, even though the “anti-supremacy” in-
terpretation of Art. 53 of the Charter may be supported by some arguments derived from its 
drafting history, it is ultimately not tenable on several grounds.45 First, in a strictly literal in-
terpretation, one may stress the precise language of the provision according to which “noth-
ing in this Charter” may lead to restrictions of rights in national constitutions. Clearly, this 
does not exclude the possibility that other Community instruments may have such an effect. 
This somewhat formalistic literal interpretation is further supported by important political 
considerations. The reference to the national constitutions primarily stresses the drafters’ po-
litical message that the Charter is not meant to replace national constitutions. Conversely, it 
does not intend to diminish the essentials of the Community law acquis as regards the rela-
tionship between the Community legal order and national law, either. A contrary interpreta-
tion would not only be completely outside the mandate of the Convention, but it would also 
have to be supported by much stronger and clearer evidence, capable of overcoming the clear 
case law of the ECJ. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the model on which Art. 53 of the 
Charter is based, Art. 53 of the European Convention of Human Rights, has never been inter-
preted in the sense of limiting the supremacy of that Convention over national law, either. 
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Thus, at the end of the day, the doctrine of unlimited supremacy is still valid in Community 
law. 
IV. A Doctrinal Analysis of the Two Positions  
1. The “Bridging” Function of National Ratification Statutes 
Distilling the essence of the conflict, it may be stated that whereas the Grundgesetz, at 
least in its current interpretation by the BVerfG, imposes a mandatory control of any interna-
tional law to be applied internally via a scrutiny of the ratification statutes, European law 
does not recognise any limitation of, or exception to, supremacy based on national constitu-
tional law. This reflects the conventional legal position in international law according to 
which a State may generally not rely on its constitution in order to justify a failure to comply 
with a treaty.46 However, even though this would, therefore, constitute a violation of Euro-
pean law, constitutional review of European law provisions is logically possible as long as 
the continuing validity of the national ratification statutes continues to be a pre-requisite of 
the internal application of EC law. Since an ordinary law is normally below the constitution, 
a ratification statute could be subject to the control of constitutional courts like any other na-
tional law. In the end, the supremacy of EC law would remain contingent upon this constitu-
tional authorisation. An alternative view is only offered by the “federal emancipation” thesis. 
2. Cutting the Bridge: The “Federal Emancipation” Thesis 
The “federal emancipation” thesis denies the continuing dependence of EC law on na-
tional ratification statutes. This thesis relies first on a specific interpretation of the ECJ’s 
“constitutionalisation” jurisprudence, in which it has famously endeavoured to distinguish 
the “new legal order” from earlier international law regimes. In this jurisprudence, interna-
tional law was apparently understood as an enemy of the integration goal of the EC. This ju-
risprudence was interpreted by some commentators in the sense that the EC had, either from 
birth or as a result of the process whereby the treaties where constitutionalised, emancipated 
itself from the national ratification statutes, i.e., cut the ties to its basis in public international 
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and national constitutional law, and become a “new legal order sui generis”.47 The first indi-
cation in this direction was found in the statement in Costa v. ENEL in which the ECJ talked 
for the first time of an independent legal order and not any longer of a special order of inter-
national law. In the ECJ’s later jurisprudence, the emancipation thesis might appear to under-
lie the reference to the treaties as the EC’s “constitution”, a term traditionally reserved for the 
“higher law” of a sovereign State. An even stronger indication in this direction might be 
found in the more recent first EEA-opinion which, as described above, was understood by 
some to mean that a certain hard core of the treaties could not be changed even by the Euro-
pean legislator.48  
According to this view, the Member States are no longer the uncontested “masters of the 
treaty”49, and the EC is becoming a widely autonomous polity, its law no longer subject to 
unlimited modification or control by the Member States. As a result, the Member States 
could ensure the EC’s respect for their Constitutions’ limits to integration only collectively 
through legislative action – namely, through those treaty modifications that the ECJ would 
still allow. If this were actually true, it would, indeed, mean a definitive emancipation of the 
EC treaties from both international and national law. 
A coherent doctrinal and theoretical explanation of the “emancipation thesis”, including 
also the national constitutional law side, was offered by Hans Peter Ipsen in his famous Ge-
samtaktstheorie (“collective act theory”). Thereafter, the genesis of the EC system did not 
depend primarily upon the national ratification statutes as in the case of ordinary interna-
tional law treaties. Instead, what was crucial was national participation in the collective act of 
establishing the EC. This was based exclusively on Article 24 (1) Grundgesetz and, for this 
reason, did not need to comply with the rest of the German constitution, so that any problem 
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of compatibility with it simply could not emerge in the first place. Article 24 (1) GG would 
open the national legal order up to a law from another source which does not depend on the 
continuing force of the ratification act, since EC law would impose itself pursuant to the EC 
constitutional rules themselves.50 To sum up, the Gesamtaktstheorie presupposes an emanci-
pation from the ratification statute and a subsequent superordination of EC law over national 
constitutional law at the foundation of the Community. This super-ordination may be charac-
terised as “federal” in so far as it presupposes an absolute supremacy of European over na-
tional law – a phenomenon typically reserved to federal constitutions.51 Expressed in a meta-
phoric way, the “bridge”52 constituted by national statutes of ratification would be cut; it 
would have become a bridge in the Avignon style, on which the States may still wish to 
dance but which does not lead anywhere any longer. As a consequence, the interconnections 
between both legal orders might be entirely dealt with by supranational conflict of laws rules 
such as unconditional supremacy, which could not be adjudicated by national courts. 
3. Objections 
a) The Gesamtaktstheorie as a Piece of Legal Metaphysics 
Desirable as it may seem to some, a federal emancipation of EC law from the national 
ratification statutes can hardly be presupposed, either at the origin of the Community or at a 
later stage.53 An emancipation at the foundation stage, as advocated by the Gesamtaktstheo-
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rie, would presuppose that the EC was created (ideally by some sort of pouvoir constituant) 
as a federal-type polity - what Schilling called the “big bang theory” of EC law.54 Against 
such a theory, it must be objected that the foundation treaties were concluded by government 
officials and ratified by national parliaments as normal international law treaties. There are 
absolutely no indications that the national governments and parliaments involved had any-
thing else in mind but an ordinary international treaty.  
Furthermore, it should be excluded that, when making this international treaty, its drafters 
presupposed a “monistic” federal-type subordination of national law to EC law. As is gener-
ally known, there was, and is, no consensus among the founding States on the monistic 
model as regards the interface between national and international law. In particular, Ger-
many55 and Italy adhere to a pluralistic view and, besides requiring a national act of trans-
formation in order to allow for international law to be applied internally, reserve to them-
selves the right to review international law treaties internally, though this may be at the price 
of incurring international law liability.56 More importantly still, it should also be considered 
that with the establishment of a hierarchically superior federal system capable of depriving 
them of their constitutional identity, the European Nation States, and possibly not only those 
which share a dualistic tradition, would have committed a clear and massive violation of their 
constitutions which can hardly be implied from their action. Finally, as stated, even the ECJ 
still explicitly referred to the “international law-character” of the treaties in van Gend in 
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1962; the reference to “international law” was only omitted in 1964 in Costa v. Enel, and the 
term “constitution” is generally associated with the 1986 decision in Les Verts. Thus, the “big 
bang theory” may, indeed, be criticised as a piece of “legal metaphysics” and an ex-post ra-
tionalisation of developments which were neither intended nor foreseen at the foundation of 
the EC. 
So, at best, the evolution towards the “federal emancipation” of EC law might have oc-
curred gradually in the wake of the conclusion of the treaties through the ECJ’s famous “con-
stitutionalisation jurisprudence” and/or other developments. But this hypothesis is equally 
problematic. First, for reasons of legal certainty, one may rightly claim the need for a formal 
agreement of the Member States for such a far-reaching change of the EC’s status.57 But even 
if such a formal requirement were waived, any unequivocal expression of consent by the 
Member States would seem to be crucial. There are, however, no such indications. The 
above-mentioned process of internalisation of EC law is certainly not enough, as it does not 
necessarily cover the unlimited supremacy of EC law. Beyond this, the ECJ was, clearly, not 
granted the unilateral power to change the essentials of the system, which would, however, 
have been the case if its “constitutionalisation jurisprudence” were to be interpreted in a 
“federal” way. This interpretation could, at best, be justified if the emancipation of EC law 
could be shown in customary law, through tacit acceptance of the ECJ’s “constitutionalisa-
tion jurisprudence” by the Member States. As far as national constitutional courts are con-
cerned, this seems, however, to be excluded as well. As stated, even though a national court’s 
annulment of an EC act may be argued to be rather unlikely for practical reasons, the major-
ity of the constitutional or highest courts of the Member States did and do not, in a legally 
binding way, exclude control over EC law. As explained, they could not even have done so 
without breaching the constitutions by which they were set up and which they are supposed 
to monitor.58 This is not only true for the German Constitutional Court. In France, the Advo-
cate General has, in the famous Nicolo case before the Conseil d'Etat, even explicitly dis-
carded the Kelsenian monistic model which implies the super-ordination of EC law.59 The 
same is also true for most other European constitutional or highest courts.60 Moreover, accep-
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tance of “federal emancipation” cannot be seen in any legislative documents either. The 
above-mentioned provision of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiar-
ity and Proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam (“shall not affect the principles 
developed by the Court of Justice regarding the relationship between national and EC law”) 
cannot be interpreted in this way, either.  
In a more general perspective, it should be noted that even an explicit statement by the 
Community legislator as to the unlimited primacy of European law would not change the 
constitutional conflict in any way, since its origin in national constitutional law would remain 
unaffected. Indeed, if German representatives voted for such a provision in the Council, such 
action would be void, as it would violate Article 23 Grundgesetz by rendering the control of 
the minimum requirements set forth in this provision by the national constitutional court im-
possible. As a final footnote, one may observe that the recent transition from the Community 
to the Union even shows a certain regression to international law patterns of intergovernmen-
tal co-operation which also seems to contradict the thesis of federal emancipation.61  
b) The International Law Interpretation of the Community as an Alternative  
Another major argument which defeats the federal emancipation interpretation of the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence is that the central features of the interface between the EC Treaties and 
national law may be explained in international law terms, too.62 To start with, it may be re-
peated that the EC was founded by an ordinary international law treaty; its supranational fea-
tures are essentially linked to the wider scope of competencies delegated to it and the exis-
tence of an elaborate and highly effective legal, administrative and adjudicative machinery. 
Thus, the difference from traditional international law is not one of principle, but only one of 
degree. As stated before, it is equally recognised in international law that a State may gener-
ally not rely on its constitution in order to justify a failure to comply with a treaty. The main 
doctrinal novelty of the EC Treaties lies in the effective combination of the direct effect and 
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supremacy doctrines, which results in what may be called “internal primacy”,63 entailing the 
immediate disapplication, by any national or European court, of national law which conflicts 
with European law. This is rarely found in traditional international law, where norms enjoy 
direct effect only exceptionally, and States are generally free to choose the means they think 
most adequate for compliance with international obligations (so that all internal remedies 
against a national act contrary to international law must, normally, have been exhausted be-
fore a violation can be found). Beyond this, whereas in international law judicial review may 
only take place ex post with the purpose of finding a State liable for non-compliance, in the 
European context, by means of the Article 234 (formerly 177) EC reference procedure, an ex 
ante judicial review may take place. Thus, a State can be constrained to give immediate ef-
fect to its EC law obligations. In other words, international law liability for non-compliance 
is turned under EC law into an obligation to comply.  
Through these devices, a Member State may not only be liable for the breach of an inter-
national obligation inconsistent with its own constitution as in traditional international law, 
but it might also be forced to act against its constitution. This possibility would be particu-
larly relevant in majority decisions, by which the EC could actually disregard national consti-
tutional limits by adopting measures contrary to them. Were the ECJ to accept a measure as 
compatible with EC law, the Member States would enjoy no other remedy against it. This is 
what renders constitutional conflicts much more critical than in traditional international law, 
even though they are not completely different. Finally, according to this view, the thesis pro-
posing limits to material revision of the Treaties, which was only made in a vague obiter dic-
tum, is not yet definitively established and should, therefore, not be interpreted as implying 
an irreversible emancipation of the EC system from international law. 
4. Procedural Consequences for the Review of Community Law by National Courts 
The findings of the irrelevance, in EC law, of national limitations to integration and of the 
unlimited internal supremacy of EC law are taken to imply that there is no scope for review 
of EC law by national courts. In particular, such a power would seem to be incompatible with 
the ECJ’s authority as ultimate umpire with regard to the interpretation and validity of EC 
law, as laid down in Article 220-234 (formerly 164-177) EC.  
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This function of the ECJ is, indeed, indispensable to guarantee uniform application of EC 
law throughout the EC. Thus, the reference procedure in Article 234 EC is particularly im-
portant, since it ensures that the ECJ is consulted with regard to a potentially divergent inter-
pretation of EC law by national courts. Within EC law, the ECJ’s monopoly of interpretation 
clearly comprises the review of the Treaty’s legislative competence provisions as well.64 
From this perspective, if not the review procedure as such, at least a finding of a European 
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act as unconstitutional by a national court would clearly be in breach of EC law, and liable to 
infringement proceedings pursuant to Articles 226-228 (formerly 169-171) EC). 
5. Limited Conflict Avoidance Capacities of National Constitutional Law 
As regards the conflict avoidance capacities of national constitutional law they are, on this 
basis, confined to procedural devices. First, the finding of a European act as unconstitutional 
must be reserved to the BVerfG in an analogous application of Article 100 Grundgesetz.65 
This can be justified by the (at any rate) quasi-constitutional character of the European Trea-
ties and by the need for legal certainty, with which review by lower courts would be incom-
patible. Secondly, and more importantly, it must be ensured that the ECJ has the opportunity 
to give an opinion on any relevant issue at stake in the case. Thus, before finding a European 
act unconstitutional, the BVerfG is generally compelled to refer the matter to the ECJ pursu-
ant to Article 234 (3) EC.66 This is so even if another national court has already referred the 
same matter to the ECJ, but a new important legal issue has arisen in the meantime.67  
More importantly, the balancing of the relevant constitutional criteria - the task of bring-
ing about integration on the one hand and of ensuring respect for all other constitutional prin-
ciples and values including human rights and national competencies on the other - shows that 
judicial self restraint with respect to a limited control for manifest and grave flaws is possi-
ble. This is exactly the approach chosen by the BVerfG in the Solange II-decision68 and 
(probably) confirmed by the reference to the “co-operation relationship”69 between the ECJ 
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and the BVerfG in the field of human rights protection in the Maastricht judgment. So, a 
more or less contingent and minor violation of constitutional essentials in a single case can 
still be accepted. Only if the ECJ’s jurisprudence is subject to structural weaknesses which 
are likely to produce divergent results in a variety of cases 70 - and these were, indeed, 
claimed to exist on account of the methodologically unsatisfying control of human rights in 
the Banana judgment71 -, can such control be effectuated.  
In order to limit the outbreak of conflicts to a minimum, the BVerfG has, in its answer to 
the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt-am-Main administrative 
court for judicial review in 2000, raised the admissibility conditions for showing such struc-
tural weaknesses to a maximum, which will be difficult to reach in practice. According to 
this decision, constitutional complaints and submissions by judges complaining of fundamen-
tal-rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European 
law, including ECJ case law, has, since the “Solange II” decision, generally fallen below the 
mandatorily required fundamental-rights standard of the Grundgesetz in a given field. To ful-
fil this condition, the Court seems to require – although this is stated in ambiguous and 
somewhat contradictory language – a comprehensive analysis of the protection of the funda-
mental right(s) in question in European jurisprudence by the lower court.72 
Since this condition is extremely difficult to fulfil, submissions invoking structural weak-
nesses of European human rights protection are hardly likely to occur for the moment. How-
ever, despite these procedural safeguards, which will be shown to be incompatible with ef-
fective inter-institutional checks and balances among European and national institutions, the 
essence of the conflict is still unresolved. And it is equally clear that, in a case with higher 
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economic significance, the margin of interpretation that the BVerfG has left to itself is high 
enough to find “structural flaws” which would well require constitutional review. Thus, in 
the end, a certain potential for conflicts cannot be excluded de lege lata by national constitu-
tional law despite the BVerfG’s “traité de paix”.73 
V. Assessment 
After the discussion of the European and national constitutional law positions, the essence 
of the conflict may now be distilled: according to the Grundgesetz, constitutional review of 
EC legislation is mandatory, even though it may be carried out with lower intensity. Other-
wise, one would have to read the Grundgesetz as allowing for violations of its hard core, 
which would be fundamentally incompatible with the eternity clause in Article 79 (3) 
Grundgesetz. Technically, constitutional review may only be exercised by way of scrutiny of 
national ratification statutes, since a national court has no jurisdiction over EC legislation.  
EC law, on the other hand, demands the irrelevance of any national constitutional law ex-
ception and the inadmissibility of constitutional review by national courts. Within the EC law 
interpretation, there is, however, an important difference between the “federal emancipation 
thesis” and the international law reading of the EC’s status: if the EC legal system still de-
pends on national ratification statutes as suggested by the latter reading, constitutional review 
via the review of these statutes is logically still possible, though it is likely to constitute a vio-
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lation of international law. If, on the other hand, the EC had actually emancipated itself from 
its basis in national constitutional law and international law, this review would no longer be 
logically possible. As a consequence, the interconnections between both legal orders might 
be entirely dealt with by supranational conflict of law rules such as unconditional supremacy, 
which could not be controlled by national courts. On the basis of the “federal emancipation 
thesis”, the conflict would have been logically decided in favour of European law. Since the 
“federal emancipation thesis” and its most coherent dogmatic justification, the Gesam-
taktstheorie, have, however, been shown as barely defensible, the conflict remains unre-
solved. From their internal perspectives, the supremacy and final arbiter claims of both sides 
are equally coherent and cogent, which should exclude any definitive doctrinal solution. The 
conflict may, therefore, be ascribed strong structural features. 
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Chapter II: The Relationship between the GATT/WTO System and European 
Law 
“Though born roughly in the same period, committed to similar beliefs in the virtues of 
liberalized trade and open markets, sharing in many instances a common legal vocabulary, 
the GATT and the European Communities developed over the years as the Cain and Abel of 
international economic law-except that in this case, Cain was cast out into the wilderness by 
a complacent and self-satisfied Abel. It is time to bring him back to the fold.” 
Joseph H.H. Weiler74 
 
I. Preliminaries 
The status of the world trade order in Community law revolves essentially around the 
concept and the implications of its potential internal applicability in that system, usually 
called “direct effect”. This question will be considered in the light of three preliminary is-
sues: the theoretical concept of direct effect in general; direct effect of internal Community 
law and direct effect of other international agreements in the Community legal order. 
1. Doctrinal Essentials of the Status of International Treaties in National Law 
a) Foundations: Internalisation, Internal Validity and Applicability 
On the conventional view, international law comes into existence through “normative ac-
tion” such as agreements or customs of States or international institutions. These are, there-
fore, the authors and original subjects of international law at the same time. It follows that 
States or international institutions are also solely responsible for the compliance with and the 
implementation of their international law obligations. In this respect, they are usually ac-
corded a great deal of discretion with regard to the modalities and instruments by which 
compliance is achieved. In particular, there is, in principle, no public international law duty 
for States to extend the validity and applicability of international law to their internal legal 
order, even though this may considerably increase its effectiveness.  
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If, however, a State were to decide that international rules are to become a part of its in-
ternal legal order, which in particular includes citizens as its subjects, technically speaking, 
there first needs to be an “internalisation command” in that order, which mandates such in-
ternal validity. In national systems characterised as dualistic – which basically means that 
they presuppose national and international law as two independent, so to speak, juxtaposed 
orders -, such a command is usually contained in a national transformation or implementation 
act which usually takes the form of an ordinary statute enacted by parliament. However, an 
internalisation command is also necessary under a monistic system which presupposes the 
unity of the national and the international legal order, the latter being usually granted su-
premacy over the former. Otherwise, it would simply remain unclear whether a norm gener-
ated at the international level of the overall monistic legal order should be applied at the sub-
ordinated national level, too. 
National legal orders based on the monistic system usually limit themselves to a general 
command which may be enshrined in their constitution or in some other important legal 
document. Such a general command normally stipulates that the entry into force of an inter-
national agreement is a sufficient condition for its internal validity. As a famous example, 
one may quote Article 26 of the French constitution of 1946, whereafter “international trea-
ties duly ratified and published have legal authority even if they are in conflict with French 
laws, without there being a need, for their application, of legislative provisions beyond those 
necessary to ensure their ratification.” A more limited example is Article 25 Grundgesetz, a 
monistic feature in the otherwise rather dualistic German system, according to which the 
“general rules” of international law, and only these, automatically come to form part of the 
national legal order. As regards the European system, the national “integration clauses”, such 
as those contained in ex-Article 24 and new Article 23 Grundgesetz, which open the national 
legal order for supranational law, may be interpreted in this way, too, though without preju-
dice to the constitutional conditions and limits that they impose on European integration and 
the supremacy of European law. 
As regards the EC legal order, an “internalisation command” may be found in Article 300 
(7), ex 228 (7), EC by which “Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this Ar-
ticle shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States”. The re-
sult of this command is that international law is validated also at Community law level (in-
ternal validity). Since this formula applies to all kinds of international agreements concluded 
by the Community and since, moreover, the EC Treaties contain no other requirement for the 
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internal validation of international law, it is plausibly regarded as evidence that the EC pre-
supposes a monistic structure of European and international law.75  
Finally, internal validity should be distinguished from internal applicability, which de-
pends on additional conditions to be fulfilled. In order to be internally applicable, a single 
provision not only needs to be valid, but also of a legal nature and technically capable of di-
rect application as regards its texture and drafting, i.e. it must be sufficiently clear, precise, 
unconditional and not in need of further implementation through other norms. This distinc-
tion makes sense, because a provision which is internally valid, but not directly applicable, 
may still deploy legal effect by influencing in particular the interpretation of national norms 
pursuant to the principle of consistent interpretation of domestic law with international law, 
which is recognised in EC law, too. 
b) Internal Applicability and the Possibilities for its Exclusion 
aa) Mutual Exclusion of Direct Effect by the Parties 
Direct effect gives rise to enormous implications on States as parties of an international 
agreement, in particular by internally shifting power from the executive to the judiciary and 
by limiting their scope of discretion in the agreement’s implementation.76 Thus, it becomes 
clear that they may wish to exclude such an effect – just as they may, under exceptional con-
ditions, wish to stipulate it in the agreement, in order to guarantee its reciprocity. It is obvi-
ous that both can be done on account of the contractual autonomy of the parties. Moreover, 
when the parties have not explicitly done so, it is, as the ECJ stated in the Kupferberg judg-
ment, up to the courts to decide whether an implicit exclusion may be inferred from the 
terms, the general scheme and the spirit of an agreement.77 Such an interpretation may be 
particularly justified when the parties do not want the agreement established by them to take 
on the character of genuine “law”, when they want to establish a diplomatic forum without 
juridified character, or when they want to exclude individuals from invoking the agreement 
before national courts, which would curtail their leeway at the implementation stage.  
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Against this background, the two-step approach by which the ECJ usually examines the 
internal status of international agreements becomes clear. In a first step, the whole agreement 
is analysed. With a view to its terms, general scheme and spirit, the Court analyses whether, 
to restate the two extreme constellations, the parties meant it to work as a framework for dip-
lomatic negotiation or as an enforceable legal instrument. Only if the latter is the case, may 
the pertinent provisions themselves be examined in a second step with respect to their techni-
cal ability of being directly applied. Having said this, it is rather obvious that different courts, 
when called upon to decide on the internal applicability of an agreement in the absence of an 
explicit stipulation by the parties, may come to different results. 
bb) Unilateral Exclusion of Direct Effect by One Party 
Since internal applicability of international provisions depends on a national “internalisa-
tion” command, it follows that this may be unilaterally denied to an agreement concerning 
international norms by provisions of the domestic legal order in which the international 
norms are supposed to take effect. As there is no general international law rule requiring the 
internal applicability of international norms, this may be excluded by the parties, and such a 
denial would only be contrary to international law if the parties had made a different stipula-
tion. However, if one excludes unrealistic positions of extreme monism under which the in-
compatibility of a domestic norm with international law automatically entails its nullity ex 
tunc, even a denial contrary to such stipulation would be internally valid. 
In the European context, it has, however, been argued that the European secondary law 
legislator would be prevented, by primary law, from determining the internal status of inter-
national treaties unilaterally. Pursuant to this opinion, the formula “shall be binding on the 
institutions of the Community and on Member States” in Article 300 (7) EC would, in an an-
ticipated way, order the direct effect of any treaty provision fulfilling the technical require-
ments of being directly applied.78 Consequently, a secondary law provision such as the act of 
incorporation could not validly exclude direct effect. However, the wording of Article 300 
(7) EC is not clear in this respect, as the formula can also be regarded as a mere internalisa-
tion of the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt servanda79- in other words, 
                                                 
78
 W. Meng, “Gedanken zur Frage unmittelbarer Anwendung von WTO-Recht in der EG”, in U. Beyerlin et al. 
(eds.), Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewährung, 1995, 1062, 1070. 
79
 P. Eeckhout, “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems”, CMLR 
34 (1997), 11, 38, Fn. 80. 
 49 
it requires only internal validity, and not internal applicability. Indeed, the other interpreta-
tion would lead to an unusually far-reaching opening of the domestic legal order and might 
deprive the Community of the possibility of dealing with the implementation of international 
treaties in a flexible way. Thus, it would, to a certain extent, contradict the international law 
principle “in dubio mitius”, according to which an interpretation which minimises the curtail-
ing of a State’s sovereignty is preferable in doubtful cases. For these reasons, Article 300 (7) 
EC should, in principle, not be extended beyond pacta sunt servanda. 
In summarising the above, it may be submitted that, just as with any national legislator, 
the Community legislator is, in principle, not precluded from denying direct effect to interna-
tional norms by way of secondary law commands. Only if this is not done is it the task of the 
courts to find out whether certain provisions of an agreement may enjoy direct effect. 
c) Direct Effect and additional “Subjectivity Requirements” 
As has already been outlined, in the absence of an exclusion of direct effect by the parties, 
the legal character of an agreement and the technical fitness of the provisions in question are, 
in general international law, regarded as sufficient grounds for their being invocable before 
domestic courts by private parties. This means that directly effective provisions automatically 
confer subjective rights on individuals. It is interesting to note that this conclusion is not 
shared by internal administrative law. Thus, under the Schutznormtheorie of German admin-
istrative law, only the violation of a norm which is purported to confer subjective rights on 
individuals may be invoked; whether a norm pursues this objective is to be determined by 
means of interpretation in the absence of an explicit stipulation to this effect.80  
In directly applicable internal EC law (primary law and regulations), no such specific sub-
jectivity requirement may be found.81 As will be shown in more detail in the next paragraph, 
to tackle the question of direct effect, the ECJ has repeatedly limited itself to considering the 
nature, the systematic context and the wording of the European act in question. Regarding the 
latter, the ECJ only requires that the act in questions impose on the addressee an uncondi-
tional and sufficiently clear and precise obligation vis-à-vis the person concerned. This was 
even maintained when the Court granted direct effect to a Council decision addressed to the 
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Member States, when this was invoked by an individual before a national court.82 In general, 
this jurisprudence seems to be inspired essentially by EC law’s high reliance on decentralised 
implementation by individuals challenging national provisions before domestic courts on 
European grounds – which has been called the principle of “functional subjectivisation”.83  
As regards the direct effect of provisions contained in international agreements, the ECJ 
has essentially adopted the same position in the Kupferberg judgment.84 Yet, this position has 
recently been relativised by the Court of First Instance in the Chemnitz case, which was part 
of the Banana conflict.85 There, a German fruit importer had requested additional “hardship” 
import licences from the Commission under Article 30 of the Banana regulation. However, 
as regards the conditions for the internal applicability of an adopted WTO dispute settlement 
report (which established the inconsistency with GATT/WTO rules of the Banana regula-
tion), contrary to former case law which had examined this question ex officio, the Court of 
First Instance requested the plaintiff to show that these conditions were met:  
“(...) Furthermore, the applicant has not established a link in law between the decision of the 
Dispute Settlement Body and this action. It is clear from the Community case-law that, in order 
for a provision in a decision to have direct effect on a person other than the addressee, that provi-
sion must impose on the addressee an unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise obligation 
vis-à-vis the person concerned. The applicant has not put forward any arguments to support the 
view that those criteria are met. Its argument concerning the effects of the Standing appellate 
body’s report and the Dispute Settlement Body’s decision must therefore be rejected as un-
founded, without there being any need to consider whether the mandatory decisions of the Dis-
pute Settlement Body have direct effect.”86 
Finally, in its case law regarding the liability of the EC for damage suffered as a result of 
illegal Community action, the ECJ requests that the measure in question specifically aim to 
protect the interests of individuals.87 This requirement comes close to the German 
Schutznormtheorie. 
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d) Limited Direct Effect for Member States only 
As an intermediate position with respect to direct effect, it has been maintained that cer-
tain international provisions, in particular GATT or WTO rules, may generate rights and du-
ties only for Community institutions and/or Member States, but not for citizens.88 This would 
entail that these provisions cannot be invoked by individuals in preliminary reference pro-
ceedings, but only by States in treaty infringement proceedings or nullity suits. This interpre-
tation aims to ensure that Community and Member State institutions act consistently with 
international law, so that no international liability may arise. Also, as the amount of EC legis-
lation reviewed under GATT/WTO standards would remain much smaller due to this limita-
tion, the significance of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism would increase, and 
the political scope of manoeuvre of the Member States in the implementation of GATT/WTO 
rules and decisions would remain considerably wider.  
However, one must not ignore the objections raised against this solution:89 National courts 
would be forced to violate openly objective international law invoked by private parties. Na-
tional courts would even be prevented from referring such a case to the ECJ under Article 
234 EC. Legal findings reached in infringement proceedings involving Member States would 
be irrelevant for private parties, at least while a contested piece of legislation remained in 
force. In the face of this contradiction, the need for a uniform decision with respect to all par-
ties was claimed. In other words, either no plaintiff or every plaintiff should be able to rely 
on GATT/WTO law before domestic courts. As will be shown later, though, the advantages 
of restricting the award of direct effect to government suits might outweigh these disadvan-
tages. 
2. The ECJ Jurisprudence on the Direct Effect of Internal Community Law 
As already mentioned, the important issue of the relationship between EC and national 
law was, with the exception of the direct effect of regulations, not dealt with in the European 
Treaties, but instead left to the ECJ’s jurisprudence. The direct effect doctrine, first devel-
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oped in the celebrated van Gend en Loos90 case, already mentioned in relation to the constitu-
tional relationship among the EC and Member States, provided the starting point. In this 
case, a Dutch importer challenged an import duty by invoking Article 12 (now 25) EC before 
a domestic court which referred the case to the ECJ. Setting forth its two-step procedure, the 
ECJ replied that an answer to this question would require it to resort to the spirit, the general 
scheme and the wording of the EC-Treaty as well as to the provision at stake. Since the ob-
jective of the Treaty was the establishment of a Common Market, the Court found that it 
could not be treated as equivalent to an ordinary international agreement confined to the crea-
tion of mutual obligations among States. Instead, it was of direct importance to citizens, 
which was confirmed by the preamble’s reference to the “peoples of Europe” and by the es-
tablishment of institutions to which the Member States had conferred parts of their sover-
eignty. The Court concluded that, given that the wording of Article 12 (now 25) EC also con-
tained a clear and unconditional (negative) obligation, it was suitable for application in the 
relationship between Member States and their citizens. In later cases, the Court has also re-
quired the legal obligation to be complete and legally perfect (i.e., not in need of further im-
plementation measures) in order to be directly applied. In a further step, the Court has ex-
tended the direct effect doctrine to positive treaty obligations such as the equal treatment re-
quirement stipulated in Article 141 (ex 119) EC, regulations, directives (vis-à-vis statal insti-
tutions only) and decisions.  
Evaluating the impact of the direct effect doctrine, it is certainly correct to say that the fu-
ture of the Community would have been very different without it.91 It has increased the effec-
tiveness of EC law immeasurably, as national courts can apply EC law with greater speed 
and can use their powers, including the award of damages and other remedies such as interim 
measures, to enforce their orders. Anticipating the situation of the GATT/WTO system, the 
granting of direct effect could be a similar starting point for the constitutionalisation of the 
world trade order, with the effect of curtailing the sovereignty of the Member States in inter-
national economic relations to the benefit both of individuals and of the emerging global 
trade order itself. The crucial question will be whether these implications are, in fact, desir-
able. 
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3. The ECJ Jurisprudence on the Internal Status of International Treaties 
Further approaching the status of the GATT/WTO system, another significant preliminary 
issue is provided by the Court’s jurisprudence on the internal status of (other) international 
treaties. It was in 1974, in the famous Haegeman92 case, that the ECJ was first confronted 
with an international agreement and its status in EC law. In proceedings before a Brussels 
court, the Haegeman company, an importer of Greek wine, claimed repayment of counter-
vailing duties imposed on it by the Belgian customs authorities pursuant to Council Regula-
tion 816/70. The company claimed the duties to be incompatible with the Association 
Agreement between the Community and Greece, which stipulated the commitment to equal 
treatment. The crucial problem of this case was the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret this 
agreement. Advocate General Warner had argued that, pursuant to the wording of Article 177 
(now Article 234 EC) the Court was only competent to rule on the interpretation of the 
Treaty and on the validity and interpretation of acts of the Community. The Court, disregard-
ing the manifest difference between a unilateral internal measure and a bilateral or multi-
lateral treaty which depends on each party’s agreement, assimilated the acceptance of an in-
ternational agreement to an act performed by a Community institution in terms of Article 
177, now 234 (1) (b) EC. Furthermore, it held that the provisions of the Association Agree-
ment “from the coming into force thereof, form an integral part of Community law” which 
the Court is mandated to scrutinise. This conclusion was also based on Article 228 (7), now 
300 (7) EC, whereby international agreements concluded by the Community are binding both 
for the Community and its Member States. As mentioned, the latter findings were interpreted 
as the Court’s adherence to a monistic view of the relationship between international law and 
Community law.93 In the remainder of the case, the direct effect question did not, however, 
need to be dealt with since the countervailing duties were classified as a levy which was 
found to be compatible with the Agreement. 
In subsequent jurisprudence, the direct effect question arose in a number of cases dealing 
with association agreements. The Court’s fundamental approach to these cases was already 
developed in the first of them, the Bresciani case.94 The Court had to examine the potential 
direct effect of Article 2 (1) of the 1963 Yaounde Convention which had been concluded be-
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tween the Community and certain associated African States and the island of Madagascar. 
The quoted provision of the Convention purported to abolish customs duties on goods pro-
duced in the associated States progressively. Thereby, it specifically referred to the corre-
sponding provisions of the EC Treaty. Having noted that the question of direct effect was to 
be decided in function of the spirit, general scheme and wording of the Convention, it held 
that the purpose of the association was to promote the economic development of the associ-
ated States. Hence, even the lack of reciprocity in the obligations stipulated in the Conven-
tion could not exclude its direct effect. Instead, the Court found that Article 2 (1) of the Con-
vention contained a specific and unconditional obligation which reflected the corresponding 
EC Treaty obligation contained in ex-Article 13 EC.95 Consequently, the provision was held 
to be directly effective. A more or less similar reasoning may also be found in the subsequent 
cases Pabst,96 Demirel,97 Sevince,98 Kziber99 and Anastasiou.100 
In the present context, the Kupferberg101 case is more important as it dealt with a free 
trade agreement - which clearly have a less “integrative function” than association agree-
ments and, thus, come closer to the function of GATT. In concreto, the Court had to decide 
whether a German tax on wine imported from Portugal was compatible with Article 21 (1) of 
the 1972 free trade agreement between the Community and Portugal. On the ground that this 
provision would, again, be similar to, and pursue a similar function as, Article 95 (now 90) 
EC, the Court held it to be directly effective.  
In addition to this conclusion, the Court clarified important general questions concerning 
the treatment of international agreements. First, as already stated above, it confirmed that it is 
up to the parties to stipulate whether an agreement is supposed to enjoy direct effect; in the 
absence of such determination, the Court declared itself ready to decide the question accord-
ing to its own criteria. In this context, it observed that agreements with non-Member States 
are, in general, not to be given the same wide and policy-orientated interpretation as is given 
to the Community treaties, even where the agreement almost exactly reproduces the wording 
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of a provision in the EC Treaty. However, the Court rejected the reciprocity-based argument 
that direct effect could only be granted when the other party’s courts acted likewise. It 
stressed that, while international law obliged the parties to an agreement to bona fide per-
formance, the mere fact that one party did not recognise direct effect did not provide suffi-
cient evidence to question such performance. Moreover, the Court found that the special in-
stitutional framework of joint committees for consultations and negotiations that the agree-
ment provided for its implementation did not exclude the direct application of provisions 
which fulfil the technical conditions of direct effect. Finally, against the opinion of the Advo-
cate General who had advocated a similar approach as with GATT, the Court did not con-
sider the safeguard clauses contained in the agreement to be an obstacle to direct effect, ei-
ther. This was because these clauses allowed the parties only to derogate from certain provi-
sions of the agreement, but not from the tax provision at stake. Beyond this, the Court 
stressed that the safeguard clauses only applied to special circumstances and after the due 
consideration within the Joint Committee in the presence of both parties. 
Even though it does not involve a direct effect question, the Court’s first EEA opinion is 
also interesting with respect to the compatibility, with the EC treaty, of a free trade agree-
ment setting up its own judiciary.102 Here, the ECJ held that legal decisions taken by an in-
ternational court established by an international agreement into which the Community has 
lawfully entered, are also binding for the ECJ itself. However, as a result, the Court denied 
the compatibility of the EEA court system with the Treaty; above all, on account of the far 
reaching overlap of competence with the ECJ, which regarded the Court as being incompati-
ble with Article 164 (now 220) EC. 
Assessing this jurisprudence, it appears to be fully consistent if the Court, in an overall 
judgment based on the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of an agreement as a 
whole, has quite generously awarded direct effect to bi-lateral trading and association agree-
ments. These agreements pursue a policy of economic rapprochement, and granting them 
direct effect has relatively limited and calculable implications. By contrast, GATT is a multi-
lateral agreement which does not pursue any integrationist goals. Moreover, it is obvious that 
the direct effect of a world-wide agreement would put higher constraints on the EC’s foreign 
trade policy in general. Already on this basis, it may be expected that the Court, in again as-
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sessing the spirit, general scheme and the wording of this agreement, might prefer a more 
restrictive approach towards the internal status of GATT.  
II. The Relationship of GATT '47 and European Law 
1. The Status of the Community within GATT '47 
Whilst the GATT' 47103 was never entered into by the Community, the original six EC 
Member States were founding parties of this treaty and maintained their membership even 
subsequent to the creation of the EC. With the gradual transferral of competence in the area 
of external commercial policy, and, in particular, with the introduction of the common cus-
toms tariff on July 1, 1968, the Community has, however, taken over the contractual rights 
and obligations of its Member States. This “succession in function” (“Funktionsnachfolge”), 
initially only internal, has also assumed relevance in international law by the tacit acceptance 
of the other contracting parties. Yet, the external obligation of the individual EC Member 
States vis-à-vis other GATT parties thereby remains unaffected.104 Whilst the ECJ has recog-
nised the de facto membership of the Community, it has apparently never characterised 
GATT’47 as part of the Community legal order, which it usually does with other interna-
tional treaties. However, deducing from this that the Court did not accept GATT’ 47 as inter-
nally binding according to Article 228 (7), now 300 (7) EC105 seems to be a formalistic over-
statement. As regards its hierarchical status, it has been deduced from Article 228 (7) EC, 
according to which international agreements entered into by the EC are binding on its institu-
tions and on the Member States, that these should be ranked between primary and secondary 
                                                 
103
 Even subsequent to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the GATT ‘47 was still in force until 
31.12.1995. See the “Decision on Transitional Coexistence of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement” of the 
GATT contractual parties, GATT Focus, December 1994; see, on this, P.-T. Stoll and H.-C. Ress, “Die Ba-
nanenmarktordnung in der EG im Lichte des GATT”, EWS 1996, 37.  
104
 On these questions, see, among many, C. Vedder, in Grabitz/Hilf (eds.), Kommentar zum EU-Vertrag, Art. 
234 EC, in particular para. 17; C.-D. Ehlermann, ibid., 203; A. v. Bogdandy, in Grabitz/v. Bog-
dandy/Nettesheim, Europäisches Außenwirtschaftsrecht, 1994, 64; M. Hahn and G. Schuster, “Der Verstoß von 
gemeinschaftlichem Sekundärrecht gegen das GATT”, EuR 1993, 261; K. J. Kuilwijk, The ECJ and the GATT 
Dilemma, 1996; R. Steinz, Europarecht, 4th ed. 1999, 217ff. 
105
 In this sense, see W. Schroeder and M. Selmayr, “Die EG, das GATT und die Vollzugslehre”, JZ 1998, 344, 
who also advocated that it was due to this reason that the ECJ denied justiciability to this agreement and thus 
predicted a different approach as regards the WTO agreements, as these had been formally ratified by the EC – 
an assessment that turned out to be completely irrelevant for the ECJ’s reasoning in successive caselaw. 
 57 
law (“mezzanine theory”). However, it should be added that, if direct effect were granted nei-
ther to individual plaintiffs nor to EC Member States, such status would not entail any mean-
ingful implications. 
2. GATT’s Essential Features and their Assessment in the International Fruit Com-
pany Decision 
It was in the famous International Fruit Company case in 1971 that the ECJ was first con-
fronted with the issue of the internal status of GATT' 47. In this preliminary reference, a 
Dutch company sought to have a set of Community regulations providing for restrictions on 
the importation of apples from third States declared invalid. This claim was based on the vio-
lation of Article XI GATT, which lays down the general elimination of quantitative restric-
tions, and resembles Article 12 (now 25) EC. The Court analysed the GATT in a quite suc-
cinct way. Confining itself to the first of the two analytical steps expounded above, it referred 
only to the spirit, the general scheme and the terms of the agreement as a whole, but did not 
examine whether the invoked provision itself would meet the technical conditions generally 
required for direct effect in EC law.  
a) Overall Assessment 
Assessing GATT’s general characteristics, the ECJ noted that, “according to its preamble, 
the agreement is based on the principle of negotiations undertaken on the basis of reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous arrangements and that it “is characterised by the great flexibility 
of its provisions, in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation, the measures to 
be taken when confronted with exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts be-
tween the contracting parties.”106 This assessment boils down to the Court conceiving of 
GATT essentially as a forum for intergovernmental negotiation, rather than as a fully-fledged 
legal system. In order to understand these reservations, it is necessary to examine in more 
detail the GATT provisions on safeguard measures and derogations as well as on consulta-
tion and dispute settlement. 
b) Safeguards, Measures and other Exceptions 
Article XIX GATT constitutes a quite open-textured exception to the fixed tariff conces-
sions and the general ban on import quotas in favour of the domestic economy. It provides 
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that, where, on account of a GATT obligation or a concession relating to a benefit, certain 
imported products cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of the same product 
or of directly competitive products, a Contracting Party is authorised to unilaterally suspend 
the obligation and to withdraw or modify the concession. This could occur either after man-
datory consultation and a failure to agree, or, on a temporary basis only, without consultation 
in urgent cases. In turn, other GATT Parties affected by such measures had the right to sus-
pend substantially equivalent concessions as compensation for the losses. The requirements 
of Article XIX GATT were handled in a rather flexible way. If a State did not manifestly act 
in bad faith, a safeguard measure would generally be consented to by the other Parties.107 
As regards derogations from its free trade principles, the GATT contains a wide list of 
grounds, inter alia, public morality, public health, human, animal and plant life (Article XX 
GATT), national security (Article XXI GATT) and even the protection of the balance of 
payments (Article XII GATT). In all of these, a State is justified to disregard GATT provi-
sions as long as such action does not amount to an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or 
to a disguised restriction on trade. In addition, in exceptional circumstances and after exten-
sive consultation, a two-thirds majority of the Contracting States may grant a “waiver” from 
some of the GATT obligations for a single State for a certain period of time. Such a measure 
is, however, subject to annual review by the Contracting Parties. 
c) Consultation and Dispute Settlement 
Negotiation and consultation as means of dispute resolution have always been guiding 
principles of the GATT. This is laid down, inter alia, in Article XXIII GATT which requires 
each Contracting Party to give adequate opportunity for consultation with other Parties on all 
issues capable of impairing the well functioning of the agreement and to grant “sympathetic 
consideration” to such consultation. In practice, consultation was carried out in a “two-step 
mode”, i.e., firstly by consultation among the individual parties concerned, and secondly by 
referral to the Contracting Parties jointly in the GATT institutions. 
Article XXIII GATT, the provision to which the ECJ attached paramount importance in 
the International Fruit Company case, provides for a dispute settlement procedure to be fol-
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lowed where a Party invokes that the attainment of any objective of the GATT is being nulli-
fied or impaired or where it is being denied a benefit accruing to it under the GATT as a re-
sult of the failure of another Party to carry out its obligations under the Agreement. The prac-
tical functioning of the procedure was summarised well by Philip Lee and Brian Kennedy as 
follows:108  
“The Parties were first obliged to attempt to find a solution on a voluntary basis: the complainant 
could only make representations to which the other party was obliged to accord sympathetic con-
sideration. This “consultation” procedure in some way duplicated Article XXII GATT and, be-
cause of this, the Contracting Parties decided in 1960 that it was to be understood that consulta-
tion under Article XXII GATT would fulfil the conditions of the first stage of Article XXIII:1 
GATT. If no compromise was reached, the matter could be referred to the Contracting parties, 
which were obliged to investigate it and to issue appropriate recommendations or to give a rul-
ing. While originally the preparation of such decision was exercised by the Contracting Parties 
and then by working parties, beginning in the 1950s, reports were prepared by independent pan-
els. Following the presentation of written proceedings by the parties and an oral hearing in front 
of the panel, the panel would issue a reasoned opinion. This report would be sent to all Contract-
ing Parties and discussed after thirty days. The parties could only reach a decision by consensus, 
including the vote of the “convicted” State. Only in this event, the report and its conclusions 
would take effect. A surveillance mechanism was in place to ensure that the panel recommenda-
tions and rulings were carried out. Contracting Parties could suspend the application of any obli-
gations or concessions under the agreement and, in the event of such suspension, the party con-
cerned was entitled to withdraw from the GATT.” 
Evaluating the practice of dispute settlement, it was in the first place the consensus re-
quirement for the adoption of panel reports that conferred a diplomatic character on the 
whole procedure. Even though it has happened only rarely that a report was actually vetoed 
(famous examples include the EC’s veto of the first Banana panel report and the US’ veto of 
the tuna – dolphin report), it is against the background of the availability of the veto right that 
the entire functioning of the procedure needs to be assessed. 
3. Subsequent Jurisprudence 
The International Fruit Company jurisprudence was continuously relied upon in numer-
ous subsequent judgments. Even though significant changes were introduced into the GATT 
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by the Tokyo Round of negotiations, which included a separate “Understanding on Dispute 
Settlement” (codifying the existing practice and specifying certain time-limits), the Court 
never referred to any of these with a view to qualifying its previous assessment.109 
However, two important exceptions from the denial of direct effect, which may be charac-
terised as a sort of indirect effect, were recognised in the Fediol110 and Nakajima111 cases. In 
Fediol, an action brought under Article 173 (now 230) EC, the EEC Seed Crushers’ and Oil 
Processors’ Federation had challenged a Commission decision by which its request to initiate 
a procedure with respect to certain commercial practices of Argentina regarding the export of 
soya cake pursuant to Council Regulation No 2641/84 had been rejected. This regulation, the 
so-called “New Commercial Policy Instrument” inspired by the notorious US Article 301 
Trade Act provision, gives Community citizens a right to Community intervention against 
“illicit commercial practice” of third States. In determining when such practice may be 
found, the Court resorted to the GATT, since the recital to the Regulation contained an ex-
plicit reference to it, from which the ECJ deduced the EC legislator’s intention to guarantee 
its consistency with GATT. In the rest of the judgment, the Court examined the compatibility 
of the Argentine measures with Articles III, XI, XX and XXIII GATT, but did not find any 
violation. It is interesting to note first that, making the review of GATT compatibility of a 
Community act dependent on an explicit reference to GATT in that act, the Court indirectly 
leaves the EC legislator with the choice for or against such review. Second, this jurispru-
dence leads to the politically little convincing result that the compliance with GATT by third 
States and foreign enterprises may be controlled by private parties, although this is not the 
case with respect to the Community’s own compliance with this treaty. 
In Nakajima, the Court even went one step further. A European importer of printers from 
Japan tried to challenge the imposition of an anti-dumping duty on the ground that the EC 
Anti-Dumping Regulation112 in force at that time was incompatible with the GATT Anti- 
Dumping Code enacted during the Tokyo Round. When reviewing the regulation, the Court 
allowed for an incidental control of GATT compatibility, as the recital to the Regulation 
stated that it “was adopted in accordance with existing international obligations, in particular 
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those arising from Article VI GATT and from the GATT Anti-Dumping Code.”113 There-
from, the ECJ deduced that the EC legislator wanted to implement specific GATT obliga-
tions of the Community. As to the substance of the case, the Court did not, however, find any 
violation of these texts either. In a doctrinal perspective, both the Fediol and the Nakajima 
judgments are consistent with the theoretical foundations of direct effect. If the parties to an 
agreement are free to exclude direct effect mutually or even unilaterally, it should also be 
possible that such effect is internally re-acknowledged by one party under particular circum-
stances. 
The last major instances in which the Court had to deal with the internal status of GATT 
4`7 in the Community legal order were the Banana, Chiquita and the Dairy Agreement 
judgments. In the Banana judgment,114 in which the German government had impugned the 
EC Banana regulation in an annulment action under Article 173 (now 230) EC, the Court 
held that the regulation’s consistency with GATT was not justiciable. In saying so, the Court 
once again referred to its assessment of the diplomatic nature of GATT as developed in its 
International Fruit jurisprudence. It distinguished Fediol and Nakajima by stressing that the 
review of the compatibility with GATT was only possible “if the Community intended to im-
plement a particular obligation entered into within the framework of GATT, or if the Com-
munity act expressly referred to a specific provision of GATT.”115 Importantly, the Court did 
not acknowledge any difference regarding whether the EC regulation was challenged by a 
Community citizen or a Member State in this analysis. 
As regards the national constitutional law implication of this jurisprudence, it was even submit-
ted that denial of justiciability to GATT/WTO in proceedings initiated by Member States, and 
the unequal treatment might constitute a violation of the Rule of Law as a core part of national 
constitutions.116 Thus, from the perspective of the German Grundgesetz, the right of a Member 
State to have Community legal acts reviewed under international law standards by the ECJ may 
be considered indispensable, too. This is true in particular for obligations that the Community 
has taken in place of the Member States and for whose compliance the latter continue to be indi-
vidually liable under international law. Otherwise, the hard core of the principle of the Rule of 
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Law, which manifests itself here in the openness towards international law, would be breached. 
The judgment of the ECJ would thereby probably exceed the limits to integration contained in 
the Grundgesetz in Articles 23 I 1, 3 and 79 III. Under this premise, a similar judgment might no 
longer be covered by the general command to apply EC law contained in the national statutes of 
ratification of the European Treaties, and, according to the principles of the Maastricht judgment 
of the BVerfG, might be found not to have any effect on national territory. Thus, this scenario 
might ultimately cause another dangerous “constitutional conflict” among the EC and a Member 
State. 
In Chiquita,117 the Banana judgment’s “justiciability exception” was also granted to 
Member States. An Italian banana importer had argued that an Italian consumption tax on 
Bananas was incompatible inter alia with the GATT and the 4th Lomé Agreement. Whilst the 
latter’s invocability was approved, the ECJ refused to control the GATT-consistency of the 
national measure. The reason the Court alleged for this finding was again the diplomatic na-
ture of GATT first noted in International Fruit Company. By contrast, the subsequent Dairy 
Agreement decision is in stark contradiction with this reasoning. Here, the ECJ allowed an 
action by the Community against the Republic of Germany under Article 169 EC to stop the 
breach of obligations deriving from the Diary Agreement concluded under GATT' 47, with-
out even addressing their direct effect at all.118 A high Community official justified this ap-
proach on the ground that, with regard to the “modalities of compliance with international 
treaties with respect to third countries”, the European institutions would have to decide alone 
within the bounds of their competence, without a minority Member State having a right to 
particular conduct by the EC in the WTO. By contrast, according to Article 228 (7) (now 300 
(7)) EC, the Community should be able to ensure the respect of WTO law “internally” by 
Member States.119 This approach continued by the ECJ even under the WTO system, will be 
shown to be exposed to severe criticism. 
                                                 
117
 Case C-469/93, Chiquita [1995] ECR I-4533. 
118
 Case C-61/94, Commission/Germany [1996] ECR I-3989. 
119
 See J. Sack, “Noch einmal: GATT/WTO und europäisches Rechtsschutzsystem”, EuZW 1997, 688. 
 63 
III. The Relationship of WTO and European Law 
1. Introduction 
The World Trade Organisation came into effect on 1.1.95 as the successor to GATT' 47. 
Alongside the agreement establishing the WTO itself, the WTO system consists of the fol-
lowing three main agreements: GATT' 94 (which incorporates GATT ’47, together with new 
additions), the General Agreement on the Trade in Services (GATS) as well as the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Among the “minor” 
GATT agreements, the agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (TBT), on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and on Anti-
Dumping are particularly important. Further common instruments are a Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism and a Trade Policy Review Body. All these agreements can only be signed 
jointly by a Member State (the “single undertaking approach”). By contrast, the so-called 
Pluri-lateral Trade Agreements (“PTAs”) - successors of former GATT codices – can be ac-
ceded to separately and become integral parts of the WTO system only for those parties that 
have ratified them.120  
The WTO Treaty was concluded by the Community and all the Member States jointly as a 
so-called “mixed agreement”. Called upon to demarcate the spheres of competence among 
them, the ECJ issued a quite differentiated finding in its opinion 1/94.121 On the one hand, it 
held that the WTO agreements affected exclusive Community competence under common 
commercial policy powers (Article 113, now 133, EC) with respect to GATT '94 and the SPS 
and TBT agreements. On the other hand, it found that the Community and the Member States 
are jointly competent to conclude and administer GATS and TRIPS as such are not covered 
by the EC’s exclusive competence under Article 113 (now 133) EC. However, where the 
Community, acting under Article 94 EC or other powers explicitly or implicitly conferred 
upon it by the treaties, occupies these fields by new internal legislation, it also acquires ex-
clusive competence (“pre-emption”122) externally. This demarcation reflects the division be-
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tween exclusive competencies such as the common commercial policy already set forth in the 
Treaty to which the subsidiarity principle does not apply (“exclusivité par nature”), and ex-
clusive competencies created by the occupation of certain fields by secondary legislation 
(“exclusivité par exercice”).123  
As a consequence, the EC’s internal competence is subject to change with respect to fields 
covered in a mixed international agreement. As a result, the delimitation of competencies as 
drawn in Opinion 1/94 has a purely provisional character, and may not be relied upon in 
fields in which new EC legislation has been enacted. This may give rise to legal uncertainty 
and even cases of liability as, the Community and its Member States being full members of 
the whole WTO agreements package, the internal division of competencies may generally 
not be invoked as an excuse for unconditional performance according to general international 
treaty law (Article 26f. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties).  
The WTO opinion was further criticised on the ground that the distribution of competence 
might entail huge practical problems of co-ordination among the EC and the Member 
States124 - a fact which the ECJ had, however, considered as irrelevant for the delimitation of 
competence.125 In particular, so the critique continues, it would now allow Member States to 
decide separately about the internal status of the areas under their competence. This finding 
was even expressly confirmed by the ECJ in the recent Dior judgment126 as regards TRIPS 
provisions falling within Member State competence. In the WTO opinion, the ECJ had not 
expressed any position on this, but generally stressed the obligation to work loyally together 
in the application of the Treaty in order to ensure the essential “requirement of unity in the 
international representation of the Community”.127 That notwithstanding, the complex com-
petence position may entail the risk of weakening the EC’s position within WTO, in particu-
lar by possibly allowing third States to outplay the EC against its Member States or vice 
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versa.
128
 At least for the time being, though, such problems have apparently not become 
critical.129 
With a view to the direct effect question, it will first be examined whether and to what ex-
tent the features upon which the ECJ has grounded the diplomatic classification of the 
GATT’47 in the International Fruit Company jurisprudence have been changed. These in-
cluded, most importantly, the safeguard measures and the consultation and dispute resolution 
mechanism. 
2. Important Features of the new GATT/WTO System 
a) Safeguards 
The GATT/WTO system contains a new Agreement on Safeguards which precisely de-
marcates the relevant requirements for safeguards and, generally, lays down a more stringent 
and rigid procedure. These features were argued to contribute to more effective procedural 
guarantees as well as increased foreseeability and legal certainty. The most important innova-
tions may be summarised as follows: Whereas, under Article XIX GATT, a previous written 
notice by a party to the Contracting Parties and its availability for consultation were suffi-
cient to adopt safeguard measures lawfully, Article 3 of the new Agreement renders obliga-
tory, before any measures are taken, an investigation which includes public notice to all in-
terested parties and public hearings in which they can present evidence and their opinions on 
the justification of an envisaged measure. Thereafter, the competent domestic authorities are 
under an obligation to draft a report containing their findings on all pertinent questions of 
fact and law. Moreover, the new Agreement contains a precise and detailed definition of the 
concept of “serious injury” and stipulates time-limits for all safeguards as well as provisions 
for the application of safeguards and provisional measures in cases where there is a risk of a 
serious injury. 
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A new Committee on Safeguards is established under Article XIII of the Agreement. This 
body must be notified immediately after the initiation of a process of investigation, the find-
ing of serious injury and the decision to adopt a measure. It also possesses several quasi-
judicial powers such as the power to ascertain whether Members have respected the proce-
dure for the adoption of a safeguard measure under the Agreement. On the request of Mem-
bers who are applying such measures, it has the competence to control whether the envisaged 
suspensions of obligations by other Members is substantially equivalent. Even though this 
question is not explicitly settled, the Committee’s findings might be supposed to be binding 
in later dispute settlement procedures, because otherwise the powers granted to it would not 
be effective at all. As a consequence therefrom, Committee decisions should, in principle, be 
subjected to the same procedural rules as the dispute settlement bodies. Finally, the Agree-
ment prevails over the original provision on safeguards contained in Article XIX GATT in 
cases of conflicts. 
As regards derogations from the GATT’s free trade principles and provisions, they have 
remained unaltered in its 1994 version. It should, however, be noted that no economic consti-
tution can do without such derogations, since free trade cannot, neither practically nor legiti-
mately, be granted priority over competing values in all cases whatsoever. Thus, Community 
law contains similar derogations from free trade of goods such as Article 30 (ex 36) EC and 
the Cassis mandatory requirement formula. Yet, the fact that should be decisive for the as-
sessment of derogations is that their application is now subject to legal scrutiny under the 
new dispute settlement procedure. 
b) Consultation and Dispute Resolution 
As already stated on several occasions, the most important up-grading of the GATT '47 
institutional framework took place in the field of dispute resolution. In the Marrakesh 
Agreement concluding the Uruguay Round, a new Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) was introduced. This system has been endowed 
with exclusivity in the sense that any dispute can only be resolved in accordance with the 
rules and procedure of the Understanding, which excludes bilateral settlements outside the 
GATT/WTO system (Article 23 (1) DSU). The main general feature of the new system is its 
quasi-judicial character. 
In detail, the dispute settlement procedure starts with a mandatory consultation stage. A request 
for consultation being made by a State and notified to the DSB, the addressee State shall reply 
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within 10 days after its receipt, and both parties shall enter into consultations in good faith within 
a maximum period of 30 days, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution (Article 4 
(3) DSU). After that, the parties may voluntarily resort to alternative dispute resolution devices 
such as good offices, conciliation and mediation. 
If consultations and alternative dispute resolution devices fail to settle a dispute within 60 days 
after the request for consultation, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel 
(Article 4 (7) DSU). The initiation of a panel can only be refused by a consensus decision of the 
Dispute Settlement Body (Article 6 (1) DSU) whose tasks are performed by the general GATT 
Council. Panels are composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental indi-
viduals such as senior national officials or international law experts (Article 8 (1) DSU) selected 
with a view to ensuring the independence of the body. The function of the panels is to assist the 
DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the DSU and the covered agreements by making an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the 
case and the applicability of, and conformity with, the relevant covered agreements (Article 11 
DSU).  
The procedure is dealt with in detail in Article 12 DSU. Its most important characteristic are 
rigid and short deadlines following a timetable to be established by the panel normally within 
one week of its composition (Article 12 (3) DSU). The panel’s report shall, as a general rule, be 
completed after 6 months of confidential deliberations, whereby a 3 month prolongation can be 
granted by the DSB upon motivated request (Article 12 (8), (9), 14 DSU). Panels may seek in-
formation and technical advice from any relevant source and may consult experts (Article 13). 
The panel report shall be circulated to the members, who are entitled to raise objections which 
must be considered by the DSB (Article 16 DSU). The adoption of the report (Article 16 DSU) 
shall take place within 60 days of circulation unless a party formally notifies its decision to ap-
peal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. Appeals are dealt with by a Stand-
ing appellate body composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case (Arti-
cle 17 DSU). The establishment of an appeal procedure is meant to compensate for the abolition 
of the veto power to oppose the adoption of a panel report. The appeal is restricted to issues of 
law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel (Article 17 (6) 
DSU). The appeal procedure (regulated in Article 17 (4)-(13) DSU) is also completed by means 
of a report, which needs to be accepted by the DSB under the same conditions as panel reports; 
i.e., within 30 days of its circulation to the Members (Article 17 (14) DSU). 
With respect to the implementation of DSB rulings and recommendations, the Member con-
cerned shall, at a DSB meeting to be held within 30 days after the adoption of the relevant report, 
inform the DSB of its intentions as to the modalities of compliance (Article 21 (3) DSU). The 
maximum time-frame for compliance is of 15-18 months (Article 21 (3)-(4) DSU). Where there 
is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to 
 68 
comply, such dispute shall be decided through recourse to the dispute settlement procedure, in-
cluding, wherever possible, resort to the original panel (Article 21 (6) DSU). In the event of non-
compliance within the fixed time-frame, compensation and the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations are available as temporary measures. However, none of these remedies is pre-
ferred to full implementation (Article 22 (1) DSU). Compensation is only possible if the parties 
agree to it within a reasonable period of time (Article 22 (2) DSU). Otherwise, only the suspen-
sion of concessions is available (Article 22 (2)-(9) DSU). The following guiding principles apply 
in this context: As a general rule, the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions 
or other obligations with respect to the same trade sector(s) where a violation of WTO law has 
been found; if this is not practicable or effective and the circumstances are serious enough, the 
suspension of concessions may also take place in other sectors (“cross-retaliation”, Article 22 (3) 
DSU). The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be equivalent to the 
level of the damage caused by the violation (Article 22 (4) DSU). Any retaliation measures must 
be authorised by the DSB, which may again decide by majority to reject the request. Disputes 
over the modalities of suspension such as the amount of sanctions shall be resolved in a specific 
arbitration procedure (Article 22 (6) DSU).  
In an assessment of the functioning of the new dispute settlement system, one may find a 
peculiar mixture of legal adjudication and diplomatic negotiation, even though the former 
may be argued to be dominant.130 The initial step of consultation and possibly conciliation is 
clearly one of diplomacy, irrespective of whether a panel is established later. Even when a 
panel is established, bilateral negotiations in which the panel is not involved in any way may 
be continued outside the panel process. If the parties communicate that they have reached an 
agreement at some stage, the panel will simply stop its work, and its report will be confined 
to a short summary of the case and the indication that a settlement has been concluded. How-
ever, such compromise must be notified to the DSB so that any remaining violation of WTO 
will become known, and another party may start a dispute settlement procedure against it. As 
in any other kind of international arbitration or adjudication, the dispute settlement procedure 
may also be engaged in by a party for tactical or strategic purposes, in order to promote a fa-
vourable compromise in the ongoing negotiation process. This, however, does not contradict 
its legal character.  
Once a panel is actually established, this procedure will be exclusively legal. In their self-
understanding, panellists appear to conceive of themselves as judges, with an ethos of neu-
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trality and independence.131 The formulations in Article 11 DSU according to which panels 
are supposed to “assist the DSB in making recommendations” and should give the parties 
“adequate opportunity to develop mutually satisfactory solutions” may be viewed as euphe-
misms to play down the actual strength of the mechanism. In practise, panels have worked 
out compromise solutions only on rare occasions, in which this was explicitly requested by 
the parties; otherwise, they have simply adjudicated the cases brought before them in the 
light of WTO law - and they have done so quite successfully for the time-being, since all re-
ports but three were accepted and implemented by the parties. 
Moving now to the interconnection of GATT/WTO and EU law, this can, just as with the 
interface of EU and national law, be viewed from the perspective of both WTO and EU law. 
3. The WTO Perspective on the Relationship with EU Law 
The WTO perspective on the relationship with the legal orders of its members contains 
several fundamental elements: Firstly, as regards substantive law, there is a conflict among 
the different rationales of universal and regional trade agreements, in particular as regards the 
scope of the Article XXIV GATT exemption for free trade areas and tariff unions. Second, 
with respect to the enforcement of DS decisions, there is the question of whether a WTO 
member owes specific performance to a decision, or whether compensation or accepting re-
taliation are lawful alternatives; and, most importantly in the present context, the question of 
the internal status to be granted to WTO law within the Members’ legal orders. 
a) Regionalism vs. Universalism: 
aa) Background 
In substantive law terms, the relationship between the WTO and the EU reflects the struc-
tural conflict of regionalism vs. universalism, as the EU latter constitutes a regional trade 
agreement deviating from the WTO’s global mission. Regional trade agreements may take 
various forms, their most basic from being free trade areas in which the parties agree to 
eliminate all customs duties and other “restrictive regulation of commerce” among them-
selves; a more upgraded form is a customs union, in which the internal liberalisation is com-
plemented by the alignment of customs duties and other commercial policy elements towards 
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third States, with the effect that the customs union operates as single customs territory for the 
purpose of international trade; definitions of these two forms are given in Article XXIV:8(a) 
and 8(b) GATT. A still more advanced regional arrangement, not specifically contemplated 
in GATT, is the establishment of a completed common market, as in the case of the EU. 
All regional arrangements may be perceived in potential conflict to multi-lateral trade lib-
eralisation, as the objective of regional trade integration entails by its very nature a different, 
necessarily less favourable, treatment of third States, which is in conflict to the multi-lateral 
MFN principle underlying GATT/WTO. In particular, the formation of strong regional trade 
alliances may put the WTO system under strain, as they are capable of governing and distrib-
uting among themselves world trade in a divide et impera manner, and of rendering the actual 
conditions governing trade among them difficult to control for outsiders. On the other hand, 
the need for closer integration on a regional basis is undeniable, and the WTO barely pos-
sesses the legitimacy to prohibit, in the most extreme case, the EC Treaty on the ground of its 
being inconsistent with its own rules.  
In a sort of compromise approach due to political and economic constraints, Article XXIV 
GATT allows such regional trade arrangements under certain conditions on the theoretical 
assumption that the benefits of fuller trade liberalisation between some countries will out-
weigh the discriminatory effects of these preferential agreements on non-parties. To ensure 
the attainment of this objective, and also to impose limits on regional agreements capable of 
circumventing multi-lateralism, two conditions are required. First, the agreements should 
cover “substantially all” trade between the parties; second, the creation of a customs union 
should not raise trade barriers with third States. These conditions are summarised in the Pre-
amble to the “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV GATT ‘94”:  
“contribution [to the expansion of world trade] is increased if the elimination between the con-
stituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, 
and diminished if any substantial sector is excluded; (…) the purpose of such agreements should 
be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of 
other Member with such territories (…).” 
In order to alleviate the adverse effects of the establishment of regional arrangements for 
third parties, Article XXIV:6 GATT foresees “compensatory adjustment”, where a WTO 
member acceding to a regional trade agreement is required to modify its scheduled commit-
ments to third States. In the event that a regional arrangement intended to lead to a free trade 
area or customs union does not comply with the requirements of Article XXIV GATT, the 
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possibility of granting a waiver, which requires a two-thirds majority of the contracting par-
ties (Article XXIV:10 GATT), is provided for. In practice, one of the major weaknesses of 
the GATT regime for regional trade agreements has proved to be the possibility of interim 
agreements which are alleged to lead to a free trade area or customs union within “a reason-
able length of time” (Article XXIV: 5(c) GATT). Under GATT ’47, the enforcement of Arti-
cle XXIV GATT appears to have been very weak, with the effect that the establishment of 
regional trade agreements was de facto mainly left to the political discretion of parties wish-
ing to do so. However, following the creation of the WTO, the legal enforcement of Article 
XXIV GATT has been considerably tightened. This became visible in the Turkey - Textile 
Imports from India case.  
bb) Turkey - textile imports from India 
In Turkey - textile imports from India,132 the WTO dispute settlement had to decide on the 
consistency with Article XXIV GATT of a customs union agreement concluded between 
Turkey and the EU. Under this agreement, Turkey is required to align its commercial policy 
to that of the EU, and this included not only the alignment to the EC’s common external tar-
iff, but also adoption of trading rules implementing the EC’s import policy. Specifically, Ar-
ticle 12 of the agreement provides that “in conformity with the requirement of Article XXIV 
GATT, Turkey will apply, as from the entry into force of this Decision, substantially the 
same commercial policy as the Community in the textile sector.” Implementing this provi-
sion, Turkey introduced new quotas on its imports of textiles from India. 
Following India’s challenge, the WTO panel and appellate body found that these quantita-
tive restrictions were contrary to Article XI and XIII of GATT ’94 and Article 2.4 of the 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and were not justified by the customs union ex-
emption laid down in Article XXIV GATT. First, as regards the political prerogative of the 
WTO Council and the regional trade agreements committee to decide on the interpretation of 
GATT provisions, the panel, confirmed by the appellate body, held that while the overall 
compatibility of a customs union agreement with Article XXIV GATT involved a very com-
plex economic, legal and political assessment, it declared itself competent to give a ruling on 
the WTO compatibility of a specific measure adopted in the ambit of a customs union.  
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As to the distribution of the burden of proof, the appellate body held that the Party claim-
ing the benefit of the regional trade agreement exemption must demonstrate that the measure 
at issue was introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully complies with the 
requirements of Article XXIV:8(a) and 5(a) GATT. Interpreting Article XXIV:5(a) GATT, 
the appellate body put great emphasis on the formula that “the provisions of this agreement 
shall not prevent (…) the formation of a customs union or of a free trade area (…)”. The ap-
pellate body considered this formula as a restrictive exemption which requires that the appli-
cation of a specific WTO rule – here the rules on quantitative restrictions – would actually be 
rendered impossible the formation of a customs union. This means that a specific provision 
in the customs union agreement must be necessary for its formation. Importantly, in order to 
decide what is necessary for the formation of a customs union, the appellate body resorts not 
to the content of the specific customs union set up between Turkey and the EU, but to the 
GATT concept of a customs union. This narrow interpretation is premised on the rationale of 
Article XXIV:4 GATT, according to which a customs union should not raise barriers to trade 
with third countries. 
In conclusion, the appellate body found that the precise alignment of Turkey to the EU’s 
quota system for textile imports was not necessary for a workable customs union. Though 
Turkey had sustained that the adoption of quantitative restrictions was necessary for the full 
operation of the customs union in order to prevent trade diversion, the appellate body dis-
agreed on the ground that less restrictive means would have been available. Certificates of 
origin, which would have allowed the Community customs authorities to distinguish between 
Turkish-origin textile imports and those from other third countries such as India, might have 
been sufficient. This rationale would be all the more justifiable as the EC would have to re-
move its quantitative restrictions at the time fixed by the WTO agreements anyway. Impor-
tantly, this interpretation does not allow the creation of a more advanced form of a customs 
union which foresees the abolition of internal borders and therefore requires a totally com-
mon commercial policy based on uniform trade rules. It is clear that this objection could 
theoretically also be made to the creation of, or the accession of a country to, an integrated 
common market, as this is not specifically contemplated in Article XXIV GATT. In practice, 
such an objection seems to be politically impossible. The appellate body shows itself to be 
aware of such dangers when it stresses that “we make no finding on the issue of whether 
quantitative restrictions found to be inconsistent with Article XI and XIII GATT will ever be 
justified by Article XIV GATT.” 
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b) Procedural and Status Issues 
aa) Enforcement of DS Decision: The Compliance Obligation 
The issue of whether WTO law includes the obligation of specific performance towards 
DS decisions is highly controversial. At the same time, it is also highly relevant in the EU 
context with respect to Article 300 (7) (ex-228 (7) EC), according to which EC institutions 
and Member States are bound by international agreements entered into by the EC.  
On the one hand, some academic commentators and representatives of the Commission133 
have argued that the DSU itself does not contain any absolute compliance obligation in the 
perspective of public international law. Compensation or the acceptance of retaliation would 
instead be considered in the DSU as separate and fully legitimate options, alternative to com-
pliance. This view is based on the observation that the DSU seems to favour solutions which 
are “mutually acceptable” to the parties, even as a preference to the withdrawal of measures 
inconsistent with WTO law. Thus, Article 22 (8) DSU lays down that the suspension of con-
cessions shall cease not only if the incompatible measure is withdrawn or the Member con-
cerned has provided a solution to the nullification and impairment of benefits, but also if a 
“mutually satisfactory solution is reached”. Similarly, Article 3 (7) DSU provides that what 
is “clearly to be preferred” is a mutually acceptable solution, but one that is “consistent with 
the covered agreements”. What is more, a presumption in favour of the legality of accepting 
retaliation might be deduced from the fact that the suspension of concession is precisely 
regulated by the DSU. Thus, this must be “equivalent” to the level of the nullification and 
impairment caused by the measure found to be inconsistent with WTO law. Therefore, it 
must not be characterised as a punitive measure, but has, as its main objective, to restore the 
imbalance in concessions caused by the measure found to be incompatible.134  
However, whilst the non-punitive character of the suspension of concessions may well be 
acknowledged, the core of these arguments may be powerfully objected to on the ground that 
full bona fides performance is the ordinary obligation of any party to any international treaty, 
and that the DSU does in no way deviate from this general principle.135 This is confirmed by 
the general principle contained in Article XVI:4 WTO agreement, according to which each 
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Member “is to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures” 
with its obligations under the WTO agreements. More specifically, the DSU explicitly 
stresses in Article 22 (1) that unconditional compliance is the preferred option:  
“(…) neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to 
the full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the cov-
ered agreements (…)”.  
As regards the alleged alternative of compensation, this may lawfully be granted only on a 
temporary basis (Article 22 (1) DSU). The admitted fact that the DSU does not possess any 
effective means to prevent temporary compensations from becoming definitive in the event 
that no party objects (proceedings ex officio are excluded), may well be considered as a 
weakness in the system, but does not render “definitive compensation” lawful. For all these 
reasons, compensation and the acceptance of retaliation should not be conceived of as regular 
and lawful alternatives to compliance. Instead, they represent the only legal remedies avail-
able in international law for the breach of an agreement. On a different line of argumentation, 
an obligation of compliance and, with this the direct effect of any agreement in international 
law, could always be excluded by referring to the alleged alternatives of compensation or ac-
cepting retaliation.136 
A second and different question, again relevant under Article 300 (7) EC, is whether the 
obligation of compliance only refers to WTO decisions, which would entail national and 
European courts never being under obligation to scrutinise the WTO-consistency of EC acts 
by themselves. However, this reasoning would be too wholesale, too. The duty of compliance 
with WTO law extends to the whole body of the WTO agreements, not only to DS decisions. 
On this basis, if DS proceedings are actually pending, the ECJ might well wait for their out-
come and not take any own decision before. However, if this is not the case, the duty of 
compliance exists all the same, and it may well need to be clarified under which conditions it 
might have to be controlled by the Members’ internal courts such as the ECJ.  
bb) No WTO Law Provisos on its Internal Status in its Members’ Legal Orders 
Even though WTO law thus contains the absolute obligation of compliance, it is silent on 
the question of how a Member State is supposed to comply and the domestic remedies a State 
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should make available. The history of the negotiations of the Marrakesh dispute settlement 
agreement show that this question has been very controversial.137 Firstly, a Swiss proposal 
designed to ensure that the WTO agreements would be capable of having direct effect or 
some equivalent status in the national law of all participants was rejected by most big trading 
blocks and subsequently dropped.138 Furthermore, even an agreement on a provision entitling 
the DSB to recommend to a Member how it should comply in bringing its measures into con-
formity with WTO rules was dismissed. According to the provision finally adopted to this 
effect, Article 19 (1) DSU, a panel or the appellate body may only “suggest” ways to do so. A 
fortiori, a GATT/WTO obligation that would require the ECJ to grant direct effect to WTO 
law may be excluded. Thus, it may be concluded that citizens were not considered by the 
trade negotiators in the GATT as candidates to enforce the validity of its rules. 
This assessment was unequivocally confirmed in the panel on Section 301 of US Trade 
Act 1974. The panel noted that the fact that WTO law indirectly protects the economic oppor-
tunities of individual traders, and that many of the benefits from the treaties flow from such 
protection, cannot be bootstrapped into the notion that WTO obligations are owed directly to 
traders. Thus, the panel literally took up the ECJ’s famous language in van Gend and Costa: 
“Neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted by GATT/WTO institutions as a 
legal order producing direct effect. Following this approach, the GATT/WTO did not create a 
new legal order the subjects of which comprise both contracting parties or Members and their 
nationals”.139 
4. The European Perspective on the Relationship with WTO Law 
a) Regionalism vs. Universalism 
As may be expected, the EU pursues a much milder stance on the regionalism vs. univers-
alism conflict. The different assessment by both sides became visible in the case Italy vs. 
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Council140 which was decided by the ECJ almost parallel to the WTO DS bodies’ decision in 
Turkey - textile imports from India. Italy vs. Council arose out of the enlargement of the EC 
to Austria, Finland and Sweden. In the context of their accession to the EU, these countries 
had to implement the complete legal acquis of the EC, an obligation imposed of course on 
any new member. Thus, they also had to join the EU customs union, align their external tar-
iffs to the EU’s common external tariff, and become a part of the EU’s extensive preferential 
trade regime. Under GATT law, this required, as already outlined, negotiations with affected 
third State trading partners, with a view to achieving “mutually satisfactory compensatory 
adjustment” (Article XXIV:6 GATT) and paragraph 5 of the Understanding on the Interpre-
tation of Article XXIV of GATT ’94. In the framework of such negotiations, the EU granted 
Thailand and Australia, both faced with a considerable increase in the customs duties applied 
to specific exports, new tariff quotas which allowed for specified quantities of rice to be im-
ported at a zero tariff. These agreements were implemented by means of a Council Regula-
tion.141  
Italy, fearing disadvantages for its domestic rice production, challenged the legality of this 
Regulation inter alia as incompatible with GATT. It argued that “there can be no mutually 
satisfactory solution” where, as here, non-member countries to the free trade area obtain spe-
cific advantages from the enlargement of the Community in the absence of adequate com-
pensatory adjustment.142 According to Italy’s argument, mutuality presupposes the accept-
ability of a regional trade agreement for each GATT Member State, including Italy, too. The 
ECJ was prepared to review the consistency of the Regulation with WTO law under the Na-
kajima doctrine which will be presented below, as the agreements and the implementing 
Regulation were explicitly designed to ensure compliance with Article XXIV GATT ’94. As 
regards the substance of the case, the Court, however, held that the GATT concept of “mutu-
ally satisfactory compensatory adjustment” does not constitute an “objective criterion” 
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against which the legality of a specific agreement can be measured. For the compliance with 
the GATT provision, it is only necessary to show that an agreement has been reached:  
“if the parties themselves have reached agreement on the question of mutually satisfactory com-
pensatory adjustment, the requirement referred to in Article XXIV:6 GATT must be regarded as 
fulfilled and cannot therefore serve as a basis for examining the legality of the Regulation…”  
It should be noted in passing that this reasoning is very much in line with earlier jurispru-
dence, stating the margin of discretion granted to the Community institutions even more ex-
plicitly. 
“The Court has consistently held that the Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in 
their choice of the means needed to achieve the common commercial policy… In a situation of 
that kind, which involves an appraisal of complex economic situations, judicial review must be 
limited to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the 
facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has 
been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of power…”143 
In an overall assessment, the findings of the ECJ in Italy v. Council are based on a view of 
mutuality defined in terms of the EU as a whole as opposed to its trading partners. Despite 
the independent membership of EU countries in GATT/WTO, the unity of external commer-
cial policy is considered as requiring that the internal political debates as to the balance of 
advantage between Member States will not be re-opened in the context of GATT rules. 
Moreover, the EC executive is granted wide discretion as to the priorities and enforcement of 
external commercial policy. This discretion is extended not only to external agreement, but, 
necessarily, also to internal institutional acts.  
As has been plausibly noted, this political interpretation of Article XXIV:6 GATT appears 
to be well justifiable in the light of GATT/WTO law. First, the political characterisation of 
negotiations for compensatory adjustment is shown by paragraph 5 of the Understanding on 
the Interpretation of Article XXIV GATT: should an agreement fail within a reasonable pe-
riod of time, the customs union may go ahead anyway, the affected third countries being 
“free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII 
GATT”. Therefore, it appears that, whilst failure to enter into negotiations does lead to a vio-
lation of Article XXIV GATT, failure to reach agreement does not. More generally, the ap-
plication of Article XXIV GATT as a whole might even be considered to be essentially a po-
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litical issue. This view finds support in Article IX:2 WTO-Agreement, according to which 
the Ministerial Conference and the General Council possess the “exclusive authority” to 
adopt interpretations of all the WTO agreements, with the Committee on regional trade 
agreements being a subordinate body reporting to these institutions.  
However, as shown, the WTO bodies strongly objected to the political characterisation of 
the Article XXIV GATT exception to multi-lateralism. Their jurisprudence is in stark con-
trast to the attitude of self restraint and deference to the European political institutions dis-
played by the ECJ. In a more general perspective, the different positions of the ECJ and the 
WTO dispute settlement bodies as regards the political or legal nature of regional trade 
agreement-based exceptions clearly shows the wide margin of discretion existing in the in-
terpretation of WTO rules. It is obvious that this might lead to serious clashes between the 
WTO and powerful regional trade regimes such as the EU and others (e.g., NAFTA or 
MERCOSUR). Indeed, the margin of discretion granted by the ECJ to the Community execu-
tive is a fundamental element in the internal status that EC law grants to the WTO system. 
b) The Internal Status of WTO Law in the European Legal Order 
As regards the crucial question for the interconnection of WTO and EU, namely the for-
mer’s legal status within the latter, this presentation will take the order of chronological 
events. Firstly, the Council decision on the Uruguay Round of Negotiations which tried to 
exclude direct effect, will be outlined (aa). After this, the ECJ’s subsequent jurisprudence on 
the subject will be analysed. This comprises the Hermès decision, in which the Court tried to 
distinguish direct effect and consistent interpretation (bb); and, more recently, the crucial 
new landmark decision in Portugal vs. Council which denies again an effective interconnec-
tion between both legal orders (cc). 
aa) The Denial of Direct Effect in the Uruguay Round Council Decision 
With a view to the considerably increased juridification of the dispute settlement mecha-
nism many commentators had expected a more positive attitude from European institutions 
towards the direct effect question.144 However, the Council had already stated its opposing 
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view in the decision concerning the conclusion of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations.145 The 11th recital of the preamble reads as follows:  
“(...) by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, including the An-
nexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts 
(...)” 
In an earlier memorandum, this conclusion had been justified by the Commission as fol-
lows: 
“it is important for the WTO Agreement and its annexes not to have direct effect, that is one 
whereby private individuals who are natural or legal persons could invoke it under national law. 
It is already known that the United States and many others of our trading partners will explicitly 
rule out any such direct effect. Without an express stipulation of such exclusion in the Commu-
nity instrument of adoption, a major imbalance would arise in the actual management of the ob-
ligations of the Community and other countries.”146 
The legal significance of the Council decision is highly controversial. Contrary to earlier 
opinions by Advocate Generals Cosmas and Elmer,147 which show a considerable degree of 
deference, Advocate General Saggio did not attach much weight to it for various reasons. 
Firstly, according to general public international law on treaty interpretation as codified in 
Articles 31 – 33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), these unilateral declara-
tions are not capable of influencing the interpretation of GATT/WTO law, which instead 
needs to be informed by the “ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in 
light of its object and purpose” (Article 31 VCLT).148 Secondly, the similar declaration of the 
US legislator is argued to be equally irrelevant for the same reasons. According to the general 
international law rule “inademplenti non est adimplendum” codified in Article 60 VCLT, 
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only the substantial violation of a Treaty by one party may give rise to a denial of its legal 
effect. Thirdly, Advocate General Saggio stressed, by referring to the opinion of Advocate 
General Tesauro in Hermès, that pursuant to Article 228, new 300 (7) EC, international 
agreements are binding for EC institutions; therefore, the Council could not, by a secondary 
law measure, limit the jurisdiction of the ECJ or national Courts on the matter.  
However, it should be repeated that Article 300 (7) should not be interpreted as precluding 
the EC legislator from excluding direct effect altogether. As noted, this may be done by the 
parties by joint agreement or unilaterally by one party, with the latter option possibly entail-
ing a violation of international law. Such a stipulation would need to be respected by the 
ECJ, too. However, in the present case, Advocate General Saggio’s view may be upheld for 
other reasons: in its decision, the Council does not seem to stipulate a constitutive normative 
command, but merely its own declaratory assessment of the nature of WTO law. Whereas, as 
already outlined, the nature of an agreement may well imply a tacit mutual exclusion of di-
rect effect, the Council’s unilateral assessment of it is not an authoritative restatement of the 
parties’ intentions and may, therefore, be rebutted. As a consequence, the last word on 
whether the nature of the WTO system is actually such as to exclude direct effect should, in-
deed, lie with the Courts. 
bb) Direct Effect Confused with Consistent Interpretation: The Hermès Case 
The Hermès case149 was a reference procedure dealing with a procedural question regard-
ing the granting of interim measures under the TRIPS agreement in a dispute among two 
firms.  
(1) Facts 
By virtue of international registrations designating the Benelux, Hermès International is 
proprietor of the name “Hermès” and the name and device “Hermès” as trade marks. It ap-
plies these trade marks inter alia to neckties which are marketed in the Netherlands through a 
selective distribution system. After finding evidence that its Dutch competitor FHT was mar-
keting counterfeit copies of its ties, Hermès applied to the President of the Arrondissements-
rechtsbank Amsterdam (competent for such orders under Dutch procedural law) for an in-
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terim order requiring FHT to cease infringement of its copyright and trade mark. This order 
was granted. In the same proceedings, Hermès also requested the President of the Arrondis-
sementsrechtsbank to fix a period of three months from the date of service of the interim de-
cision as the period within which FHT could, under Article 50 (6) TRIPS, request revocation 
of these provisional measures and a period of 14 days as the period within which Hermès 
could initiate proceedings on the merits of the case, this period to run from the date on which 
FHT requested revocation. 
Article 50 (6) TRIPS reads: “(...) Provisional measures (...) shall, upon request by the defendant, 
be revoked or otherwise cease to have effect, if proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of 
the case are not initiated within a reasonable period, to be determined by the judicial authority or-
dering the measures where a Member’s law so permits or, in the absence of such a determination, 
not to exceed 20 working days or 31 calendar days, whichever is longer.” 
The Dutch judge considered that the latter request could not be granted, because Article 
50 (6) TRIPS does not place any time-limit on the defendant’s right to request revocation of 
provisional measures, but instead allows the defendant to request revocation of a provisional 
measure at any time prior to the delivery of judgment in the main proceedings. This finding 
is very convincing, because, otherwise, provisional measures could deploy some res iudicata 
effect after the expiry of the said period, which would seriously worsen the defendant’s legal 
position by depriving him of the possibility of initiating main proceedings altogether. 
This notwithstanding, the judge thought it necessary to refer the question of whether the 
interim order at issue actually constituted a “provisional measure” within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 50 (6) TRIPS to the ECJ; as this would have the effect that a period would need to be 
fixed within which the plaintiff would have to start main proceedings if the defendant were to 
ask for the revocation of the provisional measure. Setting such a deadline would clearly de-
crease the value of a provisional order, as the defendant could constrain the plaintiff to initi-
ate main proceedings, whereas, without such a deadline, the defendant would need to initiate 
main proceedings himself – which is the legal situation in Dutch150 and German procedural 
law. The reasoning behind the TRIPS provision is that provisional measures are, apparently, 
trusted less, and the solution of cases through main proceedings, which ensure better guaran-
tees of a fair procedure, is preferred. However, as the Dutch judge pointed out, this rationale 
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does not square well with the Dutch system, in which a high standard for provisional orders 
is set forth: the defendant is summoned to appear, the parties have the right to be heard, and 
the judge hearing the application makes an assessment of the substance of the case, which he 
also sets out in a reasoned written decision, against which an appeal may be lodged. Finally, 
although the parties, then, have the right to initiate main proceedings, in matters falling 
within the scope of the TRIPS Agreement, they normally abide by the interim decision. 
(2) Decision 
First, the Court had to decide on its own jurisdiction as regards the interpretation of Arti-
cle 50 TRIPS. In this context, the Dutch government had invoked the ECJ’s WTO opinion 
1/94,151 according to which “measures to secure the effective protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights”, such as Article 50 TRIPS, essentially fall within the competence of the Member 
States only, on the ground that the Community had not yet exercised its internal competence 
with respect to the questions raised here. The Court replied to this objection that Regulation 
No. 40/94 on the Community trade mark had already been in force at the time of the signa-
ture, by the Community and its Member States, of the Final Act of the WTO agreement. Un-
der the heading “provisional and protective measures”, Article 99 (1) of this Regulation 
states:  
“Application may be made to the courts of a Member State, including Community trade mark 
courts, for such provisional, including protective, measures in respect of a Community trade mark or 
Community trade mark application as may be available under the law of that State in respect of a 
national trade mark, even if, under this Regulation, a Community trade mark court of another Mem-
ber State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.” 
In this regard, the Court stated at paragraph 28 of the judgment: 
“It is true that the measures envisaged by Article 99 and the relevant procedural rules are those 
provided for by the domestic law of the Member State concerned for the purposes of the national 
trade-mark. However, since the Community is a party to the TRIPS Agreement and since this 
agreement applies to the Community trade mark, the courts referred to in Article 99 of Regulation 
No 40/94, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for 
the protections of rights arising under a Community trade mark, are required to do so, as far as pos-
sible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement.” 
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The fact that the dispute in the main proceedings concerned trade-marks whose interna-
tional registration was designated as Benelux was found immaterial on two grounds. First, 
the ECJ pointed to its consolidated jurisprudence according to which it is solely for the na-
tional court hearing the dispute to assess the need for a preliminary ruling so as to enable it to 
give its judgment. Second, where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the 
scope of national law and to situations falling within the scope of Community law, it is 
clearly in the Community interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpreta-
tion, this provision should be interpreted uniformly, whatever the circumstances in which it is 
to apply.  
Second, the Court answered the referred substantive law question on the characterisation 
of the Dutch measures in the framework of Article 50 TRIPS. One might have expected that 
the ECJ would have needed to decide the direct effect issue before being able to give an an-
swer on the merits of the case. Along these lines, Advocate General Tesauro had, indeed, 
recommended, in his final opinion, the granting of direct effect if reciprocity would be en-
sured among the WTO Members involved in a case.152 Whereas this solution may sound at-
tractive at first glance, it would not be always practicable in a multi-lateral regime, under 
which not only two, but several parties – which may treat the direct effect issue differently – 
are regularly involved in a dispute. In addition, the result would be an unequal treatment of 
domestic importers whose legal positions under GATT/WTO would be made dependent on 
the behaviour of foreign States. 
It was, perhaps, against the background of these difficulties that the court tried to circum-
vent the direct effect question altogether. With respect to the question of direct effect of Arti-
cle 50 TRIPS, it stated that it would not be required to give a ruling on this question, but only 
to answer the question of interpretation submitted to it by the national court “so as to enable 
that court to interpret Dutch procedural rules in the light of this article.”153 In the following 
passage, the Court expounded that, notwithstanding its high procedural requirements, an in-
terim order under Dutch law should be considered as a “provisional measure” in the sense of 
Article 50 (6) TRIPS, since it was also covered by the basic doctrinal distinction between in-
terim measures and main proceedings upon which the TRIPS provision was based as well. 
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(3) Comment 
One may first note that the ECJ did not question the applicability of TRIPS to internal 
cases in the EU at all. This is in contrast to previous jurisprudence on the GATT ’47 in which 
the ECJ treated the EC and its Member States as one GATT Member.154 Yet, one may justify 
this jurisprudence on the ground that, as regards internal competence, unlike the GATT, the 
TRIPS issues that are relevant here fall within national competence, a case in which the “one 
Member fiction” must logically not apply. 
Secondly, the ECJ’s extremely wide approach to its interpretative jurisdiction deserves at-
tention. Even though, in Hèrmes, EC trademark law was not relevant at all, the ECJ deemed 
it sufficient to trigger its interpretative competence that the norm to be interpreted may, in 
other cases, be potentially relevant for the application of Community law. It is rather obvious 
that, on this reasoning, the Court will be able to claim jurisdiction over many, if not most, 
GATS and TRIPS issues. Consequently, this reasoning is likely to attenuate the procedural 
consequences of the division of competencies set out by the ECJ in its WTO opinion 1/94. 
This assessment has now been further confirmed by the recent Dior case,155 also dealing with a 
Dutch reference on the interpretation of Article 50 TRIPS. There, the ECJ explicitly extended its 
interpretative jurisdiction beyond trade-mark protection law: “Since Article 50 of TRIPs consti-
tutes a procedural provision which should be applied in the same way in every situation falling 
within its scope, and is capable of applying both to situations covered by national law and to 
situations covered by Community law, that obligation requires the judicial bodies of the Member 
States and the Community, for practical and legal reasons, to give it a uniform interpretation. 
Only the Court of Justice acting in co-operation with the courts and tribunals of the Member 
States pursuant to Article 177 of the Treaty is in a position to ensure such uniform interpretation. 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret Article 50 of TRIPs is thus not restricted 
solely to situations covered by trade-mark law.”156 
Thirdly and most importantly, as regards the direct effect question, even though the ECJ 
claimed not to deal with it, it may be argued that it did indirectly decide on it all the same. 
This is because it seems impossible to reach the result found by the ECJ by simple consistent 
interpretation of Dutch procedural law within its wording – this criterion being the traditional 
limitation of interpretation and the only relevant difference between consistent interpretation 
                                                 
154
 Case 266/81, SIOT [1983] ECR 731, 776, para. 12. 
155
 Case C-300/98 of 14 Dec. 2000, Dior, nyr, para. 32ff. 
156
 Case C-300/98 of 14 Dec. 2000, Dior, nyr, para. 37-39. 
 85 
and direct effect. As stated, unlike with Article 50 (6) TRIPS, under Dutch law the defendant 
may not simply request revocation of a provisional order, with the effect that a deadline will 
be fixed within which the plaintiff must start main proceedings. Moreover, it would seem to 
be virtually impossible to read such a non-existing deadline into a national provision by 
means of ordinary interpretation. Therefore, the conclusion very much seems to be that the 
ECJ must have implicitly approved the direct application of Article 50 TRIPS by the Dutch 
judge. 
As regards the Dutch side, this conclusion is not extraordinary and may even have been 
considered as implicit by the Dutch judge. This may be explained by the fact that the Nether-
lands belong to the monistic countries, in which an international agreement duly entered into 
under both international and national law automatically comes to form, without any further 
steps being necessary, an integral part of the domestic legal order. However, the Dutch judge 
could have known that the ECJ’s approach to the direct effect of GATT used to be much 
more restrictive; and since the Dutch court considered the interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement as a question of European law, it should have included a reference question re-
garding the internal status of TRIPS, as well. The ECJ, in turn, benefited from this omission 
by evading the direct effect question on the simple ground that it had not been asked.  
In the more recent Dior case, the ECJ explicitly left the decision on the direct effect issue to 
Member State law as far as the fields left to national legislative competence of the TRIPS 
agreement following the reasoning of opinion 1/94 are concerned: “In a field to which TRIPS 
applies and in respect of which the Community has already legislated, as is the case with the 
field of trade marks, it follows from the judgment in Hermès (…) that the judicial authorities of 
the Member States are required by virtue of Community law, when called upon to apply national 
rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights falling within such 
a field, to do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of TRIPs. 
On the other hand, in a field in respect of which the Community has not yet legislated and which 
consequently falls within the competence of the Member States, the protection of intellectual 
property rights, and measures adopted for that purpose by the judicial authorities, do not fall 
within the scope of Community law. Accordingly, Community law neither requires nor forbids 
that the legal order of a Member State should accord to individuals the right to rely directly on 
the rule laid down by Article 50(6) of TRIPs or that it should oblige the courts to apply that rule 
of their own motion.”157 In a field reserved to national competence, this jurisprudence may lead 
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to the somewhat weird result that, whereas the ECJ may rule on the interpretation of a WTO law 
provision, a national Court might then deny the ruling any internal effect by refusing to grant the 
provision direct effect. This contradiction shows again the difficulties linked to the division of 
internal competence among the EU and its Member States established in opinion 1/94. 
cc) The New Denial of Direct Effect to WTO Law by the ECJ: Portugal vs. Council  
aa) Facts  
After the end of the negotiations of the Uruguay Round on 15 December 1993, leading to 
the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the adoption of a set of WTO 
agreements amongst which the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and another on Import 
Licensing Procedures on 15 April 1994, the EC had continued negotiations on further market 
access arrangements for textile products with India and Pakistan. On 15 October and 31 De-
cember 1994, the Commission, and India and Pakistan respectively, had signed two “Memo-
randa of Understanding”. Portugal, fearing dangers for its own textile industry, objected to 
these memoranda. As a reaction, the Council adopted Regulation No 852/95 on the granting 
of financial assistance to Portugal for a specific programme for the modernisation of its tex-
tile and clothing industry as a means of compensation.158 After this, the understandings with 
India and Pakistan were signed on 8 and 27 March 1996 respectively, and approved by 
Council decisions taken by qualified majority against the votes of Spain, Greece and Portugal 
on 26 February 1996.159  
In both understandings, the parties agreed on concessions for market access as regards 
certain textile products going beyond the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. With 
respect to India, the EC undertook, in exchange for that country’s commitment to bind the 
tariffs applicable to certain textile and clothing items, to remove all restrictions currently ap-
plicable to certain handloom and cottage industry products and to give favourable considera-
tion to exceptional flexibilities for other textiles products up to the amounts of a fixed quota; 
the latter obligation was also stipulated in the understanding with Pakistan in exchange for its 
commitment to eliminate quantitative restrictions for a series of textile products. 
                                                 
158
 OJ 1995 L 86, 10. 
159
 OJ 1996 L 153, p. 47. 
 87 
By application of 3 May 1996, Portugal brought an action under Article 173 (1) EC 
against the Council Decision 96/386/EC of 26 February 1996.160 Alongside several objec-
tions based on EC law, Portugal contended that the understandings with India and Pakistan 
violated certain rules and principles of WTO law, in particular those of GATT ‘94, the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and the Agreement of Import Licensing Procedures. 
Portugal invoked several arguments to support this view: first, alluding to the Fediol excep-
tion, WTO law should be justiciable here, because the Community measure, constituting a 
derogation from GATT ’94 and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, had referred ex-
pressly to specific provisions of WTO law. Furthermore, the Portuguese government argued 
that the WTO agreements were substantially different from GATT ’47, in particular as re-
gards the new dispute settlement procedure. Finally, it was maintained that the case did not 
raise the problem of direct effect in the first place; WTO law was only relied upon here by an 
EC Member State for the purpose of reviewing the legality of a Council measure. 
bb) Decision 
In his opinion, Advocate General Saggio strongly attacked the jurisprudence of the Court 
and fervently endorsed the view that Community acts should be measured against WTO law 
standards which should act as “paramètre de légalité” in both Article 230 (ex 173) and 234 
(ex 177) EC cases. To justify this result, the Advocate General relied in particular on the 
primary law command in Article 300 (7) EC, according to which treaties entered into by the 
EC are binding on its institutions and on Member States. In the face of the establishment of 
the WTO as a stable institutional infrastructure and the DSB as a mandatory enforcement 
mechanism the legal characterisation of WTO could no longer reasonably be denied. The 
contrary Council decision in occasion of the ratification of the Uruguay Round agreements 
would not be able to change this result for the reasons already mentioned above. The missing 
reciprocity in the granting of direct effect would not change this legal position, as the ECJ 
had already stressed in Kupferberg that this was not an absolute precondition. At least in an 
annulment procedure initiated by a Member State as a privileged subject of EC law, the “in-
vocability” of WTO law is presented by the Advocate General as an absolutely cogent result. 
As a consequence, the Advocate General examined the consistency of the agreements with 
India and Pakistan with Article 2 GATT and Articles 4-7 WTO Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing, but found no violation. As these agreements would only accelerate trade liberalisa-
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tion in the fields covered, they would be perfectly compatible with the overall objective of 
GATT/WTO law. According to GATT law, the measures contained it the agreements would 
be allowed as long as they do not affect the rights of third parties. As Portugal is a EU Mem-
ber, it could not, however, be characterised as a third party in this sense.161 
However, the Court gave a completely different decision. First, it pointed to its Kupfer-
berg jurisprudence, according to which it is up to the parties to an international agreement to 
determine the internal effect of its provisions; only if such determination is missing, does the 
question fall to the ECJ. Furthermore, the Court remembered that, even though, in general 
international law, every party is bound to perform an international agreement bona fide, it is 
up to the contracting party to determine the modalities of the performance; this means that 
direct effect is by no means commanded by general international law.  
In the assessment of GATT/WTO along these lines, the admittedly important changes this 
system underwent with respect to GATT ‘47, in particular the strengthening of the safeguards 
regime and the dispute settlement mechanism, do not alter, according to the ECJ, its essen-
tially negotiation-based diplomatic nature. It is true that the dispute settlement mechanism 
pursues the main purpose of securing the withdrawal of national measures found to be in-
compatible with WTO rules. However, it also gives the parties the opportunity to enter into 
negotiations with a view to finding, albeit only as a temporary measure, mutually acceptable 
compensation, should the immediate withdrawal of the incriminating measures be impracti-
cable (Article 22 (1) and (2) DSU). Consequently, to require judicial organs in the EC to re-
frain from applying national or EC rules inconsistent with WTO law would deprive the EC’s 
legislative and executive organs of this possibility. Thus, “the WTO agreements, interpreted 
in the light of their subject-matter and purpose, do not determine the appropriate legal means 
of ensuring that they are applied in good faith in the legal order of the contracting parties.”162  
In the following part, the ECJ argues that such effect is not determined by its own juris-
prudence on the internal status of international agreements, either. First, the WTO, being still 
founded on the principle of negotiations with a view to reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements, needs to be distinguished from agreements such as free trade agreements con-
cluded between the Community and non-Member countries which introduce a certain asym-
metry of obligations, or pursue special integrationist objectives such as association agree-
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ments. This seems to mean that, whilst in the case of free trade or association agreements, 
just as with EC law itself, direct effect may be instrumentalised for integrationist goals, in the 
case of the WTO, the reciprocity in its effective internal application enjoys much more im-
portance - particularly since it is known that the most important commercial partners of the 
EC, i.e., the US and Japan, do not accept direct effect, either. Even though, according to the 
Kupferberg judgment, the fact that some parties do not recognise direct effect is not in itself 
sufficient to constitute a relevant lack of reciprocity in the implementation of an agreement, 
this is argued to be different in the case of WTO rules where lack of uniform application 
would constitute a greater danger: “To accept that the role of ensuring that those rules com-
ply with Community law devolves directly on the Community judicature would deprive the 
legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by 
their counterparts in the Community’s trading partners.”163 Thus, reciprocity rationales may 
be viewed as decisive for the Court’s view. Finally, the Court notes that this interpretation is 
in harmony with the above-mentioned final recital in the preamble to Decision 94/800, by 
which the WTO Treaties were ratified by the EC and according to which the WTO agree-
ments were not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts 
by their nature. Thus, the Court left open whether it would be bound by this Decision in the 
case of conflicts. 
cc) Comment 
In a doctrinal perspective, the most important question is whether the decision is, as may 
be derived from the AG’s opinion, actually incompatible with the primary law command 
contained in Article 300 (7) EC, according to which EC institutions and Member States are 
bound by international agreements entered into by the EC. This would undoubtedly be so if 
this primary law provision automatically entailed the granting of direct effect to international 
treaties entered into by the EC; indeed, if this were so, direct effect could not be denied by 
European secondary law, such as acts of ratification of international agreements, and would 
have to recognised by the ECJ as well. In this sense, it has been argued that the formula 
“shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States” in Article 300 
(7) would, in an anticipated way, order the direct effect of any treaty provision fulfilling the 
technical requirements of being directly applied.164  
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Against this, it has been argued that the wording of Article 300 (7) EC is not clear in this 
respect.165 The formula could also be regarded as a mere internalisation of the fundamental 
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda; in other words, it would only prescribe 
internal validity, but not internal applicability. The other interpretation, so the argument runs, 
would lead to an unusually far-reaching opening of the EC legal order and might deprive the 
Community of the possibility of dealing with the implementation of international treaties in a 
flexible way. Thus, it would, to a certain extent, contradict the international law principle “in 
dubio mitius”, according to which the interpretation which least curtails a State’s sovereignty 
is preferable in doubtful cases. 
However, whereas the first opinion may be reproached as overstating the point, the con-
trary might be said about the second, with the result that some middle ground solution would 
need to be envisaged. In substance: if a Community governed by the rule of law is supposed 
to be internally bound by an international treaty as stated in Article 300 (7) EC, it seems to be 
undeniable that this legal obligation should also be controlled by the Community’s court, at 
least in objective control procedures whose purpose it is to ensure the legality of European 
acts. Unlike private actions, control proceedings by Member States against the EC or vice 
versa fulfil this purpose exactly. In other words, in a Community governed by the rule of 
law, there must not be any internally valid act which is not justiciable in any proceedings at 
all. 
However, a violation of Article 300 (7) EC would not be present if GATT/WTO law 
could actually be conceived of as a purely diplomatic regime of intergovernmental policy 
making. As stated, the parties to an agreement may establish it only as a framework for dip-
lomatic negotiation and deny it any legal character, thus also excluding, explicitly or implic-
itly, internal direct applicability by mutual consensus. Under this assumption, the binding 
effect of GATT/WTO as an international agreement in the sense of Article 300 (7) EC would 
not extend to mandatory compliance in each single case, as by their very nature diplomatic 
arrangements do not generate legally-binding results, even though making use of their insti-
tutions and procedures may well be a legally-binding obligation. However, in view of the 
strong juridified features of the WTO system, the premise of this view remains hugely prob-
lematic. This is even more so as, the WTO agreements having been concluded as mixed 
agreements, EC Member States are externally liable for full compliance with the agreement 
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by the EC and themselves, and may also be exposed to effective retaliation by third parties. 
Last but not least, the EC’s support of an infringement action by the Commission against 
Germany in the Dairy case mentioned above should be read as implying the ECJ’s implicit 
consensus on the legal characterisation of GATT.  
However, as GATT/WTO contains diplomatic elements as well, the ECJ’s view may not 
be refuted being undoubted wrong doctrinally; instead, such a conclusion will be shown to 
require a more profound theoretical analysis. At doctrinal level, one could, however, further 
argue that, if GATT/WTO’s partly diplomatic character is found to exclude the binding char-
acter of its provisions, the same might not be true for DS decisions which are rendered at the 
end of a manifestly legal procedure. This points to the question of whether direct effect could 
and should be granted to DS decisions only. 
dd) Limiting Direct Effect to Adopted Dispute Settlement Reports as an Alternative? 
On account of the denial of direct effect to WTO rules, the option of granting direct effect 
only to adopted dispute settlement reports deserves further attention. Indeed, the ECJ’s objec-
tion to direct effect based on the compensation alternative laid down in Article 22 DSU 
would not apply in the same way to dispute settlement decisions which are not implemented 
in time and in which compensation has been refused by the other party, which has almost al-
ways happened so far. Such DS decisions might well be granted direct effect. This would 
constitute a huge step forward towards a more effective interconnection of the constitutional 
levels, and might seem to provide an acceptable compromise towards the recognition of 
WTO as a true legal order. 
Yet, this interesting possibility raises a whole set of difficult questions. As a first objec-
tion, one might state that – similar to what the ECJ held in its first EEA opinion with respect 
to the EEA court – such an effect of dispute settlement decisions would be tantamount to en-
dangering the jurisdictional monopoly conferred on the ECJ by Article 164 EC.166 This ob-
jection may, however, be defeated by referring to a famous ECJ quotation from precisely this 
opinion:167  
“Where, however, an international agreement provides for its own system of courts, including a 
court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the Contracting Parties to the agreement, and, 
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as a result, to interpret its provisions, the decisions of the court will be binding on the Commu-
nity institutions, including the Court of Justice. Those decisions will also be binding in the event 
the Court of Justice is called upon to rule, by way of a preliminary ruling or in a direct action, on 
the interpretations of the international agreement, in so far as that agreement is an integral part of 
the Community legal order. An international agreement providing for such a system of Courts is 
in principle compatible with Community law. The Community’s competence in the field of in-
ternational relations and its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entails the 
power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such an agreement 
as regards the interpretations and application of its provision.”168 
This legal assessment of the ECJ is all the more relevant for the case of WTO law as the 
EEA agreement did not have direct effect in the Court’s view at that time.169 Notwithstanding 
this unequivocal jurisprudence, a similar argument of institutional incompatibility was, how-
ever, raised by the Council in Portugal v. Council to deny the invocability of WTO law as a 
“paramètre de légalité”, which could be used a fortiori as an argument against the direct ef-
fect of dispute settlement decisions. This argument was not discussed in the decision, but 
plausibly rejected in the opinion of Advocate General Saggio:170 
“In its defence, the Council states that the WTO Agreements provide for an autonomous system 
for the settlement of disputes which usurps the Court’s powers to interpret and apply the rules of 
the agreements. In my opinion, the system provided for in the WTO Agreements, and in particu-
lar in the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes, does not imply any limitation on the ju-
risdiction of the Court of Justice because, first, it does not provide for the establishment of a ju-
dicial body but for a system for the settlement of disputes between persons subject to interna-
tional law: the body which adopts the decisions or recommendations is a political body to which 
individuals within a particular domestic legal order have no access; and, second, the establish-
ment of a judicial body whose jurisdiction was not limited to interpreting and applying the 
agreement but also included the power to annul measures of the Community institutions would 
be incompatible with the Community legal order inasmuch as it would clearly conflict with Arti-
cle 164 of the EC Treaty. In any case, it is evident that internal review of the rules of agreements 
by the Community institutions and the Member States cannot fail to offer a stronger guarantee of 
the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken at international level and is therefore in keeping with 
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the objectives of the agreement. The fact that the contracting parties have undertaken to use the 
dispute settlement system provided by the WTO Agreements to settle disputes arising from 
breaches of the agreement and the possible adoption of retaliation measures, does not preclude 
the parties themselves from annulling or sanctioning internal measures which might be contrary 
to the rules of the agreement.” 
Other implications of the option of granting direct effect only to adopted dispute settle-
ment decisions were considered in the last Atlanta and Chemnitz cases decided by the Court 
of First Instance. In its Opinion in the last Atlanta case,171 Advocate General Mischo had to 
examine whether the WTO appellate body report in Bananas could constitute a ground for 
liability on the part of the EC, for which direct effect would be a precondition. The Advocate 
General denied this possibility for the reason that the DSU granted a Member “a reasonable 
period of time” to comply with the ruling (Article 21 (3) DSU, and that the option of com-
pensation, which allowed the contested legislation to be left in place, was also available (Ar-
ticle 22 DSU). As already stated, this objection is barely convincing, as compensation is not 
meant as a permanent solution and the direct effect of a dispute settlement decision should be 
limited to the period after the expiry of the time-frame set for implementation anyway.  
More interesting is the Court of First Instance’s reasoning in the Chemnitz case, in which 
the potential direct effect of the appellate body report in the Bananas case was discussed. The 
importing company, Chemnitz, had argued that the appellate body had found the (original) 
EC Banana Regulation inconsistent with WTO law, and that, in its present form, it could 
therefore not be implemented in a manner consistent therewith. This argument seems to im-
ply that dispute settlement decisions enjoy direct effect and may hence entail the nullity of 
the Regulation ex tunc. Subscribing to the reasoning suggested by the Commission, the Court 
left the direct effect question open in its reply. It ruled that the appellate body report had only 
found some inconsistent elements, but not called into question the overall WTO consistency 
of the Regulation’s tariff quota system as such. Accordingly, the Commission had adopted 
the 1998 amendments to the Regulation with a view to bringing them into compliance with 
WTO rules. Consequently, so the Court concluded, the applicant could not rely on the report 
in order to claim that the Banana regulation no longer existed. Yet, as the Court of First In-
stance’s assumption on the overall consistency of the tariff quota system with GATT/WTO 
was shown to be plainly wrong in subsequent panel procedures, one might argue a contrario 
that, in this opposite hypothesis, the applicant might be able to rely on the nullity of the 
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Regulation found by the appellate body. However, whilst this conclusion a contrario is not 
completely implausible, it is not entirely cogent here as one might also argue that the Court 
had only applied an “at any rate for the case at issue” reasoning, which would not allow any 
conclusion to be drawn for the hypothesis in which the whole scheme was found to be WTO-
inconsistent. 
Second, the Court of First Instance reasoned that the plaintiff had not established a link in 
law between the decision of the DSB addressed to the Member States only and the present 
action. To do so, the plaintiff would have had the burden of showing that the DSB decision 
imposed on the EC as its addressee an unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise obli-
gation, which it did not fulfil. This reasoning is again very difficult to analyse. Since the 
wording of the dispute settlement decision which found the Banana regime inconsistent with 
the WTO is, of course, clear and unconditional in itself, the fundamental problem seems to 
lie in showing that this finding gave rise to an obligation also vis-à-vis the plaintiff as a third 
party. This could only be denied on account of a subjectivity criterion similar to the German 
administrative law Schutzzwecklehre, which requires the protection of individuals’ rights to 
be a specific purpose of a norm (a construct which was shown above to be rather alien to EC 
law), or an analysis of the nature and general scheme of the WTO agreements (the first of the 
two criteria being usually applied for the direct effect test), assuming that these would be ca-
pable of affecting dispute settlement decisions, too. It is clear that, on account of these crite-
ria, and as actually also advocated by the Spanish government,172 direct effect of adopted 
dispute settlement decisions could be denied for largely the same reasons – the diplomatic 
characterisation of the WTO and the lack of reciprocity in particular – just as it had been de-
nied for WTO rules in Portugal vs. Council. Thus, via a complex detour, we have come back 
to the question of the legal vs. diplomatic characterisation of the WTO itself.  
ee) Conclusion: Unlimited Judicial Self Restraint and the Need for a Theoretical Analysis 
The reasons why the ECJ adheres to the diplomatic characterisation of the WTO may be 
further expounded. Thus, what really matters to this Court seem to be less concerns of doc-
trinal consistency or the new institutional features of the GATT/WTO system, but the broad 
scope of the WTO and the huge political and economic implications of deferring to it. Unlike 
bilateral association or free trade agreements which affect the EU system only marginally, 
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the WTO constitutes an encompassing transnational order for world trade, which is for issues 
that are also governed by the EU system itself. Thus, it may be capable of limiting the EU’s 
policy choices and thus of changing its global standing and self-understanding to a huge ex-
tent. Just as internally the granting of direct effect to EU law has completely changed the 
EU’s own shape and character, the same might be true for the WTO. In this situation, the 
ECJ prefers to leave dealing with the WTO entirely to the EC’s political institutions. 
With a view to these far-reaching political implications, it is submitted that a realistic as-
sessment of the future status of GATT/WTO should go beyond a doctrinal analysis and 
should be based on a contextual, i.e., political and economic, background assessment of the 
concept and the function of the WTO and its relationship with the EU. Only when the ECJ’s 
theoretical assumptions may thus be refuted, can this Court’s deductions therefrom in Portu-
gal vs. Council also be successfully questioned. Before such analysis is undertaken, the Ba-
nana conflict, in which a considerable number of these frictions between the three constitu-
tional levels came to light in a dramatic way, will be presented in an excursus. 
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Excursus: The Banana Conflict 
I. The European Banana Import Regime in a Nutshell 
1. The Banana Market Regime in the Context of the Common Agricultural Policy 
The 1993 EC banana import regime established a sectoral planified economy system, in 
which “bureaucratic dirigism” substitutes, to a large extent, market mechanisms. In this re-
spect, it is a typical child of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and reflects its more 
general complexities and contradictions. Historically, the establishment of the CAP was part 
of a larger compromise between agricultural and competition policy which rendered possible 
the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1958. France, which was still de-
pendent to a considerable extent on agriculture, and traditionally more prone to intervention-
ist policies, was willing to accept free trade of German industrial goods only at the price of a 
guarantee of the survival of its agriculture. As a result, an interventionist system of agricul-
tural policy which limited the Community’s general free market system, in particular the ap-
plication of free movement and competition rules,173 was established. Its – in part competing 
- objectives were set as follows:174 to increase agricultural productivity by promoting techni-
cal progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the op-
timum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour; to ensure a fair standard of 
living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of 
persons engaged in agriculture; to stabilise markets; to assure the availability of supplies; 
and, finally, to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. To achieve these 
objectives, the CAP, which normally uses the form of common European market organisa-
tions (covering by now about 95% of all agricultural products),175 may resort to all necessary 
measures, in particular regulation of prices, aid for the production and marketing of the vari-
ous products, storage and carryover arrangements and common machinery for stabilising im-
ports and exports. According to the principle of financial solidarity, the CAP is financed by 
guidance and guarantee funds which notoriously consume about one half of the Community’s 
budget. Moreover, the CAP is committed to a system of Community preference which is 
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supposed to protect Community products against normally cheaper world market products. 
However, the EC’s accession to the WTO rendered important changes in the CAP necessary, 
which were brought about by the agricultural reform of 30/6/1992, which included, most no-
tably, a shift from direct product subsidies (by mechanisms such as guaranteed intervention 
prices) to producer income aid. As set forth by the Commission in its Agenda 2000, the ac-
cession of Eastern European countries still largely dependent on agriculture will require other 
profound changes, mainly for budgetary reasons. Indeed, the extension of the current dirig-
iste system of planification, subsidisation, and compensation to the new Eastern European 
Member States would prove unaffordable. 
2. Essential Features of the EC Banana Market Regime 
As regards the banana market, this has always played a special role in the EC. At the 
foundation of the Community in 1958, bananas were excluded on a German request from the 
common import regime to be established in a protocol attached to the Implementing Conven-
tion based on Article 136 EC.176 This enabled Germany, whose high consumer demand for 
bananas was satisfied by cheap imports of “Dollar bananas” from Latin America, to maintain 
a duty-free import quota completely exempted from tariffs and annually adapted to the de-
mand. In an overall perspective, the exemption of bananas from the CAP entailed that differ-
ent national markets - some entirely free, others completely protected, others again in be-
tween - persisted. 
The consistency of the European Banana regime with GATT was already challenged for the first 
time when the different national regimes were in place and national markets were still formally 
secluded. Several Latin American countries, Columbia, Venezuela, Guatemala and Costa Rica, 
alleged injuries under the different national import schemes and invoked the GATT dispute set-
tlement procedures, whereafter a panel was established on 10 February 1993. In its report, it 
found that the quota schemes in place in some countries violated Articles I (the most-favoured 
nation principle) and XI.1 (quantitative restrictions). However, the EC was able to block its ac-
ceptance in the GATT Council as, according to standing practice, a unanimous decision, includ-
ing the votes of the members found in breach of the agreement, would have been necessary.177 
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When the goal of the completion of the internal market was envisaged at the end of 1992, 
the issue of setting up a harmonised banana import regime was taken up again. It was obvi-
ous from the beginning that the harmonisation of the different systems in order to open up the 
frontiers within the internal market would be an extremely difficult task. After long discus-
sions and the threat of some Member States including France to block all other harmonisation 
measures and thus the completion of the internal market as a whole,178 a protectionist regula-
tion was enacted by majority-voting in the Council against the strong resistance of the coun-
tries with formerly free markets, namely Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Germany 
even sought to stop the regulation before the ECJ by means of a temporary injunction, how-
ever without success.179 
The 1993 Banana regulation was meant to protect not only the rather insignificant number 
of banana producers in the Community, but also those of former colonial States of Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific rim (the so-called ACP States), which are connected with the EC 
in development associations through, most notably, the Lomé Conventions, and the distribu-
tors of these bananas. The protection of the EC and ACP producers was to the detriment of 
the “Dollar-Bananas” produced in Latin American, which are generally cheaper and of a bet-
ter quality than EC and ACP Bananas. In substance, the regulation introduced a differentia-
tion between EC, traditional and non-traditional ACP and, finally, “third country” banana 
producers as well as the different distributors. A variable quota tariff was placed on the im-
port of third-country bananas and the so-called non-traditional ACP-imports, which was 
originally set at 2 million tonnes yearly (thus cutting back the import of about 2.3 millions in 
1992) at a duty of 75 ECU per tonne respectively duty free for non-traditional ACP-imports. 
The former distributors of third world bananas received 66.5 % of it (“A-operators”), the dis-
tributors of traditional ACP-bananas and Community bananas – even though they had not 
previously been involved in the import of such bananas – 30% (“B-operators”), whereas the 
remaining 3,5% was reserved to market participants, who began marketing third world ba-
nanas or non-traditional ACP bananas from 1992 (“C-operators”). The shares of the respec-
tive quotas were granted to individual distributors on the basis of the average amount sold by 
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them between 1989 and 1991. Technically, this was done by means of licences, which were 
subject to the provision of a security, and transferable to other distributors. Import amounts 
above the customs quota were subject to a punitive duty-rate of 750 ECU per tonne for non-
traditional ACP-bananas and 850 ECU per tonne for third world bananas.  
As a result of the new system, German importers had about 840,000 tonnes at their dis-
posal, in comparison with imports of 1,371,000 tonnes in 1992, which constituted a reduction 
of about 40%.180 Following the implementation of the new system, it turned out that the gap 
could not even be filled by Dollar bananas imported by the operators of Community or ACP 
bananas favoured by the 30% clause, nor by additional Community or ACP bananas. This 
was due to the fact that the relationships between producers and importers were based on 
long-term contracts and investments. In other words, the producers of European and ACP 
bananas were not able (or ready) to satisfy the demand of Member States previously supplied 
by Dollar bananas, and the operators favoured by the 30% clause were not prepared to import 
from third countries. Instead, they preferred to sell, for high profits, their licenses to tradi-
tional importers of the Dollar bananas who suffered from reduced quotas. Thus, a redistribu-
tion of income in favour of distributors of Community and ACP bananas was caused.  
Against this background, it is obvious that the whole regime resulted not only in a massive 
increase of prices for the consumers of countries such as Germany, which had previously 
been supplied with Dollar bananas. Instead, due to the artificial trade restriction inherent in 
the regime, huge wealth losses, mainly to the detriment of Latin American producers and 
European consumers, were caused. An independent study undertaken at the World Bank181 
concluded that the import restrictions cost EC consumers $ 2.3 billion a year in artificially 
inflated prices, out of which only about $ 300 million benefited ACP producers, whilst most 
of the extra costs resulted in monopoly profit for European distributors. Moreover, the study 
submitted that the system massively distorted competition, encouraged black marketeering, 
restricted the growth of the EU banana market, discriminated against efficient producers and 
robbed inefficient ones of incentives to raise productivity and cut costs.  
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II. Challenges before GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies and the Reactions of the 
EU 
1. The Second Panel 
When the 1993 Banana Regulation’s draft text was published, the parties to the first Ba-
nana panel, Columbia, Venezuela, Guatemala and Costa Rica, fearing a massive decrease in 
their exports to the EC, requested consultations under the GATT. The EC refused this request 
by alleging that a not yet adopted text could not be characterised as a “measure” subject to 
GATT rules. As a reaction, these countries asked for a dispute settlement in accordance with 
Article XXIII GATT. After consultations held in April 1993, a panel was established on 16 
June 1993 which submitted its report on 18 January 1994. Rejecting the EU’s view that the 
association with ACP countries under the Lomé Agreements should be characterised as a cus-
toms union or a free-trade area in the sense of Article XXIV GATT, the report found that es-
sential features of the Regulation, including the tariff preferences to ACP countries and the 
import licensing scheme violated Articles I (MFN), II (tariff bindings) and III (national 
treatment) GATT. However, as in the first Banana panel, the EU again blocked the report and 
prevented it from being adopted. 
2. The Framework Agreement with Latin American Countries of 28 and 29/3/1994  
As it was clear, even at that time, that this would no longer be possible under the new 
GATT/WTO system due to enter into force on 1 January 1995, the Community tried to fore-
stall future challenges to its import regime by these countries. Thus, on 29.4.1994, a frame-
work treaty was agreed with Costa Rica, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela (but not Guatemala) for banana imports. This granted these countries a reduction 
of tariff duty from 100 to 75 ECU per tonne, a larger tariff quota amounting to one half of the 
entire tariff quota for third country bananas (which was distributed among them by country-
specific export quotas in relation to their traditional trade share), and the right to issue export 
licences to be used for import into the EC by A and C-operators. The treaty was implemented 
by Commission Regulation No. 478/95.182 It was to be regarded by the parties as a final set-
tlement of the dispute. 
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During the negotiations establishing the WTO, the EC was able to place the framework 
agreement in the schedule containing the EC’s trade concessions within the GATT, with the 
result that it became part of WTO law. However, when the WTO agreements were adopted 
by the EU on 22/12/1994, Germany made a reservation in respect of the framework agree-
ment. On 10/4/1995, this Member State initiated an annulment action against it before the 
ECJ, which was partly successful.183  
3. The 1994 Waiver granted to the Lomé IV Convention  
As a further effort to ensure the GATT-consistency of the Banana regime, European and 
ACP countries successfully negotiated a five-year waiver till 29 February 2000 concerning 
the Lomé IV Convention, an association agreement between the EC and former ACP colony 
States, which are inter alia granted privileges for imports into the EC.184 These waiver nego-
tiations, which followed a suggestion by the second Banana panel, were completed in the 
GATT General Council a short period before the establishment of the WTO. The EC had a 
strong interest in obtaining this instrument before the WTO rules came into force, since the 
granting of waivers is now subject to a more stringent procedure. According to its wording, 
the waiver only exempted the EU from its obligations under Article I (1) GATT, the most 
favoured nation principle, so that the unequal treatment of ACP States vis-à-vis other pro-
ducer countries was justified. However, all the other GATT obligations of the EC remained 
unaffected, and it was precisely this limited scope of the waiver that gave rise to controver-
sies in the third Banana panel.  
4. The Third Banana Panel 
a) Procedural Overview 
Despite the settlement achieved in the framework agreement just mentioned, on 4 October 
1995, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, joined for the first time by the United States, made 
a new request for consultations against the EC Banana regime.185 By this time, the Uruguay 
Round agreements were in effect, and so the claimants could have recourse to the upgraded 
new WTO dispute settlement understanding and other Uruguay Round instruments such as 
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the GATS, the agreement of Import Licensing Procedures, the Agreement on Agriculture and 
the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures. Ecuador, the world’s largest producer 
of bananas, became a WTO Member on 21 January 1996 and immediately joined the group 
of complainants. 
Following the failure of the consultations held on 14-15 March 1996, the WTO Council, 
in its function as the Dispute Settlement Body, established a panel in compliance with the 
complainants’ request on 8 May 1996. The panel reports,186 circulated on 22 May 1997, 
found a considerable amount of violations of the regime with GATT, GATS, and the WTO 
Licensing Agreement. On the Community’s appeal, the new WTO appellate body upheld the 
panel report with minor modifications on 9 September 1997.187 This report was adopted by 
the DSB on 25 September 1997. As alluded to, under the new procedural rules of the WTO 
dispute settlement understanding (DSU),188 the Community could no longer block the accep-
tance of the panel and appellate body reports, since a (so-called negative) consensus of all 
WTO Members would now have been necessary to do so (Article 16 IV and 17 IV DSU). In 
a subsequent arbitration decision according to Article 21.3 (c) DSU requested by the EU, the 
“reasonable period of time” prescribed by Article 21 DSU for the implementation of the re-
port was set at 15 months and one week, i.e., up to 1 January 1999.189 
b) Substantive WTO Law Essentials 
As the third panel and appellate body report very clearly outlined the most important vio-
lations of the Banana regime with GATT/WTO law, these will be briefly summarised in or-
der to give an overview of the substantive law problems which are not at the core of this the-
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sis.190 On the whole, the discriminatory tariff, quota and licensing system established by the 
Banana regulation are manifestly incompatible with the spirit, the overall system and many 
single provisions of the world trade system, and might thus be regarded as a textbook case, as 
they cover a maximum of GATT violations which can arise in a single case. This raises the 
suspicion that the regime was established without any regard to the EC’s obligations under 
GATT at all.  
aa) Standing of the US as a Preliminary Question 
At the outset, the panel and appellate body had to examine the important preliminary 
question of whether the US was to be allowed to join the complainants and to invoke GATT 
violations.191 The EC contested this right by claiming that the US could not invoke an own 
legal interest. The necessity of such an interest, in other words the exclusion of an actio 
popularis under the DSU, was derived by the EC from Articles 4.11. and 10.2. DSU which 
regulate the intervention by third parties. The appellate body replied that both provisions 
concern a different situation in that the US could not be regarded as a third party here. Whilst 
the first provision deals with the joining in at consultation proceedings already under way 
between members when the third party “considers to have a substantial trade interest”, the 
second refers to the right of third parties, having a “substantial interest” in a matter before a 
panel, to be heard and to make written submissions to the panel. The appellate body con-
cluded that neither of these provisions nor anything in the WTO Agreement provided a basis 
for asserting that the parties to the dispute had to meet any similar standard.  
Moreover, the appellate body also denied that there was an international law principle ex-
pressed in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice according to which the right 
of “standing” in international proceedings would require a “legal interest”. To the contrary, 
the appellate body stressed the wide wording of the basic provisions governing the settlement 
of disputes - Article XXXIII:1 GATT: “if any Member should consider that any benefit ac-
cruing to it directly or indirectly... is being nullified or impaired...” and Article 3.7 DSU: 
“Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to whether action under 
these procedures would be fruitful.” It inferred from these provision that a Member should 
enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to initiate dispute settlement proceedings or not. 
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The language of Article 3.7. would even suggest that a Member is expected to be largely self-
regulating in deciding whether any such action would be “fruitful”. Finally, the appellate 
body also noted that the US was a producer of bananas, that the internal US market could be 
affected and that, in general, due to the increased interdependence of the global economy 
Members are more likely than ever to be affected by potential WTO law violations. On ac-
count of these reasons, taken together, the US were granted standing. 
bb) Article I GATT – MFN Principle 
The basic content of the MFN principle is that any trade advantages granted to one party 
must be automatically granted to all other parties as well. It is manifest that the unequal 
treatment of Dollar and EC/ACP bananas by means of different tariffs and tariff contingents 
constitutes a violation of that principle. In a second step, this infringement might have been 
justified on the ground that EC and ACP States would constitute a free-trade area or a cus-
toms union in the sense of Article XXIV GATT which constitutes an exception to Article I 
GATT.192 These provisions allow States assembled in free-trade areas and customs unions to 
grant one another additional trade advantages not subject to the MFN principle. However, it 
was quite clear that special association with the ACP countries under the Lomé Agreements 
could not qualify for one of these possibilities. Both would presuppose in principle that du-
ties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated with respect to substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories; however, a customs union also requires that 
substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the 
members to trade with third States (Article XXIV:8(a) and (b) GATT). The Lomé Agree-
ments provide only for unilateral trade privileges accorded by the EU to Lomé States, while 
these are allowed to maintain most of their import restrictions in order to protect their indus-
tries. Therefore, the EC resorted additionally to Part IV GATT and argued that these provi-
sions allowed for the unilateral granting of concessions in favour of developing countries. To 
this argument, the panel replied that while unilateral tariff reduction for developing countries 
may even be compatible with the GATT, under no circumstances could some third world 
States be privileged at the expense of others when both are in a similar state of development. 
However, the waiver for the Lomé IV Agreement mentioned above entailed that differential 
                                                 
192
 This argument had already been dealt with in the Bananas II panel (GATT Doc. dispute settlement 38/R, 
reported in ILM XXXIV (1995), 180, 224, no. 159. It is taken up again here on account of its fundamental im-
portance. 
 105 
tariffs were exempted from the MFN requirements during its validity, i.e., till 29 February 
2000. Yet, the appellate body found that the waiver did not extend to the discriminations in 
the allocation of import licences. In this case, a violation of Article I GATT was present. 
cc) Violation of earlier Tariff Concessions, Article II GATT 
An important feature of the GATT/WTO system is the establishment of preferential tariff 
rates which are fixed in the relevant schedules annexed to GATT as provided in Article II 
GATT. For bananas, the EC had, already in 1963, conceded a value tariff of 20% which be-
came a binding part of GATT. This tariff concession had been violated in several ways: First, 
the weight tariff introduced by the Regulation could lead to a higher tariff rate than the value 
tariff; e.g., in 1992, the rate was of 24%.193 Second, the punitive tariff of 850 ECU/t for im-
ports exceeding the quotas is equivalent to a value tariff of 160%, which constitutes a fla-
grant violation of Article II GATT. 
dd) Violation of the National Treatment Rule, Article III:4 GATT 
Article III:4 GATT contains the rule that imported products shall be accorded a no less fa-
vourable treatment than like products of national origin in respect of all laws and regulations 
affecting their marketing. In this context, the panel found that the unequal allocation of the 
quotas, in particular the cross-subsidisation of Community operators receiving 30% of the 
import quota for Dollar bananas, constituted a violation of the national treatment rule. 
ee) Quantitative Restrictions and Article XIII GATT 
In the first place, it is already questionable whether the punitive tariffs of 850 ECU/t do 
not constitute a quantitative restriction under Article XI:1 GATT. This might, indeed, be ar-
gued because the extremely high punitive tariff renders imports economically impossible, 
and thus has the effect of a quantitative restriction. However, in Bananas III, the panel and 
the appellate body preferred to deal only with the provision on non-discriminatory admini-
stration of quantitative restrictions, Article XIII GATT, as this obligation also applies to tariff 
quotas (Article XIII (5) GATT). In this context, the dispute settlement organs found two in-
consistencies: first, the allocation of tariff quota shares, by agreement and by assignment, to 
some Members not having a substantial interest in supplying bananas to the European Com-
munities, but not to other Members, constitutes discriminatory unequal treatment. The same 
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was found for the allocation of quotas to certain Latin American countries in the framework 
agreement. 
However, in this context, the scope of the above-mentioned waiver becomes relevant. As 
stated, according to its wording, it exempts the EC only from Article I:1 GATT, and “only to 
the extent necessary to permit the EC to provide preferential treatment for products originat-
ing in ACP States as required by the relevant provisions of the Fourth Lomé Convention”. 
Having confirmed its competence to review the scope of the waiver following the objections 
raised by the EC in this respect, the appellate body stated that, first, only some measures of 
the Banana regulation were required by the 4th Lomé Agreement. Second, reversing the panel 
decision, it continued that even for these measures, the waiver must not be extended against 
its wording to Article XIII GATT. The panel’s main arguments, the close relationship be-
tween Articles I:1 and XIII:3 and the need to give “real effect” to the waiver, are not re-
garded as sufficient to override its clear wording. This result is further motivated by the ap-
pellate body by referring to the exceptional nature of waivers and the strict disciplines to 
which they are subjected. 
ff) Licensing agreement and GATS 
Besides these violations, the panel and the appellate body also found violations of Article 
X (3a) GATT and Article 1.3 of the WTO Licensing Agreement through the discriminatory 
way in which the licenses had been administered. The discriminatory allocation of import 
licences – in particular due to the quota system established in Article 18 Banana Regulation, 
the exemptions from licenses for operators of EC/ACP Bananas foreseen in the framework 
agreement, and the granting of exceptional hurricane licenses to them – were also found to 
constitute violations of Articles II:1 (MFN) and XVII (non-discrimination requirements) 
GATS. Importantly, GATS and GATT were held to apply concurrently, since in situations 
such as the present one measures were liable to fall under the scope of application of both 
agreements. 
5. The Difficult Implementation of the Bananas III Report 
To comply with the Bananas III Report, the European Commission published a draft 
amendment regulation on 14 January 1998 which was forwarded to the Council of Agricul-
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ture Ministers.194 When the content reached the complainants, all of them including Panama - 
pressed by powerful US-owned companies such as Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita - sustained 
that the previous inconsistencies with GATT, the discriminatory licensing system in particu-
lar, had not been removed. However, the EU rejected this criticism. In a reconsideration, on 
the complainants’ request, of the issue in the DSB on 25 March 1998, the EU contended that 
all objections were premature, since the amended regulation had not yet been implemented. 
Even though diplomatic exchanges continued throughout May and June of 1998 and the new 
Regulation was formally approved and published in the Official Journal on 29 July 1998.  
Its essential content may be summarised as follows. First, in order to enable traditional 
ACP suppliers to maintain their presence on the EU market, a special framework of technical 
and financial assistance was introduced. Substantively, according to the amended regime, the 
tariff quota for traditional imports from ACP States was maintained at 857,000 tonnes (duty 
free), but was no longer distributed between ACP countries. This solution was alleged to of-
fer more flexibility. Furthermore, for third State and non-traditional ACP imports, the tariff 
quota of 2,200,000 tonnes was maintained at a duty of 75 ECU per tonne for third State im-
ports and duty free for non-traditional ACP-imports; the punitive duty of 765 ECU per tonne 
on imports beyond the quota was maintained, too. An additional tariff quota of 353,000 ton-
nes at a duty of 300 ECU per tonne was opened for third State bananas to take account of the 
EU enlargement and to ensure adequate supplies to the market; this apparently was a com-
promise in order to appease the Germans and the Dutch. Finally, the licensing system was 
simplified; however, according to the Commission’s implementation legislation, though the 
tariff quotas had been formally abolished, the imports were again allocated among importing 
countries based on their share of the EC market during the period from 1994 to 1996, i.e., 
when the rules found in breach of GATT and GATS were in place. It is this discrimination, 
crystallising the effects of the previous illegal regime, which may have particularly enraged 
the complainants of the third panel. 
When, after the failure of consultations, the complainants wanted to challenge again the 
compliance of the implementation legislation with the DSB decision,195 serious procedural 
problems surfaced. These were related to the difficult relationship between Articles 21.5 and 
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22 of the DSU. Article 21.5 DSU reads: “Where there is disagreement as to the existence or 
consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommenda-
tions and rulings, such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement 
procedures, including, wherever possible, resort to the original panel...” By contrast, Article 
22 DSU establishes that a party may request authorisation for retaliation if the other party 
“fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compli-
ance...” As a result, it was not clear whether the review procedure established in Article 21.5 
DSU had to be exhausted before retaliatory action could be allowed by the DSB according to 
Article 22 DSU. Whereas the EU insisted on the first interpretation, the US and the other 
complaining States obviously preferred the second. Moreover, the phrase that the dispute on 
correct implementation “shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement proce-
dures” left it unclear whether such procedures were to be repeated in their entirety, or 
whether an expedited procedure with immediate reference to a panel (without prior consulta-
tions and without the possibility to appeal) would be sufficient. 
While the complaining parties presented the EU with a request for consultations “without 
prejudice” to their rights under Article 21.5 DSU on 18 August 1998, the US also announced, 
on 22 October 1998, unilateral retaliatory action pursuant to Section 301 of the US Trade Act 
of 1974 if the EU regime was not in compliance with WTO rules by 15 December 1998. In 
an immediate response, the EU authorities strongly denounced the threat to resort to unilat-
eral action by the US and confirmed their initial position that retaliatory action could be initi-
ated only upon a “multi-lateral finding” of non-compliance in a procedure under Article 21.5 
DSU followed by the formal permission for such action according to Article 22 DSU. More-
over, the EU insisted that it would challenge a Section 301 sanction by the US against itself 
at the WTO in separate proceedings. Since the US upheld their threat of retaliation, the EU 
initiated proceedings on 25 November 1999; consultations without any positive outcome 
were held on 17 December 1998, and a panel was requested by the EU on 26 January 
1999.196  
A new tactical move was carried out by the EC on 15 December 1998, a few days before a 
US-EU summit was scheduled to take place in Washington. On that day, the US Trade Rep-
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resentative was to announce a list of European products targeted with 100 percent punitive 
tariff duties, pursuant to the unilateral Section 301 determination. Against this background, 
the EU asked itself for the establishment of a panel in accordance with Article 21.5. DSU. 
Strongly criticising the unilateral action threatened by the US, the EU requested the panel to 
find that, in the absence of a formal request for the establishment of an Article 21.5 DSU 
panel by the complaining party, its implementing measures “should be presumed to conform 
with WTO law.” To this move, the US and the other complaining States convincingly ob-
jected that such a panel would not scrutinise the compatibility of the EU implementation 
measures with WTO law, but would, instead, be confined to interpreting the scope and legal 
effects of Article 21.5 DSU itself. 
As a reaction to the sui-generis Article 21.5 DSU request197 made by the EU, Ecuador 
filed its own request for an Article 21.5 panel on 18 December 1998. Unlike the EU’s re-
quest, this State’s request contained the clear indication that the panel should examine the 
compatibility of the European implementing measures. In addition, Ecuador asked the panel 
to make suggestions on how the EU might implement its recommendations. During a special 
meeting of the DSB on 12 January 1999, an agreement was reached that both Article 21.5 
DSU panel requests should be separated. As a consequence, both requests were granted by 
the DSB under the negative consensus rule and referred to the original panel. 
However, notwithstanding the establishment of the two Article 21.5 DSU panels, the US 
also announced on 12 January 1999 that it would continue the Article 22 DSU procedure. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Article 22.2 DSU, the US requested the authorisation to suspend 
tariff concessions and other obligations to the EU, covering trade to an amount of US$ 520 
million. This request had a particularly incisive impact since under the reverse consensus 
rule, it is deemed to be adopted automatically. In response to this threat, Santa Lucia, Domin-
ica and the Ivory Coast, backed by the EC, blocked the adoption of the agenda for this meet-
ing, with the effect that the DSB meeting scheduled on 25 January 1999 was suspended, and 
the American request for authorisation to retaliate could not be granted. 
After several other DSB meetings in which no solution on the future procedure was found, 
this procedural impasse could be overcome only on 29 January by a compromise suggested 
by WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero. Following this proposal, the DSB suspended 
consideration of the American request for authorisation to retaliate under Article 22.2 DSU, 
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in exchange for the EU requesting arbitration on the appropriate level of retaliation pursuant 
to Article 22.3 DSU. The arbitration was due on 2 March 1999. Surprisingly, however, the 
arbitrators did not issue a report on that date, but instead asked for additional information 
from the parties. This might have been a tactical move by the panellists in order to allow for 
the Articles 21.5 and 22.6 DSU decisions to be rendered on the same day in respect of the 
DSU’s tight time schedules. This delay put the US in an embarrassing situation since it was 
under considerable internal pressure from the Congress to impose the retaliatory tariffs. In 
response the US decided to apply retaliatory tariffs retroactively as of 3 March 1999 condi-
tional to WTO authorisation; however, pending this authorisation, it also suspended, as of 
March 3, customs clearance of all products on the previously established list of retaliatory 
tariffs. In another countermove, on 4 March 1999, the EC requested consultations with the 
US in respect of the beginning of retaliatory action without authorisation by the WTO, thus 
starting an additional dispute settlement procedure. 
On 6 April 1999, the reconvened third Banana panel reported its decisions on the Article 
21.5 requests filed by Ecuador and the EU as well as the arbitration award requested by the 
EU in accordance with Article 22.6 DSU. Hardly surprisingly for GATT/WTO experts, the 
panel found essential features of the 1998 amended Bananas regulation to be again incom-
patible with WTO law. In addition, following Ecuador’s request to make specific suggestions 
on implementation, the panel proposed a tariff-only system, possibly combined with negotia-
tions in view of a suitable WTO waiver. 
In the arbitration award, the panel found an impressive procedural compromise which, de-
spite strong criticisms by the EU,198 might be considered an acceptable way out of the di-
lemma. On the one hand, the award confirmed the US’ right to retaliate even before the com-
pletion of an Article 21 (5) DSU procedure. On the other hand, the panel found that it was 
also allowed to scrutinise, by way of incidental review, the WTO-consistency of the amended 
regime as foreseen in Article 21.5 DSU; thereby it confirmed its earlier findings from the Ar-
ticle 21 (5) DSU report just outlined. Thus, while the US won the case, the EU’s main objec-
tion had been addressed as well. The retaliatory action was taken only upon multi-lateral au-
thorisation in accordance with DSU rules, and the Article 21 (5) DSU examination was com-
pleted before such authorisation as well. At the same time, in the arbitration decision prop-
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erly speaking, the panellists enormously reduced the retaliation tariffs envisaged by the US 
from the previous 520 million dollars to an amount of 191,4 million dollars per year. Interest-
ingly, the calculation was based on a hypothetical banana regime compatible with WTO 
rules, thereby rejecting the US approach based on an estimate of lost profits to American 
companies.  
In its reaction to the decision, the EU affirmed that it would comply with it, but reserved 
its right of appeal199 which it, however, renounced at a later stage. On 7 April 1999, the US 
requested under Article 22.7 DSU the authorisation of retaliatory action to the extent allowed 
by the Article 22.6 DSU award. When this request was granted on 19 April 1999, the US had 
already taken action due to the pressure of internal lobbies; the final list of retaliatory tariffs 
had been published on 9 April 1999. Whilst the list comprised European goods as diverse as 
pecorino cheese, handbags, bed linen, lead-acid storage batteries and electrothermic coffee or 
tea makers, the Netherlands and Denmark were completely exempted from the sanctions 
which was apparently a reaction to their vote against the 1998 amended Banana regulation in 
the EC Council. A new controversy was in sight when – in a so-called “roundabout ap-
proach”– the US intended to change the list of products subjected to retaliatory tariffs every 
six month, thus causing additional hardship to European exporters; these plans were, how-
ever, withdrawn at a later stage. 
On 19 November 1999, Ecuador, too, requested authorisation of retaliatory actions. This 
country is the world’s biggest Banana producer, supplying 30% of the world banana market 
in 2000, worth US$ 900 million, and is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to trade restric-
tions.200 The request for sanctions was aimed at “cross-retaliation” and was to cover specifi-
cally distribution services under GATS (distribution services sector), Article 14 (Protection 
of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisation), Article 3 (Geo-
graphical Indications) and Article 4 TRIPS (Industrial Design). Trade in goods was not tar-
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geted as Ecuador was afraid of negative effects on its own economy which might have even 
worsened the current crisis. The Netherlands and Denmark were again exempted from the 
sanctions. As the EC objected to the level of suspensions proposed by Ecuador (US $ 450 
million) and alleged a violation of the principles laid down in Article 22 (3) DSU, another 
arbitration procedure according to Article 22 (5) DSU took place, in which, on 17 March 
2000, the arbitrators reduced the amount of suspensions equivalent to the level of impairment 
suffered by Ecuador to US$ 201,6 million.201 
6. The Final Settlement of the Dispute 
To comply with the new finding, the Commission presented a new proposal,202 on 10 No-
vember 1999, containing two phases of amendments of the Banana regime, which was dis-
cussed in a controversial way and adopted with modifications by the Agricultural Council 
only in December 2000.203 Its essential features are as follows: in a first stage, three new tar-
iff contingents are to be established. Contingent A comprises 2,200,000 tonnes at a tariff of 
75 Euro per tonne. Contingent B, encompassing 352,000 tonnes also at a tariff of 75 Euro per 
tonne is a flexible contingent which can be adapted to the demand in accordance with an es-
timation of consumption (Article 27 Regulation 404/93) to be carried out in an administrative 
committee procedure. Finally, contingent C is an autonomous contingent, i.e., one not bound 
under previous GATT concessions, of 850,000 tonnes at a tariff of 300 Euros. Whereas all 
three quotas are open to bananas from any origin, ACP countries, in accordance with Article 
168 (2) Lomé IV Convention, enjoy a tariff preference both within and out of quota of up to 
300 Euro. For imports exceeding the tariff contingent, the applicable tariff is still the former 
tariff of 793 Euro per tonne, reduced to 680 Euro after 1/7/2000, minus a certain reduction to 
be calculated in a complex way on the basis of tariff bids by importers. In order to remove 
the former discriminations in the reference-year based allocation of licences found to be in 
violation of GATT and GATS, the licences are now to be allocated on a “first come, first 
served basis”. In a second stage to enter into force after 2006, the regime is to be replaced 
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entirely by a tariff-only system. However, before such a “flat tariff” can be applied, the 
Commission is to conduct negotiations with the main suppliers under Article 28 GATT, as 
the new tariff would involve a partial suspension of former GATT concessions. 
Yet, this proposal was again attacked by the US as inconsistent with the 1999 arbitration 
report. In particular, the license allocation procedure was accused of leading to ship races to 
EC harbours. However, on 11 April 2001, a compromise was achieved between the European 
Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, and the new US Trade Representative, Robert B. Zo-
ellick - old friends as the reports indicate.204 This foresees first that licences will again be al-
located on the basic of historic references. Second, in another amendment to the Council 
Regulation, the B quota will be increased by 100,000 tonnes, whereas the higher taxed C 
quota will be reduced by the same quantity and exclusively reserved to ACP origin bananas, 
subject to an Article VIII GATT waiver which the US will help the EU to achieve. In turn, 
the US suspends the sanctions imposed on EU exports as of 1/7/2001. 
Two weeks later, the dispute with Ecuador was also settled. Under this deal, country quo-
tas will be lifted, import volumes from Latin American increased by 100,000 tonnes to 
353,000 tonnes - in line with the US-EU agreement - and market access to traditional and 
non-traditional importers from Ecuador is improved. The implementing Regulation 216/2001 
based on the EU’s agreements with the United States and Ecuador was adopted by the Euro-
pean Commission on 2 May 2001. The whole new regime is scheduled to enter into force on 
1/1/2002.205  
All in all, the WTO challenges against the regime may thus be said to have been finally 
successful. This was different for national challenges by Germany and German importers as 
most of them failed. Nevertheless, they provide more interesting insights to the functioning 
of the multi-level constitutional system. 
                                                 
204
 Cf., European Commission (ed.), Press Release IP 1/562 of 11 April 2001. 
205
 Financial Times of 2/8/2001, p. 3, left column. In this article, potential problems in obtaining the Latin 
American producer countries’ consent to the waiver were reported. 
 114 
III. Challenges of the Banana Regime before European and National Courts 
1. The ECJ’s Judgement in Germany v. Council  
After the enactment of the 1993 regulation, Germany sought to have it declared void in an 
annulment action before the ECJ. In its well-known 1994 Banana judgment, the Court re-
futed the German request. Germany had invoked more than ten objections against the regula-
tion, most of which were “hopeless” from the very beginning because they were either mani-
festly unfounded or had already been in constant jurisprudence. Burdening the Court with 
these reflected a considerable degree of insensitivity and was prone to deviate the Court’s 
attention from the truly crucial issues.206 For example, it was clear that Germany could not 
reasonably invoke a violation of the objective to supply consumers at reasonable prices con-
tained in Article 33 (1) (e), EC since the development of prices in the whole internal market 
needs to be taken into account and since the objectives of Article 33 (1) EC are anyway in 
part competing so that the legislator must necessarily enjoy a considerable degree of discre-
tion in balancing them. The same is true for the objection according to which the way the tar-
iff quota is allocated to conflicts with the objective of undistorted competition laid down in 
Article 3(f) EC. Here, it was sufficient for the Court to point to Article 42 EC, according to 
which competition rules shall apply to agricultural products only to the extent determined by 
the Council within the framework of the objectives and procedures of the CAP. However, the 
substantive law objections concerning violations of fundamental rights, namely the equality 
principle, the freedom of property and the freedom to pursue a business are absolutely crucial 
and merit closer inspection. 
With respect to the objection that the establishment of a quota system and the allocation of 
the quota among the different economic operators constituted an infringement of the equality 
principle, the Court first stated:  
“(…) It is true that since the Regulation came into force those categories of economic operators 
have been affected differently by the measures adopted. Operators traditionally essentially sup-
plied by third-country bananas now find their import possibilities restricted, whereas those for-
merly obliged to market essentially Community and ACP bananas may now import specified 
quantities of third-country bananas. However, such a difference in treatment appears to be inher-
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ent in the objective of integrating previously compartmentalised markets, bearing in mind the 
different situations of the various categories of economic operators before the establishment of 
the common organisation of the market. The Regulation is intended to ensure the disposal of 
Community production and traditional ACP production, which entails the striking of a balance 
between the two categories of economic operators in question. Consequently, the complaint of 
breach of the principle of non-discrimination must be rejected as unfounded.” 
Next, the Court discarded a violation of the freedom of property in a similarly wholesale 
way:  
“Both the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business (...) are not absolute, 
but must be viewed in relation to their social function. Consequently, the exercise of the right to 
property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession may be restricted, particularly in the 
context of a common organisation of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond 
to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute a dispropor-
tionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed. The 
right to property of traders in third-country bananas is not called into question by the introduc-
tion of the Community quota and the rules for its subdivision. No economic operator can claim a 
right to property in a market share which he held at a time before the establishment of a common 
organisation of a market, since such a market share constitutes only a momentary economic posi-
tion exposed to the risks of changing circumstances. Nor can an economic operator claim an ac-
quired right or even a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being 
altered by decisions taken by the Community institutions within the limits of their discretionary 
power will be maintained, especially if the existing situation is contrary to the rules of the com-
mon market.” 
The objection based on a violation of the freedom to pursue a profession was dealt with by 
the Court in a somewhat longer passage which is nevertheless worth citing as a whole since it 
also contains arguments relevant to the context of the equality principle:  
“With reference to the alleged infringement of the freedom to pursue a trade or business, it must 
be stated that the introduction of the tariff quota and the machinery for subdividing it does in-
deed alter the competitive position of economic operators on the German market in particular, 
who were previously the only ones able to import third-country bananas free of any tariff restric-
tion, within a quota which was adjusted annually to the needs of the market. It must still be ex-
amined whether the restrictions introduced by the Regulation correspond to objectives of general 
Community interest and do not impair the very substance of that right.  
The restriction of the right to import third-country bananas imposed on the economic operators 
on the German market is inherent in the establishment of a common organisation of the market 
 116 
(...) The abolition of the differing national systems, in particular the exceptional arrangements 
still enjoyed by operators on the German market and the protective regimes enjoyed by those 
trading in Community and traditional ACP bananas on other markets, made it necessary to limit 
the volume of imports of third-country bananas into the Community. A common organisation of 
the market had to be implemented while Community and ACP bananas were not displaced from 
the entire common market following the disappearance of the protective barriers enabling them 
to be disposed of with protection from competition from third-country bananas. The differing 
situations of banana traders in the various Member States made it necessary, in view of the ob-
jective of integrating the various national markets, to establish a machinery for dividing the tariff 
quota among the different categories of traders concerned. That machinery is intended both to 
encourage operators dealing in Community and traditional ACP bananas to obtain supplies of 
third-country bananas and to encourage importers of third-country bananas to distribute Com-
munity and ACP bananas. It should also in the long term allow economic operators who have 
traditionally marketed third-country bananas to participate, at the level of the overall Community 
quota, in the two sub-quotas introduced.  
With respect in particular to the applicant' s criticism that the application of the Regulation has 
given rise to trading in import licences between traders in Community and traditional ACP ba-
nanas and traditional importers of third-country bananas, to the detriment of the latter, it must be 
noted that Article 20 of the Regulation accepts the principle that licences are transferable. The 
practical consequence of that principle is that the holder of a licence, instead of himself import-
ing and selling third-country bananas, may assign his import rights to another economic operator 
who himself wishes to import.  
The principle of transferability (...) is not peculiar to the common organisation of the market in 
bananas, but exists in other sectors of agricultural policy, in particular with respect to trade rela-
tions with non-Member countries. Moreover, the transfer of import licences is an option which 
the Regulation allows the various categories of economic operators to exercise according to their 
commercial interests. The financial advantage which such a transfer may in some cases give 
traders in Community and traditional ACP bananas is a necessary consequence of the principle 
of transferability of licences and must be assessed in the more general framework of all the 
measures adopted by the Council to ensure the disposal of Community and traditional ACP 
products. In that context it must be regarded as a means intended to contribute to the competi-
tiveness of operators marketing Community and ACP bananas and to facilitate the integration of 
the Member States’ markets. Accordingly, the restriction imposed by the Regulation on the free-
dom of traditional traders in third-country bananas to pursue their trade or business corresponds 
to objectives of general Community interest and does not impair the very substance of that 
right.” 
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Finally, the Court dealt with the alleged violation of the principle of proportionality. Sur-
prisingly, this was done not in the context of the different fundamental rights, but in a sepa-
rate paragraph:  
“The applicant also argues that the arrangements for trade with third countries are in breach of 
the principle of proportionality, in that the objectives of supporting ACP producers and guaran-
teeing the income of Community producers could have been achieved by measures having less 
effect on competition and on the interests of certain categories of economic operators. 
It should be pointed out in this respect that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy 
the Community legislature has a broad discretion which corresponds to the political responsibili-
ties given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty. The Court has held that the lawfulness of a 
measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate 
having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue. More spe-
cifically, where the Community legislature is obliged, in connection with the adoption of rules, 
to assess their future effects, which cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criti-
cism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the 
time of the adoption of the rules in question (...) 
The Court' s review must be limited in that way in particular if, in establishing a common or-
ganisation of the market, the Council has to reconcile divergent interests and thus select options 
within the context of the policy choices which are its own responsibility. In the present case, it 
became apparent from the oral argument presented to the Court that the Council inter alia had to 
reconcile the conflicting interests of some Member States which produce bananas and were con-
cerned that their agricultural population living in economically less-favoured regions should be 
able to dispose of produce of vital importance for them and thus avoid social problems and of 
other Member States which do not produce bananas and were primarily concerned to ensure that 
their consumers were supplied with bananas on the best price terms and had unlimited access to 
third-country production. 
The Federal Republic of Germany submits that less onerous measures, namely a more extensive 
system of aid for Community and ACP producers coupled with a system of levies on imports of 
third-country bananas serving to finance that system of aids, would have made it possible to 
achieve the objective pursued. 
While other means for achieving the desired result were indeed conceivable, the Court cannot 
substitute its assessment for that of the Council as to the appropriateness or otherwise of the 
measures adopted by the Community legislature if those measures have not been proved to be 
manifestly inappropriate for achieving the objective pursued. 
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The applicant has not shown that the Council adopted measures which were manifestly inappro-
priate or that it carried out a manifestly erroneous assessment of the information available to it at 
the time when the Regulation was adopted (...) Nor is it clear that the alternative measures sug-
gested by the applicant are suitable for achieving the objective of the integration of markets, 
which is the basis of any common organisation of a market.  
It follows that the complaints of breach of the right to property, disregard of acquired rights, in-
fringement of the freedom to pursue a trade or business and failure to comply with the principle 
of proportionality must likewise be rejected as unfounded. 
This massive criticism that this rather lax protection of human rights by the ECJ provoked 
may best be shown in an analysis of subsequent jurisprudence. 
2. Subsequent Jurisprudence 
The procedural complexity, the incisive economic impact of the Regulation on importers, 
and its unconditional approval by the ECJ generated a huge amount of litigation of which 
only two important “sagas” will be presented here.207  
a) The T-Port Cases 
The German import company T. Port started a true judicial cavalcade before national and 
European courts. In the first case, he had asked for additional licences for the time after 1993, 
exceeding the contingent fixed in the Banana regulation, for reasons of hardship. This request 
was based on the contention that its imports during the reference years for the allocation of 
the quota had been exceptionally low due to the economic breakdown of a producer. If the 
number of licences were not increased, the importer claimed to face bankruptcy. The request 
was first rejected by the Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Frankfurt and, on ap-
peal, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Higher Administrative Court) Kassel.208 These courts re-
futed the plaintiff’s arguments according to which the Banana regulation was inapplicable 
since it exceeded the limits to European law set by the Grundgesetz, as interpreted in the 
Maastricht Judgement of the Constitutional Court.209 
The plaintiff successfully challenged, still in interim proceedings, these decisions before 
the BVerfG, claiming that they infringed fundamental rights. The latter court’s decision, a 
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brief chamber decision taken by three judges, is highly interesting as it tries to avoid any con-
flict with European law by resolving the case exclusively under German law. The ruling is 
based on the freedom of property granted by Article 14 GG and the right to effective judicial 
protection enshrined in Article 19 (4) GG. According to constant jurisprudence, the latter 
also encompasses the right to be granted interim measures, particularly if the applicant is in 
danger of bankruptcy. In the Constitutional Court’s view, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had 
violated these rights by ignoring that the Banana Regulation, on the assumption that it is to 
be considered as valid under constitutional law, left space for hardship measures. Thus, this 
Court managed to avoid, at least on the surface, any conflict by not addressing at all the 
plaintiff’s argument that the Regulation would be ultra vires on constitutional grounds. How-
ever, even though its result may appear plausible, the ruling circumvents the application of 
EC law without any visible justification: first, the admissibility of an interim measure would 
have had to be assessed in the first place under Community law, in particular under Article 
186 EC, and not under a national constitutional provision. Indeed, the Verwaltungsgericht-
shof had examined this question and found that the Community law requirements to grant 
interim relief were not fulfilled; therefore, the Constitutional Court’s ruling seems, indeed, to 
presuppose logically the primacy of the Article 19 IV Grundgesetz over EC law, or at least a 
“constitutional-consistent” interpretation of EC law.210 Similarly, if supremacy of EC law 
were to be taken seriously, the freedom of property and its scope of protection would have 
had to be dealt in its European, not national, version.211 
Having been ordered by the Constitutional Court to re-examine the case, the Verwal-
tungsgerichtshof now granted additional licences for 2,500 tonnes in 1995 at a tariff of 75 
ECU per tonne by way of interim measures. At the same time, it referred to the ECJ the ques-
tions of whether, as the BVerfG had suggested, the Commission was actually obliged to grant 
relief for hardship cases pursuant to Article 16 III and Articles 27 and 30 of the Regulation, 
and whether national courts would be allowed to grant interim measures before such action 
was taken by the Commission.  
In its judgment T. Port I of 26 November 1996212, the Court answered that Article 30 (not 
Article 16 III) of the Regulation could, indeed, serve as a legal basis for hardship measures. 
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These would need to be granted by the Commission in the event that an importer suffered 
problems due to a low allocation of licences on the basis of economic anomalies in reference 
years for which he was not to be held responsible. Moreover, the ECJ held that the Commis-
sion’s jurisdiction for these measures was exclusive and that national courts were not allowed 
to grant interim relief themselves. The plaintiff’s only possibility would, therefore, be to 
challenge a Commission decision, or the omission of such in due time, before the Commu-
nity courts. The grant of interim measures by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof was thus found il-
legal, without however any immediate consequences, in that the case had become moot. 
While the references were still pending before the ECJ, the extra licences granted by the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof had already been exhausted, and the plaintiff started other proceed-
ings against the custom administration. Proving that he was already indebted by approxi-
mately 1,7 Million DM and that he would otherwise face immediate bankruptcy, he sought to 
achieve permission to import Dollar bananas without any licences and free of customs 
charges from the Hauptzollamt (customs administration) Hamburg and the Bundesfinanzmin-
isterium (federal ministry of finance). After this request had been denied, he seized the 
BVerfG by way of Verfassungsbeschwerde (individual constitutional complaint).213 In a deci-
sion of 26 April 1995, the BVerfG declared this complaint inadmissible, because the ordinary 
remedies before the finance courts had not been exhausted. However, the Court stated by 
way of an obiter dictum that it might be possible that the competent finance courts might 
temporarily suspend the application of provisions of the Regulation on account of the import 
regime’s potential incompatibility with GATT, which might be relevant under Article 234 
(new 307) EC214 - an argument which had not yet been considered by the ECJ. 
Following the Constitutional Court’s decision, the plaintiff successfully challenged the 
customs authorities’ decision before the Finanzgericht (finance court) Hamburg, by which it 
was granted interim measures against the fiscal administration’s refusal of imports of Dollar 
bananas without licences and free of duties.215 This Court acknowledged a “dominant prob-
ability” that the plaintiff would enjoy a right to import a certain quantity of Dollar bananas at 
a duty of 20% per tonne, which the Court agreed to convert to 75 ECU per tonne. This result 
was based on Article 234 EC, according to which the GATT – as interpreted by the first Ba-
                                                 
213
 Reported in EuZW 1995, 412f. 
214
 As authority, the Court quoted Ch. Vedder, in Grabitz/Hilf (eds.), Kommentar zum EGV, Art. 234 no. 5. 
215
 Reported in EuZW 1995, 413. 
 121 
nanas panel which had found violations of Articles 1, 2 and 3 - would take precedence over 
secondary EC Law. Under Article 234 (new 307) EC, Member States are justified in not ap-
plying secondary law incompatible with obligations arising out of international treaties con-
cluded prior to the EC Treaty.  
At the same time, the Finanzgericht court referred several new questions to the ECJ. The 
first question regarded the previously mentioned interpretation of Article 234 EC and the 
status of GATT in the Community legal order. The second question raised the issue of the 
validity of Regulation 478/95, since the finance court suspected a violation of the equality 
principle contained in Articles 39 and 42 EC and Article 13 GATT. The third question, con-
ditional to a positive answer to the first two questions, concerned the issue of the invocability 
of GATT provisions by Community citizens. The finance court found that, following the 
constitutional court’s obiter dictum, it had the competence to decide in a procedure for in-
terim relief on the conflict between Community secondary legislation and the international 
law obligations of the Federal Republic under the GATT. Moreover, the right to effective 
judicial protection contained in Article 19 IV GG presupposed that Community citizens may 
invoke certain GATT provisions. For otherwise, a judicial scrutiny of the GATT-
compatibility of the Banana regime would not be possible at all, which would result in a lack 
of judicial control, as the possibility of invoking GATT provisions as “paramètre de légalité” 
had already been denied to the Federal Republic in the Banana judgment. Finally, the Court 
stated that, after the ECJ’s reply to the reference question, it might have to verify if the 
Community banana regime was constitutionally ultra vires according to the principles estab-
lished by the BVerfG in the Maastricht judgment216 and refer the case to this Court.217 
However, the decision to grant interim relief - not the reference to the ECJ - was quashed 
on procedural grounds by the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Finance Court) following the appeal 
by the custom authorities. The Bundesfinanzhof held that an “anticipated” interim order such 
as the one granted by the Finance Court was procedurally impossible, but that this order 
might still be granted at a later stage through the suspension of the enforcement of a tariff 
decision. Following the appeal decision, the custom authorities claimed that the importer had 
to pay the punitive tariff for imports exceeding the quotas fixed in the Banana regulation, i.e., 
the amount of 850 ECU per tonne. Upon a new request of the plaintiff, the Finanzgericht 
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suspended the payment of the tariffs until such time as it had received the ECJ’s decision on 
the preliminary ruling mentioned earlier. This decision was once again appealed against by 
the customs authorities. This time, however, the Bundesfinanzhof upheld the lower court’s 
ruling.218 It fully confirmed the Finanzgericht’s view of the potential supremacy of GATT by 
virtue of Article 234 (new 307) EC. Elaborating on the latter’s reasoning, it added that the 
direct effect of GATT provisions might not even be relevant, since even a not directly appli-
cable international norm might have to be considered ex officio on account of the legality 
principle. 
The Finanzgericht’s reference was answered on 10 March 1998 by the ECJ in the T. Port 
II judgment. First, as to the effect of the GATT, the ECJ held that Article 234 EC did not ap-
ply to the present case. This was motivated by the reasoning that this provision would guar-
antee only pre-existing rights of a foreign State. However, Ecuador, the country of origin of 
the bananas in the case at issue, had joined the GATT/WTO system only in 1996, which ex-
cluded any pre-existing rights to be invoked under Article 234 (new 307) EC.219 As a conse-
quence of this finding, the question on the internal status of GATT was no longer directly 
relevant for the decision, and the ECJ left it open. With respect to the second question, the 
validity of the above-mentioned framework agreement with some Latin American countries 
in general and the exemption of B-group importers from licensing requirements (which led to 
a price advantage of about 33% as compared to A and C group importers), the ECJ first up-
held the allocation of 50% of the third countries’ tariff quota to the parties to the agreement, 
since, under Community law, no equal treatment duty would exist in respect of third coun-
tries. Moreover, in so far as a different treatment of third countries also entailed, as an 
“automatic” consequence, a different treatment of Community importers trading with these 
countries, this would be justified as well. However, this “automatic different treatment” was 
not found with respect to the granting of export licences. As expounded above, when import-
ing bananas from the parties to the agreement, A and C importers were required to present 
licences whereas B importers were exempt from this duty. According to the Court, this dif-
ferent treatment amounted to a violation to the principle of equality set forth in Article 40 (4) 
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3 EC, since it was not motivated by the objective of market integration and since the Council 
had not presented sufficient grounds of justification for it. This finding was repeated in the 
judgment Germany v. Council220 given on the same day, and led to a certain assouplissement 
of the conflict as a whole. 
However, T. Port’s legal resources were not yet exhausted. After the ECJ’s decision in T. 
Port I of 26 November 1996, in which Article 30 Banana Regulation was found to constitute 
a legal basis for hardship measures, T. Port tried to use this possibility and, in December 
1996, asked once more for the granting of additional licences on account of unusual difficul-
ties encountered with Latin American suppliers during the reference years relevant for the 
allocation of its individual import quotas (Article 19 (2) Regulation) before 1993. Since the 
request was not answered by the Commission in the next two months, the plaintiff filed an 
action for failure to act pursuant to Article 175 (ex 232) EC. On 9 July 1997, the original ap-
plication was dismissed by the Commission on the ground that sufficient grounds for hard-
ship measures, and in particular also for the lack of negligence on the part of the applicant, 
had not been offered. This decision was challenged by the importer, but upheld by the CIF in 
its T. Port III judgment of 28 March 2000.221  
In this judgment, the conditions for hardship orders were assessed so narrowly that the firm’s 
complaint had no chance from the outset. Thus, difficulties based on disruptions to agreements 
with producers that arose only after the adoption of the Regulation were rejected without exam-
ining any infringements of fundamental rights as a basis for hardship orders on the mere ground 
that these were not difficulties inseparably connected with the transition from the old to the new 
regimes.222 The effectiveness of legal protection in relation to hardship applications also leaves 
much to be desired. The description of the position in the T. Port III judgment223 speaks for it-
self: “by registered letter of 16 December 1996…the plaintiff [against the background of threat-
ening bankruptcy, C.S.] applied to the Commission for speedy adoption of a hardship measure, 
specifically the issue of additional import certificates for third-country bananas under the cus-
toms quota. Since the Commission did not respond to this application over the next two months, 
the plaintiff lodged a complaint for omission, by letter received on 27 February 1997…pursuant 
to Article 175 [old version]….by decision of 9 July 1997, the Commission rejected the applica-
tions made by the plaintiff by letter of 16 December 1996.” In the context of this litigation, one 
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may, indeed, ask whether, on account of the long period of time which elapsed before the Com-
mission’s answer to the request for hardship measures, the right to effective legal protection 
granted in national constitutional law (Article 19 (4) GG) is still sufficiently protected. 
On the whole, with the softening of the ECJ’s Banana jurisprudence in T. Port II and the 
1998 amendments to the import regime, T. Port’s problems seem to have been resolved, and 
at the time of writing no more actions are pending before European courts. 
b) The Atlanta Cases 
The Atlanta company established at Bremen is a traditional importer of tropical fruit.224 
After the establishment of the new Banana regime, Atlanta’s imports had decreased, without 
any transitional periods and permanently, by 50%. Like T. Port, Atlanta was not able to sub-
stitute the amount of imports in dollar bananas that it had been deprived of under the new 
regime by the import of EC or ACP bananas, since such bananas were not available in suffi-
cient quantities on the market, their producers being linked to other distributors by long-term 
contracts. The sudden decrease in supplies entailed the consequence that the complainant 
could no longer use his infrastructure (transport, cooling and ripening devices) built up in the 
course of decades in an economically viable way. As a result, several hundreds of workers 
were made redundant, and 8 out of 40 branch establishments were closed. Since the mini-
mum capacity of the firm’s infrastructure was not ensured, Atlanta plausibly alleged that it 
would face imminent dangers of bankruptcy. 
After the request for additional licences for the year 1993 (exceeding the contingent fixed 
in the Banana regulation) had been refused by the Bundesamt für Landwirtschaft und 
Ernährung (federal agency for agriculture), the importer challenged these decisions before 
the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt. Sharing the plaintiff’s objections on the compatibility of 
the import regime with European primary law and national constitutional law, the Verwal-
tungsgericht continued to raise doubts on the validity of the Regulation even after the ECJ’s 
Banana judgment. Therefore, by way of interim measures, the Verwaltungsgericht ordered 
the national administrative agency to grant additional licences to the plaintiff. At the same 
time, it referred the questions to the ECJ of whether the Regulation was valid in particular in 
respect of Article 190 EC (since the Council had not motivated the increase of the import tar-
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iff and the allocation of the tariff quota), and whether and under which conditions a national 
court might grant interim measures against EC legislation upon whose validity it had doubts.  
The ECJ answered these references in the two fundamental Atlanta judgments of 
9/11/1995.225 As regards the first question, the ECJ confirmed its findings in the 1994 Ba-
nana judgment, and added that the motivation of the Regulation was sufficient as its essential 
objectives were plain from the its preamble, the general factual context and other EC legisla-
tion. As regards the second question, the ECJ, elaborating on its earlier jurisprudence in 
Zuckerfabrik,226 found that a national court may suspend the effect of EC legislation, but only 
under certain narrow conditions. First, the national court must have considerable doubt as to 
the validity of the Community act and refer any question of validity which has not yet been 
answered by that court to the ECJ. Second, the decision must be urgent in the sense that the 
temporary order is necessary in order to avoid the applicant suffering severe and irreparable 
damage. Third, the national court must adequately take the interests of the Community into 
account. Fourth, in the examination of all prerequisites, the national court must pay attention 
to the standing caselaw of both the ECJ and the Court of First Instance on the legality of 
regulations or a decisions. 
Having received these answers, the Verwaltungsgericht continued to share the plaintiff’s 
objections with respect to the Banana regulation’s compatibility with German constitutional 
limits to European law as interpreted in the Maastricht decision of the Constitutional Court. 
Thus, this Court now referred the matter to the BVerfG for constitutional control in analogous 
application of Article 100 GG. In substance, the Verwaltungsgericht endorsed the main 
points of criticism raised in the literature227 and found that the hard core of the principle of 
equality, the freedom of property, and the freedom to pursue a business had been infringed 
by the Banana regulation. First, with respect to the objection of discrimination, the formula 
used by the ECJ in which “those formerly obliged to market essentially Community and ACP 
bananas may now import specified quantities of third-country bananas” is criticised as highly 
ambiguous and incomplete. In particular, it hides that, in the repartition of the quota for Dol-
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lar Bananas, the reservation of a high percentage of it (30%) to a group of operators who 
were not previously engaged in trade with third country imports in any way, is completely 
unusual and evidently discriminatory. It was clear to all participants without any prognostic 
assessment of future developments that in the lack of long-term relationships with the pro-
ducers, the quotas of Dollar bananas granted to EC/ACP operators could not be used, but 
would instead be sold to traditional operators of such bananas. Thus, the result of a “pure and 
arbitrary financial transfer from one group of operators to another” was undeniable and ap-
parently accepted by the Community institutions, including the Court.228 Contrary to what 
may be inferred from the Banana judgment, it is rather obvious that such financial transfer 
was by no means necessary to integrate the market. 
This reasoning with respect to the freedom of property and the freedom to pursue a busi-
ness was found to contain important weaknesses, too. While it is generally accepted even by 
most national constitutions that the subsistence of market shares cannot be claimed, and that 
no legitimate expectations with respect to existing market situations can be recognised, real 
property investments in the producing countries and domestic ports and distribution networks 
were also threatened here. In particular, the sudden and forced limitations on imports at rea-
sonable tariffs without transitional periods, which put the plaintiff in danger of bankruptcy, 
were prone to affect the very substance of the right or property.229 What is more, even though 
the Court mentioned in abstracto limitations on legal interventions (“disproportionate and 
intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed”), it did not 
balance in concreto the intensity of the impact of the Community measures on the vested 
rights of the economic operators on the one hand, and the necessity of the measures for the 
public interest on the other. According to general methodological standards recognised also 
under Community law, such a balancing analysis should, however, have been an integral part 
of the proportionality test. The Court’s deference to the Community legislator’s political dis-
cretion leads not only to the limitation of judicial review to manifestly inappropriate meas-
ures in view of the objectives pursued by the legislator, which are again uncritically ap-
proved; moreover, the complainant is allocated the burden of proof as to the superiority of 
the suggested alternatives. A legitimate proportionality check would, however, require the 
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Community legislator’s political discretion to be treated as entirely irrelevant; only the justi-
fication of the measures should be taken into account – and such justification should be veri-
fied by the Court according to objective and neutral standards.230 As Ulrich Everling con-
vincingly stated, submitting the principle of proportionality to the discretion of the institu-
tions in the way the Court has done grants them a carte blanche and reduces judicial control 
to a minimum.231 This may be argued to frustrate the intrinsic function of the proportionality 
principle which is to prevent excessive intrusions into subjective freedom rights and, more 
generally, to contain public power, thus ultimately contributing to the separation of powers 
by subjecting the legislature to a neutral judicial control. The conclusion which seems to un-
derlie the Verwaltungsgericht’s reference was, to put it brutally, that the ECJ behaved as the 
Council’s and the Commission’s “house court” rather than as a true constitutional court 
which takes its mandate to defend individual rights in a credible way seriously.232  
3. The BVerfG’s Banana Decision 
The answer to the Verwaltungsgericht’s reference by the Constitutional Court was given 
only after nearly four years when the judge rapporteur of the Maastricht Judgement, Paul 
Kirchhof, had already been succeeded by Judge Siegfried Broß. In its decision of 7 June 
2000, the BVerfG rejected the Verwaltungsgericht’s submission as inadmissible in a tone 
strongly critical of the lower court.233 The pertinent reasoning, which takes national constitu-
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tional law conflict avoiding capacities to an extreme,234 runs as follows: while the Verwal-
tungsgericht had set out its view of the unconstitutionality of the regulation in a way which 
met the requirements of Article 80(2) BVerfGG (Federal Constitutional Court Act), the spe-
cial admissibility conditions for submitting provisions of Community law had, however, not 
been met.235 These followed from the Solange II decision, from which the BVerfG had not, 
contrary to the administrative court’s view, deviated in the Maastricht judgment, and also 
from Article 23 GG. According to these, the BVerfG would no longer exercise its jurisdiction 
over the application of Community secondary law as long as the EC, in particular ECJ case 
law, in general guarantees effective protection of fundamental rights against the power of the 
Communities in a way to be regarded as essentially equivalent to the fundamental-rights pro-
tection mandatorily required in each field by the Grundgesetz, and also generally guarantees 
the essential content of the fundamental rights. The concept of the co-operative relationship 
introduced in the Maastricht judgment showed no differences from this. A submission was 
accordingly admissible only where departure from these preconditions could be shown. This 
called for a comparison of fundamental-rights protection at national and Community level, as 
the BVerfG had undertaken in the Solange II decision.236 This was, however, lacking in the 
case at hand. 
Furthermore, according to the BVerfG, the T. Port I decision, which had been taken in the 
meantime,237 was susceptible to refute the thesis of a negative fundamental-rights develop-
ment in the EU, since, therein, the Commission was obliged to take all the transitional meas-
ures regarded as necessary.238 These were intended to enable the problems arising after the 
introduction of the common market organisation to be solved provided that they nonetheless 
had their origin in the situation of the national markets prior to the adoption of the regulation. 
The administrative court ought, at the latest after the BVerfG’s pointer to this judgment in its 
letter of 26 March 1997, to have recognised the inadmissibility of its submission and ought to 
have withdrawn it.  
The answer by the administrative court’s presiding judge was, first, reproached of being formally 
incorrect since not he alone but only the whole chamber could accompany and alter the submis-
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sion decision until the BVerfG’s decision. Secondly, the statements were wrong in content. The 
presiding judge had answered that Article 30 of the banana regulation offered no means to re-
move the fundamental-rights infringements since the severity was not random but desired by the 
framers of the regime. Unlike in T. Port I, the plaintiffs did not ask for the setting of a different 
reference period for the import licenses due to them, but, instead, requested a general increase in 
the reference quantities in order to remove hardship associated with the introduction and alloca-
tion of the customs quota in general. Accordingly, this ultimately concerned not an individual 
case but hardship necessarily associated with the preferential treatment for EC and ACP bananas, 
and equally affected all German importers. These statements, according to the BVerfG, were in 
contradiction with the grounds in the submission decision, complaining mainly of the absence of 
transitional measures.  
Finally, the BVerfG took no position at all regarding the constitutional implications of 
GATT/WTO law. 
4. Critical Analysis 
Commenting upon the “appeasement-type” reception of the ECJ Banana jurisprudence by 
the BVerfG, one may cast considerable doubt on whether European law actually offers a suf-
ficient standard of hardship relief as alleged by the BVerfG (a), and whether this court’s self-
restraint regarding constitutional review of European law is compatible with the Grundgesetz 
and a suitable means to guarantee the respect of human rights by the EC more generally (b). 
Against, this background, the practical consequences of the BVerfG’s decision may be ana-
lysed (c), and some conclusions for an alternative approach may be drawn (d). 
a) The European Law Side: Effective Redress for Encroachments of Fundamental 
Rights through Hardship Relief Applications? 
Whilst the BVerfG could probably have declared the submission moot under procedural 
law as the Banana regime had been fundamentally changed in 1998,239 from a substantive 
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law perspective the Verwaltungsgericht’s reasoned assessment of the fundamental rights was 
very convincing and hardly needs to have anything added to it in terms of content.240 What 
one is dealing with here is, in fact, textbook cases of fundamental-rights infringements, 
which could scarcely occur more clearly in conditions of rule-of-law, i.e., in the absence of 
situations where the administration of justice and the protection of rights come to a stop - an 
assessment expressed, in similar terms, by former ECJ judge Ulrich Everling.241 
 It is accordingly relevant whether - as indicated by the BVerfG - the ECJ decision in 
T. Port I previously mentioned can alter this constitutional assessment. The answer is, how-
ever, no doubt negative, in view of the narrow sphere of application and the careless treat-
ment of hardship applications pursuant to Article 30 of the regulation by the European bod-
ies. As already described by the presiding judge of the administrative court, such applications 
are by no means, contrary to the BVerfG’s presentation, admissible for all transitional prob-
lems associated with introduction of the new market organisation, but solely for those trace-
able to extreme disruptions during the reference years prior to the adoption of the relevant 
market regulation for the allocation of licences. These difficulties must additionally be in-
separably connected with the transition from national regulations to the new regime and must 
not be traceable to lack of care by the market participants concerned either.242 The burden of 
proof for the meeting of all these conditions is on the firm.243  
As reported, the only decision, not even addressed by the BVerfG, on hardship provisions, 
the judgment by the Court of First Instance of 28 March 2000, T. Port III, assessed the condi-
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tions for hardship orders so narrowly that the firm’s complaint had no chance from the outset. 
Thus, difficulties based on disruptions to agreements with producers that arose only after 
adoption of the regulation were rejected without testing for any infringements of fundamental 
rights as a basis for hardship orders on the mere ground that they were not difficulties insepa-
rably connected with the transition from the old to the new regimes.244 The effectiveness of 
legal protection in relation to hardship applications also left much to be desired.  
These circumstances render quite illusory the assessment of the BVerfG245 that the admin-
istrative court ought, by the date of the pointer to the T. Port I decision at the latest, to have 
recognised the inadequacy of its justification for its submission, and withdrawn it. Whether 
there is, in other respects, a contradiction between the statements of the presiding judge and 
the submission decision - as alleged in the decision - seems initially irrelevant for the test by 
the BVerfG, which is not bound by the scope of review indicated in the application.246 Addi-
tionally, the presence of a contradiction does not, on closer examination, seem compelling 
either - although a more detailed explanation of the situation by the administrative court 
would have been desirable. For the administrative court’s finding that such massive interfer-
ence with ownership rights and professional freedom could, at most, have been justified if 
transitional measures had been taken does not mean that this is already the case if a legal ba-
sis for particular transitional measures is available. Instead, it is conceivable that - as stated 
by the administrative court’s presiding judge - the encroachments are so severe that they 
could not have been brought back to a constitutionally acceptable level even by transitional 
measures. This idea is even expressed explicitly by the Verwaltungsgericht in relation to the 
equality principle:247  
“whether equal treatment of both groups [of importers] could have been reached by introducing a 
transitional measure that would have allowed both groups to adjust to the new circumstances, or 
by allotting rigid quotas of EC and ACP bananas to the traditional third-country marketers, need 
not be gone into since in the chamber’s view the regulation challenged, which does not provide 
for such measures, infringes the plaintiff’s fundamental rights under Article 3(1) of the Grundge-
setz.”  
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In the upshot, the BVerfG itself should have examined whether the recognition of a legal 
basis for particular transitional measures could have changed the constitutional assessment. 
In view of the massive fundamental-rights infringements and the shortcomings in dealing 
with hardship applications, the bare statement that the administrative court “could not, 
against the background of the T. Port I decision of the ECJ, deduce a general fall in the fun-
damental-rights standard in its case law” is not persuasive.248 
b) The Restriction of the BVerfG’s Power of Review 
 In general respects, the statement that the Maastricht judgment has not departed from 
the Solange II decision in respect of the BVerfG’s power of review in the fundamental-rights 
area meets with no objection. For the formula of co-operative relations between the BVerfG 
and the ECJ introduced in the Maastricht judgment was in fact described there in direct refer-
ence to the Solange II case law to the effect that the ECJ would guarantee fundamental-rights 
protection in each individual case, while the BVerfG could confine itself to the general guar-
antee of the fundamental-rights protection mandatorily required by the Grundgesetz.249 Ac-
cordingly, the BVerfG would again exercise its competence in the fundamental-rights sphere 
only should the Community bodies depart again from the fundamental-rights standard at-
tained at the point of the Solange II decision. Even the publications by constitutional judges 
Dieter Grimm and Paul Kirchhof cited by the administrative court in support of the alleged 
differences between the co-operative relationship described in the Maastricht decision and 
the Solange II decision allow scarcely any other conclusion. Thus, Grimm’s article says, ver-
batim:250  
“Constitutional complaints and submissions by judges are accordingly inadmissible as long as 
breaches of fundamental rights in the individual case are asserted. They are, however, admissible 
if it is shown that the mandatory fundamental-rights standard is generally being missed. What 
that means in detail calls for further clarification…”.  
As the last sentence indicates, the real problem thus lies in specifying the formula of the 
general guarantee of fundamental rights taken as a basis in the Solange II and Maastricht 
decisions, whose absence is what leads to the activation of the review power of the constitu-
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tional court in the first place. To flesh out this formula, especially in Paul Kirchhof’s publica-
tions, there are, indeed, indications pointing in the direction of the equation between “gen-
eral” and “structural” assumed by the administrative court. Thus, as early as 1991, he had 
already mentioned three possible situations where involvement by the BVerfG might come 
into consideration:251 where protection of individual rights through Article 173 EC is inade-
quate, where particular types of fundamental rights are missing at EU level, and finally where 
the ECJ is “simply and generally” not capable of fundamental-rights protection. At least the 
first two situations are manifestly of a strongly structural nature. It seems only consistent 
from this viewpoint, too, to call any weaknesses necessarily associated with a particular me-
thodical procedure for fundamental-rights review as “structural”.252 
Even a retreat to such a review of structural flaws is not unproblematic from the viewpoint 
of the Grundgesetz. For, in principle, the BVerfG, in contrast to other constitutional or su-
preme courts such as, in particular, the US Supreme Court, is obliged by Article 92f 
Grundgesetz and Articles 90ff BVerfGG to make a fundamental-rights review in the individ-
ual case. This requirement is obviously no longer guaranteed if particular weaknesses in fun-
damental rights protection by the ECJ are assessed as mere “slips” that do not yet add up to a 
structural shortcoming; also problematic, then, is the absence of equal treatment between 
possibly completely identical first cases that are still let by as slips, and later ones that 
amount to “the last straw”. Yet, this restriction on the criteria of review could presumably 
still be justified on account of the ratio of reconciling the constitution’s pro-European orien-
tation embodied in the enabling clause on the one hand and constitutional human rights on 
the other. 
Undoubtedly, this interpretation does not allow any breach of the constitution, but instead 
calls for the creation of as considerate as possible a balance between the conflicting constitu-
tional principles; Article 23 Grundgesetz can accordingly be understood as a special “optimi-
sation formula”. Thus, while single defects in the protection of individual human rights at 
European level are still tolerable, none of these rights may be given up completely. This 
dogmatic construction was already the basis for the Solange II decision, in which the waiving 
of review in individual cases was explicitly justified by reference to Article 24 Grundgesetz 
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old version, as long as equivalent protective instruments exist at European level.253 As Peter 
M. Huber254 has shown, this outcome can be obtained still more exactly by interpreting Arti-
cle 19(II) Grundgesetz in the sense of the theory of the abstrakter Wesensgehalt (i.e., the es-
sential content of a constitutional human right, examined not in each single case, but in an 
abstract perspective encompassing all relevant cases), which can be equated with the formula 
of general guarantee of fundamental rights. In any case, however, it is the quality of protec-
tion of the individual right that is to be focused on. And as the administrative court has con-
vincingly shown, specifically the protection of the right of ownership and professional free-
dom is, in view of the numerous methodical weaknesses in fundamental-rights review, in 
structural deficit not only in the banana judgment itself but in the area of the whole of agri-
cultural market organisation law. 
Against this background, the restrictive specification of the formula of general guarantee 
of fundamental rights given in the Banana decision seems scarcely compatible any longer 
with the guarantee of the Wesensgehalt. It proves that even showing structural infringements 
of individual rights is insufficient; instead, a court making a submission must assess “the 
European legal development including ECJ case law since 1986” as a whole, and must also 
undertake an exhaustive comparison of fundamental-rights protection under national and 
European law. According to a first interpretation, this formula might allow compensation of 
the weaknesses in protecting particular rights by the strengths in the protection of others. It 
would, therefore, no longer guarantee the abstrakten Wesensgehalt of the fundamental rights 
in question. In other words, market participants severely affected in their ownership rights 
and professional freedom would see themselves being told that, for example, freedom of re-
ligion and assembly and other fundamental rights were well protected against European insti-
tutions, so that a relevant fall in the fundamental-rights standard in the context of a general 
overall view could not be assumed.255 
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This interpretation is admittedly countered by the new addition, in comparison with the 
earlier case law, on the general guarantees of fundamental rights: in that it refers to the 
“jeweils” mandatorily required standard in fundamental-rights protection”. Logically, the 
addition “jeweils” can be understood only as meaning not the individual case but, abstractly, 
the standard of protection required for each of the individual fundamental rights.256 Accord-
ingly, at any rate in the case of particular fundamental rights, the proof of structural protec-
tive deficits should suffice. The only logical difference still conceivable from the administra-
tive court’s position would, then, be that the requisite “general” proof of deficits in protection 
would have to be brought for the whole of Community law, and not only - as practised by the 
administrative court - in agricultural market organisation law. This interpretation would, ad-
mittedly, in turn, be in contradiction, to some degree, with the requirement formulated by the 
BVerfG to draw a comparison of the German and European protection of fundamental rights 
on the model of the Solange II decision, since the latter extended to more or less all funda-
mental rights. Yet, even this preferable interpretation ultimately seems scarcely compatible 
with the Grundgesetz. Since, traditionally, a great part of the property infringements com-
plained of to the ECJ have to do with agricultural market regulation law, then the abstrakter 
Wesensgehalt and thus the general protection of property would no longer be guaranteed 
even once this is structurally in deficit in (only) this area of law - as shown by the administra-
tive court. 
Both interpretations are contradicted in methodical respects, moreover, by the BVerfG’s 
statement cited, that it “would not have been possible for the administrative court, against the 
background of the ECJ’s T. Port I decision, to deduce a general fall in the fundamental-rights 
standard in its case law.” For, if the complaint of a fall in general fundamental-rights stan-
dard presupposes a (negative) overall assessment of the development since 1986, and not 
even the showing of considerable defective developments in a whole area of law such as ag-
ricultural market organisation law is enough for this, then, conversely, one single (hypotheti-
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cal) “pro-fundamental-rights” decision could not alter this overall assessment - unless differ-
ent criteria are to apply to “pro-right” and “anti-right” decisions. 
All in all, it is scarcely possible any longer to follow logically the fleshing-out of the for-
mula of the general guarantee of fundamental rights, in view of the various contradictions, so 
that its more precise content, unfortunately, remains obscure. 
c) Practical Consequences 
One immediate practical consequence of the restrictive, unclear specification of the for-
mula of general protection of fundamental rights is presumably that submission of provisions 
of Community law to the BVerfG for judicial review will scarcely be possible at all in the 
future. For the comparison of European and German fundamental-rights protection involves a 
task that can no longer reasonably be handled by a court, especially since it could easily be a 
topic for entire academic monographs.257 That the BVerfG has thrown out as inadmissible 
even the submission-decision of the Frankfurt administrative court, which was carefully 
worked out with exhaustive consideration of the literature, might, presumably, deter other 
courts from making submissions. A successful submission would thus seem conceivable at 
most where a court took up exhaustive academic preliminary work into its submission deci-
sion – a, perhaps, unusual procedure which could, undoubtedly, bring the BVerfG into fairly 
great embarrassment. Leaving this possibility aside, the Banana decision has presumably re-
duced the BVerfG’s power of review to a largely symbolic political significance - which was, 
perhaps, the court’s very intention.258 
It should be noted that the EU fundamental rights charter adopted at the end of 2000 will pre-
sumably end by making the investigation of the European fundamental-rights standard still more 
complicated. For, on the one hand, the charter is not legally-binding, while on the other, it is to 
be expected that the ECJ - as is the practice to date in respect of the constitutional traditions of 
Member States and the ECHR - will recognize individual constitutional rights listed therein as 
general legal principles of Community law; but difficulties will no doubt arise here, too, in the 
methodical quality of judicial review, something not even the charter can prescribe to the ECJ. 259 
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d) Overall Assessment and Conclusion 
The Banana decision further confirms the failure of the concept practised by the BVerfG 
since Solange I260 of, on the one hand, verbal maintenance of a general power of review, and, 
on the other, a relative degree of flexibility in cases in which it might actually have been ac-
tivated. For in its last Banana decision, the BVerfG was no longer constitutionally capable of 
giving the ECJ’s case law its blessing. In its fleshing out, the formula of “general fundamen-
tal-rights guarantee” is scarcely compatible with the Grundgesetz any longer, and not even 
internally consistent. The BVerfG has thus shown that it does not really mean to exercise its 
power of review, in the absence of having any alternative concept available. 
One explanation for this behaviour is the negative assessment, evidently shared by the 
BVerfG, of the consequences of a domestic declaration of non-applicability of Community 
legal acts. Such action would, indeed, affect the legal cohesion existentially important to the 
Community - in which political consensus is, if anything, even rarer than in nation States. If 
one constitutional or supreme court began to declare Community law non-applicable domes-
tically, it is likely that others would follow suit – the “cold war” logic of “mutually assured 
destruction” already pointed to above.261 Perhaps the least harmful consequence would be 
that the majority principle in the Council, laboriously re-introduced in the Single European 
Act, would de facto be rendered ineffectual. That these fears are widely shared is shown by 
the negative reactions, particularly of foreign observers, to the Maastricht judgment,262 which 
has brought out the possibility of national non-application of Community law more press-
ingly than did the earlier case law. In these circumstances, it is, indeed, comprehensible for 
the BVerfG not to wish to put integration at risk for a comparatively minor matter such as the 
banana market regime. Instead, clearly signalling to its own courts and also to foreign ob-
servers that it wanted to deal as little as possible with Community law seems to have been the 
preferable option. Though this retreat will no doubt have been noted with relief in many 
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quarters, the far-reaching sacrifice of fundamental-rights protection is undoubtedly an unpre-
cedentedly high price for it. It accordingly ought to be the object of academic efforts and fu-
ture BVerfG case law to develop an alternative approach which will make a certain degree of 
review over the ECJ possible, though without endangering the cohesion of the legal Commu-
nity by declaring Community law inapplicable domestically. 
IV. Evaluation of the Conflict and Conclusions for the following Analysis 
To sum up, the Banana dispute may be found to be composed of several single substantive 
and procedural conflicts. The final arbiter conflict in the EU vs. national law relationship and 
the conflict over the recognition of the WTO as a genuine legal system in its relationship 
with the EU may be characterised as procedural conflicts. By contrast, the divergences 
among the scope of economic rights and free market vs. planified sectors of the economy in 
the EU vs. national law scenario, as well as those between free trade vs. protectionism and 
universalism vs. regionalism in the WTO vs. EU scenario, are truly substantive in nature.  
In a summary evaluation of the substantive side of the conflict, it may be noted that the 
divergences among the EU and the WTO may seem to be stronger than the divergences 
among the EU and national constitutional law on the scope of economic rights and free mar-
ket vs. planified sectors of the economy. Regarding the latter, both the national and the Euro-
pean system are made up of a mixture of economic models; both of them have free market-
oriented and planified sectors in their economies, and it is mainly their more or less coinci-
dental “misfit” that gave rise to the clash in the Banana conflict: Germany preferred a free-
market system in the import of Bananas, whereas it might well opt for more planified or in-
terventionist systems in other economic areas. Whereas the dirigiste system of the Common 
Agricultural Policy is clearly an exception to the overall market-based liberal economic sys-
tem of the Community, the Grundgesetz does, by no means, exclude planified sectors of the 
economy such as agricultural market organisations; on the contrary, similar regimes have 
also existed nationally before their harmonisation at European level.263 More generally, the 
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German constitution does not contain specific overall requirements for the economy and is 
therefore interpreted as being relatively neutral in this respect. Even the current system of the 
social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) was denied constitutional status, and the 
legislator is generally accorded a great deal of discretion in economic matters by the BVerfG, 
while only extreme economic models such as a pure liberalist laissez-faire or comprehensive 
and rigid planification are constitutionally excluded.264 In line with this, the Verwaltungs-
gericht Frankfurt unproblematically presupposed the constitutionality of market organisa-
tions as dirigiste instruments in its reference decision. It even expounded that, under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the importer could have been aware of the establishment of such an 
organisation, and thus could not rely on an unlimited exercise of his commercial freedoms in 
the future. Nevertheless, the Grundgesetz’ fundamental economic rights and principles, such 
as the freedom of property, and the freedom to pursue a business on the one hand, and the 
social State principle on the other, necessarily entail important consequences for the German 
“economic constitution”. In particular, restrictions of economic freedom rights are always 
subject to rigid requirements, such as the protection of the hard core of a right and the princi-
ple of proportionality, which renders necessary inter alia periods of transition for the entry 
into force of interventionist measures. As becomes apparent from the Verwaltungsgericht’s 
reference decision, it is essentially here that the ECJ is criticised for weaknesses, and it is 
here - and not so much in the dichotomy of planified vs. free market economy - that the core 
of the substantive conflict seems to lie.265  
Notwithstanding the probably minor scope of the substantive conflict between EU and na-
tional law in comparison with the free trade vs. protectionism and the regionalism vs. uni-
versalism conflict in the EU-WTO relationship, both substantive conflicts, to a significant 
degree, endanger the effective relationship among the three constitutional levels. As regards 
                                                                                                                                                       
from certain dairies which were again locally determined by the authorities. These restrictive provisions were 
repeatedly challenged without success before administrative courts and occasionally even before the constitu-
tional court. In many decisions, administrative courts justified the restrictions on farmers, milk traders and proc-
essors on account of public health rationales, in particular, the effective supply of this important product in cit-
ies. On this basis, even rationales such as the amortisation of investments of individual dairies were held to 
override the claims of farmers against the obligation to supply a certain dairy which paid less than others.  
264
 See BVerfGE 4, 7 (1954); BVerfGE 25, 1 (1968); BVerfGE 30, 292 (1971); BVerfGE 50, 290 (1978). 
265
 Even though this has not been discussed by national courts, the effectiveness of human rights protection - 
protected by Article 19 (4) Grundgesetz - may be a problem as well. Thus, as reported, in the Atlanta case, no 
answer was given by the Commission to an urgent request for an interim order.  
 140 
potential solutions, there are no ready made conflict rules that indicate what principles and 
values should take priority over others. Instead, all the principles and values involved enjoy a 
significant degree of legitimacy – even protectionism when the survival of important parts of 
the domestic industry is at stake – and none of them can be easily sacrificed.  
What is more, divergences among value perceptions and priorities are, to a certain extent, 
even unavoidable between three different constitutional systems based on different premises 
and objectives, and monitored by different judicial organs. Acceptable solutions may, there-
fore, only be achieved through careful and sensitive balancing of competing values and prin-
ciples on a case-to-case basis. It is obvious that the procedural framework for conflict resolu-
tion becomes decisive under these conditions. It is precisely here that the shortcomings of the 
current interconnections between the systems which surfaced in the Bananas dispute – the 
last arbiter question and the non-recognition of GATT/WTO as a legal system – come to 
bear. And, fortunately enough, such procedural weaknesses should be easier to remedy than 
clashes among substantive values which are generally more deeply embedded in national sys-
tems. This confirms the importance of the central task of this thesis, namely, to establish a 
functioning interconnection between the three constitutional systems. 
To overcome the current deadlocks in the interconnection of the three systems, the forego-
ing analyses have repeatedly shown that doctrinal possibilities are quite limited. Thus, in the 
EU vs. national law final arbiter conflict, the positions of both sides were logically perfectly 
consistent from the internal perspective of each of them, and the supremacy and final arbiter 
claims of both sides had to be acknowledged as equally coherent and cogent. The conflict 
was, therefore, ascribed strong structural features, which limited the potential of classic doc-
trinal devices from the very outset. Yet, both the doctrinal solutions currently available, the 
BVerfG’s constant threat to set aside a European act as unconstitutional – read by many into 
the BVerfG’s Maastricht decision –, and the far-reaching judicial self restraint displayed in 
the last Banana decision, needed to be criticised as being far from ideal. Whereas the former 
scenario always implied the “mega-accident” of the breakdown of the Rule of Law, the cur-
rent scenario renounces any national constitutional control on the protection of human rights 
at EC level, which might, however, be said to be badly needed in view of the substantively 
and methodologically unsatisfactory human rights protection granted by the ECJ in Bananas 
and elsewhere. As both the solutions currently available are thus inadequate, any promising 
attempts to resolve or alleviate the conflict need to transcend the internal doctrinal perspec-
tives of each legal order and to review the theoretical premises of the positions involved. 
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A very similar conclusion may be reached for the interconnection between WTO and EU 
law. As outlined, the current jurisprudence of the ECJ, in particular in Bananas and in Portu-
gal vs. Council, may be criticised in many doctrinal respects. Thus, it was argued that it is 
barely compatible with Article 300 (7) (ex 228 (7)) EC, according to which international 
agreements entered into by the EC are binding on Member States and EC institutions alike – 
which, in a Community based on the Rule of Law, should also be read as requiring judicial 
control. What is more, the legality of the different treatment of the EC and its Member States 
with respect to the direct effect question may be questioned – as reported, the ECJ approved 
an infringement procedure against Germany in order to stop the breach of obligations deriv-
ing from the GATT ’47 Dairy Agreement, without examining their direct effect at all, 
whereas it discarded annulment actions by Member States on account of the alleged lack of 
direct effect of WTO law.266  
Yet, the language of the judgment, in particular the emphasis on traditional public interna-
tional law notions such as reciprocity and the scope of manoeuvre of the legislative or execu-
tive organs, clearly indicates that the ECJ seems to care less about perfect doctrinal consis-
tency or even the constitutional equilibrium among the EC and its Member States than about 
the Community’s sovereign power in external trade policy. All this shows the ECJ adhering 
to the traditional “realist” vision of international trade relations, in which sovereign States 
interact in an anarchic and power-oriented way. Consequently, a critique may most power-
fully challenge not the Court’s doctrinal inconsistencies, but this theoretical vision itself.  
On these grounds, the following analysis will transcend the internal perspectives of each 
legal order and adopt an overall perspective of the status and functions of the three constitu-
tional systems as suggested by democratic, constitutional and legal-structural theories. This 
analysis will aim to flesh out a theoretical framework capable of providing normative guide-
lines for interconnecting the three constitutional levels in an effective, legitimate and mutu-
ally reinforcing way. 
                                                 
266
 See Case C-61/1994, International Dairy Agreement, [1996] ECR I-1996, 3989.  
 142 
Part II: A Theoretical Reconstruction of the Functions of the Three Levels 
“Post-enlightenment lawyers have separated social, political and moral theory from tech-
nical international doctrine… By leaving theory to others, modern lawyers accept irrele-
vance – to avoid controversy… But doctrine constantly reproduces problems which seem ca-
pable of resolution only if one takes a theoretical position. Because theory cannot be dis-
cussed in a specifically juristic way, technical competence offers no help and the lawyer’s 
very identity is imperilled.” 
Matti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argu-
ments, 1989, p. XIII, XV. 
 
For a reconstruction of the role and function of supranational regimes, a whole set of con-
stitutional theories is available.267 The starting point of the following analysis is the tradi-
tional realist model which seeks to preserve the central role and supremacy of the State even 
in the age of globalisation. At the other extreme of the scale, one may locate functionalism 
which announces an ever stronger erosion of State sovereignty on account of the delegation 
of ever more policy fields to specialised, expertocratic supranational structures to whom su-
perior technical problem-solving capacity is ascribed. Another important theory, neo-
liberalism, advocates a similar model: the supremacy of supranational regimes and their legal 
system is based on their higher capacity to achieve the paramount goal of establishing a re-
gional or even global market, characterised essentially by economic freedom rights of market 
operators and undistorted competition. The last and most promising theory, to which this the-
sis will subscribe, is that of multi-level governance. It admits neither a general preference for 
the State nor for supranational regimes, but tries to integrate both into an overall system of 
network governance. Pursuant to this theory, the delegation of policy fields to supranational 
regimes is assessed in accordance with their problem-solving effectiveness on the one hand 
and their democratic legitimacy on the other. Each of these models will be shown to provide 
for a specific version of the interconnection of the three constitutional orders. 
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Chapter I: Realism 
“Granting protection to GATT provisions within the Community legal order is detrimen-
tal, because just as military disarmament, legal disarmament, too, must be carried out in a 
reciprocal way. Unilateral concessions achieve nothing else but to provide advantages for 
disarmament’s enemies (…)” 
Jörn Sack, Commission Official268 
 
I. Conspectus 
In its classic version, realism builds on the new European order established by the West-
phalian Peace Treaties (1648), characterised by the emergence of “the State” as a transper-
sonal entity, based on a social contract among the individuals, representing a nation of peo-
ple, enjoying the dominion of a territory and pursuing exclusively its own, self-determinated 
interests – phenomena culminating in the notion of sovereignty, the State’s super-ordination 
to, and autonomy from, all other entities.269 As exemplified par excellence in the philosophy 
of Thomas Hobbes, the State perceived in this sense was understood as the sublimation of the 
crude state of nature, thus guaranteeing the security of its peoples and ensuring the preserva-
tion and expansion of its own power. 
In this perspective, international relations are constituted by the interaction of sovereign 
territorial Nation States which pursue their preferences of power accumulation and wealth 
maximisation in an anarchic and competitive international environment through strategic ra-
tional decisions, with no higher authority effectively controlling and containing them. Inter-
national politics, therefore, amount to a zero sum game over power, influence and resources. 
In this environment which obviously favours the powerful, international law is no law at all 
properly speaking; devoid of any significant degree of effectiveness, it is not able to control 
and contain the behaviour of States, but is largely reduced to a political tool for strategic ne-
gotiation in which sovereign States continuously test their powers against each other in bar-
gainings, trade-offs and sanctions, which are used as the main implementation tool. Interna-
tional organisations, which flourished from the 17th and 18th centuries onwards in the form of 
                                                 
268
 “Von der Geschlossenheit und den Spannungsfeldern in einer Weltordnung des Rechts”, EuZW 1997, 650. 
 144 
military alliances or peace orders, were viewed as devices in the power struggle among 
States compatible with their overall diplomatic strategies. However, just as with international 
law’s status vis-à-vis national law, truly effective international organisations were regarded 
as undesirable rivals of States. 
Accordingly, in the field of international trade, law and international organisations are 
conceived of as strategic devices to, put bluntly, foster market access rights abroad for do-
mestic producers and to deny them at home to foreign producers. To this end, partial liberali-
sation measures are traded against the concessions of other States. This conception may in-
clude the occasional disrespect for international law altogether when the other partners are 
not expected to react with sanctions, when a State is ready to accept such sanctions, or – un-
der more elaborate arrangements - to pay compensation. Reciprocity rationales are invoked 
as the principal external justification of such protectionist strategic behaviour. In a simplified 
perspective this primitive system may be said to have continued to exist, albeit with impor-
tant developments and exceptions, even after the Second World War under the GATT ’47. 
Thus, in the seventies and eighties, GATT’ 47 was increasingly eroded by bilateral agreements 
such as Orderly Marketing Agreements or Voluntary Restraint Agreements stipulating quantita-
tive restrictions against its wording and spirit.270 These agreements were often negotiated clan-
destinely, which led to a completely intransparent situation in which, at the end of the day, States 
could act relatively freely in a protectionist way. The EC was frequently alleged, not wrongly so 
perhaps, to be particularly fond of such bilateral agreements.271 This bias became visible once 
more in the Banana dispute when, after blocking the first panel report under the consensus rule 
of the old GATT, the Commission successfully “bought” the resistance of several South Ameri-
can Countries by allocating them special privileged quotas, and obtained a waiver for the Lomé 
Agreement which was also suspected to be in conflict with GATT. The EC’s - finally vain - re-
sistance against an upgrading of the GATT Dispute Settlement mechanism during the Uruguay 
Round may eventually be considered another expression of this overall approach. 
However, traditional realist views were challenged with the increased awareness of inter-
national interdependence, which emerged in the early seventies as a reaction to the oil crisis 
and was further stimulated by the Club of Rome’s famous report on the limits of growth pub-
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lished in 1972. The growing international interdependence was also reflected in the increas-
ing number of transnational and non-statal actors such as multi-national corporations and 
non-governmental organisations pursuing social, environmental and ethical objectives. In 
general, international relations were about to take on a more stable institutional form, charac-
terised by recognised and habitudinal patterns of co-operation with converging expectations. 
The central realist tenet, according to which international co-operation was typically based 
on a certain stable hegemonic distribution of power among States, was shaken by the prolif-
eration of international institutions following the decline in US hegemony. 
In international relations theory, developments led to the qualification and sophistication 
of realist concepts within the so-called “regime theory”. The proliferation of international 
regimes – generally defined as institutional arrangements for the collective management of 
political interdependencies in sectors which can no longer be effectively governed by States 
alone – was explained by the observation that “regimes continued in some measure to con-
strain and condition the behaviour of States towards one another, despite systemic change 
and institutional erosion.”272 This phenomenon was attributed to regimes’ functional advan-
tages: they establish common rules to guide the behaviour of other actors, thus enabling an 
upgrading of the status and role of international law and ensuring foreseeability of decisions. 
They also provide information which furthers transparency and thereby facilitates policy 
choices. Lastly, by providing a normative and institutional framework for precise and stable 
agreements, regimes decrease transaction costs in international co-operation. In sum, in a 
public economy perspective, co-operation of sovereign States in regimes was shown as a ra-
tional and cost-saving behaviour induced by nothing else but the self-interest of States. 
In a more political perspective, regimes were shown to be capable of enlarging the prob-
lem-solving capacities of States under modern societal conditions of complexity and frag-
mentation by providing them with an “extension of influence”, as it were, to the international 
plane, thus enabling them to play “two level games”:  
“At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to 
adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those 
groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments. 
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Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries 
remain interdependent, yet sovereign.”273  
The two level game pattern thus allows States to maintain their national actor perspective 
even while participating in a regime’s common institutions.274 In all this, the crucial realist 
element, the central role of State sovereignty, is still omnipresent: the sole purpose of interna-
tional regimes is to render States’ policies more effective. Thus, States remain in a dominant 
and controlling position vis-à-vis all regimes, and States may, of course, leave any of them 
whenever they wish to do so. It is against this background that the realist reading of 
GATT/WTO, the EU and their relationship with their Member States needs to be viewed. 
II. A Realist Reading of GATT/WTO 
1. Economic Explanations  
In the field of international trade, realist accounts frequently rely on economics, more spe-
cifically on classic free trade and modern political economy, to show both the virtues and the 
real-world obstacles to free trade. According to free trade theory, whose beginning is gener-
ally associated with Adam Smith’s famous Wealth of Nations (1776), free trade is always the 
better option as compared to protectionism (“mercantilism”), since it leads to real or com-
parative advantages for a particular national economy entailing increases in welfare both at 
national and global level. Whereas this conclusion is generally recognised for bilateral or 
multi-lateral trade liberalisation, the case of unilateral liberalisation appears to be far less 
clear in economic theory. The dominant view seems to be that, even if trading partners con-
tinue to shield off their internal markets by protectionist measures, an increase only in im-
ports may result in a productive specialisation in the domestic economy and, thus, in an in-
crease in overall welfare of the country in question.275 Yet, it is rather obvious that these ef-
fects may come to bear only in the long run, and presuppose that the multiple institutional, 
logistic and organisational framework conditions and resources for such a productive spe-
cialisation are actually present. 
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The last observation already gives an idea of why unilateral trade liberalisation may face 
huge political obstacles within a State. This has been explored in more detail by political 
economy (“public choice theory”).276 This theory starts from a contextual characterisation of 
national trade policy. Just as other sectoral policies, this policy is not devoted to the rather 
theoretical, abstract and hardly tangible aim of overall welfare, but instead to (partial) wel-
fare interests of certain groups in society - and predominantly those which have most politi-
cal influence. In addition, groups favouring protectionism, i.e., mainly domestic producers 
who make jobs available and largely contribute to a State’s tax revenue, often have a better 
lobby in a State than groups favouring trade liberalisation, i.e., consumers as well as import 
traders and export-oriented producers. Consumers, in particular, are generally less well or-
ganised, and thus can be disadvantaged more easily. Exporters often face considerable diffi-
culties in convincing the government and the public of their arguments in favour of liberali-
sation, since their advantages are often associated with disadvantages of domestic producers. 
Thus, liberalisation often entails the immediate loss of jobs in import-competing areas of the 
domestic industry, whereas the potential future gains in other sectors are, if any, barely 
measurable and calculable. As a result, only reciprocal trade liberalisation is normally politi-
cally acceptable. This depends, however, upon the co-operation of foreign States, which is 
normally beyond the influence of national governments. 
These circumstances explain why the theoretically best solution for everyone, trade liber-
alisation, is not necessarily the most attractive one for national politicians committed to the 
goal of being re-elected. Instead, they are often inclined to pursue a double strategy which 
consists of ensuring a maximum of exports to other countries on the one hand, and of block-
ing the domestic market as far as possible for foreign products on the other. If it actually 
worked, this strategy might, indeed, be the best solution for the State in question. However, if 
several States behave in such way, the overall result will be protectionism on all sides, which 
is the worst case for everyone. If, however, all countries opt for free trade, this situation may 
well be the best in a long-term economic perspective, but it is only the second-best in politi-
cal terms. This situation has been conceived of as a prisoner’s dilemma as described by mod-
ern game theory: each State must take its decision independently, and the value of the deci-
sion can only be assessed once the decision of the others is known. The free trade option be-
comes politically devaluated if the other party reacts in a protectionist way, in the hope that 
                                                 
276
 See, for an instructive summary, W. Meng, “Gedanken zur Frage unmittelbarer Anwendung von WTO-
 148 
no countermeasures will be taken. In turn, protectionism is only reasonable behaviour if the 
other party does not react in the same way. All in all, one party loses out in the asymmetric 
constellations (free trade vs. protectionism), but both do under symmetric protectionist condi-
tions. By contrast, both parties are relative winners under symmetric liberalist conditions, but 
possibly with slightly worse results compared to the (favourable) asymmetric constellation. 
This dilemma may be said to be the reason for the relative instability of the traditional inter-
national trade system. It entails that there is always an incentive to seek benefits at the disad-
vantage of others. Since all participants have reason to distrust one another, each participant 
will be tempted to opt unilaterally for the asymmetric constellation. If this happens on a more 
frequent basis, the participants’ distrust will become so huge that protectionism will become 
the predominant behaviour. 
2. Legal Implications 
Against this background, “realist” international lawyers have recognised the need to stabi-
lise the international trade system legally, in order to prevent States from being trapped in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, which is manifestly incompatible with the self-interest of States. Corre-
spondingly, the up-grading of the WTO from GATT ’47, in particular as regards the estab-
lishment of a more effective dispute settlement mechanism, found wide support. This not-
withstanding, GATT/WTO was denied constitutional status as a fully fledged legal system: 
in order to reserve to a State the possibility of non-compliance when paramount self-interests 
are deemed at stake, the “internalisation” of GATT/WTO law within the domestic legal sys-
tem of its Member States is refused. Specifically, refusing to play the diplomatic game by 
accepting the internal applicability (direct effect) of GATT/WTO law is alleged to result in 
an unsustainable imbalance in the internal implementation of an international agreement to 
one’s own detriment. This means that, whereas its trading partners may continue to use the 
law strategically at the sole risk of compensation claims or sanctions, a State may find its 
hands tied by its own citizens effectively enforcing international trade law before domestic 
courts. This State would thereby be deprived of the liberty of breaking international law 
when it deemed it appropriate, or to engage in diplomatic negotiation procedures with others 
whose outcomes need not necessarily be in conformity with it. As alluded to, this reasoning 
corresponds to the ECJ’s reciprocity-oriented justification for the denial of direct effect to 
WTO law in Portugal vs. Council, according to which the WTO agreements do not deter-
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mine the appropriate legal means of ensuring that they are applied in good faith in the legal 
order of the contracting parties. The additional emphasis on the Council’s and the Commis-
sion’s political scope of manoeuvring – which their foreign counterparts are alleged to enjoy 
- may be viewed in a similar light. 
3. Critique  
The realist assessment may be challenged on the ground that it underestimates the actual 
functioning of the WTO system and, therefore, prematurely gives way to alleged political 
constraints. For the reciprocity argument loses strength in particular when a politically inde-
pendent legal dispute settlement mechanism exists which may be independently initiated by 
any single State, and whose decisions are almost always obeyed and implemented by the par-
ties. Then, a major imbalance in the actual management of the parties’ obligations should no 
longer be of great concern.  
Yet, the realist concept may be reproached as an even more fundamental error: if, on ac-
count of economic globalisation, neither the problem-solving capacities of the State nor those 
of the EU are actually sufficient, but additional supranational co-ordination of trade relations 
is actually needed at global level - and the evidence shows that this is so -, the reaction can-
not be that that level’s impact on the domestic and European system should be minimised, 
which might lead to huge problems which put the Rule of Law in international trade relations 
at risk. Instead, conditions of legitimate governance should be established as far as possible 
at that level as well. The realist concept gives no answer to these questions. 
III. A Realist Reading of the EU 
Realist interpretations of the EU, focusing on the central controlling and commanding role 
of the Nation States individually within the supranational polity, are offered in a more em-
pirical and a more normative version. Whereas the first argues that Member States do actu-
ally continue to possess the leading role in the European system, the second advocates that, 
irrespective of whether this is still the case in reality, Member States should, at any rate, re-
tain or regain control over the integration process for reasons of democratic legitimacy. 
1. Analytical level  
While a functionalist reading of the European integration processed prevailed during the 
first years of the Community’s existence, an intergovernmentalist concept gained momentum 
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for the first time in French President General De Gaulles’s vision of a “Europe des Patries” 
propagated in the mid-sixties. Famously, this culminated in France’s boycott of Council 
meetings, the so-called “politique de la chaise vide”, which ultimately led to the 1966 Lux-
embourg agreement in which the unanimity principle for council decisions was de facto es-
tablished. De Gaulle’s vision clearly entailed an emphasis on the authority, political effec-
tiveness and even a kind of mystified, pre-democratic legitimacy of the Nation State, assign-
ing to the EC only a technical role of co-operation, its authority being entirely derived from 
its Member States and their peoples. Yet, these concepts remained mainly at a propagandistic 
level and aimed to justify the French political behaviour, without being analytically elabo-
rated very far. 
After a few sporadic attempts with realist flavour, such as Donald Puchala’s reconceptu-
alisation of the Community as a “system of concordance”,277 the realist reading was consoli-
dated with the extension of international relations regime theory to the Community. This ap-
proach was inaugurated by an essay by Stanley Hoffmann published in 1982278 and consecu-
tively refined in the works of Alan Milward279 and Andrew Moravsic.280 All these studies 
were premised on the fundamental observation that the Nation State, though having lost a 
great deal of its problem-solving capacities in economic, social and cultural matters due to 
the ever growing international interdependencies, continued to flourish as a centre of political 
power and a focus of its citizens’ allegiance and solidarity. This phenomenon was explained 
by re-interpreting the Community as a regime of sovereign Nations, as an institutionalised 
intergovernmental co-operation widening its Member States’ scope of manoeuvre through 
stabilising mutual relations, providing information and decreasing political, economic and 
social transaction costs by regulating certain policy fields together.  
When the integration process regained momentum in the eighties, this explanatory model 
was even extended to matters decided by majority-voting (which was reintroduced in the 
Single European Act 1986) and more generally to the functioning of the EC’s central institu-
tions such as the Commission and the EP which enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy. 
In the realist reading, though a State would occasionally be forced to act against its will, all 
                                                 
277
 D. Puchala, “Of Blind Men, Elephants and European Integration”, JCMS 10 (1972), 267. 
278
 S. Hoffman, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe today”, JCMS 20 (1982), 21 
279
 A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, 1992. 
280
 A. Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Ap-
proach”, JCMS 31 (1993), 473. 
 151 
these devices were argued to serve ultimately its interest by rendering statal policies more 
effective. The key feature on which this thesis was based was the option of enabling States to 
play “two-level games”. Such games allegedly increased the power of the executive vis-à-vis 
the national legislature, in particular by reducing its right of assay in complex legislation to 
the yes/no alternative in council decisions and treaty amendment ratification procedures. Fur-
thermore, unpopular decisions, which would not have been accepted nationally, could fre-
quently be shielded off from national discourse altogether (on account of the non-public na-
ture of Council deliberations) or, if that was not possible, at least attributed to some European 
scapegoat without damaging the government’s national reputation very much. Such strategies 
were further facilitated by the Community’s high dependence on law and legal dispute reso-
lution, as alleged legal constraints were frequently used as a tool for the de-politicisation of 
“hot issues”, with law enjoying a higher degree of legitimacy than politics in common Euro-
pean tradition. At European level, the scope of manoeuvre of national governments was wid-
ened by the possibility of designing package deals containing some “sweets” for everyone, 
and of offering, or claiming, side payments as well as other compensatory mechanisms. All 
in all, in Luhmannian terms, the main asset of the Community in the realist view was to pro-
vide an important Entlastungsfunktion (discharging function) for the Nation State.281 
If single parts are plausible, the realist interpretation of the Community may be shown to 
be too one-sided, sub-complex and therefore ill-suited to explain the integration process as a 
whole. First, even though States were important actors during all the integration process, re-
alism tends crucially to underestimate the importance of European institutions, which have 
progressively developed a life of their own, as well as the even more autonomous role of 
European law. Thus, classic literature, such as Joseph Weiler’s “The Transformation of 
Europe”, has shown that the ECJ’s “constitutionalisation” doctrines such as direct effect and 
supremacy most importantly, which were developed in an incremental and scarcely perceiv-
able way, provided extremely important framework conditions of the integration process – 
and not only were they not contemplated in the founding treaties, they were not even con-
sented to by the Member States at later stages. Indeed, Moravcsik himself has admitted that 
the phenomenon of the constitutionalisation of the treaties could no longer be explained 
meaningfully from a regime theoretical perspective, since the ensuing loss of sovereignty 
rights was simply too massive as to be rationally explained by the mutual advantages of the 
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States.282 However, following another famous essay by Joseph Weiler, it is exactly the dual-
ism between the Member State-dominated political institutions and the relative autonomy 
and strength of a directly applicable and hierarchically superior supranational legal order that 
conferred stability on the European system.283  
As regards the Commission, this institution has always had a dominant influence on the 
EC’s core competence of market regulation. This is legally due to the Commission’s monop-
oly of legislative initiative, the introduction of qualified-majority voting in the Council 
(which enabled the Commission to disrespect national minority positions), as well as its 
strong competencies in enforcement of EC law; practically, this is due to the Commission’s 
bureaucratic know-how and its central position in co-ordinating the other actors of the Euro-
pean system. In addition, more recently in the so-called “new approach” to market regulation 
started at the end of the eighties, the “dualist supranational” distinction between the Member 
States’ dominated political institutions vs. the supranational legal system’s autonomy began 
to fade even further. This became manifest with the rise of new private-public governance 
structures surrounding the Commission such as standard-setting bodies, agencies and com-
mittees, which were allocated fundamental tasks inter alia in agricultural, foodstuff, and en-
vironmental regulation. These structures have created a more political administration which 
escape dominant influence and control by Member States, the Council’s role being restricted 
to enacting framework legislation, which is often less controversial. 
To sum up these objections: if single parts of it do seem plausible and are capable of 
clearly explaining the State’s behaviour, particularly at important political junctures in the 
integration process, the realist interpretation as a whole is too one-sided, sub-complex and 
thus ill-suited to provide a convincing overall framework for the interpretation of the Euro-
pean system. In other words, if Europe promotes the scope of manoeuvre of Nation States 
and enables them to play “two level games”, this is probably not the most important part of 
the whole story. 
However, the realist interpretation of Europe does not end here. There are also important 
voices which stress that, even if, in reality, the Member States may have lost control of the 
integration process to a considerable degree, this development is normatively undesirable or 
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even dangerous on account of a lack of democratic legitimacy, and should, therefore, be 
stopped or even reversed. Among such normative perspectives, the German BVerfG’s “Sta-
atenverbund” concept spelled out in the Maastricht judgment and the scholarly concept of 
“administrative supranationalism” deserve particular attention. 
2. Normative level 
a) The “Staatenverbund” Concept 
The Maastricht judgment was rendered on an individual complaint (Verfassungsbesch-
werde) against Germany’s ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, which argued that this 
would be unconstitutional. The judgment, which was drafted by constitutional law professor 
and judge rapporteur Paul Kirchhof and, indeed, contained a somewhat diluted version of his 
views published earlier,284 confirmed and refined earlier jurisprudence on the constitutional 
limits to integration. These were found to exist in particular in the area of human rights and 
competence where the BVerfG announced the possibility of stepping in were the Community 
not to respect the indispensable minimum standard contained in the Grundgesetz. Beyond 
this, it also claimed limitations on majority decisions in the Council, arguing that the majority 
principle was limited by the principle of mutual solidarity where constitutional principles and 
elementary interests of the Member States were at stake.  
However, the main political thrust of the judgment were objections to integration derived 
from the principle of democracy which the BVerfG – faced with an individual action, for 
which the violation of an individual constitutional right needed to be invoked – addressed by 
means of a complex detour via the voting rights laid down in Article 38 Grundgesetz. Ac-
cording to this court, democracy is essentially rooted in the “people”, the demos of a Nation 
State, which constitutes a pre-democratic community of fate which shares a high degree of 
background consensus on the polity’s most important political problems. And since it is clear 
that in Europe no such relatively homogeneous spiritual, cultural and political entity exists, 
the democratic potential of Europe is regarded as limited. Accordingly, the BVerfG con-
cluded that Germany’s membership in a Community of States performing sovereign tasks 
was, of course, not excluded, but that its competencies should be limited and that the national 
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representative institutions would need to retain “a sufficient number of tasks and competen-
cies of substantial political weight”. Finally, the BVerfG manifested its views also by invent-
ing a new name for the EC. Instead of Community, it created the new term “Staatenver-
bund”, which arouses associations to the old public international law concept “Staatenver-
bund” (confederation) and whose essential content seems to lie in its unsuitability for democ-
racy.285 
Subsequently, these criticisms were taken up and refined by several authors. The German 
constitutional law scholar Marcel Kaufmann explored the consequences of the Staatenver-
bund concept for a Member State and, thus, linked it to regime theory.286 According to this 
author, it is true that the State remains the ultimate locus of democracy, so that the Commu-
nity’s powers can only be derivative; this notwithstanding, a Member State of the EC is no 
longer a classic sovereign Nation State, but a modern integrated State whose very identity is 
deeply transformed by its ideal, institutional and normative allegiance to the Community; the 
Community is thus seen as a stage in a State’s evolution. Consequently, it is not only the 
Community which shall respect the State’s identity, but also vice versa. However, if national 
sovereignty is no longer present in the Community’s daily business, it is nevertheless consid-
ered as retained in the State’s capacity to recover potentially unlimited scope of action by 
discarding European law in conflict with national constitutional law or by leaving the Com-
munity altogether. Thus, the lacuna of regime theory, the allegedly far-reaching autonomy of 
the European legal system, is claimed to be filled – albeit only by defining it away in contra-
diction with reality. 
b) Administrative Supranationalism  
Whilst it was sometimes argued that the Maastricht judgment was a typically German 
product, simultaneously reflecting at the same time a high degree of constitutional sensitivity 
and a reliance on an outdated “demos-bound” concept of democracy, similar democratic con-
cerns have also been raised more recently by the American author Peter Lindseth.287 This 
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scholar has analysed in more detail the implications of the “no-demos conception” on the le-
gitimacy of Community institutions, law and appropriate devices of control. His main reason-
ing runs as follows: whereas national administrative agents mostly enjoy implicit popular 
confidence owing to the membership in the same community, supranational governance is 
deprived of the cultural, social and historical underpinnings of the modern administrative 
State. This lack renders supranational governance fragile, and continually exposed to the 
threat of social and political backlash, which needs to be taken into account also within an 
assessment of the European system’s effectiveness. Signs of this backlash may actually be 
observed in the various anti-Europe movements existing in several European countries.  
Furthermore, this author does not overlook the fact that the diminishing problem-solving 
capacities have strained the idea of the Nation State as the ultimate locus of sovereignty and 
increased the range of supranational powers up to a point at which the construct of delegation 
of administrative powers to the EU has become mere fiction. Indeed, the notion of delegation 
presupposes that the principal is, in theory, capable of doing the job himself. However, in the 
European reality, EU Member States would no longer be able to cope with the EU’s tasks 
themselves, and the value of European integration lies precisely in the “surplus” in govern-
ance and problem-solving capacities created at supranational level. In other words, this 
means that the existence of “governance without government” entails the presence of “agents 
without principals”. However, and this is Lindseth’s crucial point, sovereignty and delegation 
of power would retain significance in a cultural and spiritual sense, in so far as they continue 
to shape popular understandings. These are viewed as “empirical realities in their own right”, 
since a viable political system needs to be supported not only by élites but also by the 
broader population.  
As a consequence of the lack of demos-based legitimacy, the European system should be 
viewed in an administrative law perspective (“administrative supranationalism”). In this per-
spective, the European treaties constitute mere enabling legislation, the legitimacy of which 
is channelled through the national constitutional States separately. Administrative law de-
vices should also be made use of to control and supervise the normative and executive pow-
ers delegated to supranational institutions. Treaty interpretation by European courts, in par-
ticular in the fields of competence and subsidiarity, should be guided by an “in dubio pro 
mitius” principle as opposed to the ECJ’s well-known teleological “preference for Europe”; 
in addition, a European conflict tribunal should be set up to decide more neutrally than the 
ECJ on the division of competencies among the EU and its Member States. 
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c) Critique 
The main objection that may be raised against both the Staatenverbund and the adminis-
trative supranationalism concepts is that their normative claim is simply incompatible with 
reality. If, on account of the increasingly transnational character of many economic and so-
cial activities, the problem-solving capacities of the Nation State are no longer sufficient, and 
the need for effective transnational co-ordination emerges, the latter may not reasonably be 
denied or curtailed on account of democracy objections. In other words, if, due to the com-
plexities and scope of the European system, the construct of “delegation” increasingly be-
comes mere fiction, this fiction may not simply be upheld for the reason that it is rooted in 
the social, historical and cultural perceptions of the people. With the probably inevitable fur-
ther intensification of European integration, this would only widen the gulf between the na-
tional demoi and the European institutions. But worse than this, stopping or reversing the 
process of European integration on account of a perceived lack of democratic legitimacy 
would leave a vacuum, as certain transnational phenomena with which the Nation State can 
no longer cope would simply be left uncontrolled, prone to the market or other uncontrolled 
orders. It is obvious that such a development, in particular should it further affect the acquis 
of the European social States, would have extremely negative consequences for the European 
citizens. Against this background, the only possible way out of the dilemma should be clear: 
autonomous democratic legitimacy of European governance, which should be able to sup-
plement the democratic legitimacy derived from the Nation State, should be promoted in the 
overall multi-level system. Such an attempt, which must, of course, overcome the narrow 
demos-based concept of democracy, will be sketched out later. 
IV. The Realist Version of the Relationship among the Legal Orders 
This criticism against the realist reconceptualisation of the EU would not, however, be en-
tirely persuasive if the central claim of the normative models, the concept of “dormant sover-
eignty” - which may be activated by a State when it deems appropriate by striking down un-
constitutional European law – were really true. It has already been stated that, on this point, 
the doctrinal views of European and national law diverge fundamentally. Thus, the analysis 
also needs to be pursued at a higher level of abstraction, by resorting to legal-structural mod-
els about the relationship of the European and national legal orders. Among these, several 
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authors have used the conceptual apparatus of the Pure Theory of Law developed by Hans 
Kelsen and his followers, which may, indeed, seem to be a promising approach.288 
The Pure Theory defines as a legal system a set of norms which have been recognised as a 
unity, understood in the sense that all of them may be traced back to a common reason of ex-
istence, a Grundnorm¸ which, however, remains fictitious. The Grundnorm is hierarchically 
the highest rule for law-creation, and it commands the validity of all subordinated norms. In 
such a “chain of validity”, any subordinated norm also commands, besides its other contents, 
the validity of the norm subordinated to itself.289 As a consequence, the criteria relevant for 
assigning norms to a common Grundnorm become decisive. According to Kelsen, a legal 
system deriving from a common Grundnorm presupposes that the effectiveness of all its 
norms is guaranteed.290 As a criterion to measure such effectiveness, Kelsen relies on the 
availability of powerful sanctions, capable of enforcing legal rules against their addressees’ 
will. 
This conceptual apparatus has been applied to the relationship of the supranational legal 
order with national law: from the EU’s coming into existence through an international treaty, 
its subsequent evolution brought about by amendments to the founding treaties, and its sub-
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sisting dependence on the national ratification statutes, Marcel Kaufmann291 and Theodor 
Schilling292 have inferred its subordination and dependence from a Grundnorm contained in 
national law. Thus, this reconstruction leads to a monistic model in which EU law would be 
subordinated to national law. This reconstruction is mainly based on the claim that EC law 
would not possess any effectiveness independent of national law, and, therefore, no validity 
as an autonomous legal order,293 because it would prove ineffective in hard conflicts with 
national law. This would be further justified by the fact that most European constitutional 
courts reserve themselves the power to review European law on grounds of constitutionality. 
Since the EC does not, to a large extent, dispose of its own administration and, therefore, has 
to rely on national administrations sworn to uphold their constitutions, EC law would not be 
able to impose itself over national law in cases of hard conflict. For this reason, only “nation-
alised EC law”, i.e., EC law compatible with the criteria of validity derived from a national 
Grundnorm and, therefore, applied by national administrations, would be effective. EC law 
would thus remain integrated in the chain of validity of the legal systems to which it owes its 
very existence: the national legal systems.  
As a result, EC law would be a - not necessarily uniform - appendix of the legal orders of 
all Member States. The threat of splitting should, however, be avoided by means of the self 
restraint of national law, ordained in “opening clauses” like Article 23 GG, which mandate 
national law to take account of the objectives and needs of the integration process through an 
optimisation of conflicting European and national principles. This interpretation is alleged to 
have the advantage that it allows for the use of the Member States’ potentials of democratic 
legitimacy for the EC. Finally, conflicts of validity between the two orders could be avoided, 
and conflicts among norms would remain in the sphere of law, with their solution not requir-
ing a choice between law and “non-law”.  
As a first comment on this monistic model, one may point to its threatening, though barely 
realistic, implications for the stability of the European Rechtsgemeinschaft (legal commu-
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nity). In particular, the EC would, in principle, be vulnerable to any intervention by a Mem-
ber State, without having any defence. If a Member State were to give up its constitutional 
self restraint and simply to abolish the whole Community with respect to itself by repealing 
its ratification statutes, sanctions according to Articles 226 ff (formerly 169 ff) by the EC 
would have to be viewed as non-law or, at least, as per se illegal, since they would not be 
compatible with the national Grundnorm. Thus, the EC would only exist by the grace of the 
Member States, and could barely guarantee the essential uniformity of its law.  
However, this type of reconstruction does not resist closer inspection for several reasons. 
In a first line of criticism, it may be objected that it is by no means clear that EC law would 
not be effective at all in the case of hard conflicts. As already stated, EC law sanctions might 
be adopted vis-à-vis Member States which fail to respect either EC legislation or the funda-
mental values and principles of the Community order (Article 226-228 (formerly 169-171) 
EC and new Article 7 EU). These might be implemented, at least in part, by Community in-
stitutions only (e.g., by blocking any financial transfers to the State in question), so that the 
impact of the potential refusal of national organs to implement EC law might be considerably 
weakened. Beyond this, it is important to note that additional sanctions of other Member 
States (which would act as a sort of guarantor or trustee for the EC) pursuant to international 
law against a Member State which fundamentally and repeatedly disobeys EC law, thereby 
departing from the basis of the EC’s “self-contained regime”, would, as ultima ratio, also 
seem to be possible. The probable strength of EC law and/or international law sanctions is 
further supported by the appreciation that an outbreak of a “Cold War” and a possible sus-
pension or termination of the membership of the Community might have such negative po-
litical and economic consequences for the “disobedient” State that it could barely allow itself 
to insist on its position without accepting a compromise in which the controversial EC provi-
sions would regain at least part of their effectiveness. Taken together, these possibilities 
guarantee a considerable degree of independent effectiveness to the European order, which 
would seem to exclude its monistic subordination to national law.  
In a second and even more persuasive line of criticism, it should be stressed that the ex-
clusive reliance on sanctions in order to measure the effectiveness of a legal order seems to 
be misguided in the first place. This perspective ignores the fact that more than from sanc-
tions, the effectiveness of a legal system derives from voluntary compliance. This phenome-
non is absolutely crucial, not only because systematic non-compliance on a large scale could 
barely be dealt with effectively by any enforcement mechanism and would, therefore, almost 
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inevitably lead to the collapse of any legal system. Also, from a democratic point of view, a 
system which needs to resort to sanctions on a regular basis is likely to lack legitimacy. 
Elaborating on the preconditions of States’ compliance with international law, modern re-
search has brought to light a bundle of concurring elements:294 (1) considerations of legiti-
macy and distributive justice inherent to international law, (2) the iterative process of dis-
course among the parties, the treaty organisations and the wider public and, more generally 
and convincingly, (3) transnational legal process as such, i.e., “the complex process of insti-
tutional interaction whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but ultimately 
internalised by domestic legal systems. This approach may be said to encompass and refine 
the others, in that it attaches central weight to “(...) the pathways whereby a “managerial” 
discourse of “fair” international rule penetrates into a domestic legal system, thus becoming 
part of that nation’s internal value set.”295 These grounds for compliance apply with particu-
lar force to the “constitutionalised” European system in which the internalisation of Commu-
nity norms and principles has already gone much further than in traditional international law.  
Thus, it seems even misleading in the first place to base a structural assessment of the in-
terface of the two orders exclusively on the most exceptional situation of the internal disap-
plication of EC law by a Member State on constitutional grounds – a revolution-type situa-
tion which has never happened to date and on whose ultimate consequences one might only 
speculate. Considering the ordinary functioning and interconnection of the two systems in the 
light of compliance rationales, it should instead be admitted that, within the ever wider fields 
of its competence, EC law de facto sets the basic legal “validity criteria” (i.e., norms close to 
the Grundnorm in the “validity chain”) alone, which are then “internalised” and implemented 
by national law, mostly without any supplementary internal “validity check” or other kind of 
second-guessing. In this context, it may be even more important to observe that by transfer-
ring important regulatory tasks to the Community, the know-how, often both scientific and 
administrative, and the institutional infrastructure necessary for problem-solving will have 
moved to European level as well. Thus, many regulatory fields have become so complex and 
diverse that it is factually increasingly difficult for the Member States to exercise any mean-
ingful national “validity-check” at all. This development is reflected inter alia in the fact that, 
to date, such checks have only been considered for human rights and competencies by the 
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BVerfG. Although these fields are, of course, highly relevant for the EC, it may be observed 
that in similarly important areas, such as foodstuff law risk regulation performed in comitol-
ogy procedures, any validity-check based on national constitutional principles seems to be 
notoriously absent. Finally, the process of the internalisation of European norms and their 
underlying values which are stressed by compliance theory inevitably entails some sort of 
autonomous “legitimacy-building” of EC law. This development would be ignored by a mo-
nistic model with subordination of EC law, under which the EC’s legitimacy is derived es-
sentially from the Nation State.296 
All in all, given its sanction and enforcement instruments on the one hand, and the high 
level of compliance through the internalisation in the national legal orders on the other, it 
seems to be rather unrealistic to deny EC law any autonomous (i.e., not derived from national 
law) effectiveness. On the contrary, as stated already in the introduction, autonomous effec-
tiveness may be argued even to be the distinctive feature of supranational governance re-
gimes, a feature which distinguishes it from traditional international regimes. Finally, the end 
of the Banana dispute persuasively confirms the failure of the monistic concept. For a case 
had arisen where the BVerfG could no longer really give the ECJ’s case law its constitutional 
blessing. In its opaque construction of the formula of “general fundamental-rights guaran-
tee”, which is, in a way, scarcely compatible with the Grundgesetz any longer, and not even 
internally consistent, the BVerfG has shown that it does not really mean to exercise its review 
reservation, without, however, having any alternative concept available. Instead, the BVerfG 
did not wish to set integration at stake for a comparatively minor matter in the overall eco-
nomic view such as the banana import regime, but preferred to signal clearly to its own 
courts and also to foreign observers that it wanted to deal as little as possible with Commu-
nity law. Insisting on the unlimited supremacy of national law under these conditions be-
comes more and more illusory. 
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Chapter II: Functionalism 
“The good thing about expert governance in agencies is that you no longer know whom to 
corrupt.” 
Giandomenico Majone297 
 
Functionalism is a child of the development of the modern industrial society since the 19th 
century. It reflects the unprecedented rise of the economy, the natural sciences and technol-
ogy in many fields of life. These are argued to obey their own functional, i.e., purpose and 
objective-oriented, logic and technical rationality which are opposed to “the political” and its 
manifestation in the State. Accordingly, functional authority relying on experts is alleged to 
be non-ideological, unpolitical, pragmatic and efficient and therefore superior to political au-
thority dependent on the often irrational preferences of the electorate and political parties. 
As an integration theory, functionalism accordingly denotes the delegation of public tasks 
to supranational agencies on account of their superior problem-solving capacities and their 
bureaucratic and technical expertise.298 Thus, functional integration dissolves the former real-
ist junctim between authority and territory. The first examples of such “functional” interna-
tional institutions were river commissions, the world post union (established 1874) and world 
telegraphic union (1868). Owing to increased political co-operation and economic interde-
pendencies in the twentieth century, a lot of other institutions of this kind have been estab-
lished in fields as diverse as radio and TV, navigation, aviation, weather forecasts and atomic 
energy.299 All these fields are characterised by sectoral processes of technical co-operation 
among Nation States.  
The central methodological postulate of functional integration theory is the so-called 
“spillover effect”: the quasi-automatic, gradual, but irresistible extension of technocratic au-
thority from one sector to others. Whereas classic functionalism saw this process strictly con-
fined to technical fields, neo-functionalism, developed from the sixties onwards largely with 
a view to explaining the ongoing European integration process, extended it also to more po-
                                                 
297
 Statement in a conference at the European University Institute in 2000 (rephrased by the author). 
298
 C. Joerges, “Legitimationsprobleme des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts und der Vertrag von Maastricht”, in 
G. Brüggemeier (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, 1994, 103ff. 
299
 For a more exhaustive presentation, see I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisa-
tionen, 5th ed. 1986, 313ff. 
 163 
litical matters.300 Spill-over is supposed to be brought about by the establishment of common 
institutions and the transfer of loyalty, less that of the ordinary people, but primarily that of 
political and bureaucratic élites, interest and party representatives. Key functionalist elements 
such as technical expert governance and spill-over phenomena may now be analysed in more 
detail in both the EC and the WTO. 
I. A Functionalist Reading of the EU 
1. From the “Zweckverband” to the “Regulatory State” 
The functional reading of the EU was elaborated already in the early seventies by Hans 
Peter Ipsen who characterised the Communities as “Zweckverbände funktioneller Integra-
tion” (objective-oriented associations of functional integration). This concept served, in the 
first place, to provide an alternative to the dichotomy between State and international organi-
sation. It emphasised the technical and sectorally limited character of delegated European 
authority, thus separating it from the unlimited political powers and the social, spiritual, and, 
at times, even mythical content of the Nation State. It further stressed its instrumental orien-
tation towards the establishment of a common market, whose functioning conditions and vi-
ability would, therefore, become the analytical and normative Leitmotiv of European law.  
The functional concept was further refined in the eighties and nineties by Giandomenico 
Majone under the label of “Europe as a regulatory State”.301 Interpreting the internal market 
as a project of re-regulation, rationalisation and modernisation, Majone advocates an effi-
ciency-oriented economic optimisation of regulatory policy. This should renounce redistribu-
tory activities and limit itself to the correction of market failures. These tasks should be car-
ried out by non-majoritarian expert bodies, for which the American federal agencies are rec-
ommended as a model. The legitimacy (“accountability”) of this type of administration 
should be guaranteed by stringent transparency requirements and judicially enforceable par-
ticipation rights in the regulatory process, rather than by hierarchical oversight which does 
not allow for effective governance under modern conditions of diffusion and complexity. 
This concept, too, shares the fundamental functionalist thesis that the essence of modern 
“governance” is technocratic rather than political, so that expert decision-making should be 
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institutionalised at national and supranational level. Expert decision-making is regarded as 
superior to other forms both procedurally and substantively, since it is supposed to enable 
discursive decision-making among rational and neutral actors who have no self-interest, 
which is supposed to lead to the technically best policy outcomes. By contrast, traditional 
intergovernmental bargaining is deemed inadequate on account of huge collective action 
problems, and the possible fixation on particular national interests rather than overall inter-
ests. However, extending this to the European level, the national model of parliamentary de-
mocracy is also viewed as defective on account of the well-known pathologies of party poli-
tics, interest group manipulations, blockages and policy failures: the short-termism of elec-
toral policy entails that “politics” threaten (sound) “policy”, as the division of the democratic 
process “into relatively short intervals produces negative effects when the problems faced by 
society require long-term solutions.”302 Acting under the permanent threat of being voted out 
of office, politicians have few incentives to develop policies whose fruits might become visi-
ble only in the long run. As a result, politics aiming at pleasing the electorate tend to create 
bad outcomes: “Legislators engage in advertising and position-taking rather than in serious 
policy-making, or they design laws with numerous opportunities to aid particular constituen-
cies. Thus, re-election pressures have negative consequences for the quality of legislation”.303 
By contrast, expert decision-making is alleged to be devoid of all these flaws.  
2. Critique 
The fundamental objection against the functionalist reading of the EU would seem to be 
rather obvious: government by technical and scientific experts and bureaucratic élites is fun-
damentally incompatible with democracy. However, this assessment needs to be specified 
further. Following a famous distinction introduced by Fritz Scharpf, the democratic concept 
may be divided into two understandings.304 The first and more traditional one, denominated 
“input-legitimacy”, stresses government by the people, by means such as election or forms of 
direct participation in decision-making processes. The second one, characterised as “output-
legitimacy”, emphasises government for the people, meaning that, as long as decisions are 
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just and effective, they can be assumed to be in the citizens’ interest even though the citizens 
are not directly involved.  
In modern Nation States, combinations of the two forms of legitimacy can often be found: 
traditional democratic mechanisms are supplemented by non-majoritarian expertocratic insti-
tutions such as, most prominently, courts and central banks. Such institutions, which are ac-
tive in fields which are regarded as unsuitable to be left to the market or to national politics, 
are widely considered as legitimate derogations from the principle of democratic (input-) le-
gitimacy justified by effectiveness and efficiency rationales. This finding might be trans-
posed to European institutions which may also be ascribed a certain degree of expertocratic 
“output-legitimacy”. However, it is equally clear that, in contrast with the national situation 
where expertocratic institutions only complement conventional democratic institutions, they 
enjoy much more weight and influence at European level. A sound mixture of both elements 
would, however, suggest that some solid form of “input-linkage” to the electorate should be 
retained even though technical and bureaucratic efficiency may ultimately suffer from this. 
The weight of this finding is increased by an even more general criticism. As European 
and national political experience have continuously shown, there is no such thing as politi-
cally neutral technocratic expertise; and hence, the advocated prospect of impartial, effective 
and, at the same time, legitimate decision-making is a chimera.305 Though embedded in a sci-
entific and technocratic context, important questions of market regulation, such as risk regu-
lation in foodstuff law, entail difficult and complex political and moral choices. Experts may 
be easily biased in such questions on account of allegiances, sympathies or even “profes-
sional deformations”. 
These two crucial criticisms, according to which expert “output-oriented” legitimacy is 
not sufficient for a highly integrated polity such as the EU and a clear distinction between 
technical and political matters is impossible, are, to a certain extent, reflected and confirmed 
by recent institutional developments in EU market regulation. As a word of caution, this 
analysis will, however, be limited to the “functionalist candidates” among the institutions. In 
fact, it is rather obvious that the Council of ministers representing the national executives 
does not have any “in-built” technocratic bias. The same is true for the Parliament which, 
though limited in its competencies by the limited extent of co-decision procedures and still 
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devoid of the right of legislative initiative, tends to have clear pro-integrationist preferences 
and to favour all kinds of diffuse issues and interests extending from consumer and environ-
mental protection to European citizenship.  
However, technocracy may be alleged to dominate the Commission and the influential 
“corporatist network” governance structures surrounding it, in particular committees, agen-
cies, standard-setting bodies and private (mostly lobby) associations. It is, indeed, true that 
these structures have a dominant influence, especially on the EC’s core competence, market 
regulation. In particular, corporatist network governance was argued to be strong in the wake 
of the so-called “new approach” to market regulation alluded to above. This strategy was mo-
tivated, first of all, by the need to enact huge masses of secondary legislation to meet the 
1993 internal market deadline which could no longer be achieved by the traditional law-
making procedures which, to a large degree, involve the Council. In substance, the new ap-
proach consisted essentially in a balancing, within a scheme of framework directives enacted 
by the Council, of the national concerns for continued social protection in the market, and a 
European interest in the maintenance of economic rationality. This scheme contained only 
general “benchmark” standards, and left their operationalisation to ad hoc institutional ar-
rangements at European level which still, however, maintained the strong participation of 
national and private interests.306 Such arrangements may be characterised as transnational 
governance structures in which law-making and law-implementing in important fields of 
market regulation such as risk regulation (e.g., in foodstuff, product safety or environmental 
law) are more or less openly delegated to discovery processes outside constitutionally pro-
vided procedures. Examples include most notably private standard-setting bodies, commit-
tees and agencies. Yet, the few politically neutral agencies recently established at EC level 
are largely confined to “regulation by publication”, i.e. to ancillary administrative tasks such 
as the gathering, evaluating and diffusion of information in fields which are highly character-
ised by scientific expert knowledge; none of them was endowed with fully-fledged regulatory 
competencies comparable to those of the American agencies.307 Instead, such tasks were 
mainly conferred upon the new committees, which are assemblies of supranational and na-
tional politicians, experts and interest group representatives chaired by a Commission official 
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and which represent a higher degree of political influence of the Member States. Established 
and modified by the two comitology decision (1987 and 1999), these institutions have the 
task of enacting subordinate market regulation, implementing and concretising framework 
legislation enacted by the Council.308 On the whole, the fact that more political structures 
were mostly preferred over technocratic agencies points to the fact that Member States in-
creasingly perceive the EC’s activity as essentially political, for which expertocratic legiti-
macy is deemed insufficient. Then, mere administrative, output-oriented legitimacy is no 
longer sufficient, but democratic input legitimacy – which, in the European tradition, needs 
to be constitutionally assigned – is necessary. These findings constitute other important pro-
visos for the approach to be developed later. 
II. A Functionalist Reading of the GATT/WTO System 
In a functionalist reconstruction, the GATT/WTO system may be characterised as a sec-
toral international regime with the task of establishing and administering free trade. Such a 
reading may, indeed, derive from several sources. First, most favoured-nations agreements 
and other trade regimes were part of the first international organisations in the 19th century. 
Also, following what might be described as a spill-over logic, they have since their begin-
nings known an impressive widening of scope, reaching from trade in goods to services and 
intellectual property, and now broaching even the field of international competition.309 
Whereas the activities of GATT/WTO are predominantly of a co-ordinating nature in these 
fields, in other areas, such as the Trade Barriers Agreement (TBA) and the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) positive standards have also been set, which are 
interpreted by some as the first steps towards a world-wide harmonisation or even unification 
of trade laws, and “flank” matters, by a world trade “government”. 
However, it is precisely in these respects that the functionalist logic has suffered substan-
tial blows in the last years. It has become increasingly clear that the regulation of interna-
tional trade is much more than a technical matter which may be left to experts working in 
some hidden place in intransparent conditions shielded off from public knowledge and dis-
course. Instead, the regulation of international trade has evolved from its traditional object of 
preventing protectionism to the much more difficult and genuinely political tasks of balanc-
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ing free trade against competing values deeply rooted in national culture and political process 
such as social and environmental protection. For this reason, the harmonisation of standards 
by non democratically accountable experts is increasingly perceived as illegitimate. Institu-
tionally, this change of perception has been reflected in the growing importance of the WTO 
adjudicative mechanism vis-à-vis its “regulatory branch”, the WTO Council and its sub-units 
- whose scope of manoeuvre is, at any rate, substantially restricted by the unanimity princi-
ple. The WTO adjudicative mechanism, the institution where value balancing is carried out, 
performs de facto the task of a global constitutional court. Its legitimate scope of review of 
national measures conflicting with free trade policy still needs to be determined. Even at this 
stage, it has become clear, though, that the functional paradigm in its classic dimensions of 
expertocracy and spill-over is ill-suited both to reconstruct analytically and provide norma-
tive guidelines for WTO governance in general, and WTO adjudication in particular. 
III. The Functionalist Version of the Relationship among the Legal Orders 
One of the principal proponents of the functionalist view of the EC, Hans Peter Ipsen, has 
also elaborated its legal translation into a doctrine of unlimited supremacy of European law. 
As outlined above, this has been doctrinally justified through the Gesamtaktstheorie (collec-
tive act theory) according to which European law does not derive its validity from national 
constitutions, but was established as a superior legal order by means of a single, “revolution-
ary-type” of collective act by the founding States. Translated into the concepts of the Kel-
senian Pure Theory of law, this theory amounts to a monistic model with the subordination of 
national law. This would presuppose that, in the wake of the “Gesamtakt” revolution, all na-
tional law is subordinated to a European Grundnorm, with the effect that European law alone 
may determine the criteria of validity of any national law. Such a conception would render 
“total” supremacy of European law possible, which would be limited neither vertically by 
national constitutional law, nor horizontally as regards the expansion of its legislative compe-
tencies. It would, therefore, go much further than the underlying functional approach, i.e., 
Ipsen’s Zweckverband or Majone’s regulatory State which legitimise only the sectoral dele-
gation of policy fields unsuitable to be left to the national legislator. 
Irrespective of this huge theoretical defect, functionalist monism with subordination of na-
tional law also meets considerable obstacles under a Pure Theory reconstruction relying on 
sanctions and voluntary compliance as a means to ensure the effectiveness of European law. 
Even though the latter possesses considerable autonomous sanction and enforcement devices, 
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and is regularly internalised and complied with without supplementary national “validity 
checks”, it seems overstated to recognise it as being able to dominate effectively, and impose 
its validity criteria upon national law in all circumstances. As its implementation and en-
forcement is, to a very high degree, entrusted to the national administration and judiciary, a 
possible revolt – in particular a soft one like the numerous interim measures granted by Ger-
man courts against the Banana regulation – drastically decreases its effectiveness and is 
likely lead to a sort of “draw”, materialising in some sort of legal or political compromise. 
This should, in turn, exclude the unlimited subordination, measured in terms of effectiveness, 
of national law under EU law. As a result, not only the monistic subordination of national 
under EU law as advocated by functionalist theorists, but, instead, any type of monistic hier-
archical relationship between the two legal orders should be excluded. 
Chapter III: Neo-liberalism 
“No man’s life, liberty, or property is safe when the legislature is in session.” 
Mark Twain310 
 
After the fall of communism, liberalism probably constitutes the dominant and most suc-
cessful constitutional model world-wide. Among its various strands, American libertarianism 
and German ordo-liberalism, which was developed in Germany in the thirties as a counter-
movement to the Nazi style planified economy and continues to be an influential school311 to 
date, deserves particular attention in the present context, since it has analysed both the EU 
and the WTO in depth. 
Generally, liberalism commences from the assumption that under conditions of social plu-
ralism, characterised by the dissolution of integrating institutions such as religion or ho-
mogenous ethnicity, personal convictions as well as value choices and hierarchies of indi-
viduals become more and more diverse. As a consequence, it becomes increasingly impossi-
ble for politics to reconcile such different assumptions. Functioning automatically, through 
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an “invisible hand” (Adam Smith) in a decentralised way, the system of free and open mar-
kets is hailed as the best institutional response to these conditions. It lays the foundations of 
peaceful co-existence of human beings by enabling social interaction without a previous con-
sent on values, and guarantees a maximum of personal freedom. The price mechanism be-
comes the main indicator for social exchange. Given these eminent advantages of the market 
system, any statal interference with the free play of market forces is regarded with suspicion. 
Redistribution, in particular, is considered to be inadmissible since it would always constitute 
paternalistic interference with private freedom and entail the strategic promotion of the inter-
est of particular “rent-seeking” groups.  
Within an ideal liberal polity, the law’s function is confined to providing the legal infra-
structure of the market. This role is performed, in the first place, by private law, in particular 
contract and tort law, which is said to constitute the very constitution of a liberal polity.312 
Regulatory law such as competition law is only needed to guarantee the well functioning of 
the market through undistorted competition, which means that market failures such as carteli-
sation, abuses of market power, and the elimination of competition through mergers need to 
be controlled. Apart from market exchanges, any further social communication or even an 
agreement on a political constitution is, strictly speaking, not even necessary in the first 
place. If this should develop, it should, at any rate, be subordinated to the market mechanism. 
Finally and most importantly, it is claimed that this system has no legitimacy problems: gen-
eral consent on the existence of a market and on market behaviour rules is assumed to have 
been given since each individual would only benefit from them.313 
I. The Neo-liberal Reconceptualisation of the EU 
Even though the system of the European Communities was clearly not designed in delib-
erate pursuit of ordo-liberal visions, the adepts of this school came to see their conceptions 
                                                 
312
 See F. Böhm, “Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft”, Ordo 17 (1966), 75; J. Basedow, Von der 
deutschen zur europäischen Wirtschaftsverfassung, 1992; E.-J. Mestmäcker, Die Wiederkehr der bürgerlichen 
Gesellschaft und ihres Rechts, Rechtshistorisches Journal 10 (1991), 177; for critical comments on the latter 
contribution, see M. Stolleis, “Auferstanden aus der Wende: Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft und ihr Recht?”, RJ 
11 (1992), 500; K. Günther, “Ohne weiteres und ganz automatisch?, ibid., 473; Th. Vesting, “Wiederkehr der 
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und ihres Rechts?”, in H. Schlosser (ed.), Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 1896-1996, 183. 
313
 Cf., O. Gerstenberg, “Private Ordering, Public Intervention and Social Pluralism”, in C. Joerges and O. Ger-
stenberg (eds.), Private Governance, democratic constitutionalism and supranationalism (European Commis-
sion COST A 7 EUR 18340, 1998), 205. 
 171 
realised in an optimal way quite soon.314 The paramount liberalist features in the European 
economic constitutions were traced back to the institutional asymmetry of supranational law 
and intergovernmental politics315 immanent to the European treaties: On the one hand, “mar-
ket-correcting”, i.e., regulatory and interventionist policies (“positive integration”) depend on 
the consent of the EC’s legislative organs, in the first place, the Council of Ministers, and are 
thus in an institutionally disadvantaged position. On the other hand, the most important lib-
eral principles are already laid down as legally-binding rules in the founding treaties, which 
enjoy supremacy over EC legislation and national law, amounting to a constitutional status; 
these are the abolition of tariffs as well as quantitative and qualitative restrictions in favour of 
the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, and a system of undistorted compe-
tition. Following the ECJ’s jurisprudence on direct effect and supremacy of EC law, these 
principles can relatively easily be implemented and enforced by the supranational institu-
tions, the Commission and the ECJ without the Member States having a further say (“nega-
tive integration”).316 As a result, liberal market freedoms were “constitutionalised” in the 
European Treaties, i.e., laid down as basic rules superior even to national constitutions, and 
thus shielded off from the vicissitudes of the political process. In these circumstances, it is 
barely surprising that German ordo-liberals, in contrast to traditional public lawyers and the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, have never raised objections even against the spearhead of the 
ECJ’s constitutionalisation doctrines, the unlimited supremacy of EC law over national con-
stitutions. 
Probably, the most important liberal constitutional feature in the EC system may be said 
to be the strong position assigned to competition law. In the Member States which possess 
such a law, it has the status of an ordinary law beyond the constitution and, thus, enjoys the 
same hierarchical rank as competing regulatory and interventionist policy goals. Conse-
quently, under national constitutional systems, economic freedoms are protected against sta-
tal intervention only in the framework of constitutional rights. The situation in the EC is re-
markably different: being part of the European treaties, the main competition principles have 
constitutional status, and, therefore, could, coupled with a huge degree of political sensitivity 
of the Commission, be imposed on national law in the course of the years. This rendered the 
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gradual dismantling of national monopolies possible, and the deregulation of the so-called 
service public area which encompasses the sectors of postal services, telecommunication, 
supply of energy and other public goods, etc. To this extent, the EC system gradually eroded 
the national “mixed economies”, which were compromise solutions between the market and 
interventionist economic models. 
Neo-liberal visions seemed to reach their apex with the internal market programme 
launched by the Commission in the mid-eighties. It had its roots in the famous ECJ’s Cassis 
de Dijon317 decision in which Germany was forced to allow the import of a French liqueur 
which contained a lower percentage of alcohol than similar German products. Elaborating on 
the proportionality principle contained in Article 30 (ex 36) EC, the ECJ found that Germany 
had to recognise the French product standard. As it became increasingly clear that the har-
monisation approach was quite slow to establish an internal market and often blocked by na-
tional resistance, the Cassis principle was extended to the whole sector of market regulation 
in the well-known 1985 White Paper of the Commission.318 The philosophy of this approach 
was to generate a regulatory competition of national economic and social standards in which 
the most adequate standard would win the race. This was welcomed by neo-liberals as a more 
effective realisation of the market freedoms, capable of doing away with the complex State- 
centred legal co-ordination of transnational economic relations by private international law 
(conflict of laws).319 The liberal vision of a transnational “private law society” enabled by a 
supranational economic constitution seemed to be finally accomplished.320  
However, this approach did not have the expected success, since, due to reasons of dis-
trust, different regulatory traditions, and compatibility problems with the existing national 
regulations, the Member States were often unwilling to accept the others’ standards in mat-
ters such as health and safety and environmental protection, and preferred to undergo a 
Treaty infringement procedure. Furthermore, in cases in which the difference between two 
standards was particularly huge, for example, when they were based on different objectives 
or regulatory philosophies, mutual recognition did not work at all.  
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The modest success of the concept of mutual recognition heralds a more general failure of 
the ordo-liberal reconceptualisation of the EU. The deregulatory effect of the EC Treaties’ 
basic freedoms and competition provisions on national regulation, State monopolies and the 
public service sector structures did, and do not, establish a sort of pre-political supremacy of 
the internal market governed by an “invisible hand”. Instead, they most frequently involved a 
set of creative political processes which came about by complex interaction of various pri-
vate and public, European and national actors and which often led to the re-regulation, by 
new European law, of the sector in question.321 This was facilitated in the main by the intro-
duction of qualified-majority voting in the Single European Act in 1986 and rendered the es-
tablishment of new administrative mechanisms and institutions such as agencies and commit-
tees necessary. 
Another argument against the neo-liberal reading of the EU is the fact that its activities are 
increasingly extended beyond the market into regulatory, and sometimes even distributive, 
policies. In this context, it should first be remembered that the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) was never subjected to market mechanisms and the free trade paradigm from the very 
beginning.322 As described in relation to the EU’s Banana regime, it has always been a purely 
interventionist regime, which the neo-liberals have characterised as an unfortunate and dam-
aging Altlast. This view is too narrow-minded. Despite the highly doubtful “market-
correcting” CAP strategies of product-subsidies instead of producer-dependent subsidies, 
price maintenance, promotion of industrial farming and animal breeding methods etc., it 
should also be noted that the EC policy in this field also aims at protecting human and animal 
health, and curing the landscape and the environment as a whole – tasks which are unsuitable 
to be subjected entirely to market mechanism. 
A further meaningful shift away from a liberally conceived market regime became obvi-
ous with the extension of the Community to new policy fields in the Single European Act and 
the Maastricht Treaty.323 Thus, the new activities such as the European Social Fund, eco-
nomic and social cohesion and industrial policy are clearly redistributory. Other activities 
and projects, such as trans-European networks, research and technological development are 
distributory. Finally, the largest part of the new policies are regulatory, i.e., market-creating 
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and market-correcting, and go largely beyond the liberal market logic. This is true for impor-
tant fields such as environmental policy and consumer protection which limit companies’ 
professional and contractual autonomy. One may thus conclude that not only free markets, 
but also regulatory and, at times, even redistributory activities are at the core of the EC’s po-
litical activities. The neo-liberal concept denies even the legitimacy of such European tasks 
and is, therefore, clearly unable to provide a theoretical framework for them. 
The expansion of “market-correcting” policies at EU level aggravates the objections 
against neo-liberalism from the standpoint of democratic theory.324 The most fundamental 
critique has always been that the supremacy of the market over other political goals must not 
be assumed as being “naturally” granted under democratic conditions, but requires an explicit 
decision by the people. This decision presupposes the existence of a political and legal order 
of freedom and constraint, a public sphere and political dialogue. If this is so, it should be 
admitted that the democratic process can also lead to different decisions, most notably deci-
sions on an adequate “blend” of free-market mechanisms and regulatory as well as interven-
tionist instruments; a notorious example is the decision of when and to what extent a certain 
public good, such as the environment, should be commodified, i.e., subjected to the market 
mechanism at all. Furthermore, the market may be reproached as not possessing a moral filter 
against irrational, or even aggressive, preferences of certain societal groups. Such preferences 
may be generated by the societal environment and personal values. At any rate, they cannot 
be governed, contained and balanced merely by the price mechanism as a social “mediator”. 
Correspondingly, the market alone is not able to manage the social and economic problems 
arising from the integration process, but, instead, democracy must move to the supranational 
level as well. 
To summarise, it is due to its bias in favour of negative market integration, which also en-
tails the complete neglect for procedural tools and conditions needed for the establishment of 
a European democracy in neo-liberal theory, that this concept does not constitute an adequate 
model for the EU. As a result, it is not able to provide either adequate guidelines for constitu-
tional conflicts which typically involve the balancing of European economic freedoms and 
competition rules against national regulatory policies, or, as in the Banana conflict, vice 
versa. 
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II. The Neo-liberal Reconceptualisation of the WTO 
1. Outline 
As regards the WTO, the neo-liberal model seeks to provide a powerful counter-device to 
the “realist” protectionist temptations of States as explained by public choice theory. Whilst 
ordinary international agreements on trade liberalisation are deemed insufficient to remedy 
the prisoner’s dilemma situation described above, a stable legal order is called for to monitor 
States’ respect for their free trade commitments. Only if such a legal order is actually effec-
tive may governments resist protectionist pressure from domestic lobby groups, and the in-
vocation of international legal commitments may even become a powerful defence strategy 
against such groups.  
In order to provide for such a stable legal order, liberal theorists argue that the interna-
tional trade system needs to be “constitutionalised”.325 The core of such a constitution of free 
trade should be the granting of subjective liberty and equality rights to the citizens as well as 
their effective protection by national and international courts. The judiciary, rather than the 
executive, should be entitled to ensure the necessary authoritative interpretation and supervi-
sion of free trade commitments. In fact, judicial control is viewed as the best defence in order 
to prevent politicians from giving way to protectionist rent-seeking interests. 
Liberal theorists further argue that the present GATT/WTO system may already be inter-
preted so as to include important constitutional principles and rights.326 Generally speaking, 
whilst this system does not provide a constitution of free and undistorted trade - which is re-
served to regional integration communities such as the EC and presupposes the abolition of 
impediments to trade altogether -, it makes a forum and procedures as well as substantive 
priniciples for gradual trade liberalisation available. Its biggest achievement, though, lies in 
subjecting international trade relations to the Rule of Law. This finds its expression in the 
binding legal quality of WTO rules and in the existence of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
which renders authoritative legal opinions on trade disputes. Beyond this, the WTO system 
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contains a set of provisions which require States to guarantee certain specific procedural re-
quirements of the Rule of Law even in their domestic legal order. Among these are, the duty 
of publication, and of neutral and just implementation of trade regulation (Article 10 GATT) 
as well as the principles of transparent policy-making, of due process and of judicial protec-
tion of individual rights.  
The fundamental substantive constitutional principle in GATT/WTO law is that of non-
discrimination, which may be subdivided in two elements. First, it consists of the most-
favoured nation principle (Article 1 (1) GATT, Article 2 (1) GATS and Article 4 TRIPS) ac-
cording to which any trade concession accorded by any party to any product must be granted 
immediately and unconditionally to a similar product originating in, or destined for, the terri-
tories of all other contracting parties. Second, it encompasses the principle of national treat-
ment (Article 3 (4) GATT) according to which foreign products, once they have crossed the 
border, may not be treated less favourably than like products of national origin. It is impor-
tant to note that these duties are not only directed to States. Instead, the formulation “prod-
ucts” and “like products” entails that import and export traders, too, may be viewed as their 
addressees. In substance, these principles have the constitutional market-generating function 
of allowing importers to choose among foreign suppliers according to efficiency criteria 
only, irrespective of the exporter’s nationality. Beyond this, the MFN principle ensures the 
stability and reliability of “synallagmatic” trade concessions because it prevents trading 
States from offering more favourable conditions to third States in subsequent transactions; 
thus, it further ensures the transparency of the system by rendering the proliferation of differ-
ent bilateral agreements on mutual concessions impossible. Thereby, it also renders possible 
a multiplication of liberalisation measures which, if accorded to one State, could automati-
cally be invoked by all the other Member States as well. This ensures that all Member States, 
even small States or newcomers, participate in the liberalisation benefits, irrespective of their 
different bargaining powers or strengths. 
Finally, one may note the “principle of the use of uniform and proportionate policy in-
struments”.327 This finds its most important expression in the GATT’s general prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions and its preference for tariffs (Article 11 GATT). This is based on the 
rationale that quantitative restrictions tend to decrease the impact of changes in the world 
market conditions of supply and demand on imports and consumers, whereas tariffs have an 
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impact only on the price of a good - which constitutes a less strong, and therefore more pro-
portionate, interference with the undistorted functioning of the market. In addition, tariffs 
generate governmental revenue rather than private “quota rents” to the benefit of domestic 
producers. All in all, the “tariffs only” strategy may be said to provide an important basis for 
the transparency, calculability and negotiability of trade restrictions.328 
These constitutional guarantees of the world trade system are supposed to supplement na-
tional constitutional economic rights. As Jan Tumlir put it in a famous formula: “the interna-
tional economic order can be seen as the second line of national constitutional entrench-
ment”.329 National constitutions and GATT might thus be viewed as a “compound” of mutu-
ally reinforcing constitutions. However, with reference to the European situation, this for-
mula should be extended, because GATT/WTO law has become an integral part of the 
Community legal system, and national competence in the field of external trade policy has 
been transferred to the EC. Thus, GATT/WTO law also adds to and concretises the protec-
tion offered by EU law to the freedom to trade. 330 Alongside national constitutional and EU 
law, GATT/WTO law may, therefore, be viewed as the “third line of constitutional en-
trenchment”.331 
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2. Critique 
It is undoubtedly the great merit of the liberalist constitutional reading of the GATT/WTO 
system that it provides a powerful and coherent alternative to the “realist anarchy”. On this 
view, the WTO may, indeed, be characterised as a legal stronghold of the subjective rights of 
the market participants against protectionist temptations of governments as criticised by free 
trade and public choice theory. 
As a first critique, it may, however, be noted that the liberal reconceptualisation does not 
sufficiently take the actual functioning of the new WTO system into account. Whilst, for the 
time being, the WTO has actually managed to tame the earlier diplomatic power-game and to 
bring to bear, to a certain extent, supranational constitutional features, this has not been 
achieved through the granting of domestically enforceable constitutional rights to private par-
ties, but within the system itself has been achieved through the establishment of an effective 
dispute settlement mechanism. Yet, this observation calls for another general characterisation 
of the GATT/WTO system, according to which it is no longer adequately captured as a mere 
functionalist constitutional counter-device against States’ protectionist temptations. What one 
may observe is not a shift of power from the executive to the judiciary as in ordinary direct 
effect cases, but the emergence of a third level of governance above national and European 
levels. It is true that this level is, somewhat strangely perhaps, limited to a weak executive 
branch, which fulfils mainly organisational tasks, and to a strong judicial branch. This carries 
out genuine constitutional adjudication by balancing competing constitutional values and 
principles of huge political significance such as free trade vs. environment or social policy, or 
universalism vs. regionalism – subject matters which may, otherwise, only be found on the 
agenda of national and supranational courts, and for whose resolution neo-liberalism, which 
focuses too narrowly on the prevention of protectionism, does not offer any convincing 
guidelines. Even worse, neo-liberalism might be accused of a bias of values associated with 
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free trade, as their (exclusive) constitutionalisation puts them into a position of advantage 
with regard to non-economic values.332 
In these respects, these objections may be linked to the democratic critique of the neo-
liberal vision of the EU in that negative integration mechanisms such as the non-
discrimination principle, commercial freedoms and undistorted competition are not just com-
ponents of an “economic constitution” which functions automatically, as it were. Instead, the 
delegation of powers to GATT/WTO, even if they are essentially adjudicative, creates a 
“surplus in supranational governance” and raises the question of this system’s democratic 
legitimacy. This requires that some form, or effective substitute, of democratic participation 
and representation of citizens be ensured at international level. In sum, whereas market free-
doms do constitute important elements for a supranational system’s legitimacy, liberal consti-
tutionalism needs to be complemented by a theory that accommodates the “surplus in supra-
national governance” within the WTO system. 
To this end, the following approach will first propose a constitutional theory which, to 
some, extent builds on liberal constitutional theory, but also seeks to capture the functioning 
and the legitimacy of the WTO system by emphasising its function as “third line constitu-
tional entrenchment” in the overall multi-level constitutional system. It is on the basis of this 
theory, denominated multi-level governance and constitutionalism, that a more precise pro-
posal for the interconnection of the two systems will be elaborated. 
For reasons of completeness, it should be added, here, that unlike functionalist protagonists, neo-
liberal authors have, apparently, never defended a well elaborated version of the relationship 
among the legal orders. However, as already mentioned above, the constitutional concept under-
lying the whole approach would seem to require unconditional supremacy, too, and, therefore, a 
monistic hierarchical relationship among the WTO, the EU and the national level. Yet a similar 
general problem as in functionalism surfaces here. According to the neo-liberal model, the su-
premacy of supranational law would only be justified as long as the EU or WTO constitution 
stuck to their task of enabling markets and defending them against intrusions by the legislator in 
favour of rent-seeking lobbies. However, as the existence of planified sectors in the European 
constitution in general, and single cases such as Bananas in particular, show, the EU by no 
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means confines itself to its neo-liberal function of enabling markets. In these cases, it would 
clearly be against the neo-liberalist spirit to grant EC law unlimited supremacy. However, a con-
ditional application of the supremacy rule, dependent on whether the supranational regime’s 
functional “market mission” is fulfilled in a particular field, would barely work in practice. 
Chapter IV: Multi-Level Governance and Constitutionalism 
“If the EU were to apply for membership in the EU, it would not qualify because of the 
inadequate democratic content of its constitution. Nevertheless, a good 50% of the acts 
passed in France today are in fact merely the implementation of measures decided in the 
opaque labyrinth of institutions in far-away Brussels, so, is France still democratically gov-
erned? (…) The WTO systems of agreements comprises almost 10.000 pages and is the result 
of marathon negotiations lasting over a decade and in which over 150 States and thousands 
of experts participated. Although these agreements contain far-reaching implications for em-
ployees in crisis-prone industrial sectors and in agriculture, the German government is gen-
erally almost overzealous in implementing the demands stipulated in the agreements. Did 
German citizens really have a recognizable influence on these decisions? (…) Against this 
background, one may point almost paradigmatically to a fundamental dilemma of politics in 
the age of globalisation – the contradiction between “system effectiveness and citizen par-
ticipation”. 
Michael Zürn, Democratic Governance beyond the Nation-State333  
 
I. Conspectus 
The concept of multi-level governance is based on the premise that each of the forgoing 
concepts has some truth in it, but does not entirely do justice to the complex phenomenon of 
supranational governance both in the EU and the WTO. Firstly, it is contrary to functional 
claims of gradual “statalisation” of the EU and a gradual “destatalisation” of its Member 
States that multi-level governance accommodates the subsisting important role of the latter 
and their institutions; in fact, these remain powerful within the overall system both as deci-
sion makers in the Council and as enforcers of EU law. However, multi-level governance 
also acknowledges that, by delegating huge parts of market and social regulation to the su-
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pranational level, which also entails the creation of powerful supranational institutions, the 
Member States have lost a meaningful degree of autonomous powers in these fields and may, 
therefore, no longer be regarded as the “focal points” of the overall system. Likewise, multi-
level governance acknowledges the value of functional specialisation and expertise, without, 
however, overestimating its capacities, and without clinging to the illusion of its allegedly 
apolitical scientific and technical nature. The same is true for the neo-liberal vision of the 
free market, whose importance as a counterdevice to protectionism is acknowledged, but 
whose neglect of democracy, constitutional exclusivity and primacy over social values is not 
approved. 
Turned into positive terms, multi-level governance leaves open the question of where the 
EU and the WTO may be situated on a flexible scale between a traditional Nation State and 
less developed forms of international co-operation. It, instead, refers to the complex, multi-
faceted and often contingent interaction of public and private institutions in “networks” at 
different – sub-national, national, international and supranational - levels of governance. As 
suggested by some of its proponents,334 multi-level governance may be conceptualised with 
the analytical tools of systems theory, which conceives of the economy, politics, law and so-
ciety (as opposed to single actors including the “State”) as different systems within an overall 
network. These tools might, indeed, adequately capture the increasing functional differentia-
tion, specialisation and decentralisation of the multi-level system’s various components, 
which evolve in constant learning processes in which novel problems are tackled by monitor-
ing, adapting and fine-tuning regulatory experiences over time. As these conceptual tools are, 
analytically, completely detached from the State, they are unproblematically capable of 
transnational extension. 
In substantive terms, the multi-level governance approach crucially revolves around two 
fundamental criteria in order to analytically and normatively reconstruct the relationship 
among the various constitutional levels: institutional capacity, i.e., the technical potential of 
effective problem-solving at supranational level; and (democratic) legitimacy, understood in 
Weberian terms as the degree to which supranational governance is socially accepted and 
complied with by the governed, and thus able to exist at all.335  
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As regards capacity, the multi-level approach stresses the “network” aspect of current 
governance. This entails that no actor, and respectively no subsystem, may act autonomously 
in an effective way any longer; instead, their relationship is in essence decentralised, co-
operative and highly interdependent. It is obvious that, under these conditions, hierarchical 
direction, such as the classic “command and control” type of administration, drastically loses 
importance. Instead, “soft governance mechanisms” such as recommendation, expertise, ex-
plication and consultation gain increasing weight alongside the traditional national command 
and control style.336 Even where supranational institutions possess strong autonomous en-
forcement tools as in EU competition law, and where the “long shadow of hierarchy”, i.e., 
the threat of an octroi is therefore always present, a clear preference for negotiated solutions 
in sensitive issues seems to exist.337 Incidentally, this development reflects a more general 
trend towards societal self-regulation as the only remaining means of enabling effective gov-
ernance in complex and fragmented societies; a development blurring the line between the 
public and the private spheres - and their legal counterparts, private and public law.338 
As regards multi-level governance’s second fundamental element, legitimacy, this is 
based on the fundamental premise that the essence of all governance is political. Whilst sci-
entific expertise and legal adjudication are absolutely indispensable elements of modern gov-
ernance, they are never of an entirely neutral scientific or “legal-technical” nature. Hence, all 
kinds of governance raise the question of legitimacy without which no political system may 
exist. Roughly speaking, legitimacy may be defined as encompassing a set of human rights, 
separation and balancing of powers, rule of law and, most importantly, democracy. These 
constitutive elements interact in a “flexible system” (bewegliches System339), under which 
deficiencies of some elements can, to a certain extent, be compensated by the strength of oth-
ers, which renders necessary a comprehensive overall assessment. Along these lines, a provi-
sional assessment of the EU’s and the WTO’s legitimacy is already possible: in the EU, all 
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legitimacy components are, in principle, present; with democracy, however, being in a struc-
turally weak position on account of the significant lack of a Europe-wide political discourse, 
“pan-European” intermediate institutions such as media, parties and associations and the ex-
pertocratic corporatist specificities of network governance. By contrast, the legitimacy of 
GATT/WTO is limited to the Rule of Law and its contribution to the overall checks and bal-
ances of power within the multi-level constitutional system. 
As regards the functioning of multi-level governance, a holistic approach, as advocated by 
the theories presented above, which attempts to capture the complexity of the European sys-
tem in a few buzzwords and maxims, is not promising.340 Instead, lower level and simpler 
concepts are needed to describe different modes of governance in relation to institutional ca-
pacity and legitimacy. For this evaluation, four different types of multi-level governance may 
be distinguished: regulatory competition and mutual adjustment, intergovernmental and su-
pranational political decisions and, finally, hierarchical (i.e. administrative and judicial) di-
rection. Whereas all four are represented at EU level, only the second and the fourth play a 
role in the GATT/WTO system. This difference will give rise to a completely different as-
sessment of the relationship between the three constitutional levels. 
II. A Multi-Level Governance Reconceptualisation of the EU 
1. Regulatory Competition and its Strain on Democratic Legitimacy 
In the post-national constellation, the default relationship between the various constitu-
tional levels is that of regulatory competition and mutual adjustment. Whereas national gov-
ernments continue to adopt such policies nationally, they do so in response to, or in anticipa-
tion of, policy choices of other governments. The outcomes of mutual adjustment can be di-
verse, mutually or unilaterally beneficial or even detrimental for everyone. Just as competi-
tion is beneficial to the economy, it may also trigger regulative innovations and progress. 
However, not infrequently, such “systems competition” prevents governments from adopting 
policies that would reflect the preferences of their constituencies. As a drastic example, Fritz 
Scharpf points to the situation in which the American States found themselves in the early 
decades of the 19th century, when even “progressive” State governments could not adopt leg-
islation to limit the employment of children for fear of losing market shares in interstate 
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commerce.341 The origins of the shift of governance from national to European level may be 
found in such inadequacies of mutual adjustment of policies among States as an answer to 
increasing economic interdependence.342 This notwithstanding, similar competitive con-
straints may still be observed even after the completion of the Single Market in some policy 
fields, such as taxation, employment relations, and social and environmental policies. It goes 
without saying that, at global level, such discrepancies are particularly strong, in particular 
between “first” and “third” world countries. 
Regulatory competition and mutual adjustment may have a negative impact on democratic 
legitimacy. With the major political decisions being imposed on a State by external economic 
and social pressures, the core of national democracy is threatened, as “de iure freedom and 
political legitimacy is worth nothing without factual freedom of choice.343 Instead, democ-
racy presupposes “spatial congruence” between the space in which regulations are valid and 
the space in which the social interactions to which the regulatory decision refers takes place 
(“output congruence”). Beyond this, democracy also requires spatial congruence among the 
people who are affected by a decision and their representatives in the decision-making sys-
tem (“input congruence”). Otherwise, a group affected by a decision, but not involved in its 
making, can be said to have been determined by others instead of self-determined. Suprana-
tional governance structures, which aim at co-ordinating and harmonising “production fac-
tors” such as product- and process- related production standards as well as social standards, 
can thus be viewed as an attempt at re-establishing spatial congruence. However, as will be 
shown below, their one-sided focus on economic and technical matters, as opposed to the 
more culturally and traditionally linked social policies, leads to additional problems for de-
mocracy. 
2. Intergovernmental Politics and its Lack of Effectiveness  
The second mode of multi-level governance is that of intergovernmental politics, which 
may be found both in the WTO and in parts of the European system. This mode of govern-
ance implies that, national policies are co-ordinated or standardised by agreements at Euro-
pean level, but that national governments remain the protagonists of the decision- making 
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process, that none of them can be bound without its consent, and that the transformation of 
agreements into national law and their implementation remains fully under their control. Cur-
rently, this mode of governance applies to the cases in which the European system provides 
for unanimous decision, most importantly on tax policy, common foreign and security policy 
and the remaining parts of the Third pillar, such as police co-operation. Likewise, within the 
WTO political organs, its general council and its “sub-councils”, intergovernmental politics 
dependent on unanimity is the universal rule. 
To the extent that participating governments possess veto rights, the legitimacy of inter-
governmental politics can be derived from that of national governments.344 However, the in-
stitutional capacity of this mode of governance is normally limited to solutions which are 
preferable to the status quo for all participating governments. To be sure, consensus may, in 
certain cases, be fostered by package deals and side payments or other compensatory mecha-
nisms, which have actually become the preferred options to overcome the unanimity hurdle 
in the EU. Yet, in cases of major interest clashes, solutions will be blocked totally – and it 
was exactly this possibility that was the intrinsic reason for the pillar-construction of the EU, 
with sovereignty issues being particularly salient in the Second and (in part ex) Third pillar. 
Situations of blockage also arise in cases of regulatory competition where national solutions 
differ greatly, and some, especially smaller, countries benefit from this situation, such as in 
tax competition in Europe. 
3. Supranational Politics and its Challenges for Effectiveness and Legitimacy  
The third mode of multi-level governance is that of supranational politics. This form is 
taken here as encompassing all forms of policy-making which escape complete control by 
Member States, and is, therefore, characterised by the various degrees of autonomy of supra-
national institutions. This type of governance applies only to the EU, and, in particular, to the 
establishment of the Single Market and the EC’s concomitant tasks under the First pillar. In 
these matters, European legislation normally requires the initiative of the Commission, 
which, then, must be approved by qualified-majority by the Council of Ministers and, in-
creasingly, also by the European Parliament. In this type of governance, the institutional re-
sources and strategies of the supranational actors on the one hand, and the convergence of 
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preferences among national governments on the other, are mixed and may vary greatly from 
one policy area to another – which makes its assessment in terms of institutional capacity and 
legitimacy difficult. 
Whereas supranational measures requiring qualified-majority may normally still be 
blocked in cases of strong divergence among national interests, this is no longer the case in 
the more frequent constellation in which Member governments disagree over the concrete 
shape of a European measure, but still prefer a common solution to the status quo. It is in 
these cases that supranational institutions work particularly effectively: the Commission’s 
agenda-setting monopoly, the expanding co-decision rights of the Parliament, the good ser-
vices and esprit de corps of national representatives in the COREPER, as well as national 
and European experts in agencies and the hundreds of committees preparing, or specifying 
the details of, council directives.  
The legitimacy of such joint-decision procedures loses its intergovernmental foundation 
and, therefore, its linkage to Nation State-based democracy. This has given rise to the ex-
tremely wide debate on how democracy could be re-established or substituted at European 
level. Only two cornerstones of this debate may be referred to here: its antithetic starting 
point, the BVerfG’s above-mentioned “no demos” thesis (a), and, once this thesis has been 
attenuated, if not refuted, the practical difficulties of establishing democracy in the current 
network governance, which seems to favour market-building at the expense of Welfare State 
functions (b). 
a) Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of a European Demos 
According to the BVerfG’s view, already presented above, democracy is essentially rooted 
in the “people”, understood as the relatively homogeneous demos of a Nation State. This is 
alleged to constitute a pre-democratic, ethnically, culturally, historically and linguistically 
defined community of fate which shares a high degree of “background” consensus on the 
polity’s most important political issues, which legitimises majority decisions and their accep-
tance by the losing minority.345 And since it is clear that, in Europe, these conditions are 
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largely absent, Europe is denied, at least in its present state, any significant democratic poten-
tial. To quote one exemplary voice: “Collective identities develop, become stable and are 
passed into tradition in communities of communication, of experiences and of memories. 
Europe, even within the narrower scope of Western Europe, has no communication commu-
nity, hardly any common memories and only limited common experiences.”346  
However, the “no demos-thesis” has been challenged on various grounds.347 To start with, 
a homogenous demos may, by no means, be praised as an ideal for a social community in the 
first place. For this would presuppose a priority of the people with respect to the State, in the 
sense that persons sharing close social, historical and cultural affinities would, at a certain 
historical moment, have decided to institutionalise their social co-existence within a State. 
This argument is, however, not confirmed by history, as often only the formation of a State, 
gradually or through a revolution, has given rise to the emergence of a demos which was cre-
ated through unification movements or similar developments. Such a demos formation may 
hardly be presented as a social ideal, as it has frequently involved the subjugation or at least 
assimilation of minorities of the population which share different collective identities.348 
Furthermore, and more importantly in the present context, due to increasing social and 
ethnical pluralism, the specification and complexification of societal relations and the “trans-
nationalisation” of many economic, social and political activities, modern Nation States suf-
fer from a diminishing consensus on universal values and the decrease of a common identity 
of their citizens, which has led to the erosion of a unitary, ethnically rooted national demos. 
Under modern conditions, collective identity has, instead, become a sort of “package deal”, 
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with whose individual components only a minority is in total agreement, but the practical 
sum of which is accepted by a majority.349  
Beyond this, the “remaining modern demos” cannot plausibly be conceived of as a mono-
lithic construct which is either present or absent.350 Instead, it is a compound of several fea-
tures which may be realised to different degrees, in which even split “demos-like affinities” 
and identities are possible. Thus, there may be a minimum degree of collective identity which 
entails some basic concern for the well-being of the collective. Such a public spirit (Ge-
meinsinn) may be claimed to constitute a precondition for public deliberations about political 
choices. Public spirit may be transformed into public discourse if most of the members af-
fected by the decision have a capacity to communicate publicly. Whereas such discourse may 
exist transnationally in smaller sectoral publics such as epistemic communities, the develop-
ment of a broader public discourse is dependent on a common language and intermediate in-
stitutions such as the media, associations and a common party system. Finally, the strongest 
form of a demos, common collective identity and solidarity, may provide the basis for redis-
tributive processes within a polity. Common solidarity is the readiness of individuals to give 
up things they value for the benefit of the collectivity. Whether this is actually present may 
be measured by public acceptance of re-distributive social policies. 
In applying these distinctions to the European level, a low degree of “public spirit” may 
well be claimed to exist there. This may be seen not only in the common European cultural 
heritage, but also in the memory of two disastrous world wars coupled with the insight - 
which lies at the very beginning of the Communities and which is well rooted in the con-
science of most Europeans - that European integration is the only way to guarantee peace and 
prosperity for the future Europe. Similarly, the experiences of Communism and its fall after 
1989 may well generate the insight that European integration must not stop at the borders of 
the former iron curtain, but needs to be extended to the whole of Europe. Furthermore, the 
existence of a European constitutional order which has consolidated the fundamental rights 
of citizens, extended them beyond national borders and established a European citizenship, 
giving basic rights such as the right of vote in communal assemblies, may provide another 
contribution to a weak European demos – in the sense of what Jürgen Habermas called “con-
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stitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus). Higher degrees of public spirit may only be 
observed in Europe in new “sectoral demoi” expressing a new common transnational iden-
tity. This may emerge within societal groups such as epistemic communities in science, and 
European “networks” in culture and education, including the ever growing exchanges of pu-
pils, students, researchers and workers. Finally the lack of a strong, “Nation State type” 
demos, which legitimates even processes of redistribution, is not that much of a problem 
since such mechanisms are barely present in the European system anyway. Structural and 
Regional Funds, the main means of redistribution in Europe, may be said to be largely insig-
nificant when compared to traditional mechanisms of redistribution within Nation States, 
such as the German Länderfinanzausgleich. 
On this basis, one may perfectly share Joseph Weiler’s lucid claim that the currently per-
ceivable demos in European States is split among a persistently strong national demos and a 
weak, but growing, European one.351 Even Weiler’s different characterisation of both demoi 
is normatively most attractive and, in the long run, by no means unrealistic: whilst the na-
tional demos should be the location of the irrational side of persons and peoples, representing 
their internal belongingness, feelings and emotions – in short the “Eros” -, the European 
demos should be the stronghold of the intellectual and rational taming of the “Eros”, repre-
senting a sense for tolerance and co-operation in many fields of life – the “civilisation”. 
b) Democratic Legitimacy and Network Governance 
If the principal existence of a thin European demos may be recognised, the problem is that 
European governance is currently only founded to a relatively small degree (corresponding 
perhaps most authentically to the powers of the European Parliament) on this emerging “thin 
demos” and what may be considered as its traditional and legitimate expression – namely, 
democratic accountability based on general and equal elections and public debate, fostered 
by a party system, the mass media, and civil society. Instead, the predominant network type 
of governance largely operates by means of expertise and functional representation and me-
diation of interests, with economic lobby interests often enjoying advantages. However, it is 
exactly in this situation that an emerging constitutional theory, deliberative supranationalism, 
also sees its potential to establish democratic conditions in an alternative way. 
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aa) Deliberative Supranationalism 
In a nutshell, deliberative theory starts off from a twofold insight. On the one hand, mod-
ern pluralistic conditions are supposed to undermine the traditional demos-based concept of 
democracy; on the other, the alternative of a pluralist democracy without basic common val-
ues, whose guarantees are largely limited to values associated with fair process, such as 
openness, transparency and equal chances to present one’s view,352 is always in danger of 
degenerating into a purely aggregative form of democracy. The latter might have the well-
known defects of rendering possible any substantive outcomes, including arbitrary or dis-
criminatory decisions. Deliberative theory tries to parry these objections by combining a 
minimum basis of substantive values on which a broad consensus is supposed to persist – 
namely, the requirements that all citizens should be, and treated as, free and equal - with a 
sophisticated procedural approach. In this sense, deliberative democracy aims at institutional-
ising the ideal that all political decisions are taken through free public reason-giving in which 
all participants have equal voice.353 Instead of relying on tactical bargaining and strategic 
coalitions, in making binding decisions participants must refer to considerations capable of 
being recognised and accepted as pertinent and appropriate by all those affected by them, 
provided that they share the commitment to find, and to act on the basis of, mutually justifi-
able terms of co-operation (“deliberative inclusion”).354 In doing so, the highest, most con-
crete, common denominator of consent should be established. Conversely, deliberation 
should continue on a more general level whenever shared understandings of lesser generality 
have broken down. In this way, decisions on which not all participants can agree should, 
nevertheless, be based on reasons which are acceptable to all, as judged from their own per-
spective. If realised in practice, these deliberative requirements are claimed to limit, to a 
large extent, the number of possible substantive outcomes serving the common good, and 
thus to concretise the concept of equal membership in the polity. On this basis, the constitu-
tional rights of liberty and equality are postulated to constitute the preconditions and results 
of democracy at the same time, the latter in so far as they are endogenised by the participants 
and, therefore, materialise again in specific political decisions. This has been referred to as 
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the deliberative circle of constitutional rights and democracy355- a construct which may be 
able to overcome the one-dimensional liberalist preference for constitutional rights over de-
mocracy. Ultimately, if such deliberative conditions are actually present, democratic self-
government is claimed not to be affected adversely, but actually enhanced by the cultural and 
ethnical heterogeneity of participants – and it is precisely this that makes the deliberative 
concept so attractive for transnational extension. 
At a theoretical level, the deliberative concept has known fundamental attacks which are, 
however, not fully convincing. Deliberation may thus not necessarily be equated with the 
collective seeking of higher moral truth in a fictitious “normative super-discourse” which en-
compasses the whole society, and ignores real world functional constraints, complexity and 
fragmentation of societal subsystems. Instead, much is already gained if decision-making 
units respect deliberative conditions alongside the functional specificities and constraints of 
the subsystem in question. It is also misleading to reproach deliberation for necessarily yield-
ing purely technocratic governance in which élites are favoured with respect to the unedu-
cated. It should, instead, be recognised that, in the modern “knowledge society” (Wissensge-
sellschaft), technocratic expertise is absolutely indispensable, but that the decisive question 
lies in its institutional “re-coupling” with public discourse and democratic decision-making. 
This is admittedly a huge problem, particularly if deliberation takes place in transnational 
élitist circles far away from both the people and from the conventional democratic mecha-
nisms of control. Notwithstanding this, the respect of deliberative procedures seems to be the 
first important precondition for the democratic “re-coupling” of decisions taken or influenced 
by experts. Finally, the argument that the existence of deliberative conditions is very difficult 
to measure is, by itself, not suitable to refute this approach altogether. If anything, it calls for 
the institutionalisation and regulation of deliberative requirements. In sum, if adequately 
combined with functional needs and constraints of network governance and detached from 
the ideal of a moral super-discourse involving the whole society, deliberative democracy may 
be regarded as a normatively attractive model to complement traditional Nation State based 
democracy in the European multi-level system. 
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bb) The Reality of European Network Governance 
Moving back to the reality of the European scenario, it is in one of the core elements of 
network governance – comitology – that an impressive study356 based on empirical evidence 
has actually claimed that deliberative decision-making may materialise in practice. In its ba-
sic concept, deliberative decision-making, indeed, seems to be well compatible with the 
specificities of network governance: if on account of effectiveness, legitimacy and compli-
ance constraints, governance by command and control is no longer possible and needs to be 
replaced by non-hierarchical and co-operative patterns in which a balance between compet-
ing interests is achieved, the realm of arguments and rational persuasion is automatically in-
creased. In the experience of European committees, deliberative conditions seem to have 
been promoted, in particular by the rationality potential inherent to science; scientists are 
normally supervised by their own epistemic communities, expertise provokes counter-
expertise, and conflicts among experts may, in salient cases, ultimately even mobilise the 
media.357 It is equally true that the transnational character of these debates may neutralise 
long-established alliances between scientific experts and industry at national level, and that, 
as a result, the influence of powerful national lobbies is even neutralised in a number or cases 
at European level. 
However, up until now, deliberative conditions and decisions seem to have been achieved 
rather occasionally and only in some areas of European network governance, whereas in oth-
ers – such as the veterinary committees involved in the BSE crisis – this system has shown to 
be vulnerable to manipulation by powerful lobbies. It should, therefore, be acknowledged 
that, so far, such network decision-making structures are, on the whole, not sufficiently insti-
tutionalised and “constitutionalised” through clear and legally binding procedural frame-
works; this entails that responsibilities are often not clear, and that committees frequently 
work under conditions of complete intransparency to the public. Such observations have 
given rise to the fatal thesis that deliberative conditions, especially among scientists, may 
emerge predominantly when decision-making happens in secret, shielded off from public de-
bate and control – a thesis which has not yet been plausibly refuted. Instead, empirical evi-
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dence shows that there is no assurance that all affected interests, in particular diffuse interests 
of consumers and other weak and inhomogeneous societal groups will even be aware of what 
is going on at European level, let alone that they may have realistic chances of influencing 
policy outcomes.358 Worse than this, important regulatory decisions seem to be sometimes 
achieved even by “subterfuge” in opaque institutional conditions without any public dis-
course taking place at all.359 
These legitimacy concerns are aggravated by the fact that European governance provides 
structural advantages for deregulatory, “market-making” policies at the expense of national 
Welfare State policies. To quote again from Fritz Scharpf: “all is not well from a problem-
solving perspective if the market-making policies on which Europe can agree will damage 
the capacity of national governments to adopt those “market-correcting” policies on which 
the Union cannot agree. Unfortunately, this European problem-solving gap tends to exist in 
precisely those policy areas where national governing functions are most vulnerable to sys-
tems competition”, i.e., in particular costly Welfare State functions and process regulation, 
such as environmental standards. Since Welfare States continue to be absolutely crucial for 
societal consensus all over Europe, but are, at the same time, so diverse and complex that 
they may not be harmonised in the foreseeable future (e.g., public and earnings-related social 
insurance in Scandinavian and continental countries; strong industrial relations in Germany), 
the regulatory competition scenario remains present which puts Welfare States under consid-
erable pressure. Solutions to these dilemmas are extremely difficult to design.360 Roughly 
comparable concerns may be raised with respect to the WTO system, too. As recently criti-
cised, intellectual property rights protected by TRIPS may, for example, be an obstacle to the 
cheap production of medicines needed to combat epidemics such as AIDS in third world 
countries.361  
The fourth mode of multi-level governance, which is most important in the present con-
text, is labelled hierarchical direction. In the European system, it is present in the delegation 
of enforcement powers to the Commission, and to expertocratic institutions such as the Euro-
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pean Central Bank. Beyond this, the most important source of hierarchical direction in supra-
national systems is alleged to be law and adjudication. 
4. Supranational Governance by Law and Adjudication and its Effectiveness Surplus 
Supranational governance by law operates by means of the application of pre-established 
legal texts, which have been enacted by intergovernmental or supranational policy-making, 
and which enjoy supremacy towards inferior norms. These legal texts are, in the first place, 
the founding treaties which set up supranational structures; in the EC, also secondary law 
which has been enacted by supranational institutions as a result of the delegation of law-
making authority by the founding treaties may displace national law. As legal, constitutional 
texts in particular, are, by their nature, often vague, abstract and general, supranational courts 
and adjudicative bodies enjoy a considerable degree of discretion in applying and further de-
veloping them by means of the acknowledged methods of judicial law-making such as anal-
ogy and the “imaginative distillation” of general principles. Thus, in many cases, legal gov-
ernance is less determined by the legal texts themselves than by adjudication. Governance by 
law’s reliance on higher-ranking and often general constitutional norms also explains its or-
dinary functioning: it mostly proceeds by means of negative intervention into the lower legal 
system, entailing the immediate inapplicability or avoidance of one of its norms. Only on 
rather exceptional occasions does supranational constitutional law also imply positive com-
mands on the inferior norms or the inferior legal system.362  
Negative intervention by supranational primary law may be directed against supranational 
secondary law or national law. The first case does not, properly speaking, amount to suprana-
tional legal governance, but forms part of the EC’s internal checks and balances aiming at the 
control of supranational politics. Such control should be the stronger when the legitimacy of 
a supranational European act may be deemed to be lower, with a strict and effective constitu-
tional review being capable of compensating legitimatory weaknesses to a certain extent. 
Thus, on account of the Banana regulation’s more than dubious democratic provenance – a 
majority vote in which several Member States were blackmailed363 – a very strict constitu-
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tional control would have been necessary. On these grounds, the fact that the undemocratic 
procedure was not mentioned at all by the ECJ, and the wide discretion the ECJ granted to 
the European legislator may be said and was actually perceived as such by national courts, to 
make the Regulation’s weak legitimacy even weaker. 
Negative intervention by supranational law against national law is the typical form of le-
gal governance. As already stressed in the neo-liberalist reconceptualisation of the EU, it is 
precisely the feature of such negative intervention into national law which leads to a struc-
tural advantage of deregulation of the formerly nationally regulated fields of the economy. 
This intervention proceeds by simple application of the EC Treaties’ economic freedoms and 
competition rules by the ECJ and the Commission (negative integration). By contrast, posi-
tive integration, which means enactment of new European regulation, depends on majorities 
in the political institutions, which are often difficult or impossible to reach. Against this 
background, a closer analysis of supranational governance by law and adjudication in terms 
of effectiveness and legitimacy essentially boils down to an evaluation of the impact of nega-
tive intervention. 
a) Effectiveness  
The effectiveness of negative intervention may be analysed at two levels, that of suprana-
tional law and that of the inferior national law. To start with the first: as regards its immedi-
ate result, namely, that of rendering conflicting provisions of the inferior legal system inap-
plicable or void, negative intervention is very effective. As is well known, in market-building 
by deregulation, EC law was very effective. Pursuant to the direct effect and supremacy doc-
trines, it was able to count on the valuable co-operation of national courts and individuals, 
enforcing EC law against conflicting national law before national courts, most often in com-
bination with the Article 177 (now 234) EC reference procedure. All this led to a high degree 
of internationalisation of the EC legal order into the national ones, with the effect that it be-
came comparably effective. This notwithstanding, the dangers of ineffectiveness of European 
legal governance are present for the same reason, namely, that, for its enforcement, EC law 
depends, to a large extent, on the collaboration of national law, national administrations and 
courts who owe their ultimate allegiance to their own States and constitutions. Non-
compliance may, then, happen particularly when supranational measures are felt to be ille-
gitimate. Here again, the German instance courts’ resistance against the Banana regulation 
through the granting of interim measures provides a telling example. 
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As regards the effects of supranational governance by negative intervention in the national 
legal systems, these range from simple disruptions which negatively affect its effectiveness 
to the deliberate elimination of certain legal provisions or even entire sub-systems. This hap-
pens because hierarchical interventions always involve the risk of not respecting the intra-
systemic knowledge, specialised acquis, autonomy, logic and functioning conditions of the 
“subjected” legal system – i.e., particularly those features which reflect the functional differ-
entiation, specialisation, autonomisation and transnational extension of modern society.364 As 
an example, again drawn from the field of private law, one may point to European consumer 
protection law directives. On account of their punctual nature, they are only effective in 
combination with the rest of national private laws, to which they are, in general, not well-
tuned, as no single law may account for the specificities of 15 others. In the field to be exam-
ined here, the ECJ’s wholesale non-recognition of GATT/WTO as a legal system in Portugal 
vs. Council –an inverted form of hierarchical imposition, as it were - may lead to similar re-
sults, as this system’s regulatory potential and its economic benefits cannot be realised if it is 
denied any meaningful interconnection with the internal legal orders of its founding Mem-
bers. 
In order to reconstruct and assess the effects of a supranational legal intervention into the 
national legal system analytically, it may be useful, as a first step, to compare these to legal 
interventions into other social systems more generally; such a comparison is also justified as 
social systems are reflected in the legal sub-systems which are supposed to regulate them. 
Now, “steering” social systems by law, sometimes also referred to as the “juridification of 
social spheres”, has turned out to be a highly complex endeavour often prone to ineffective-
ness. To give an example, the famous process of “materialisation” of national private law, in 
which law aims to compensate for social injustices by taking over control of social phenom-
ena such as situative (e.g., inferior knowledge) or structural (e.g., the dependence of worker 
or tenants) limitations of the contractual freedom of both parties, has turned out to become 
easily ineffective or even counterproductive.365 Similarly, the juridification of Welfare State 
functions has also proved easy to turn into ineffectiveness. Last but not least, the legal plani-
fication of economic sectors, even long before the Banana experience, has shown that the 
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law’s ability to steer the economy effectively is limited. In general terms, it is especially 
when the autonomous logic and functioning conditions of other sub-systems such as the mar-
ket mechanism are no longer respected that the results of legal interventionism may be inef-
fective and counterproductive. As a remedy, it has been plausibly argued that legal “steering” 
of social systems is most effective when it keeps to a “reflexive” or “procedural”366 role, 
which aims, first of all, at stabilising the good functioning of other social systems, with any 
interventions taking place only indirectly by means of influencing the other system’s frame-
work conditions and autonomous logic, e.g., by providing incentives “in the autonomous lan-
guage” of the other systems, such as the “language” of prices and costs in the economy. 
It may be derived from these findings that effective governance by supranational law 
should equally keep to such a “reflexive” or “procedural” role,367 if it does not specifically 
aim at displacing provisions of the lower legal system (as is frequently the case in the EC’s 
deregulation measures linked to the establishment of the Single Market). This means that it 
should also sensitively account for the lower legal system’s autonomy, integrity and the so-
cial and political constraints under which it operates. As regards the interconnection of the 
two systems in particular, this should be guided only by “interface standardisation” through 
non-hierarchical co-ordination which ensures the relative autonomy of each sub-system.368 
This does not exclude, as a type of working relationship in co-ordination, the general su-
premacy of a specific legal system such as the EU or GATT/WTO legal system over a more 
general one. However, supremacy, understood as such a working relationship, must not be 
equated with unconditional hierarchical imposition. The interventions of the higher system 
on the lower must, at least, be limited where the core constitutive principles of the latter are 
at stake, and where, consequently, co-ordination relationships would lead to de facto hierar-
chical imposition. Any sub-system must, therefore, recognise the core principles and policies 
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of the other interacting sub-systems and, so as to avoid dangerous “identity conflicts” from 
the outset, integrate them into its own doctrinal structures as restrictions.  
A particular example of this may be found in private international law, which has the task 
of co-ordinating competing national orders of private law: here foreign law is only applied so 
that the “ordre public”, composed of fundamental rules and principles of the domestic legal 
order, even though this may not be applicable to the case at all, is not violated. Whereas in 
conventional private international law, the ordre public exception is based on legitimacy ra-
tionales related to the violation of human rights or other fundamental elements of a State’s 
legal order, it may also be associated with the effectiveness of the interconnection between 
legal sub-systems. Indeed, the interface of supranational law in specific branches such as 
media law369 or certain cases of competition law which impair national cultural values have 
been analysed according to such procedural criteria. 
b) Legitimacy  
The legitimacy of supranational legal governance may be said to have a bright and a dark 
side. To explain the latter, it may be useful to provide a comparison with the national situa-
tion as a point of reference. National constitutions have always worked as a non-majoritarian 
complement to, and sometimes a corrective to, representative democracy by public will for-
mation. In this respect, constitutional rules represent the “tying of Ulysses in order to prevent 
him from succumbing to the sirens’ singing”, as Jon Elster put it370 - i.e., the establishment of 
fundamental rules, by a legislature at a certain time, which are particularly protected against 
their future abolition and which may be imposed by Courts against future governmental and 
legislative action. In this respect, constitutions have, over the centuries, worked as useful 
checks and balances in Western democracies, and may therefore be assigned an uncontested 
degree of legitimacy even though the degree and reach of constitutional “hand-tying” re-
mains highly controversial in specific cases. 
However, there are fundamental differences between national and supranational constitu-
tions and their judicial guardians, which might change this assessment. National constitutions 
are more closely linked to the ultimate sovereign, the people, whereas supranational law gen-
erally enjoys a weaker legitimation on account of the above-mentioned difficulties of func-
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tional representation and expertocratic governance – a basic finding well reflected in the term 
of “global subsidiarity” suggested by Robert Howse.371 Also, in the national scenario, consti-
tutional courts and the legislator are in a continuous, mutually complementary interplay: if 
national norms are declared unconstitutional, the legislator can normally fill the gap without 
major problems; conversely, if the legislator’s perception of societal problems changes over 
time, such changes will normally also be reflected in constitutional jurisprudence. This situa-
tion of a mutually complementary interplay does not exist at supranational level, where either 
no “ordinary (secondary) law legislator” exists at all as in WTO, or where, as in the EU, the 
institutional capacity of legislative organs is limited by institutional provisos (majority rules) 
and fundamental incompatibilities between national systems which render harmonisation in 
highly “legitimacy-relevant” fields such as Welfare State systems barely possible. Moreover, 
national constitutions govern more or less all fields of life and society, and they are, there-
fore, responsible for balancing all constitutional values and principles on an equal footing. 
By contrast, supranational constitutions are functionally limited to the policy fields chosen 
for integration as in the EU, or even to a single field such as international trade as in 
GATT/WTO. This specialisation may easily lead to bias and a narrowing of perspective, as 
conflicting values have often no, or only limited, constitutional status within supranational 
systems. Finally, national constitutional courts operate in an environment in which a stronger 
degree of convergence on basic values may be supposed to persist. Similarly, they are also 
more integrated into political discourses which are, so far, widely confined to the national 
level; they know national situations better and are more easily exposed to criticism by public 
opinion. 
It follows from all these observations that the legitimacy of supranational governance by 
law is severely limited. In short, this type of governance is characterised by a strong “capac-
ity (effectiveness) surplus” through its deregulatory potential: it is able do much more things 
than it may do legitimately. What is most problematic against this background is the suprana-
tional balancing of substantive values such as free trade or undistorted competition vs. social 
or environmental protection as provided for in national constitutions. Instead, only basic 
standards of rationality (reasonableness), procedural fairness and the absence of discrimina-
tory practices should be strictly controlled in such conflicts, whilst the generally higher le-
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gitimacy of the national system should lead to far-reaching deference to different national 
regulatory choices.372  
Where, then, does the bright side of supranational legal governance lie? An answer may 
point both to the procedural virtues of the rule of law, and to its substantive capacity to cor-
rect “nation State failures”. To start with the first, the Rule of Law entails the transition from 
the realist-type state of nature to the state of law; it ensures the civilised treatment of foreign 
citizens and States, substituting power-dominated decision-making with rule-contained and 
deliberative decision-making. This is essentially due to the integrity of legal procedures and 
judges and the people’s widespread trust and belief in this integrity. This may, to a certain 
extent, be an irrational naïveté, as it is sometimes put, but it is also the result of the law’s 
(relative) impartiality and deliberative quality. While, as noted, the deliberative qualities of 
supranational political process are, to date, rather controversial, legal adjudication seems to 
provide a safer candidate for the realisation of deliberative ideals. This is due to the compli-
ance of the law and of adjudication with a relatively strict set of procedural and substantive 
constraints, which may be supposed to lead to more balanced and rational outcomes com-
pared to political processes. Beyond this, courts are constrained by a process of participatory 
decision-making which resembles the legislative process in traditional representative democ-
racy - i.e., the production of judicial decisions through voluntary, self-directed debate among 
citizens. In addition, the binding of subsequent parties by precedent, to the extent that they 
are similarly situated as the original parties, may constitute a form of democratic interest rep-
resentation.373 As regards constitutional adjudication, which often replaces political decision-
making by balancing competing values, it should not only be doctrinally and methodologi-
cally coherent in order to be legitimate, but also socially acceptable, by taking into account 
the public interest as well as a wider range of stakeholders’ interests – thus, going beyond 
those interests which give a right to standing as a party in the proceedings.374  
The main substantive virtue of supranational legal governance lies in its capacity to rem-
edy “Nation State” failures (or Community failures in the relationship between the EC and 
GATT/WTO). In this respect, the principle of non-discrimination and the control of “beggar-
my-neighbour” behaviour are of utmost importance, with the maxim “no taxation without 
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representation” becoming the substantive core principle for democracy beyond the Nation 
State.375 In fact, the imposition of the detrimental externalities of one’s own policies on 
neighbour States constitutes a widespread behaviour even among modern liberal democra-
cies. Such externalities can be environmental, as cross-border air pollution or waste shipment 
to other States, political, as in the case of the remittance of asylum seekers to neighbour 
States, or economic, as in the case of protectionist trade measures or unfair tax privileges in 
order to attract companies from other States, which decreases their tax revenue and puts their 
Welfare State institutions under strain. The task of controlling and correcting such “Nation 
State failures” is thus of the highest significance. It lays the ground for new basic rules in in-
ternational relations which, if implemented effectively, would bring the world closer to a 
peaceful, fair and just co-existence of Nations, and may, therefore, be well-assigned the 
predicate “constitutional”. 
To summarise, in a legitimacy perspective, supranational legal governance should, indeed, 
be confined to a predominantly “procedural law” type role vis-à-vis national systems: its 
primary task is to stabilise the latter by defending their effectiveness, political scope of ma-
noeuvre, and viability by preventing “beggar-my-neighbour” behaviour – features which may 
be called “top-down empowerment”. Several constitutional essentials of the EC system may 
be read along these lines: the non-discrimination guarantee of Article 12 (ex 6) EC can be 
read as a counterbalance to the particularism and exclusionary nature of national basic rights; 
similarly, the prohibition of protectionist policies by the four market freedoms and the avoid-
ance of private market “manipulations” through competition rules and State aid controls, 
which are increasingly extended to the granting of unfair tax advantages, can be interpreted 
in this sense given that Member States are prevented from resolving economic and social 
problems at the expense of their neighbours.376 In short, whereas the legitimacy of suprana-
tional governance by law is limited, where competing values need to be balanced, it is huge 
where it is capable of compensating Nation-State or, in the case of GATT/WTO, Community 
failures.  
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III. A Multi-Level Governance Reconceptualisation of GATT/WTO 
The GATT/WTO system may be viewed as belonging to the overall, network-type, multi-
level system of governance, too. In its origin, GATT ’47 had the principal task of bringing 
economics of comparative advantage and competition to bear among sovereign States. By 
contrast, the world trading system, today, has taken other important objectives on board, 
namely the managing of a high degree of economic interdependence377 (caused by a massive 
decrease of natural barriers to cross-border economic activities and of transportation, com-
munication and transaction costs) and the co-ordinating of free trade with other non-
economic constitutional values, such as social and environmental protection. These chal-
lenges should be accommodated by the establishment of the WTO, whose law now consti-
tutes an encompassing and voluminous construct which influences, constrains and controls 
large parts of European and national law.  
Applying the modes of governance framework of analysis suggested by Fritz Scharpf, the 
main feature of WTO governance, which also constitutes its paramount difference as com-
pared to the EU, has already been stated several times: the inferiority of its legislative branch 
in comparison with its adjudicative branch. It should be noted in passing that, to remedy this 
imbalance, interesting proposals to up-grade the political branches in the WTO have been 
made. These include the creation of committees of national parliamentarians to accompany, 
observe and consult the WTO council(s), the establishment of Councils on hot issues such as 
“trade and ethics”, and even the creation of some pre-form of WTO parliamentary assem-
bly.378 However, as long as such proposals are not implemented, WTO governance will be 
dominated by intergovernmental politics and adjudication. Whereas the enactment of any 
regulation requires unanimity in the WTO council(s), its dispute settlement system enjoys a 
distinctly greater degree of autonomy and may, therefore, be understood as a truly suprana-
tional institution.  
On account of the predominant role of WTO adjudication, its effectiveness and legitimacy 
is of decisive significance. Whereas in the EU, ECJ judgments, occasionally, may be 
amended or, more frequently, complemented by secondary legislation, the WTO adjudicators 
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have, in practice, almost always the last word on sensitive issues on account of the unanimity 
principle in the WTO’s political branch. 
1. Effectiveness of WTO Adjudication 
The questions relevant to the effectiveness of WTO Law and Adjudication are at the core 
of this thesis and have already been broached several times. As with supranational legal gov-
ernance in general, WTO adjudication boils down to negative integration, which is usually 
very effective, but bears the expounded danger of a “capacity-surplus”. Against the back-
ground of the hitherto high degree of compliance of the Member States with dispute settle-
ment reports – which have worked as the main enforcement tool of WTO law -, the central 
question therefore arises of whether the effectiveness of WTO law can and should be further 
enhanced. The answer to this question should be made dependant on the legitimacy of WTO 
adjudication. 
2. Legitimacy of WTO Adjudication 
Resorting to the criteria for legitimacy listed above, the WTO may claim to possess but 
the Rule of Law, and to provide a contribution to the overall balance of power in a vertical 
system of constitutional checks and balances. Given that the WTO is probably one of the 
most secretive international organisations, with the framework rules for transparency and in-
terest group participation being less developed than in other organisations,379 very much de-
pends on the performance of the DSB.380 In order to assess what the DSB may legitimately 
do in reviewing the WTO-consistency of national measures, it seems useful first to shed light 
on the framework conditions under which it operates.  
a) Framework Conditions of WTO Adjudication 
Generally, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism may be said to operate under huge le-
gitimacy constraints. It labours under the threat of single Members, in particular very power-
ful ones, not accepting and implementing reports. In this respect, notable differences between 
the WTO and the EU or even a Nation State are present. National courts, to implement deci-
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sions, may draw on a more or less effective enforcement machinery which may resort to the 
monopoly of force. The EC, to be sure, does not possess this monopoly. However, its impres-
sive compliance record is mainly due to the high degree of internationalisation in the national 
legal systems, which entails national lawyers being increasingly less aware of the European 
or national origin of a specific rule and that EC law be enforced through national procedural 
law devices. In addition, in the case of conflicts between European and national law, EC law 
may draw on its long established authority, the realistic availability of effective countermea-
sures (Articles 226ff (ex 169ff) EC) as well as the high political stakes of potential disobedi-
ence for a Member State. As already emphasised several times, the internal annulment, by a 
national constitutional court or similar body, of European measures would gravely impair the 
Rule of Law at European level and thus endanger the achievements of an integration project 
which has successfully safeguarded peace and prosperity for nearly half a century.  
By contrast, the WTO is a much more recent and consequently a less developed creature. 
Its internalisation in national legal systems is still relatively limited, which is mainly due to 
their frequent denial of direct effect. As an enforcement device, retaliation is certainly avail-
able against a defaulting member, but a frequent recourse to such means would not only run 
counter to free trade, but probably also endanger the system, with its basic objectives of “re-
ciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” being frustrated. For these reasons, ra-
tional persuasion is the WTO’s most effective enforcement device. Such deliberative adjudi-
cation must ensure that even negatively affected parties accept decisions as just outcomes, or 
at least as an outcome which may be subject to critique, but whose neutrality, integrity and 
high legal quality is beyond any doubt. This may be supposed to avoid challenges against the 
dispute settlement body’s status and authority and promote the gradual creation of a “supra-
national jurisprudential acquis” which may provide the authority of precedent in subsequent 
controversies. It may be anticipated that both the panel’s and the appellate body’s preference 
for compromise solutions clearly reflect such a deliberative approach. 
b) Implications for Legitimate WTO Adjudication 
Under these extremely constraining framework conditions, the scope for legitimate WTO 
adjudication is limited to ensuring the deliberative features of the Rule of Law as opposed to 
a power-oriented system, as these enjoy a strong universal “legitimacy-appeal”. In the first 
place, this means that the fairness of the DSB’s own procedure should be guaranteed scrupu-
lously (aa). Beyond this, WTO adjudicators should proceed with methodological coherence 
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and integrity in their legal reasoning (bb). Finally and most importantly (3), in a more sub-
stantive perspective, they should display greatest sensitivity when reviewing other national, 
supranational and international institutions’ measures.  
aa) Procedural legitimacy 
At first glance, several features of the DSB might raise doubts about its fairness. Proceed-
ings (Article 14 DSU) including the pleadings of the parties to the dispute and third parties 
(Article 18.2.) are secret which renders impossible any public debate or feed-back by the in-
ternational law community prior to adoption. Moreover, there is no formal mechanism for 
participation of affected non-governmental actors and citizens in the proceedings. 
However, these weaknesses have been considerably ameliorated by WTO practice. Thus, 
the practice has been established to publish panel and appellate body reports on the Internet 
immediately following their release to the parties. These reports are usually very comprehen-
sive and well drafted. All arguments are expounded in detail in the introductory sections, and 
even expert testimony and advice is included to the extent that it has formed part of the 
body’s evidentiary record. In this context, the establishment of an appellate body is of singu-
lar importance, since even though the appellate decision must be rendered within only 90 
days of the panel ruling, this interval allows for critical deliberation and the reception of pub-
lic reactions. Beyond this, in the Shrimps ruling,381 the appellate body, reversing a panel de-
cision,382 allowed the use of amicus curiae briefs from a non-governmental organisation, thus 
ensuring a certain representation of civil society and counteracting the danger that decisions 
are taken by an élite of trade specialists only, without considering the views and the special-
ised knowledge of other actors in other fields. 
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Moreover, the jurisprudence of the dispute settlement bodies, in particular that of the ap-
pellate body, may be claimed to interpret the rather summary and concise regulation of the 
procedure in the light of the “due process ideal” rather than in terms of technical efficiency in 
the settlement of disputes.383  
Despite heavy criticism,384 this assessment holds true also for the Banana III case. As reported, 
in this case, the EU had not correctly implemented the recommendations of the Bananas II panel 
(in a way which was obvious to any WTO law insider). Thereafter, the US requested the DSB to 
authorise sanctions under Article 22 DSU. The EU, alleging the WTO-consistency of its imple-
mentation measures, insisted that the matter should be decided under Article 21 (5) DSU. Ac-
cording to this provision, a disagreement on the consistency of a Member’s measures taken to 
comply with DSB recommendations must be decided “through recourse to these dispute settle-
ment procedures, including, wherever possible, recourse to the original panel.” A manifest con-
tradiction between Article 22 DSU and Article 21 (5) DSU had thus been revealed. Indeed, if a 
repeated recourse to the Article 21 (5) DSU “implementation review” procedure were permitted, 
this would render impossible the adoption of any sanctions (this was called the “sequencing 
problem”.385 In order to remedy a procedural deadlock (the EU had blocked the adoption of the 
DSB’s agenda to prevent the Article 22 DSU procedure from continuing), WTO’s DG Ruggieri 
suggested a compromise, according to which a panel under Article 22 (6) DSU was established. 
Under this provision, an arbitration procedure with the primary purpose of reviewing the level of 
the sanctions requested may be carried out. In the arbitration decision, the panel found a com-
promise which might be considered an acceptable way out of the dilemma. The panel found that, 
under the Article 22 (6) DSU procedure, it was also allowed to scrutinise the WTO-consistency 
of the EU’s amended regime by way of incidental control. In substance, the panel then con-
firmed the obvious shortcomings of the EU’s implementation measures. As a consequence, it 
approved the sanctions requested by the US, but reduced the amount of the sanctions drastically. 
Since the panel had found an acceptable compromise in a situation which could have greatly 
threatened the integrity of the whole system, Paolo Mengozzi’s conclusion, according to which, 
“le principe d’un règlement des différends prompt et efficace tend à prévaloir sur le principe du 
procès en bonne et due forme (...)”, is unacceptable. This is even more so as the US and other 
WTO Members had already raised objections against the (almost identical) draft of the European 
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implementation measures at an early stage and requested the establishment of a Article 21 (5) 
DSU panel.  
As a further step towards the “due process ideal”, Article 7 (2) DSU, according to which 
panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by 
the parties to the dispute, was interpreted by the appellate body to imply that all the claims 
that the complainant intends to make must, in the first instance, be contained in the request 
for a panel. The ratio of this interpretation is to guarantee that the defendant and third parties 
have sufficient information for an adequate response. Another important interpretation was 
given to the panel’s duty “to make an objective assessment of the matter” (Article 11 DSU). 
This duty was interpreted to be one of law, and therefore, subject to appellate review. In 
Hormones,386 the appellate body further clarified the matter as follows: “The duty to make an 
objective assessment of the facts is, among other things, an obligation to consider the evi-
dence presented to a panel and make factual findings on the basis of that evidence. The de-
liberate disregard of, or failure to consider, the evidence submitted to a panel is incompatible 
with an objective assessment of the facts.” Moreover, the decision to disregard evidence as 
irrelevant was itself found to be a reviewable issue of law.387 It was also convincingly argued 
that, though the panel has the discretion to decide as to whether to allow an amicus curiae to 
submit a brief or not, and to consider the information provided, this decision should be re-
viewable on the basis that a defective exercise or abuse of the discretion granted may well 
constitute a violation of the duty to make an objective assessment of the facts.388 Finally, 
procedural justice rights have also been strengthened by allowing a private legal counsel to 
attend and plead in proceedings. Since private attorneys are usually trained in domestic litiga-
tion and are, therefore, more sensitive to due process issues than lawyer-diplomats, this deci-
sion might further contribute to the consolidation of a true court-like system of adjudication.  
Notwithstanding these achievements, one cannot note ignore such adverse phenomena as 
the so-called technique of “completing the analysis”, frequently used by the appellate 
body.389 This euphemism addresses the situation in which the appellate body, after partially 
reversing a panel finding (what has occurred in 15 out of the first 17 appellate body reports, 
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even though, on two occasions alone, the final conclusions have been completely over-
turned), decides the case itself. This may be explained by the fact that the DSU does not, at 
least not explicitly, give the appellate body the power to remand a case to a panel. Indeed, 
such a procedure would barely be compatible with the DSU’s strict time schedules. The un-
fortunate result of the “completing the analysis” technique may be found in the fact that the 
appellate body decides, as first and last instance, certain relevant questions of law and fact 
which the panel may not even have addressed at all. This procedure not only deprives the 
parties of their right, under the DSU, to have a case examined by two instances, but it also 
renders impossible any feedback on the first instance decision which would be most impor-
tant in terms of the control and, thus, the legitimacy of the decision. Beyond this, this tech-
nique contributes to the development of the panel procedures becoming more and more a de-
graded to sort of prelude to the real endgame which takes place only in the appellate body. 
This development also becomes visible in the fact that, at the present stage, the clear majority 
of cases are appealed against, which not only entails that the tight time-schedules set forth by 
the DSU can no longer be respected in an increasing number of cases, but also that the appel-
late body’s human and logistic resources may soon become exhausted. 
Even though these matters constitute serious problems, they are, at the present stage, not 
capable of endangering the overall fairness of the procedures. This may be inferred from the 
circumstances that, as will be shown in the following, the appellate body has, up until now, 
displayed great sensitivity in politically hot issues and that the overall functioning of the 
mechanism is still very good. All in all, the fair procedure requirement may be considered as 
having largely been realised in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
bb) Methodological coherence and integrity 
The fundamental task of the DSB mechanism is to ensure a just and convincing balance 
between free trade and competing social and environmental values. Whereas former GATT 
’47 panels were sometimes accused of a “free trade bias”,390 the new WTO dispute settle-
ment bodies have already attained a more convincing record, to which their methodological 
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sensitivity may have contributed. To begin with, the importance of the wording of the provi-
sions as the starting point of any interpretation was frequently emphasised. This approach 
was justified by resorting to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on General Treaty Law, 
which stipulates that “provisions of a treaty be given their ordinary meaning in context and in 
light of the treaty’s objective.” This approach was held to be relevant for the interpretation of 
WTO law on the grounds of the convincing reasoning that the DSB’s mandate is “to clarify 
the existing provisions of agreements [covered by the WTO umbrella] in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law” and that most provisions of the 
Vienna Convention may, in fact, be characterised as codified customary law.391 This was, 
indeed, held on several occasions by the International Court of Justice with respect to spe-
cific provisions of this Convention.392 
Arguably, this textual approach has advantages in terms of deliberative legitimacy. 
Whereas the priority of teleological interpretation may be assumed to privilege the agree-
ments’ general goal – namely, that of promoting free trade - careful attention to the wording 
frequently draws the interpreters’ attention to compromises reached at the drafting stage. 
Thus, in Hormones, the appellate body had to examine the panel’s interpretation of the for-
mula, trade restrictive sanitary and phytosanitary measures “based on” international stan-
dards. The panel had interpreted this to mean that such measures must conform exactly to the 
standards in question, on the basis of the agreement’s purported general aim of eliminating 
the trade restrictive effects of diverse regulation through harmonisation.393 The appellate 
body reversed this interpretation on the ground that the detailed formulations of the text may 
hide a “delicate and carefully negotiated balance... between these shared, but sometimes 
competing, interests of promoting international trade and of protecting the life and the health 
of human beings.”394 On similar grounds, the appellate body, in Hormones again, rejected the 
systematic maxim applied, by the panel, that exceptions - in this case again to free trade - 
need to be construed narrowly.  
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Beyond this, the frequent reference to general international law standards contains the fur-
ther advantage that it draws the interpreter’s attention to the objective of internal coherence 
of international law, including sources as diverse as free trade and environmental and social 
protection agreements. This approach obviates temptations to view the WTO as a “self-
contained regime”,395 which had been advocated with respect to the old GATT396 and which 
again invites the possibility of privileging free trade rationales over competing values. In a 
similar context, one may mention the limited hermeneutic importance acknowledged by the 
appellate body to travaux préparatoires. This is in line with Article 32 of the Vienna Con-
vention which mentions legislative history only as an optional and subsidiary source of inter-
pretation which may only be resorted to when an assessment of the wording and teleology 
leads to an unclear, manifestly absurd or unreasonable interpretation of the text.  
This hierarchy among methods of interpretation was justified on the ground that “retro-
spective, originalist interpretation almost inevitably privileges the supposed intentions and 
expectations of a fairly narrow interpretative community (that of the treaty negotiators) over 
the broader community affected by interpretive decisions; namely, the community implicated 
in the notion of democratic or social legitimacy.397 Exactly along these lines, the hermeneutic 
value of a concept’s historical meaning (as apparent in the travaux préparatoires) was actu-
ally limited by the appellate body in Shrimps.398 There it stated, albeit without express refer-
ence to the Vienna Convention but to the “by definition evolutionary nature of some treaty 
provisions”, that the notion “natural sources” had to be read “in accordance with the objec-
tive of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means for doing so...”.  
Finally, the role accorded to precedents by the appellate body may be argued to contribute 
to the DSB’s legitimacy in that continuity and consistency are valuable attributes in any legal 
system. Whereas no strict rule of stare decisis is contained in the DSU, the appellate body 
has nonetheless found that adopted reports which create “legitimate expectations” concerning 
future cases need to be considered.399 This finding was convincingly interpreted in a pro-
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deliberative way as to mean that panels are bound to follow previous jurisprudence, unless 
they provide a reasoned justification for a deviation from that jurisprudence.400 Beyond this, 
the appellate body held that a panel could even find useful guidance in the reasoning of an 
unadopted panel report that is considered to be relevant. This should also imply that, where 
such reasoning is not endorsed, the reasons for doing so should be expounded.  
cc) Institutional Sensitivity in Dealing with other Levels of Governance 
Beyond methodological coherence and integrity, the DSB may also promote deliberative 
democratic conditions through a sensitive review of national or supranational measures. In 
the review of such measures, there are, at least in theory, two extreme possibilities: complete 
deference to another actor’s interpretation and application of its own law and de novo scru-
tiny, i.e., the full control of such measures against one’s own standards. Both may be argued 
to be inadequate. Complete deference may give space to “beggar-my-neighbour” policies to-
wards foreign States and undemocratic practices within a State, whereas de novo review may 
easily constitute an undue interference with the other actor’s constitutional autonomy and 
democratic accountability. By contrast, a “deliberative adjudicator” may be submitted to opt 
for an intermediary approach similar to that which was proposed above for supranational ad-
judication in the EU: formal minimum requirements such as a fair procedures including the 
consideration of all, including foreign stakeholders’, interests and respect for methodological 
integrity are objectively measurable and have a strong universal “legitimacy-appeal”. There-
fore, they may be controlled strictly. The same is true, though to a lesser extent, of typical 
constitutional “Nation State failures” such as protectionist discrimination against foreigners 
or foreign goods. However, beyond these standards, political decisions taken by other actors 
within their competence should be respected as far as possible. Member States are more 
closely linked to the citizen, more aware of the peculiarities of a given local situation and, to 
a higher degree, politically accountable to their citizens than supranational institutions. 
Therefore, following Robert Howse’s “global subsidiarity” reasoning,401 their decisions may 
be assumed to enjoy more legitimacy than decisions at WTO level. As a consequence, the 
balancing between free trade and competing social values carried out by a State or the EC 
should be respected as far as possible. 
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In this context, the interpretation of the formulas “like products” and “no less favourable treat-
ment” in Article 3 GATT is of crucial importance. As ECJ jurisprudence on “de facto”, “indi-
rect” or “disguised” discrimination shows,402 these formulae may be construed as far-reaching 
market-access rights, restricting huge parts of domestic regulation. Similarly, if “likeness” is de-
termined only on the basis of the physical similarity of products, products differing in their pro-
duction methods and even origin-neutral criteria of differentiation would be covered. Thus, as 
has been convincingly suggested,403 the different treatment of product and production-oriented 
domestic standards and measures should be abandoned, and “like products” should be inter-
preted as meaning “not differing in any respect relevant to an actual non-protectionist regulatory 
policy.”404  
These guidelines of “global subsidiarity” may again be said to be largely respected by the 
WTO’s adjudicators, the appellate body in particular.405 Both with respect to fact finding and 
in reviewing other institutions’ and actors’ measures, the appellate body held the legal basis 
to be the Article 11 DSU duty to “make on objective assessment of the facts”. This has made 
an appropriately flexible approach possible. Thus, in Hormones, the appellate body had to 
interpret Article 5.1 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures according to which measures under these agreements shall be “based on an as-
sessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or 
health...” On this formula, the appellate body found that, while the threshold of a purely hy-
pothetical possibility of risk needs to be surpassed and the party adopting the SPS measures 
needs to put forth positive evidence of a risk, such evidence may also come from qualified 
and respected minority scientific opinions. In saying so, the appellate body also recognised 
that, in risk assessments, a government needs to pay heed to public opinion which may be 
influenced not only by scientific evaluations, but also by experiences and fears which are 
barely verifiable rationally. Thus, democratically accountable governments were granted 
wide discretion in the fulfilment of their task to prevent risks, in particular when they are ir-
reversible to their population. As a result, Members were allowed to take public opinion seri-
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ously providing it was not plainly contradictory to scientific evidence. In consequence, the 
EC only lost the Hormones case because it had not put forth sufficient positive evidence of a 
risk, but was given the possibility to do so within a certain time-frame – which, however, it 
failed to do. Similarly, in Shrimps,406 the appellate body, again reversing a panel decision, 
conceded to the US the general right to uphold legislation according to which certain envi-
ronmental standards should be respected in the production or harvesting of shrimps to be im-
ported from other States (in this case, a safety device allowing sea turtles to escape from a 
shrimp capture net). The US, however, lost the case because the implementation of this right 
was not carried out in a sufficiently fair and non-discriminatory procedure. Indeed, exporting 
States were not guaranteed certain minimum rights (such as the right to be heard, to appeal or 
seek review of a certification decision and to receive a reasoned notification of it) by which 
the use of safety devices was to be certified. 
In cases in which the domestic legislator’s balancing of values is not objected to, the 
WTO adjudicator may, nevertheless, provide guidelines on how to interpret domestic regula-
tion in future cases, so as to contain future “power policy”. A true masterpiece in this respect, 
worthy to form part of legal history, is the 288 page report on the famous (or infamous) Sec-
tion 301 of the US 1974 Trade Act, which was also issued in the framework of the Bananas 
conflict.407 This provision contains the legal basis for unilateral trade sanctions whose com-
patibility with WTO law was challenged by the EU when it was threatened with such sanc-
tions on account of it having failed to implement the 1997 appellate body decision on its Ba-
nana import regime in time. Arguing that the possible application of the Statute according to 
its rather wide wording was less important than its actual wording in political practice, it 
found no violation of WTO law, but preventively subjected the exercise of the statute to nu-
merous conditions in order to ensure its consistency with WTO law. In other words, the panel 
has provided the US with a lengthy and detailed commentary, binding under WTO law, on 
how to interpret and apply its own law! All in all, whilst a negative finding might have en-
dangered the US’ support for the WTO in general, this report tries to control and contain 
American power-policy in future cases. This is an outstanding and admirable example of 
making use of the law’s deliberative quality and potential for legitimate supranational gov-
ernance. 
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Finally, another deliberative “entrenchment” feature may be noted - the possibility for a 
complaining State to ask the DSB for concrete recommendations on WTO-consistent meas-
ures by which the regime found to be in violation might be replaced (Article 19 (1) 2 DSU). 
Even though these recommendations are clearly not binding, the presentation of a concrete 
alternative – which tries to respect as far as possible the objectives of the earlier illegal re-
gime – puts the State in question under additional “deliberative pressure” to accept it or to 
give a convincing justification of why this cannot be done.408 
To summarise, the legitimacy of the WTO system is mainly limited to the deliberative, 
“Nation-State failure-correcting” potential of supranational adjudication. While this fulfils 
extremely important functions in containing States’ political power-play, it presupposes a 
high degree of respect for procedural fairness and methodological coherence and integrity, 
and imposes considerable limits in the substantive review of national or supranational meas-
ures. It is against this background that the interconnection between the WTO and its Member 
States’ legal orders will need to be reconstructed. 
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Part III: An Alternative Proposal for a Multi-Level Constitutional Inter-
connection of the Three Levels 
Chapter I: Interconnecting National Constitutional Law and European Law 
“Irrespective of how the Bundsverfassungsgericht’s position is to be assessed under public 
international law, I see the biggest shortcoming in the fact that though constitutional con-
flicts could be expected at the conclusion of the EC Treaties, they were not regulated (…) 
Against this background, it should be considered whether an institution, with which we have 
become familiar in Germany, namely, the Common Senate of the highest federal courts, 
could not be established at EU level as well as a kind of court of arbitration. As members, 
one might imagine representatives of the ECJ and a representative of the highest court of 
each Member State. The ECJ could not take over this task of arbitration as it is an institution 
of the Community.” 
Siegfried Broß, Judge at the Bundesverfassungsgericht, competent for European Matters409 
 
I. Conclusions from Multi-Level Governance for the Solution of Constitutional 
Conflicts between the European and the National Legal Order  
According to the multi-level governance approach, the interconnection of national consti-
tutional and European law should be modelled so as to optimise the effectiveness and legiti-
macy of both levels. As regards effectiveness viewed in the narrow “ultimate authority” per-
ception of the Pure Theory of law, it has already been shown in the legal-structural recon-
struction of realism on the one hand, and functionalism and neo-liberalism on the other, that 
neither legal order is “strong” enough to impose itself without any limits upon the other, and 
that unconditional and unlimited supremacy is, therefore, impossible.  
The multi-level governance approach considerably refines this conclusion by the network 
perspective according to which all constitutive elements, sub-systems and interconnecting 
mechanisms are mutually interdependent, none of which is able to deploy a great deal of 
autonomous effectiveness: while national law increasingly depends on supranational law to 
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restore its problem-solving capacities under the constraints of economic globalisation, Euro-
pean law would simply not be able to determine and monitor national implementation meas-
ures in detail. Moreover, in order to maintain also the national level’s effectiveness, it has 
been outlined that European law should behave in a “reflexive” way, respecting as far as pos-
sible the autonomy and the intra-systemic ordre public, i.e., the core constitutional rules and 
principles of national law. 
Transformed into a legal-structural perspective, the lack of absolute hierarchy renders im-
possible any monistic interpretation of the relationship of the two levels, so that a dualistic 
interpretation seems to be the cogent logical consequence. Indeed, this model would seem to 
come closest to the reality of two legal orders which are visibly separated despite important 
interconnections, and which are protected by two powerful courts, each of which has the last 
word with respect to all legal issues arising within each system. In the language of the Pure 
Theory of law, the pluralist approach assumes the existence of two logically independent sys-
tems with different Grundnormen. As a consequence, conflicts of validity between the two 
orders are excluded by definition, whereas “conflicts of obligation” for individuals facing the 
equally justified claims for validity of norms emanating from the two orders are possible.  
Other consequences regard the reach of conflict norms – so to speak “bridging norms” - 
between the two systems, in particular the supremacy rule. For, logically, such rules cannot 
change the pluralistic structure itself; in other words, they could not bring about a “legal 
revolution” through the annexation of a legal order under the Grundnorm of another. This 
means that, logically, the supremacy rule can only go as far as the national Grundnorm al-
lows it to go; i.e., EC law can only influence the national legal order in so far as national con-
stitutions allow it to do so through their “opening clauses” such as Articles 23, 79 III 
Grundgesetz. Procedurally, the competence of the guardian of the supremacy rule, the ECJ, 
must also be limited, with the consequences that this court has no competence to sit as the 
final arbiter over “Grundnorm-relevant” conflicts in application of that rule. Instead, only 
national courts would, logically, be able to take this decision.410  
                                                 
410
 The theory of institutional legal positivism reaches a similar result from a less formalist conceptual starting 
point. It conceives of law as a system, directed towards a coherent unity of norms, the existence of a legal order 
being regarded as a sort of “regulatory ideal”. Since the actual enforcement of the legal order ultimately de-
pends on legal institutions, founded and directed by norms, it may be qualified as an “institutional normative 
system”. The interface between legal orders is regulated in each system by specific criteria of legal validity, as 
contained in so-called norms of recognition (Hart). An analysis of the interplay of the EC and national legal 
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As a result of the radical pluralist scenario, the two legal orders would stand side by side 
like secluded medieval strongholds and restrict the relationships between each other – to the 
ultimate detriment of the effectiveness of both. The scenario of legal subjects having to serve 
two masters, i.e., facing conflicting commands by different legal orders would be possible. 
For constitutional conflicts could not be solved legally,411 and would need to be left to poli-
tics. This approach, however, meets with several strong objections. First, political solutions 
to constitutional conflicts would appear to be unlikely not just in view of the generally lim-
ited degree of political consensus among Member States which renders political decisions 
rarely smooth and easy. Also, political decisions would be particularly difficult to reach in 
cases in which a State has been outvoted in the conclusion of a secondary act, but nonethe-
less continues to challenge it on constitutional grounds, thus endangering legal unity. Sec-
ondly, the radical dualist scenario could also generate strongly negative implications for the 
effectiveness of the supranational legal order. These do not lie only in the central danger, 
which has been mentioned several times already, of the outbreak of the Cold War scenario, 
with a national constitutional court setting aside a European act. Instead, as mentioned, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
orders along these lines shows that both orders do not constitute one monistic system in which EC law would be 
super-ordinated to national law: “The monistic picture does not square well with the fact that the effective legis-
lature for the EC is the Council of Ministers, whose members are identifiable only by reference to the place they 
hold according to state-systems of law; so EC powers of legal change and criteria of validity presuppose the 
validity of competencies conferred by state-systems, but not themselves validated by EC law. More generally, 
the institutional theory of law insists on a degree of sociological realism, hence is not in the Kelsenian sense a 
pure theory. From this point of view, it is clear that institutions of state law look to the state legal order for con-
firmation of their competencies, not treating this as contingent upon ulterior validation or legitimation by the 
EC; while reciprocally EC institutions look to the foundation treaties as sufficient for their validation. A plural-
istic analysis is, in this instance, and on these grounds, clearly preferable to a monistic one.” Institutional legal 
positivism also advocates a similar restriction of supremacy: “(...) The legal systems of Member States and their 
common legal system of EC law are distinct but interacting systems of law, and hierarchical relationships of 
validity, within the criteria of validity proper to distinct systems, do not add up to any sort of all-purpose supe-
riority of one system over another. It also follows that the interpretative power of the highest decision-making 
authorities of the different systems must be, as to each system, ultimate (...) What this indicates is that accep-
tance of a pluralistic conception of legal systems entails acknowledging that not all legal problems can be 
solved legally.” N. MacCormick, “The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now”, ELJ 1 (1995) 259, 264. For a 
similar conclusion, see, also, J. Isensee, “Vorrang des Europarechts und deutsche Verfassungsvorbehalte - 
offener Dissens”, in J. Burmeister (ed.), Festschrift für Klaus Stern, 1997, 1239 at 1266ff. 
411 N. MacCormick, op. cit., 264. Incidentally, monism with subordination of EC law is not even discussed by 
this author. 
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German instance courts’ indirect resistance through the frequent award of interim measures 
against the Banana regulation has considerably decreased its effectiveness throughout its en-
tire existence. On all these grounds, the radical dualist situation is no viable solution from an 
effectiveness perspective, and there is a strong need to establish, or make more use of the ex-
isting, effective legal interconnections among the two legal orders which would ultimately 
overcome the Cold War scenario.  
This conclusion is strongly supported by legitimacy rationales, too. A complete submis-
sion of the national legal order under the supranational would be at odds with the generally 
higher legitimatory “dignity” of the former in the terms of the global subsidiarity reasoning 
outlined above. Secondly, breaking up the Rule of Law by leaving constitutional conflicts to 
politics would also mean renouncing the law’s deliberative virtues, which have enabled it to 
tame the earlier political “powerplay” in international relations and allowed it to create the 
Community’s supranational acquis. By contrast, it is particularly the lack of hierarchy among 
the supranational and the national level under dualism that might even favour a deliberative 
legal solution among the courts. Moreover, other framework conditions for such a legal solu-
tion should be relatively good in the EC: it possesses a fully fledged legal system in which, 
unlike the WTO, non-compliance and accepting sanctions are definitively unavailable as an 
alternative. Also, from a legal-technical perspective, interconnecting two legal orders should 
not pose insurmountable problems. Resolving such conflicts is, indeed, a genuinely legal task 
as shown inter alia by the existence of a whole legal discipline devoted to it: conflict of laws. 
The lack of a conflict resolution mechanism at EC level may, therefore, well constitute an 
important institutional failure, but does not cast doubt on the legal characterisation of this 
task. 
With respect to the concrete question of what kind of intersystemic coupling should be es-
tablished, basic guidelines may also be derived from the multi-level concept. The fact that 
there exists no hierarchical sub- or super-ordination, but heterarchical, complex couplings 
between the two legal orders should entail that neither should seek to stand above the other, 
but should respect the other’s relative autonomy. Moreover, each legal order should, as out-
lined above, integrate the other’s intrasystemic “ordre public”, i.e., its core features includ-
ing its “versions” of human rights and legislative competence delimitation, into its own doc-
trinal structures. 
From these provisos, a two-step solution may now be derived. First, a conflict should be 
avoided as far as possible. This could be practically achieved through judicial co-operation, 
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in which the two constitutional judiciaries agree on a common constitutional standard, in par-
ticular in the fields of legislative competencies or human rights protection (“concordance so-
lution”). To reach such a compromise, instead of a blind octroi of supremacy, the competing 
principles underlying the conflicting norms of both sides should be optimised so that each 
may retain maximum effectiveness.412  
Second, if a co-operation along these lines fails, the conflict should not simply be left 
open, in the hope that it will never break out as a result of a national court setting an EC act 
aside. However, according to multi-level governance logic, a further legal interconnection 
between the clashing constitutional orders should be established. This means that a third, le-
gal instance should take an “interconnection decision”. Such an instance might be found de 
lege lata at two levels only: at the level of the European Union, overarching the European 
Communities, or at the level of general public international law. A solution at EU level might 
be slightly better than the straightforward resort to international law, because it would ensure 
conflict resolution closer to the European system, which might be important with a view to 
accommodating and preserving its specific supranational features. Thus, the Union’s “roof 
construction” above the Member States and the Communities, otherwise nearly devoid of 
content, could be rendered useful for the sake of legal co-ordination between them. Since, de 
lege lata, the EU obviously only disposes of a political institution, the European Council, and 
not of any adjudicatory or mediatory institutions, EU law would, however, still have to be 
supplemented by international law as regards the establishment and functioning of a conflict 
resolution institution.413 The result of this would be a special international law sub-regime 
between general international law and EC law. 
If such a third-level, co-ordinative institution could actually be established, the EU might 
be characterised as a three-tier structure with a weak super-ordination, limited to co-
ordinative functions, of the EU over the Communities and the Member States. At this point, 
one might object that, just as with regard to the Communities, a monistic subordination of the 
Member States under the Union should equally be excluded, and that, consequently, no bind-
ing conflict resolution at EU level would be conceivable. This might, however, also be a vir-
tue. For it might be possible that a legal, albeit not necessarily strictly binding, mediation 
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 See R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 2nd ed. 1985, 78ff. and 152. 
413
 The recourse to public international law for the resolution of constitutional conflicts as ultima ratio is also 
advocated by T. Stein in O. Due et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling, 1995, 1439 at fn. 3, and idem, “Die 
regionale Durchsetzung völkerrechtlicher Verpflichtungen, ZaöRV 47 (1987), 95ff. 
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decision be taken at EU level. This might offer a persuasive compromise solution difficult to 
oppose in political practice, a fact which might ultimately confer also legitimacy, i.e., accep-
tance by both orders, to such a mediation decision. Such a “co-ordinative”, mediation-like 
solution, which would represent an intermediary step between monism and pluralism, a kind 
of “weak or limping monism” as it were, would seem to fit the multi-level governance con-
ception of the EU particularly well.414 
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 Finally, it is interesting to note in the present context that Neil MacCormick, qualifying his earlier view of 
(radical) pluralism, has now advocated a solution based on international law, which is similar to the one pro-
posed here. His new model termed “pluralism under international law” shares the starting points of radical plu-
ralism in that the two legal orders are not in a hierarchical relationship with each other, but interact on the same 
level, and that, therefore, the supremacy of EC law must be limited. The only difference lies in the position at-
tributed to international law. In this context, the self-perception of the EC as a legal order sui generis and not as 
a mere subset of international law should be respected, so that EC law and international law should be regarded 
as separate legal orders. However, whilst, according to radical pluralism, international law simply constitutes a 
further non-hierarchically and, therefore, also a pluralistically juxtaposed third legal order, according to the 
model of “pluralism under international law”, EC law and national legal systems are not only bound to respect 
international law, but also to derive their validity from it: “(...) The obligations of international law set condi-
tions upon the validity of state and of Community constitutions and interpretations thereof, and hence impose a 
framework on the interactive but not hierarchical relations between systems... [The Member States] are subject 
to obligations of international law among themselves in respect of the treaties they have agreed, and the treaties 
in question have had the effect of constituting a new legal order sui generis which could not now be lawfully 
repudiated by any of the members, though it could be dissolved or radically changed in character by treaty 
amendment. The good reasons that we have for conceptualising the relevant relationships in favour of a co-
ordinate, rather than a hierarchical, interaction between EC legal order and Member State legal order are not 
reasons for denying that this co-ordinate relationship is itself subject to norms of international law. Hence, the 
validity and partial mutual independence of EC law and Member State law is authorised by (public) interna-
tional law. [Thus,] State courts have no right to assume an absolute superiority of state constitution over interna-
tional good order, including the European dimension of that good order.” MacCormick continues that this three-
tier structure, in which EC law and national law would, at the same level, be subordinated to international law, 
would represent a form of “monism” in Kelsen’s sense. As to constitutional conflicts, “pluralism under interna-
tional law” would suggest that we do not have to run out of law (and into politics) as suggested by radical plu-
ralism. Rather, there would always be “a possibility of recourse to international arbitration or adjudication to 
resolve the matter.” 
Comparing the approach developed here with “pluralism under international law”, only two differences may be 
found: First, MacCormick does not resort to the EU level, but to international law only. Second, provided that a 
conflict resolution decision is binding under international law, but not under EC and national constitutional law, 
the whole construct may not be qualified as a true Kelsenian type monism, but, at best, as a kind of “limping 
monism”. Beyond is, MacCormick’s new model might face further practical objections on account of its purely 
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To realise these goals in positive law, the further analysis will proceed in the following 
order: first, it first tries to show that the BVerfG and the ECJ have not yet exhausted all po-
tential to avoid conflict (II). With respect to the hard case in which such a “concordance solu-
tion” fails, it will be argued that legal resources are still not exhausted. To this effect, it will 
be argued that a conflict resolution mechanism consisting of conciliation - i.e., mediation or 
arbitration415 - at EU level, may be derived, de lege lata, from international law provisions to 
be cautiously adapted to the European system (III). 
II. Optimising the Existing Interconnections: Making Use of the full Conflict Resolving 
Potential of European and National Law  
As already alluded to, even though European law does not offer any ready-made solution, 
it contains, albeit in a quite crude shape, some general principles which might be developed 
further, refined and concretised for the sake of conflict resolution. The starting point should 
be the call, sometimes encountered in academic literature, for a duty of European institutions 
to respect basic features and structures of the Member States, including those constitutional 
essentials which a Member State is not allowed to forego. As sedes materiae of such a duty, 
one might think of the subsidiarity principle (Article 5 (formerly 3 b) EC) or the loyalty duty 
enshrined in Article 10 EC combined with the duty of the EC to respect the national identity 
of the Member States (Article 6 (1) EU). 
                                                                                                                                                       
theoretical character. In particular, it does not show at all what an international law conflict settlement could 
look like and how it could be operationalised in the EC context. On the contrary, Art. 292 [formerly 219] EC 
seems to forbid a conflict settlement outside the EC system, and the dominant view among scholars seems to be 
that the intra-communitarian legal sphere is exhaustively occupied by EC law. Thereafter, recourse to interna-
tional law would be precluded in all circumstances, since it would be capable of destroying the supranational 
acquis of the EC. Given the plausibility of these reservations at first sight, it seems essential to show how they 
might be accommodated in positive law and how, then, “pluralism under international law” or, to repeat the 
term preferred here, “multi-level weak monism”, might be put into practice. This will be shown in the following 
sections, where a solution de lege lata will be proposed. See N. MacCormick, “Rising Constitutional Collision”, 
OJLS 18 (1998), 517. 
415 These two notions are often not distinguished in the literature. Here, conciliation is used as a general term 
encompassing both mediation and arbitration. Whereas mediation, typically meaning a conciliation procedure 
by a representative of a third state, which may even have its own interest in the case, is more politically ori-
ented, arbitration is normally carried out by a neutral body such as a commission, often composed of interna-
tional lawyers. Thus, the solution to be proposed here is closer to arbitration. This notwithstanding, the general 
term conciliation will be used here. 
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1. Subsidiarity 
The famous subsidiarity principle - probably one of the most outstanding examples of 
symbolic legislation416 to be found in legal history - might be viewed as broad enough to en-
compass the obligation for Community institutions to respect, whenever possible, common or 
specifically national particularities, including specific national constitutional values.417 How-
ever, as mentioned above, in the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Member States stressed that supremacy should not be restricted on 
grounds of these principles. Now, one might discuss the legal nature of Protocols and re-open 
the famous “Barber” debate as to the extent to which the council may legitimately interfere 
with the ECJ’s jurisdiction at all. It is, however, submitted that such an approach would mis-
interpret the very nature of subsidiarity. For this concept is basically concerned with the de-
limitation of competence and not with the resolution of conflicts between norms which fall 
within different spheres of competence.418 The delimitation of competence is logically prior 
to the resolution of conflicts between norms; for such conflicts can only arise if the concur-
ring norms have already been judged as otherwise valid - which also means that they are 
valid on competence grounds, i.e., not ultra vires. Thus, adding a conflict of laws dimension 
would only increase the already existent conceptual vagueness of this principle. As will be 
shown, there are more appropriate sedes materiae of a duty of co-operation and solidarity 
with conflict of laws implications. 
2. The EC’s Loyalty Duty pursuant to Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU 
The duty of EC institutions to respect the essentials of national constitutions might be de-
rived from the EC’s loyalty duty pursuant to Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU. As will be shown, 
it could allow for a concordance approach based on a certain convergence of substantive 
standards which might render conflicts less likely to become acute. The following analysis 
deals first with the scope of this duty (a), then turns to its procedural implications (b) includ-
ing the reach of the ECJ’s judicial competence which merits particular attention (c). 
                                                 
416
 As to this concept, see M. Deckert, Folgenorientierung in der Rechtsanwendung, 1995, 24.  
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 B. De Witte, “European law and national constitutional values”, LIEI 2 (1991), 1 at 20. 
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 See, convincingly, P.-Ch. Müller-Graff, “Binnenmarktauftrag und Subsidiaritätsprinzip”, Zeitschrift für das 
Gesamte Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht 159 (1995), 34 at 72ff. 
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a) The Scope of Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU 
Article 10 EC, included in the Treaty at the request of the German delegation,419 is con-
tinuously referred to by the ECJ as a general clause to deal with all kinds of legal problems 
arising between the EC and its Member States. Three directions followed by the ECJ in the 
concretisation of this provision may be relevant in the present context. The first is the deduc-
tion of genuine legal duties which have partly been put into concrete terms. Thus, the princi-
pal duty to take appropriate measures to ensure the fulfilment of treaty obligations and to fa-
cilitate the achievement of the EC’s tasks is construed widely so as to include ancillary duties 
necessary for its effective implementation.420 Second, Article 10 EC was relied upon in the 
elaboration of the general doctrines as to the relationship between EC and national law. So, 
as stated, recourse to this provision has been apparent in judicial elaboration of the suprem-
acy doctrine. Also, the duty of directive-conforming interpretation (by some called “indirect 
effect”)421 and the European principles on State liability were partly based on Article 10 
EC.422 Third, since the middle of the 80s, the ECJ has extended Article 10 EC to include also 
duties of the EC with respect to the Member States.423 In this respect, Article 10 EC may be 
said to embody the principle of Gemeinschaftstreue, similar to the principle of Bundestreue 
(federal loyalty) which exists in federal States. Also in this context, highly “concretised” du-
ties have been developed, e.g., the Commission’s duty to pass all information relevant to the 
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 M. Blanquet, L’ Article 5 du Traité CEE, 1994, 8; on Art. 10 EC, see, also, J. Temple Lang, “Community 
Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty”, CMLR 27 (1990), 645. 
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 Thus, the ECJ deemed the enactment of a national budget law to be necessary, when Community law re-
quired certain financial means to be devoted to a certain scope (Case 6/73, Commission v. Italy [1973] ECR 
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with dissuasive effect; on this, see, comprehensively, E. Steindorff, EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht, 1996, 303ff. 
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 Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci [1991] ECR I-5357; cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Bras-
serie du Pecheur and Factortame III [1996] ECR I-1029. 
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 Case 230/81, Luxembourg v. Parliament [1983] ECR 255; case 94/87, Commission v. Deutschland [1989] 
ECR 175 at 192. This duty was additionally based on the principle of the “good functioning” of the EC. See 
Streinz, op. cit., at 33ff. For an instructive survey of the extension of Art. 10 EC to Community institutions see 
K. Mortelmans, “The Principle of Loyalty to the Community (Article 5 EC) and the Obligations of the Commu-
nity Institutions”, MJ 5 (1998), 67. 
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application of EC law to national courts, including the production of documents requested by 
a national court and the examination of a Commission official as a witness before a national 
court. 424 
The duty to respect the national identities of the Member States was introduced in Article 
6 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty to counteract the fear of an omnipotent Union and a creeping 
“destatalisation” of the Member States.425 In this respect, Article 6 (1) EU was even said to 
reflect a conception of the Union as an association of Member States, a “Europe des patries” 
being designed to contain the supranational Communities.426 At any rate, the ambiguous term 
“national identity” does not mean any sort of national seclusion in the present context. In-
stead, it is to be construed in terms of a respectful attitude towards the basic structures, insti-
tutions and orientations of a State, including, however, the fundamental decision of all Mem-
ber States for European integration. Accordingly, it is claimed that the EC may not adopt 
measures which intrude disproportionately into the realm of the Member States427 - maxims 
as yet difficult to put into concrete terms. 
Even before the Maastricht Treaty, the Gemeinschaftstreue dimension of Article 10 EC 
had been viewed as the entrance gate of national constitutional law into EC law by academic 
literature although the ECJ had never made a statement in this respect.428 This interpretation 
may be thought to be confirmed by the expressly stipulated command to respect the Member 
States’ national identities contained in Article 6 (1) EU. For, in the case of States based upon 
a written or unwritten legal constitution (which is true for all Member States of the EC), con-
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stitutional identity,429 comprising the main features of a constitution, should be viewed as an 
important component of national identity. In other words, as Bruno de Witte has convinc-
ingly put it, “the fairly vague notion of ‘national identity’ might become legally relevant by 
referring to the constitutions as the depository of national identity”.430 Even though Article 6 
(1) EU may have been intended as a largely symbolic message with the political purpose of 
appeasing Member States - which is also shown by its exemption from the ECJ’s jurisdiction 
(Article 46 (formerly L) EU) -, it would appear unjustifiable not to take its clear wording se-
riously. Therefore, the duty should not be interpreted as a purely programmatic maxim with-
out any legally-binding value, and its scope should not be restricted to, say, cultural matters. 
Furthermore, it would seem untenable to exclude protection of national constitutional identities 
from the scope of Article 10 EC and to determine in this sense, by application of the acquis-
safeguard clause contained in Article 47 (formerly M) EU, the interpretation of Article 6 (1) EU 
as well. It is true that the ECJ has always confined itself to the elaboration of independent and 
uniform European constitutional standards, in particular in the area of human rights. However, as 
shown in the theoretical reconstruction above, as far as it does not guarantee respect of national 
constitutional essentials (as shaped by the competent national courts), this interpretation of the 
treaties is incompatible with a pluralistic reading of the relationship between EC and national 
law and is therefore ultra vires. To put it differently, as opposed to the important judicial devel-
opment of European constitutional standards, in particular in human rights, the possible disre-
spect, by EC organs, of national constitutional essentials cannot be recognised as a valid acquis 
communautaire which would be relevant for the interpretation of the EC according to Article 47 
EU. So, all in all, no persuasive argument can be made in favour of the exclusion of constitu-
tional identity from the scope of Article 6 (1) EU. As a consequence thereof, Article 47 EU may 
now be drawn upon just in the opposite direction: in order to avoid that the standard of protec-
tion of national identity is higher under Article 6 (1) EU than under Article 10 EC, the latter pro-
vision must be interpreted as to include constitutional identity as well.  
As a result, the duty to respect national identities may be equally based on both provi-
sions. As regards its judicial control, it may therefore be found irrelevant that Article 6 (1) 
EU is not under the jurisdiction of the ECJ, because it may equally be protected via Article 
10 EC.  
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With respect to the substance of the duty, one may claim, in the first place, that the EC is 
bound to take the constitutional problems of the Member States into account and to collabo-
rate with them in a constructive way in order to avoid conflicts. In particular, the principles 
forming the constitutional identity of a Member State should remain untouchable for the EC 
even in majority decisions.431 For a more precise definition of the substance of a national 
identity, the self-portrait of a State should provide the starting point. For a hard core of socie-
tal, cultural and legal values and norms can only be credibly protected if a State itself has the 
right to decide what is part of it. Thus, in conflict of laws terms, Articles 5 EC and 6 (1) EU 
may be compared to a Qualifikationsverweisung (connection for the purpose of qualifica-
tion”),432 which calls upon national law to decide on the scope of the notion of identity. In a 
further step, it must, however, be noted that part of the national identity is also the member-
ship of a supranational community. This, in turn, can only exist if Nation States accept a far-
reaching limitation of their national sovereignty, including the general supremacy of Euro-
pean law over national law. As a result, Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU may duly be read as 
formulae of “concordance” similar to Article 23 GG. The material premises of both legal or-
ders can, therefore, be interpreted in a quite similar way, thus facilitating a “concordance so-
lution” of conflicts.433 
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b) Implications on Conflict Resolution 
If the interpretation of Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU just given is to be taken seriously, the 
co-operation of the ECJ and national constitutional courts, and the protection of the constitu-
tional identity of a Member State through the ECJ, should go much further than in the present 
jurisprudence, which is characterised by two major weaknesses on both sides: on the national 
side, the threat of national constitutional courts, in particular the BVerfG, to set aside Euro-
pean acts as unconstitutional, without ever referring a single case to the ECJ as provided for 
in Article 234 EC, and thus without even attempting to engage in a specific problem-related 
discourse with the ECJ, is extremely problematic.434 On the EC side, the problem lies in the 
ECJ’s exclusive concern with the elaboration of uniform European constitutional standards 
and its refusal to take national constitutional laws as more than mere sources of inspiration 
into account. Instead, an effective protection of the core of national constitutions would only 
seem to be possible if those provisions and principles considered by the highest national 
courts as “identity-relevant” are taken into account directly by the ECJ. These should com-
prise national human rights, even in so far as these are different from European human rights 
as shaped by the jurisprudence of the ECJ.435 They should also include national conceptions 
of the scope of authority transferred to the EC in the EC Treaties. 
As a consequence, it seems essential that, on the one hand, a national constitutional court 
refers problematic cases to the ECJ and expounds constitutional problems and constraints in 
detail. This should include an explanation of the shape it gives to human rights and compe-
tence provisions, and a comprehensive account of why it thinks that such standards are man-
dated by a Constitution which must also be read in the light of the mandate of furthering in-
tegration. On the other hand, it seems necessary that, at least in majority decisions in which 
at least one State was outvoted, the ECJ considers the findings of national jurisprudence di-
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rectly, and integrates it into its decisions. This should not be limited to answers given to na-
tional constitutional courts, but should be extended to any reference in which constitutional 
problems are raised. It should be noted, though, that this balancing requirement does not 
mean at all that the ECJ would have to accept a constitutional dictate by a single Member 
State. Instead, this court would be entitled and obliged to consider the needs of the EC in this 
balancing procedure. Thus, if it gives reasons for the inappropriateness of a national constitu-
tional standard at EC level, the ECJ might, of course, derogate from it. This might be particu-
larly plausible in the case in which a wide variety of different national constitutional stan-
dards exist. If these standards happen to be mutually exclusive (i.e. the banning of a certain 
violation of a constitutional right in one State would entail the violation of an inverse right in 
another State), the ECJ might even be forced to opt in favour of one standard. 
This reading of Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU finds support in deliberative theory. This may be 
applied not only to democratic decision making by citizens, but with even stronger force for in-
ter-institutional discourse itself, which should work as procedural transformation mechanism of 
public discourse, i.e., initiate, support, sustain and tame it. Under these premises, an intense de-
liberation between the judiciaries about the best law would appear desirable. This should focus 
on the most appropriate standard of human rights protection and on the respect of the mutual 
autonomy in the field of legislative jurisdiction. Then, even the competence of national constitu-
tional courts to examine the constitutional compatibility of European acts seems useful, since it 
can initiate a process of deliberation. However, it should also be ensured that the discourse can 
continue “when shared understandings of lesser generality have broken down”; i.e., a kind of 
“proceduralisation of deliberation”, as it were, must be assured. In practical terms, this should 
mean that neither side should have the right to end the dialogue definitively, nor the ECJ by im-
posing unlimited primacy, nor national constitutional courts by setting aside European acts. A fi-
nal decision should, instead, be reserved to a co-ordinating third instance. 
It is submitted that, in order to comply with these conditions, the ECJ would have to 
abandon its role as the motor of integration and the guardian of the treaties at least in “iden-
tity-relevant” cases. Instead, it would have to act as a true Cour d'Arbitrage, in other words, 
as a constitutional conciliation body, as if it were placed over both the Communities and the 
Member States. Such an approach could be very rewarding: even though national constitu-
tional standards would not always be fully respected, an explicit discussion of the jurispru-
dence of the national courts might considerably improve the co-operation between both 
courts, since it engages them in a specific problem-related discourse. This might be a power-
ful means for a deliberative rationalisation and the de-escalation of conflicts. 
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c) In particular: The Reach of the ECJ’s Jurisdictional Competence 
Assuming that the ECJ were willing to act as a conciliation body along these lines (which 
does not seem probable at the present stage), one must determine the scope of its judicial 
competence flowing from the task of conciliating constitutional conflicts derived from Arti-
cles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU - which must be clearly distinguished from the limited judicial com-
petence flowing from the supremacy rule. In this respect, it may be submitted that it would, at 
least, be disloyal for a Member State to deny authority to a ECJ conciliation-type decision by 
drawing only on the limited reach of supremacy. According to the deliberative principles fol-
lowed here, it would, instead, be entirely up to the Member State in question to show in detail 
why its constitutional identity is not sufficiently protected even though the ECJ has explicitly 
taken this into account at some length in its decision. The burden of justification would thus 
be shifted. However, if the constitutional court of a Member State were really able to give 
reasons for an ongoing massive violation of constitutional identity - for which a not mani-
festly unfounded bona fides declaration should be enough436 -, the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
should be deemed to have reached its limits. For as shown, the ECJ must be regarded as a 
part of the EC legal order, and cannot ultimately be qualified as a third and higher institution 
with the competence to decide constitutional conflicts as the last umpire. In other words, the 
task of conciliating conflicts of a Community organ may not lead to a new subordination of 
the national legal order under the EC system – this would amount to putting the wolves in 
sheep’s’ clothes. 
In summary, according to the interpretation advocated here, Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU 
should be read, following deliberative principles for the inter-institutional relationships be-
tween European and national courts, as obliging the ECJ to consider national constitutional 
standards directly in its decisions. This might open a fertile problem-related discourse be-
tween the judiciaries. However, as long as the ECJ refuses to carry out the task of concilia-
tion and to consider national constitutional identities, or for as long as their protection is 
manifestly inadequate in a bona fides analysis of the competent national constitutional court, 
there exists a serious institutional failure or, legally speaking, a gap in the Community system 
with respect to the procedural concretisation and implementation of Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) 
EU. The remainder of this article will analyse whether and how this gap may be filled. 
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 However, the plausibility of the reasons given should be verified at a later stage in the conciliation proce-
dure. See, below, sub V 4. 
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III. Establishing a New Interconnection: A Public International-EU Law Conciliation 
Approach 
A public international law solution to constitutional conflicts raises several complex prob-
lems. As a preliminary issue, it will be shown that the general conditions of admissibility for 
gap-filling in EC law and for recourse to international law in particular can be complied with 
(1). After this, the international law solution will be expounded in detail (2). Then, the analy-
sis turns to the extremely difficult question of the extent to which this solution might, with 
the necessary adaptations, be transposed into EC law (3). Having done so, the possible impli-
cations for EC law, international law, national constitutional law and legal theory will be ex-
amined (4) and its practical consequences evaluated (5). 
1. Preliminary Questions for the Application of International Law  
a) General Conditions for and Methods of Gap-Filling in EC Law 
As stated, European law’s starting points for the protection of a national constitution are 
the general clauses stipulated in Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU. However, these were found to 
contain a gap as to their procedural implementation where a concordance solution between 
the ECJ and a national constitutional court fails. Starting with the general conditions for gap-
filling in EC law, it must in the first place be ascertained that the lacuna to be filled must be 
an issue of law as opposed to politics or diplomacy. As to constitutional conflicts, it has al-
ready been stated that this is exactly the premise on which the conciliation concept advocated 
here is based. Next, the question to be dealt with must fall within EC competence. Since the 
EC does not dispose of universal powers, gap-filling by judicial law-making may only take 
place in the case of an ‘internal gap’,437 i.e., if the area at stake does not fall within the com-
petence of national law. This requirement also applies to gap-filling by international law. For, 
regardless of whether international law may be applied internally within a State, it is, at any 
rate, superseded by national law at that level. In our case, this requirement does not, however, 
create any problem. The resolution of constitutional conflicts may be regarded as an integral 
complement to Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU and, as such, as an integral part of the European-
national conflict of laws area. This has already been developed by the famous doctrines of 
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the ECJ mentioned above and cannot reasonably be dealt with by national law, since a uni-
form solution available for all Member States needs to be found. 
Moving on now to methods of gap filling, it should be noted, in general, that the concreti-
sation of a general clause in constitutional law requires a multi-faceted process in the border-
land of law and politics, the traditional techniques such as recourse to analogy or to general 
principles of EC law being capable of only providing a starting point. Here, both of them are 
obviously useless for the lack of legal “material” in European primary law. The same is true 
for common constitutional principles of the Member States, since the absolute majority of 
them do not have federal systems; beyond that, the EC could not simply be equated to one of 
the few European federal States either. Therefore, the only remaining possibility lies in re-
course to international law principles. 
b) Gap-Filling through International Law 
Since the last century, the problem of the relevance of violations of internal law through 
the conclusion of a treaty has been discussed in international law. A solution to the problem 
was codified in Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23/5/1969 
(here referred to as the Vienna Convention). Thereafter, only the breach of “internal law re-
garding competence to conclude treaties” can be invoked under certain conditions against a 
international law treaty. Before the application of this disposition can be discussed here, 
however, it has to be ascertained whether international law can be applied at all within the 
EC (a) and, if yes, what methodological resources exist to do so. Besides the direct applica-
tion of international law, its indirect application through the elaboration of general principles 
of EC law is to be taken into consideration (b). 
aa) Direct Applicability of General International Law in the Community’s Internal Legal Sphere 
Despite the remaining link of the EC treaties to their international law basis, the applica-
tion of international law inside the Community legal sphere is problematic, because, through 
the constitutionalisation process, the EC has undoubtedly detached itself from a classic inter-
national organisation. Therefore, international law might no longer be suited to deal with the 
specific needs of supranationalism. 
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On these grounds, some authors have completely dismissed the application of interna-
tional law in the internal Community legal sphere:438 the EC should be conceived of as an 
autonomous “self-contained regime”. International law is only a law for “international emer-
gency situations”, incapable of dealing with the ongoing processes of integration. The under-
lying logic is different: whereas international law promotes co-ordination and co-operation 
among sovereign nations, EC law aims at solidarity and integration. With regard to this fun-
damental incompatibility, general provisions of the law of treaties, especially those on viola-
tion, withdrawal, termination and suspension, would not be appropriate in the context of the 
EC. In short, international law would be a “Trojan horse” in the EC, which might endanger 
the integration process. As a legal “forward defence”, recourse to it should therefore be com-
pletely excluded. 
However, this solution seems to go too far.439 The situation of EC law may, in some re-
spects, be compared to human life: a child, in its adolescence, is easily prone to emancipate 
itself from its parents by rejecting many of their traditions and teachings in order to become a 
person in his or her own right. Only in later years will parental wisdom often be re-
discovered. Similarly, with respect to the progress of the EC system, the thesis of the “full 
emancipation” of EC law from its bases in international law and national constitutional law 
may be largely regarded as a founding myth by which integration should be promoted and 
enthusiasm for the new European system be encouraged. However, in its present state of ma-
turity, EC law should have appreciated that there is no fundamental incompatibility between 
the goals of “co-operation” and “integration”; instead, the latter is a somewhat intensified 
continuation of the former. In legal terms, this means that, to realise the effet utile of EC law, 
it should be sufficient to exclude the application of international law where there is an actual 
conflict, an actual incompatibility with the EC’s aims. In normal circumstances, it is, indeed, 
true that recourse to international law is not necessary, since EC law is itself able to deal with 
the legal problems arising in the Community. But under exceptional circumstances - espe-
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cially regarding the interpretation of ambiguities or in gap-filling - international law may 
provide a vast reservoir of provisions and principles capable, at times, of supplementing EC 
law. In the present context, because of the capitulation of EC law before constitutional con-
flicts, there is, indeed, an emergency situation where international law could prove to be a 
life jacket-rather than a “Trojan horse” for the EC. At any rate, it seems obvious that even the 
application of international rules which may not completely suit the particular character of 
the EC might still be better than leaving the legal conflict to an extra-legal power-dominated 
Cold War scenario. To continue with this metaphor: entirely discarding the application of 
international law as a “forward defence” might eventually injure the EC’s own avant-garde. 
Beyond this, it should be noted that the latest turn in the evolution of the EC - the estab-
lishment of the EU - has, to some extent, demonstrated a return to international law patterns 
of intergovernmental co-operation. As previously stated, the Union is a typical international 
law creation, through which the Member States wanted to strengthen their control over the 
supranational communities and counteract “autodynamics”, in particular, in new fields of 
collaboration such as CFSP and CJHA. It is true that this evolution of the EC has not brought 
about a general fall-back on international law for EC system as a whole. Such a far-reaching 
intrusion into the structures of the EC cannot be based on the general provisions of the Union 
Treaty alone (Articles 1-7 (formerly A-F) and 46-53 (formerly L-S)). What is more, Article 
47 EU, whereafter the establishment of the Union is without prejudice to the EC acquis, does 
not allow for this result since the Community’s supranational peculiarities constitute an es-
sential element of the acquis. Instead, the whole European system may now be described as a 
legal and political continuum reaching from classical international co-operation on one end to 
advanced forms of multi-level governance in the supranational Communities on the other. If 
this is so, it would seem implausible and at odds with the maxims of continuity and coher-
ence of European law as a whole to exclude the most important parts of the European system, 
the Communities, completely and without any exception from the application of general in-
ternational law. More importantly, the exceptional application of international law responds 
to the legal duty of any subject of international law, be it a member of an integration commu-
nity or not, to resolve international conflicts with international law mechanisms, if other 
prior-ranking solutions have failed (see Articles 2 Nr. 2 and 33 UN-Charter). For conflicts 
resulting from international treaties, the international law minimum standard is represented 
by general treaty law as codified in the Vienna Convention. However, as already stated, in 
the course of the application of any international law norm to the internal Community legal 
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sphere, it should be verified that this norm is not in conflict with the specific structural fea-
tures of the EC - in particular, it should be guaranteed that the withdrawal of a Member State 
from the EC is generally unavailable as a remedy. 
bb) EC-Consistent Concretisation and Adaptation of International Law 
The “compatibility analysis” just mentioned may show the need for international law 
norms to be concretised, supplemented or adapted in order to meet the specific needs of the 
EC. This is methodologically possible by shaping what is generally termed “general princi-
ples of law”, using the international law provisions as a model and a frame of reference. As 
we have seen, the ECJ has had recourse to general principles when formulating European 
human rights on the basis of national constitutional rights. At this stage, international law 
norms are no longer a direct source of EC law, but are used as a sort of “legal quarry” to 
shape new EC law. Like the “general principles of law recognised by all civilised nations” in 
the sense of Article 38 (1) (c) of the statute of the International Court of Justice, they become 
mere “law-making sources”.440 In the present context, it is important to note that international 
law has also been used as a “law-finding” source for the elaboration of EC law by the ECJ.441 
In this procedure, international law provisions must be put into the context of the specific 
features of the EC - a Community unlimited in time, based on the rule of law (its law being 
directly applicable and generally taking precedence over national law) as well as on democ-
ratic principles, and aiming at ever closer integration. Thus, norms suiting the needs of the 
EC can be developed by concretising, completing and adapting the international law model. 
Thus, this procedure may be termed “EC-conforming concretisation and adaptation of inter-
national law”.442 It does not consist of pure inventions, but of a referential method of judicial 
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law-making which comes close to analogy.443 Compared to the “inductive filtering” of com-
mon features of norms and principles444 which is used to formulate ordinary general princi-
ples of law, this method involves an even smaller degree of law-making since input and out-
put-provisions more or less share the same level of abstraction.445 However, the limits to law-
making through general principles following from the institutional separation and balance of 
powers at EC level446 need to be respected.447 Thus, there must be a harmful gap in existing 
law; a general principle must really be found and not merely invented; the priority of the leg-
islator must be respected by the judge, at least if legislative action is not blocked by political 
obstacles; detailed regulations, e.g., in secondary or procedural law, which leave the legisla-
tor with a wide discretion, can generally not be developed through general principles. 
cc) A Combined Approach in the Present Case 
The two different approaches may be combined in the present case in the following way: 
as long as the outcome fits the structural peculiarities of the EC, international law may be 
applied directly. In so far as this is not case, it is necessary to effect a concretisation and ad-
aptation of the relevant international law rules in order to bring them into conformity with the 
specific features of the EC. Thereby, special international law, related to the EC-law “sub-
regime”, is created, which should be distinguished from genuine EC law as long as it is not 
implemented by EC institutions and courts. Now that the applicability of international law as 
an emergency regime in the intra-Community legal sphere has been ascertained, a virtue 
should be made out of this necessity. In other words, international law should be applied 
and, if necessary, adapted so as to ensure that it constitutes an adequate and useful supple-
ment to the EC system. 
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2. Details of International Law Conflict Resolution 
a) Introduction 
The consequences of a violation of internal law by an international treaty is a classic issue 
within international law, which has been discussed in legal practice and literature for more 
than a century.448 Three main solutions permitting a State to discard the application of a 
treaty on these grounds without incurring international law liability have been proposed.449 
First, there was the “theory of relevance”, arguing that violations, especially violations of in-
ternal law relating to the treaty making power of the organs negotiating the treaty (e.g., par-
liament vs. government), should generally be relevant at international law level and would 
give the State in question a right to withdraw from the convention. The arguments made in 
favour of this solution were: respect for internal democracy and separation of powers (par-
ticularly, the executive should be unable to circumvent the legislature); the need for a correct 
internal implementation of the treaty (which would be impossible if the treaty were to violate 
fundamental norms of internal law); analogies with the law of agency (according to which 
the principal can invoke lack of, or abuse of, power by the agent against a third party in cer-
tain situations). For the opposite conclusion, namely the irrelevance in international law of 
violations of internal law, the following points were made: international legal certainty, the 
duty of a State to examine potential conflicts with internal law before entering into an inter-
national contract and the absence of an obligation of a party to a contract to verify whether 
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the other parties respect their own internal laws by concluding the contract.450 As might be 
expected, a compromise solution between the two, which seeks to reconcile the needs of le-
gal certainty and respect for internal law and democracy, was finally proposed: the so called 
“theory of evidence”.451 According to this, the withdrawal from a treaty is only possible if the 
other party has, or, according to normal standards of good faith, should have, noted the viola-
tion of essential internal law. Furthermore, there has been disagreement as to the kind of in-
ternal law capable of being invoked: only internal provisions regarding the capacity of the 
organ concluding the treaty or any other internal provisions limiting the discretion of this or-
gan, too. 
b) Article 46 of the Vienna Convention 
In 1969, the “theory of evidence” was codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties452 (here abridged VCLT). The general rule is contained in Article 27 VCLT: 
“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to per-
form a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to Article 46.” 
Article 46 is phrased as follows: 
“Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties 
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in 
violation of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent 
unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental impor-
tance. 
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the 
matter in accordance with normal practices and in good faith.” 
However, in the second paragraph, the above-mentioned dispute as to what kind of inter-
nal law should be covered by the formula is not resolved. Thus, this question must be deter-
mined by means of interpretation. First, “internal law regarding competence to conclude trea-
ties” might refer only to provisions delimiting institutional competence, in other words the 
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“capacity” of the various institutions representing a State; i.e., whether, for example, a gov-
ernment representative is entitled to conclude an international agreement only with or with-
out the consent of the whole government or parliament, etc..453 A somewhat broader reading 
would suggest that any type of competence provision could be relevant in this context. This 
would include, in particular, provisions relating to legislative jurisdiction, i.e., the scope of 
subject matters in which internal law allows the conclusion of international agreements or the 
transfer of powers to an international organisation. Thirdly, indirectly, the treaty-making 
power, and thus the “competence” of the organ representing the State, might also be consid-
ered as limited by all internal law, including constitutional provisions on human rights etc. 
This interpretation would bring Article 46 VCLT in line with the internal law of States, the 
organs of which, on entering into an international treaty (or participating in the decision mak-
ing process of an International Organisation), must, of course, respect any internal provision.  
The genesis of the Article 46 VCLT shows that the latter option was apparently intended, 
even if some doubts remain.454 Thus, the commentary on Article 43 of the 1966 draft conven-
tion (Article 46 in the final 1969 version) explicitly states:455  
“Constitutional limitations affecting the exercise of the treaty-making power take various forms. 
Some constitutions seek to preclude the executive from entering into treaties, or particular kinds 
of treaties, except with the previous consent of a legislative organ; some provide that treaties 
shall not be effective as law within the State unless “approved” or confirmed in some manner by 
a legislative organ; others contain fundamental laws which are not susceptible of alteration ex-
cept by a special procedure of constitutional amendment and which in that way indirectly impose 
restrictions upon the power of the executive to conclude treaties... The question which arises un-
der this article is how far any of these constitutional limitations may affect the validity under in-
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ternational law of a consent to a treaty given by a State agent ostensibly authorised to declare 
that consent...”  
This result had already been advocated by special reporter Sir Humphrey Waldock.456 
However, the International Law Commission’s deliberations on the 1966 draft seem to show 
that a majority of Commission members was against the integration of substantive provisions 
in order to safeguard legal certainty at the international level.457 According to their view, only 
few and narrowly defined exceptions to the principle of irrelevance were to be admitted. This 
perception is still relied upon by several commentators.458 However, this view seems not only 
to ignore the Official Comment quoted above, but also not to account for the changes the 
1966 draft underwent with respect to the 1969 final version. Thereafter, following fruitless 
negotiations in the aftermath of the allegation of the breach of essential internal law, a State 
no longer had the possibility of simply discarding the application of the relevant treaty provi-
sion. Instead, it was only given the right to a conciliation procedure in front of the United Na-
tions (Article 66 b VCLT), respectively the International Court of Justice (Article 66 a 
VCLT). By the introduction of these procedures, still missing in the 1966 draft, the threat to 
legal certainty was considerably diminished. Thus, an important rationale for excluding sub-
stantive law provisions can no longer be relied upon. 
Moreover, a teleological interpretation also confirms the wider reading of Article 46 
VCLT. As Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma have pointed out, the need to integrate sub-
stantive provisions is all the greater since these provisions are not protected in any other way 
at the international law level.459 Rudolf Streinz rightly emphasises that the manifest violation 
of substantive law provisions such as those protecting human rights, fundamental to the good 
functioning of a State, would lead to unacceptable tensions with international law if the latter 
chose to ignore them.460 Philippe Cahier stresses that, in the Vienna Convention, there is no 
apparent reason for the different treatment of formal and substantive provisions having an 
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impact on a State’s treaty making power.461 Jörg P. Mueller argues that the integration of 
substantive provisions has a meaningful parallel in the increasing importance of ius cogens 
and human rights in international law, which is also reflected in the express reference to hu-
man rights in the Vienna Convention preamble.462 To these well-founded arguments, one 
might add that international law also has to account for the functional changes of interna-
tional structures and law,463 particularly the genesis of strong regional alliances and commu-
nities. In this context, the “idyllic” classical constellation underlying Article 46 VCLT, i.e., 
the danger that heads of State may enter into a binding international treaty without consulting 
parliament etc., while being by no means obsolete, may have lost some importance. Instead, 
conflicts over the delimitation of spheres of competence and a common standard of substan-
tive values such as human rights increasingly arise. Now, it is exactly in these situations that 
international law should offer procedural devices for the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Thereafter, what is important in Article 46 in this context is not only its substantive side, and 
the rebuttable presumption of the relevance, in international law, of manifest breaches of in-
ternal law; equally important is its procedural side, the compulsory dispute settlement proce-
dure, only at the end of which a definite decision on the conflict between internal and inter-
national law will be taken. Now, according to the generally acknowledged methodological 
principle that long-standing norms may have to be adapted in the light of changing social cir-
cumstances, and that, then, they may acquire a meaning and function different from the one 
their drafters had in mind, these changes in international structures, and also the institutional 
needs arising thereof, should be taken into account in the interpretation of Article 46 
VCLT.464 This may even lead to a differentiated interpretation of this provision: in the case 
of a classical executive agreement, the narrower reading of Article 46 might still be applied, 
in order to guarantee a maximum of legal certainty. However, in the case of treaties founding 
international law-making institutions in which certain common substantive law standards, 
and agreements on the delimitation of legislative competence are vital, this provision should 
be read as also allowing for a dispute settlement procedure with respect to such conflicts 
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which would otherwise be capable of destroying the organisation. As a result, it is assumed 
here that substantive norms should be integrated into Article 46 VCLT. 
c) The Theory of Evidence as Customary International Law 
With respect to its status among the sources of international law, Article 46 VCLT is 
unanimously considered by the literature to be codified customary law, although the avail-
able case material might give rise to some doubts in this sense.465 This implies that with re-
gard to the move from the theories of relevance and irrelevance to the compromise formu-
lated in the theory of evidence, a customary law “consolidation” is deemed to have occurred 
at the time of the entry into force of the Vienna Convention. In general, such a “consolida-
tion” – requiring general practice as an objective element and opinio iuris as a “subjective” 
element466 - has already been explicitly stated by the International Court of Justice for other 
provisions of the Vienna Convention, and it should, indeed, be correct for most of its provi-
sions.467 It is likewise generally recognised that, with the long and uncontested standing of 
the Convention, even provisions born out of compromise at the drafting stage can be re-
garded as having acquired customary status in the meantime.468 These assessments are fur-
ther confirmed by the fact that most writers who consider the recourse to international law at 
all tacitly apply the Vienna Convention to the EC Community, without bothering about the 
customary law quality of the provisions at issue.469  
Yet, in a more subtle analysis, it might be questioned if the customary law version of the 
theory of evidence also encompasses national substantive law provisions as advocated here. 
One might, of course, argue that, in the European context, at least those Member States of the 
Community which are also parties to the VCLT should be assumed to be obliged, bona fides, 
to promote the use of the convention by drawing on, or allowing other States to invoke, the 
codified version of the theory of evidence; this does not, however, solve the problem entirely, 
as France and Great Britain are not parties to the Vienna Convention. In order to circumnavi-
gate this obstacle, one might perhaps further sustain that in the case of codified customary 
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law of such eminent status and long and uncontested standing as the Vienna Convention, it 
might be no longer justified to resort to the case law at all; this would mean that the custom-
ary law version would merge with the current interpretation of single provisions such as Arti-
cle 46 VCLT. However, this interpretation may be criticised as stretching the hugely contro-
versial concept of customary law too far. Indeed, there is apparently not a single case in in-
ternational practice in which the wide reading of Article 46 VCLT has been confirmed. Yet, 
a more adequate answer to these complex questions would require a thorough analysis of the 
current debate on customary law which goes beyond the scope of this analysis. 
For the present purposes, it may, however, be suggested that a promising critical strand in 
this debate be followed. According to this, the customary law requirements of general prac-
tice and opinio iuris are so abstract, complex and open that they allow for almost any purely 
result-oriented manipulations.470 More rationality may, therefore, only be gained if one tran-
scends the doctrinal perspective in favour of a theoretical concept of international relations. 
From this perspective, the most basic, clearly discernible and theoretically “capturable” pat-
terns of State’s behaviour should also be awarded the distinction of customary law status. 
Among such theoretical approaches, international liberalism – which, just as neo-liberalism, 
may be viewed as a useful complement to the multi-level approach advocated here – seems 
to be the most attractive approach. In a nutshell, it argues, against international law ortho-
doxy, that economic interdependence and the emergence of private governance regimes 
should be recognised as a contrast to the traditional understanding of sovereignty, and that 
the basic internal rules and procedures of States, such as the Rule of Law, fairness, triadic 
dispute resolution etc., should also be binding at international level.471 This step has, how-
ever, been described as daunting for two reasons. First, the “fractured and controversial dis-
courses that rage among international-relations theorists and among political theory”472 seem 
to exclude a consensus on international liberalism. Even more importantly, the fundamental 
distinction between liberal (western style democratic States governed by the Rule of Law) 
and non-liberal States seems to render such an approach in any real world scenario to be illu-
sory. 
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However, it is particularly the latter insight that may offer a plausible way out of the di-
lemma for the EU. There, both the existence of basic liberal structures and the mutual con-
sensus on them may be presupposed. Liberal international theory may, on these grounds at 
least, be submitted to contain notions of customary law limited to liberal States, a construct 
similar to “local custom” which has, on various occasions, been recognised in international 
law in a bilateral context.473 This means that, when an international law “emergency sub-
regime” of Union (as opposed to Community) law is recognised, as argued here for the solu-
tion of constitutional conflicts, this regime should be open to the recognition of basic liberal 
rules, structures and institutions as customary law. These undoubtedly include the fundamen-
tal mechanism of triadic dispute institutions and the exclusion of being the judge of one’s 
own case. On these grounds, a third level of conflict resolution, as suggested here, might also 
be advocated on the basis of “local liberal custom” among the EU Member States. 
d) The Procedural Implementation of the Theory of Evidence 
As to the procedural consequences of a State’s allegation of a manifest breach of internal 
law, the Vienna Convention foresees the following devices: first of all, the State has to notify 
the violation and the intended measures to all the other Member States (Article 65 (1) 
VCLT).474 Notification can also be made in response to another party claiming performance 
of the treaty or alleging its violation (Article 65 VCLT) if the State in question, after becom-
ing aware of the facts, does not have to be considered as having expressly or by reason of its 
conduct acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or operation 
(Article 45 VCLT). If, within a period of not less than three months, no party has raised any 
objection, the party making the notification may withdraw from the treaty (Article 65 II 
VCLT). The withdrawal can - and, for reasons of proportionality and pursuant to the princi-
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ple of favour conventionis, must - be confined to those provisions in conflict with internal 
law, if those are separable from the rest of the treaty with regard to their application, if they 
do not constitute an essential basis of the other’s party consent, and if the continued perform-
ance of the remainder of the treaty is not unjust (Article 44 III VCLT).475 If, however, objec-
tions are raised after the said notification, the parties shall seek a solution through the means 
indicated in Article 33 UN-Charter, i.e., negotiations, mediation, arbitration, decisions by a 
court, etc. (Article 65 III).  
If no solution has been reached within a period of 12 months following the date on which the ob-
jection was raised, any one of the parties may set in motion an obligatory conciliation procedure 
by the UN, provided for in an appendix to the Vienna Convention (Article 66 b). Thereafter, a 
conciliation commission shall be established, which is constituted of five conciliators, two of 
whom may be named by the parties and the remaining one by the four other conciliators. The 
commission shall report within twelve months of its constitution. The report shall consist in rec-
ommendations submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to facilitate an amicable 
settlement; it shall not be binding upon them. 
More problematic, however, is the question of to what extent these procedural provisions 
can be recognised as customary international law. Since Article 66 VCLT was introduced 
only at the Vienna Conference, it can hardly be qualified as such. This is primarily true for 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ in Article 66a VCLT, which applies only to the parties to the Vi-
enna Convention which have signed it without reservation to this provision.476 The same 
should be true for the details of the provisions concerning the conciliation procedure under 
the guidance of the UN and the deadlines which must be respected. However, the basic lines 
of the procedural implementation of the theory of evidence should be regarded as customary 
law, since otherwise, as already stated, the result would be an incomplete regime posing 
threats to legal certainty. These basic features may be supposed to include: the duty of a State 
to notify the intended disapplication of international treaties (including the possibility of 
making the notification in response to another party claiming performance or alleging a vio-
lation), the principle of separability of single treaty provisions, the non-automatic relevance, 
in international law, of the violation of internal law and, finally, the duty of a State to reach a 
conciliatory solution before unilaterally withdrawing from a treaty. This refers to the re-
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course to negotiations among the parties and other means for peaceful dispute settlement, 
and, where these efforts fail, to a neutral (albeit not binding) conciliation procedure.477 In ad-
dition, the duty of a State to search for a peaceful and just solution in any international dis-
pute is already enshrined in Articles 2 Nr. 3 and 33 UN-Charter; therefore, a fall-back to the 
Vienna Convention is superfluous. In the case of disputes over the validity of treaty provi-
sions, this duty can, by the very nature of things, refer only to negotiations and, where these 
fail, a conciliation procedure. Correspondingly, for the lack of alternatives, one should as-
sume a reduction of a State’s discretion as to the appropriate means of dispute resolution in 
the sense of Articles 2 Nr. 2 and 33 UN-Charter. Thereafter, a State alleging a manifest 
breach of essential internal law through an international treaty should have the right to nego-
tiations among the parties (or other appropriate means of peaceful dispute resolution) and, if 
necessary, to a neutral conciliation procedure to be organised by the parties.478 An exception 
to this right could only apply when the allegation of breach is manifestly abusive or un-
founded. Were the other Member States to deny such a procedure to the State in question, the 
presumption of the international law relevance of the alleged breach should become irrebut-
table. As a sort of self-executory “international law-default judgment”, the State in question 
might, then, lawfully assume the relevance, in international law, of the alleged breach and 
withdraw from the treaty in question or respectively disapply the incriminating provisions.479 
e) Summary  
According to this customary law version of the relevance theory, manifest breaches of es-
sential national provisions including constitutional dispositions on legislative competence 
and possibly also on human rights need not to be tolerated by a State. As a consequence, 
however, the violated internal provisions do not become automatically relevant at interna-
tional law level, entailing the nullity (or partial nullity) of the conflicting international treaty. 
Instead, the State in question only has the right (and the duty) to a conciliation procedure in 
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which the question of the international law relevance of the violated internal provisions will 
be decided definitely. This rule means that a State’s resistance against international law 
which is manifestly in conflict with essential internal law, cannot be equated to a “normal” 
treaty violation which triggers the liability of a State in international law. Thus, the sanctions 
that international law provides for treaty violations may only be applied after a conciliation 
procedure. The procedural consequence is that the allegation of a manifest breach can be 
viewed as an exception to the duty of performance of a treaty. Finally, since no general duty 
of provisional application is stated in international law, a State alleging a manifest breach 
should be allowed to disapply the treaty, or the incriminating provisions of it, pursuant to 
reasonable internal and international standards for interim measures for as long as the con-
ciliation procedure lasts. 
3. Adapted Application of the Theory of Evidence to Constitutional Conflicts be-
tween the EC and its Member States 
a) Resort to Customary Law 
With regard to the possible application of the theory of evidence to constitutional conflicts 
between the EC and its Member States, the customary law version of the international law 
provisions would have to be applied. Even though the criteria ratione materiae of the Vienna 
convention could be complied with,480 its direct application is impossible, since it was en-
acted only after the EC-Treaty and, at any rate, not all the Member States of the EC have rati-
fied it.481 However, this should not constitute an obstacle to the solution proposed here, since 
no relevant differences have been found between the two versions. 
b) Applicability of the Evidence Theory in General 
The thesis of the applicability, mutatis mutandis and as ultima ratio, of the theory of evi-
dence to the EC constitutes the crucial part of the solution suggested here. Two strands of 
possible general objections will be addressed. First, the argument that important differences 
exist between the normal case of application of that theory in international law and the pecu-
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liarities of the EC context. Second, the concern that the existence of the ECJ and other spe-
cific features of the EC system might pre-empt recourse to a separate conciliation procedure. 
aa) The Theory of Evidence is apt to deal with Constitutional Conflicts as ultima ratio 
It is quite obvious that the theory of evidence and its implementation through a concilia-
tion procedure was tailored to classical executive agreements and classical international or-
ganisations (Article 5 VCLT), and its application to closely integrated supranational commu-
nities with law-making institutions and judiciary was probably barely considered. As a reply, 
one may first recall that, as argued above, international law should take the strong structural 
evolution of international organisations into account, and try to offer urgently needed conflict 
settlement devices even there. This also means that international law norms and procedures 
should be adapted as far as possible within their wording to circumstances different from 
those originally contemplated by their drafters. Beyond this, it should, however, be noted 
that, despite the differences just mentioned, the basic structural pattern of substantive law 
conflicts between the EC and its Member States is not fundamentally different from ordinary 
conflicts between international law and essential internal law as originally contemplated in 
Article 46 VCLT. As shown above, the EC has not yet evolved into a monistic federal system 
in which the Member States would be hierarchically subordinated to the EC, but is character-
ised by the pluralistic juxtaposition of several legal orders. Thus, here too, we face the situa-
tion that essential internal law is violated by an international treaty or by measures based on 
that treaty, and that, if all existing EC and national institutions have failed to resolve the con-
flict, recourse to an international law emergency mechanism as ultima ratio is indispensable 
in order to avoid fatal legal tensions and “conflicts of obligation” for citizens. In the EC con-
text, the availability of a legal conflict resolution device seems to be even more important 
than in normal international law settings. Because of the close dove-tailing of important areas 
of policy, economy and law in the integration process, such conflicts would be capable of 
generating devastating effects on both the EC and its Member States. With respect to the (at 
least) de facto-irreversibility of the integration process, a withdrawal of a State from the EC, 
or the suspension of its membership, would not be a viable solution. For these reasons, the 
EC cannot simply ignore the violation of fundamental internal law, but, as already stated, 
should be expected to provide for a conciliation mechanism capable of enabling a State to 
remain a member without having to abandon its constitutional essentials.  
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In addition, it may be noted that some of the arguments presented above in favour of the 
“theory of relevance” gain weight in the EC context. Thus, that the EC respect essential na-
tional law is all the more necessary because of the far-reaching homogeneity between the EC 
and its Member States as to the respect of human rights, democracy and the Rule of Law; the 
hard core of human rights in particular, as an integral part of national legal identities in the 
sense of Article 6 (1) EU, should be regarded as “intra-Community ius cogens”. Moreover, 
in the EC context, it is equally undesirable that basic national provisions may be circum-
vented through “evasive action” at the supranational level. The need for effective national 
implementation is another argument. Since the functioning of the EC system largely depends 
on national administrations which are sworn to uphold their own constitution, imposing a 
European norm which violates national constitutions would be difficult in practice - notwith-
standing the considerable degree of autonomous effectiveness of the EC system, which may, 
as shown, be derived from Articles 226ff. EC. Furthermore, some of the arguments in favour 
of the “theory of irrelevance” presented above seem to be less persuasive in the EC context. 
First, under a majority regime, a State no longer has the possibility of making the ratification 
of a “sub-treaty” (i.e., an act of secondary law) dependent on the non-existence of violations 
of internal law, which is generally true for the conclusion of ordinary international treaties. 
Moreover, the argument that a State entering into an international treaty cannot be expected 
to investigate its partners’ internal laws in order to avoid violations, loses weight, since the 
EC organs have specialised lawyers from all Member States at their disposal, who might well 
be expected to enquire about potential fundamental violations of national law. 
bb) Recourse to the Theory of Evidence is not pre-empted by the Existence of the ECJ and other 
Specific Features of the EC System 
Furthermore, the objection must be addressed that the recourse to the theory of evidence 
might be pre-empted by specific features of the EC system, in particular the existence and the 
competencies of the ECJ. This ratio is present in Article 292 EC according to which disputes 
arising from the application of this treaty may only be solved with the devices provided for 
therein. However, as explained above, whilst the ECJ is the ultimate arbiter for the interpreta-
tion and review of the validity of EC law according to Article 234 EC, it has no competence 
to resolve, in a binding way, conflicts between “identity-related” parts of national constitu-
tions and EC law, either on grounds of supremacy or with respect to its mandate of concilia-
tion derived from Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU. Thus, if the ECJ fails to resolve such con-
flicts in a way which is acceptable for national constitutional courts, there is, indeed, a seri-
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ous lacuna in the EC system. In such a case, there is no EC device in the sense of Article 292 
EC which might be made use of, but the need for conflict resolution is more urgent than ever. 
To this, one might object that a conciliation body would not have the competence to make a 
decision which would be binding under standing EC and national law, either. This is cer-
tainly true, but it cannot be ignored that its decision would be binding under international 
law. Under the VCLT, the non-binding character of the report of the conciliation commission 
was agreed upon only as a compromise formula, which, for many contracting parties, did not 
go far enough. On account of the “pro-international law” orientation of the EC’s and all the 
Member States’ legal orders, any other solution would seem to be untenable in the EC con-
text. Moreover, a separate conciliation procedure handled by a neutral body would not only 
add a further legal level of de-escalation, but it might also enjoy more legitimacy than the 
ECJ: the body’s only task would be that of finding a compromise, it would not be the simul-
taneous guardian of one of the clashing legal orders, and the complaining State would have a 
greater say in the procedure. This is why a properly designed conciliation procedure would 
make sense despite the existence of the ECJ.482 
Next, following the pluralistic logic, recourse to the theory of evidence is not precluded by 
the development of judge-made human rights at EC level, either, as long as (and only as long 
as) they are not capable of protecting the Member States’ constitutional identity in the sense 
of Article 6 (1) EU. Finally, there is no contradiction here with Article 48 (formerly N) EU 
whereby legislative modifications of primary law may only be adopted by the Member States 
acting jointly in an IGC. In the first place, we are not dealing here with a legislative modifi-
cation of the treaties stricto sensu, but with the supplementation of EC law by existing inter-
national law. Moreover, a conciliation device would not even contradict the ratio of Article 
48 EU. As expounded above, on account of their task of guaranteeing democracy in Europe, 
the Member States should not be confined to the cumbersome treaty modification procedure 
or the enactment of new secondary law, but should also be in a position to participate in the 
exercise of judicial review over EC law which undermines their constitutional identity. 
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Now that the applicability of the evidence theory has been acknowledged in general, it 
may be further examined whether and how its specific substantive requisites may be applied 
and adapted in order to safeguard to the largest possible degree the supranational acquis of 
the EC. With a view to the enormous quantity of secondary legislation, it must be ensured, in 
particular, that the “constitutional core objection” is confined to very exceptional cases and 
that it is not capable of undermining the effectiveness of the EC constitutional system as a 
whole. 
c) Substantive Law Requisites of the Evidence Theory 
Among the substantive requisites of the evidence theory, regard should be had as to 
whether secondary law may be equated with an international treaty in the international law 
meaning of the word (a), whether the requirement of a State’s consent can be substituted by a 
State being outvoted in a majority decision (b), how the “manifestness” criterion should be 
read in the EC context (c), how the application of the theory can be restricted to conflicting 
provisions in order to limit its disintegrative effect (d), and, finally, what the general proce-
dural consequences of a relevant breach of internal law might be (e). 
aa) EC Secondary Law as an International “Sub-treaty”  
First of all, it may be stated that a conflict between secondary law and national constitu-
tions could formally be captured by the wording of the evidence theory in the VCLT: Even 
though general treaty law does not explicitly provide for the distinction between primary and 
secondary law, secondary law authorised by treaty provisions may be regarded as a “supple-
mentary treaty” concluded by the organs of the international organisation set up by the 
“original treaty” (see Article 5, 2nd alternative VCLT), which, however, shall enjoy primacy 
over such supplementary provisions (i.e. secondary law). So, the international law solution 
could be separately applied to a specific act of secondary law only - which is very important 
in the EC context. Incidentally, this also means that the state of development of customary 
international law at the time of the conclusion of the secondary law act is relevant with re-
spect to the extension of the evidence theory to substantive law provisions. 
bb) Consent and Majority Decision 
As already mentioned, the application of the theory of evidence should not be precluded 
by the fact that, under Article 46 VCLT, a State may invalidate its consent to be bound by a 
treaty, whereas in the EC situation, a State may not have even given its consent, but may 
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have been outvoted under a majority regime. For, if international law makes a device avail-
able for the protection of national constitutions even for a State consenting to an international 
treaty, this should apply with even stronger force when the special international law sub-
regime at issue allows for majority decisions (argument a mayor ad minus).  
cc) Manifestness of the Violation of Internal Law 
The function of limiting the constitutional objection to exceptional cases should be per-
formed by the “manifestness” requirement. In line with the dissuasive function of this crite-
rion, a breach would have to be manifest at the moment of the adoption of the secondary leg-
islation by the competent EC organ; a subsequent decision by a national court would there-
fore be too late. Thus, in contrast to a violation of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, the violation of a national constitutional right will not normally be obvious to other 
Member States of the EC.483 However, with respect to the increased duty of mutual loyalty 
arising in the EC context, it should be sufficient that, in the Council procedure, a Member 
State’s representative draws the other Council members’ attention to a possible violation of 
the national constitution (or other essential internal law), even though this assessment still 
needs to be confirmed by the judiciary of that State. Conversely, in the EC context too, the 
right to invoke a ground for avoidance should be deemed to be lost whenever a State has, ex-
plicitly or tacitly, expressed its consent to the validity of the contested act (ratio of Article 45 
VCLT). In particular, a State must not have normally voted in favour of the act in the Coun-
cil. 
As a consequence, therefore, the procedure will mostly only be carried out when the secondary 
law act in question has been taken by a majority decision against the vote of one or several 
Member States, as it was true in the case of the Banana regulation. Similarly, in the case of a 
“package deal”, the application of the evidence theory should be pre-empted if a State - perhaps 
even after having pronounced a warning as to the potential incompatibility of a part of the 
“package” with its own constitution - has nevertheless voted in favour of the whole package for 
paramount reasons of self-interest. For if a high-ranking State executive considers constitutional 
problems to be surmountable and is ready to trade them against other advantages, the other 
States should not have to carry the risk of a wrong assessment of the State’s executive. However, 
one might consider an exception to this rule with respect to comitology decisions in which a 
State was represented not by a member of the government, but by a civil servant or a scientific 
expert who cannot necessarily be expected to be sufficiently aware of constitutional obstacles. 
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Finally, in the event that the constitutionality of a judicial construct by the ECJ is at stake, the 
manifestness requirement should be considered fulfilled when a State makes a corresponding 
statement in the proceedings or when constitutional objections are raised by a national court in 
the Article 234 EC reference leading to the relevant ECJ decision. 
dd) Restriction of the Procedure on the Conflicting Provisions 
As to the sphere of application of the theory of evidence, it seems quite obvious that it 
should be limited to the secondary legislation in question - which has been interpreted as a 
supplementary treaty in the sense of Article 5 2nd alt. VCLT. Beyond this, following the ra-
tio legis of Article 44 VCLT, even a limitation of the procedure on the incriminating provi-
sions of the act in question seems necessary, in order to minimise its disintegrative effects.484 
In both cases, the separability requirements contained in Article 44 para. 3 must be fulfilled. 
Whereas, according to these, a junctim with the ongoing validity of the primary law basis of 
the secondary law act, or even the whole EC-Treaty, seems to be excluded, the avoidance of 
the secondary act in question might well deprive accompanying measures of their implicit 
ratio (“Geschäftsgrundlage”), with the effect that they must be included in the procedure. 
ee) Legal Consequence: Conciliation Procedure, no Automatic Invalidation 
With respect to the legal consequences of a relevant breach of internal law, the need to en-
sure the smooth functioning of the legal system and the requirement of legal certainty should, 
in the EC context, too, prevent such a breach from being automatically relevant at the level of 
EC law. Instead, just as in international law, a Member State alleging such a breach can only 
be accorded the right (and the duty) that a conciliation procedure be carried out. 
d) Requirements for the Conciliation Procedure 
The procedural consequences of a manifest breach of essential internal law are also ex-
tremely complex, especially since they are less precisely regulated in international law, and 
their transposition to the EC context poses significant problems. The following remarks will, 
first, briefly deal with the negotiation stage (a) and, then, turn at some length to the concilia-
tion procedure in the event that negotiations fail (b) as well as the legal consequences associ-
ated with denying the availability of such a procedure to the aggrieved party (c). 
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 This argument refutes the objections against the application of Art. 46 Vienna Convention raised by Streinz 
(op. cit., at 322ff.) and Weiler and Haltern (op. cit., at 441, fn. 115) that public international law would not 
make available an alternative to the invalidation of the whole EC-Treaty. 
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aa) The Negotiation Stage 
As to the negotiation stage provided for in international law (see Article 65 III VCLT and 
Article 33 UN-Charter), no particular measures seem to be necessary since the standing or-
gans of the EC always have the discretion to revoke or amend an act allegedly in conflict 
with internal law. However, if such negotiations or other peaceful means of dispute settle-
ment fail, or are blocked by one of the parties, a conciliation procedure should take place. 
bb) Establishment, Procedure, Contents and Effects of the Decisions of a Conciliation Body 
Right at the outset, it should be stressed that while international law should be read as re-
quiring neutral dispute settlement within the European context, it does not provide more than 
a “subsidiary default model” of what such a procedure might look like. As a matter of princi-
ple, the specific procedure to be followed, including the establishment of the conciliation 
body and the effects of its decision, is left to the discretion of the parties. So, the EC and its 
Member States could opt for any neutral institutional arrangement capable of providing for 
an adequate implementation of the theory of evidence. The only solution which would seem 
to be excluded would be the assignment of this task to the ECJ. For then, this court would act 
as a judge in its own cause which, pursuant to a universal legal principle, is inadmissible. 
However, the EC could also opt for a parliamentary mediation commission, as suggested by 
Schwarze, or an ex ante control by a European Constitutional Council, as suggested by Wei-
ler and Haltern. It would even seem to be the best and most effective solution de lege ferenda 
to extend the competence of such a body to any constitutional objection raised against a piece 
of legislation at the enactment stage, and to exclude a previous decision of the ECJ in that 
case. Only if no such alternative solution is arranged by the EU should the international law 
default model of the VCLT be adapted to the supranational particularities of the European 
system, in order to ensure the minimum requirements that a conciliation procedure should be 
expected to meet. 
In the first place, because of the constitutionalisation of the treaties by the ECJ, and par-
ticularly as a consequence of the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, the EC participates 
in the exercise of public power directly affecting the citizen more than any other international 
organisation. This means that its organs and their procedures need to meet democratic stan-
dards (however, because of its essential structural peculiarities, they should not be expected 
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to comply with democratic principles of exactly the same shape as Member States).485 There-
fore, an organ deciding de facto as the ultimate umpire over the “communitarisation” of a 
national constitutional standard in human rights or in other fields - and this would be the ef-
fect of a conciliation decision – must, to the extent that this is possible, be democratically le-
gitimated. A conciliation body should, thus, be set up by the Member States as the European 
“constitutional legislator” through a specific Treaty Amendment.486 Only if a constitutional 
conflict were to arise before such an amendment would such a conciliation body need to be 
appointed by the Council or the Commission, acting as the European executive. 
With respect to the composition of such a conciliation body, by adapting the international 
law default model to the supranational peculiarities of the EC, some general requirements 
may be derived. First, it should be noted that, since the procedure will enhance the degree of 
control exercised by Member States with respect to the application of EC law, Member State 
representatives should have a strong voice. Correspondingly, the body might well be made 
up of an equal number of judges of the constitutional or highest courts of the Member States 
involved and the ECJ;487 if several Member States raise constitutional objections, all of them 
together should be entitled to appoint half of the ordinary members of the body. As provided 
for in the VCLT, it would seem appropriate that the ordinary members appointed in this way 
jointly nominate the president of the body. It would also be conceivable, though, that the 
President of the ECJ (or another ECJ judge, if the President has been involved in a previous 
decision on the case) fulfils this task. Under a majority regime - which represents the normal 
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international law solution and which seems to be the only way of avoiding a blockage in the 
system -, the President’s vote would be decisive. 
As far as the formal contents of the decision are concerned, a conciliation decision should, 
in principle, be confined to finding (or dismissing) a relevant breach of essential national law. 
Contrary to an ordinary international conciliation body, a European institution should not, in 
line with its (quasi-) judicial status, have any competence to design an alternative solution. 
However, after setting aside a European act, the body might well suggest, more or less pre-
cisely, such requirements that a similar act would be expected to meet in order to be com-
patible with the treaties and with the core of national constitutions;488 even such a far-
reaching intertwining of the judiciary and the legislature would seem acceptable given the 
predominantly legal character of the EC. Besides annulling or upholding a European act, the 
conciliation body might also have recourse to “mitigating mechanisms” such as those that are 
used at times by national constitutional courts. In particular, it might compromise by not de-
claring a European act void with immediate effect but by demanding its (possibly only par-
tial) substitution within a reasonable period of time.  
As to the substantive contents of the decision, it is of paramount importance to ensure that 
no Member State’s (alleged) identity may be protected at the expense of the Community’s 
identity, i.e., its fundamental values and orientations. This means that, in principle, no na-
tional provision in disregard of human rights, the basic freedoms and the principle of undis-
torted competition may be protected. 
For example, Greece should not be allowed to invoke its constitution as a ground for discrimina-
tory measures against Macedonia or Turkey. No Member State should be allowed to grant State 
aid independent from the EC treaty framework by invoking constitutional rationales such as the 
guarantee of certain branches of the industry or agriculture. Such an objection should be inad-
missible. 
If this condition is fulfilled, the conciliation body should balance the intensity of the 
breach of the national constitution, the desirable legal standard in the field at issue (e.g., hu-
man rights protection) at EC level as well as the consequences for both sides arising out of 
the application or disapplication of the act at stake; thereby, the rebuttable presumption of 
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relevance following from a State’s allegation of an essential breach should provide the start-
ing point. As already stated above with regard to the ECJ’s mandate of conciliation, the con-
ciliation body might, however, also decide against a national standard if it explains why this 
would not be suitable at EC level. This might be so in the event that the body has to reconcile 
widely different or even mutually exclusive constitutional standards. Thus, there is no danger 
of a “constitutional dictate” by one Member State. 
Concerning the effects of the decision: as already stated above, with regard to the close re-
lationship of the Member States in an integrated community and the need for legal uniform-
ity, the findings of the conciliation body should be directly applicable and binding in interna-
tional law. Moreover, on account of the importance of legal unity within the EC, the reach of 
the binding effect of the decision should be erga omnes.489 
 The ordinary international law solution of a unilateral withdrawal of a State from the treaty in 
question would hardly appear viable in the context of an integration community in which the 
unity of law is essentially important. Only if the European act in question falls within an area 
where differentiation according to conventional treaty law or closer co-operation pursuant to the 
new Amsterdam rules is possible,490 might the EC legislator attempt to convert the EC act at is-
sue into “relative law”, valid only in the Member States which have approved it. 
Through its erga omnes effect, a decision on the exceptional relevance of national norms 
at the European level would indirectly adapt the “contours” of the corresponding European 
provisions to those of the national ones. Therefore, such a procedure might ultimately be ca-
pable of bringing about a gradual convergence between European and national law standards. 
cc) Legal Consequences in the Case of Denial of a Conciliation Procedure 
Starting from the ECJ’s premises as to the unlimited primacy of European law over na-
tional law, the logical consequence would be that the ECJ’s jurisdiction over EC law is ex-
clusive. On this basis, it might be expected that the EC would deny a conciliation procedure 
to a Member State alleging the breach of its constitution. However, since international law 
cannot be disposed of arbitrarily by the EC, it is submitted that the latter could not, legiti-
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mately, deny such a procedure to a Member State without offering a functionally adequate 
EC law substitute. Therefore, the international law solution would seem appropriate even for 
this case: the presumption of the relevance, in EC law, of the alleged violation of the consti-
tution becomes irrebuttable, and the Member State in question may lawfully discard the ap-
plication of the incriminating act.491 
In practice, a declaration of the definite disapplication of a European act by a national judge 
should be dispensable. As will be described below, under certain conditions, the Member State 
may grant measures of interim relief when asking the EC for a conciliation procedure. If, how-
ever, the EC makes no effort to do so, the State in question could simply continue the interim 
measures, and no other steps would seem to be necessary. However, if the EC not only denies a 
conciliation procedure to a Member State, but also starts treaty infringement proceedings with 
respect to the transitory disapplication, by way of the said interim measures, of the European act 
at stake, the possibility of a legal solution would probably be exhausted, and a political solution 
might finally become unavoidable.  
4. Dogmatical and Legal Theory Implications of this Solution 
a) EC Law 
The international law concretisation of Article 10 EC and 6 (1) EU through the theory of 
evidence, as elaborated in the previous sections, provides that a Member State outvoted in the 
Council has the right to invoke a manifest violation of essential internal law as an exception 
to its duty of performance with respect to the European act at issue. In doing so, it would 
have to ask for a conciliation procedure, as a result of which the question would be decided 
by a neutral body to be set up by the parties. A treaty violation procedure would be admissi-
ble only if the State in question were to refuse to obey the conciliation decision. Accordingly, 
the theory of evidence constitutes an exception to the ECJ’s jurisdiction and to the doctrine 
of the unlimited supremacy of EC law, which may be limited through the exceptional pri-
macy of national law found in the conciliation procedure. 
Next, if a State has the right to demand that such a conciliation procedure be carried out, 
all interim measures in view of such a procedure - especially measures capable of avoiding 
the “de facto-anticipation” of the decision by factual circumstances (“Vorwegnahme der 
Hauptsache”) - must be allowed. With respect to the admissibility of such measures, one 
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might apply the ECJ’s own case law, constituting an exception to Articles 242 and 243 (for-
merly 185 and 186) EC.492 Thereafter, the disapplication of the challenged act of secondary 
legislation pending the decision of the conciliation body would be lawful in cases where the 
individuals or firms concerned would otherwise face the danger of irreversible losses or 
bankruptcy. However, national measures capable of undermining the practical effectiveness 
of the (future) conciliation decision would, generally, still be illegal. This would be particu-
larly true for a national constitutional court decision declaring European acts inapplicable 
before the conciliation procedure is completed. Even though such a decision would not be 
relevant at the level of EC law nor exclude a subsequent conciliation procedure, and even 
though it would not create problems unless the Member State in question loses the concilia-
tion procedure, renouncing a priori the factual possibility of respecting a future decision by 
an international dispute settlement body, it should in itself be considered as a clear violation 
of international law. 
b) Public International Law 
Next, the applicability of the theory of evidence entails very important consequences even 
if the conflict were to persist and if, contrary to the solution advocated here, the European 
side were to insist on the unlimited supremacy of EC law, thus leaving no space for concilia-
tion. For even a Member State willing to challenge this conception of the EC system and to 
disobey the jurisprudence of the ECJ in this respect could not react legisbus solutus. Instead, 
it would have to respect, as an international emergency regime, the international law mini-
mum standard to which Article 46 VCLT belongs. In other words, a State would be bound to 
respect this provision even if the ECJ had previously rejected its applicability. Under these 
premises, the competence of constitutional control, retained by the BVerfG, would, in so far 
as it were to include the avoidance of an EC act without a previous request of carrying out a 
conciliation procedure, be a massive violation of international law independent of its incom-
patibility with EC law. 
Even if one wanted to discard the applicability of the customary version of the theory of 
evidence as to the substantive competence limits of the treaty-making power of a State (or for 
other international law reasons), the lesson to be drawn from international law should at least 
be that a legal solution is to be found for constitutional conflicts. Thus, at any rate, before 
                                                 
492
 See Case C-465/93, Atlanta [1995] ECR I-3761; cases C-142/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik [1991] ECR I-
415. 
 259 
setting aside a European act, a Member State should make every reasonable effort to estab-
lish a legal mechanism capable of resolving conflicts. This obligation should again be de-
rived from Article 23 Grundgesetz as well as from Article 10 EC and 6 (1) EU. 
c) National Constitutional law 
On the level of national constitutional law, this solution would have important implica-
tions as well. As stated, the integration clauses of the Grundgesetz aim at a stable EC gov-
erned by the rule of law. Otherwise, the homogeneity requirements Article 23 Grundgesetz 
imposes on the EC would be completely illusory. Now, under the premise that an interna-
tional law solution which is capable of decreasing the potentially disintegrative effect of con-
stitutional conflicts exists, German institutions would be bound to make use of it. Thus, set-
ting aside secondary legislation without substantial efforts by German organs to have the EC 
set up a conciliation procedure would not only be a violation of international law and EC 
law, but also of national constitutional law.  
The fact that, though binding under international law, the decision would not be binding under 
standing EC and national constitutional law should not pose too great a problem. It is true that, if 
the national constitutional limits to integration were disrespected by the concilation decision, the 
constitutional court would not, in theory, be prevented from finding a violation of the Constitu-
tion and setting aside the act for the territory of the Member State (just as it threatens to set aside 
EC acts now). However, this outcome is unlikely for various reasons: First, legally, the cumula-
tive weight of the national constitution’s mandates to further European integration and to guaran-
tee the respect for international law might enable a Constitutional Court to give up, by virtue of 
the balancing principle of practical concordance, more constitutional ground than before.493 Sec-
ond, a failure to respect or implement a conciliation decision should now be considered a viola-
tion of EC law too, and the Commission would be able to commence treaty violation proceed-
ings. Finally and most importantly, it would appear to be politically unthinkable that a Member 
State first asks for a conciliation procedure and then does not respect its outcome. 
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d) Legal Theory Implications for the Structure of the EU 
Moving back to the theoretical models presented above, it can now be claimed that is 
through an adapted application of the theory of evidence that the model of 'pluralism under 
national law' might be put into practice. As already suggested, within the European system, a 
conciliation body might be conceived of as an organ of the Union, competent for the proce-
dural implementation of Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU read together with the theory of evi-
dence. Thus, the Union’s “roof construction” above the Member States and the Communities, 
otherwise nearly devoid of content, could be rendered useful for the sake of legal co-
ordination between them. This construction would comply well with the rationale of an in-
tergovernmental Union aiming at containing the supranational Communities and counteract-
ing bureaucratic “autodynamics”. According to this reconstruction, the structure of the Union 
might even be characterised as the very initial stage of a three-tier federal overall structure, 
similar to the famous theoretical debate in the fifties and early sixties about the structure of 
German and Austrian federalism.494  
This debate focused on the question of whether the federal structure consisted of two or three en-
tities (“zwei- oder dreigliedriger Bundesstaat”): the Länder (the States), the Bund (the Federa-
tion) and possibly also a third level representing the State as a whole (“Gesamtstaat”), on which, 
among other things, conflicts between the Länder and the Bund could be solved. This reconstruc-
tion resolves the conflict that, under the Grundgesetz as it stands, the Bund is, in some respects, 
super-ordinated, in others on an equal footing with the Länder, and in favour of the highest “co-
ordination competence” of the “Gesamtstaat”. This puts the Länder and the Bund together as 
complementary parts of one polity, and, thus, represents them as one coherent unity. Under the 
constitution, the Bund and the Länder are awarded different competencies and are, for this very 
reason, within their relative sphere of competence the highest, and hence, sovereign, legal enti-
ties. Furthermore, the constitutions of the Bund and the Länder are derived from the constitution 
of the Gesamtstaat. Only the latter possesses legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
This view was criticised, though, by the partisans of a two-tier federalism, to whom the BVerfG 
adhered in the Hessen-judgment,495 as a theoretical castle in the air. For, in reality, only two enti-
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ties could be found: the Bund and the Länder, and no Gesamtstaat overarching them.496 The 
three-tier construction would only pursue the aim of awarding the Länder sovereignty and an 
equal footing with respect to the Bund; thus, what was at stake in reality was not the delimitation 
of real political tasks, but the questions of hierarchy and supremacy. The real problems of the 
federal State, however, go well beyond the delimitation of several spheres of competence, and lie 
in the effective and legitimate interface of several centres of decision-making which displays 
important features of a system of multi-level governance: in the influence of the Bund on the 
Länder (legal control, intervention, administrative execution, political homogeneity etc.) and, 
conversely, in the participation of the Länder in the decisions of the Bund (Bundesrat [second 
chamber], constitutional amendments etc.) and, finally, in the mechanisms of achieving com-
promises between the two entities. The three-tier model would distort this finely-tuned system by 
overemphasising the delimitation of competencies and the question of hierarchy. 
An evaluation of these two positions shows that their difference is not very big, because the dif-
ferent notions are to be found at different levels of analysis comprehension, and because they 
have a partly complementary function. In the first place, undoubtedly, the Gesamtstaat is not a 
political entity existing in reality. Instead, it is but a theorem, embodying the idea of unity of the 
Bund and the Länder as a political-ethical idea, a fictitious subject of imputability of the com-
mon good, which brings together all the constitutional elements which, legally or factually, guar-
antee this unity. In the reality of the German political system, the tasks of the Gesamtstaat are 
also carried out by the Bund; the latter is, in one entity, Zentral- and Gesamtstaat, at the same 
time part of the whole and its guarantor.497 This being so, the three-tier construction is indeed not 
needed at the German level. Notwithstanding this, it is a useful analytical tool for the reconstruc-
tion of the competence and hierarchy structures, which is the paramount goal of the Pure Theory 
of Law. 
As opposed to the German situation, a three-tier structure does, albeit in a very initial 
stage, exist at EC level, consisting of the Union which the European Council as its own insti-
tution, and below it both the Communities and the Member States. If the Union, according to 
what is proposed here, were also competent to conciliate conflicts between the Communities 
and the Member States, the three-tier structure would also become more practical. This struc-
ture would be monistic in so far as the decisions of the conciliation body would be respected. 
Since these would only be binding under international law, but not under standing EC and 
national law, this construction would not be perfectly monistic. Inspired by conflict of laws 
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terminology, one might call it “weak or limping monism”.498 However, an important differ-
ence with respect to the classic three-tier Kelsenian model cannot be overlooked: according 
to the conception proposed here, the Union, as the third level, is relatively weak, its legal 
competence-competence being limited by the constitutional essentials of the Member States. 
This being so, one may note a meaningful substantive law-”intertwining” of the three-tier 
structure: while, on the one hand, the Union would be supra-ordinated to the Member States, 
on the other, this position would be limited in that a (weak) Union Grundnorm stipulates the 
identity-relevant components of the national legal systems as prior-ranking even at EC level, 
albeit contained by the mechanism of a conciliation-oriented optimisation of the underlying 
colliding principles. Therefore, this conceptualisation does not so much emphasise a hierar-
chical superposition, but the co-ordinative function of the third (EU) level. This reflects the 
reality of multi-level governance, its legal and political reality being, indeed, not so much 
characterised by questions of supremacy and the delimitation of competencies, but rather by 
the multiple and complex dovetailing of administrations, politics, and law. 
To sum up, the three-tier construction advocated here seems, to a large extent, to be capa-
ble of avoiding the dangers of an unlimited pluralism, under which two legal orders stand 
side by side like medieval strongholds and restrict the relationships between each other, to 
the ultimate detriment of both. If one wishes to take up again Paul Kirchhof’s bridge meta-
phor, the Union as the third component of a three-tier overall structure might be conceived of 
as the Florentine Ponte Vecchio, with the conciliation and co-ordination mechanism being a 
common European house on the bridge. 
5. Practical Consequences and Final Assessment 
As to the procedure to be follow by a national constitutional court, the following summary 
may be stated: if it were to regard a European act, assessed by the ECJ to be in conformity 
with EC law, as a violation of the own constitution, it would have to suspend the proceedings 
and refer the case to the ECJ pursuant to Article 234 III EC if the latter has not yet had the 
opportunity to pronounce itself on all the relevant legal issues. Besides this, it would be pos-
sible, though of limited utility, for the national court to ask the further question as to whether 
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Article 10 EC may be supplemented by the international law theory of evidence. At any rate, 
were the ECJ to give a negative answer, this should not prevent a Member State from further 
action. For, first, according to the view advocated here, the application of general interna-
tional law cannot be disposed of by the EC as long as it does not provide for a specific func-
tional equivalent. Second, the ECJ would appear biased as to this question since it relates in-
directly to its own competence. Thus, if the conflict is not resolved by co-operation between 
the ECJ and national courts in the Article 234 EC procedure, the Member State in question 
should demand that a conciliation procedure be carried out. In this regard, it would, first of 
all, have to notify the EC and all other Member States. The procedure before the constitu-
tional court might still be suspended in the meantime; the provisional disapplication of the 
incriminating European provisions might be ensured by interim measures. Now, three alter-
natives are possible: 
• The EC establishes a conciliation body and this decides in favour of the Member State 
declaring the European act in question void erga omnes. Then, the procedure before 
the constitutional court might simply be stopped. 
• The EC establishes a conciliation body and this decides in favour of the EC by up-
holding the act in question. As already stated, even though this decision would not be 
binding under standing national constitutional law, there would be strong reasons for 
the Member State concerned to accept it. 
• In response to the State’s claim that a conciliation procedure be carried out, the EC 
denies any such possibility by claiming exclusive jurisdiction for the ECJ (or by alleg-
ing other reasons).  
As stated above, such a reaction would, indeed, be the logical consequence of the EC’s 
(however unfounded, as shown) presumption of the super-ordination and unlimited suprem-
acy of EC law over national constitutional law. As a result, the constitutional conflict would 
remain unresolved. However, since it brings about its juridification, the solution proposed 
here would still have considerable advantages. For the EC, the outcome would be positive in 
that the potential threat to the uniformity of EC law would be decreased, and another “level 
of de-escalation” would be introduced. It would be entirely up to the EC to reach a stable so-
lution by setting up a conciliation procedure. The advantages for the Member State lie in the 
fact that it would no longer have to resort to clearly illegal devices in order to guarantee re-
spect for its constitution. In particular, a claim to respect common international law standards 
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rather than merely the alleged constraints implied by its own internal law might be viewed 
more sympathetically by the other Member States. What is more, by discarding the negative 
effects of the current regime, the positive effect of subsidiary national judicial control over 
EC acts would become plain. In addition, the call for the establishment of a competing organ 
for constitutional adjudication might put the ECJ under pressure to handle constitutional con-
flicts itself rather than ignore them as it does at present. Thus, the solution might have the 
effect of a Solange III decision, and like its famous predecessors, it would prove most effec-
tive if it could encourage the ECJ to take over de facto the task of conciliation itself by taking 
national constitutional problems more seriously and by integrating national views on consti-
tutional essentials into its decisions - all this, however, without the negative flavour of the 
current Cold War scenario. Finally, the availability of a subsidiary international law solution 
de lege lata might make European and national politicians more interested in elaborating a 
genuine European constitutional solution. As already stated this author’s preference would be 
a European Constitutional Council, being composed of ECJ and national constitutional court 
judges. This body would co-exist with the ECJ, and it would be competent to decide on any 
“constitutional core objection” (not just on competence issues, as suggested by Weiler and 
Haltern) raised against an EC act by a Member State. The procedure to be followed should be 
an ex ante review to be carried out within a certain deadline after the enactment of an EC act, 
and it ought to render any further review by the ECJ inadmissible. 
To sum up: by way of comparison with other doctrines of conflict of laws developed by 
the European judiciary to enhance the effet utile of European law, the supplementation of Ar-
ticle 10 EC and Article 6 (1) EU by the international law theory of evidence might add an 
important institutional mechanism capable of mediating constitutional conflicts and of ensur-
ing a better constitutional balance between the EC and its Member States. At the same time, 
the residual national competence of constitutional control over European acts would be stipu-
lated as an integral part of the checks and balances of the EU’s constitutional system. Thus, 
the widely criticised but, under the premises of pluralism and standing national constitutional 
law, unavoidable challenge to the ECJ by national constitutional courts might ultimately re-
sult in a positive outcome. 
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Chapter II: Interconnecting European and GATT/WTO Law 
“In the Bananas judgment, it was an unforgivable mistake by the judges, who apparently 
were blinded to such a point by their own theories that they did not realise that they had be-
fore them not a private party, but a Member State, itself a contracting party of GATT and a 
member of the Council, which, under the EC Treaty, enjoys the treaty-making power. In a 
case raised under Article 173 by one of the so-called “privileged” parties (Member States 
and Community Organs), who have the right of challenging any action of the Community on 
any ground, the decision of the Court was a blatant denial of justice. I cannot help quoting 
here a topical French saying: C’est pire qu’ une faute, c’ est une erreur (…) By its stubborn 
ignorance of the most elemental rules of the GATT/WTO system the Court of Justice has 
fallen back to a legal low which cannot compare with the standard of adjudication at inter-
national level. To restore its authority, it is time for the Court to concern itself with the sub-
stance of the rules of international trade, instead of denying usque ad absurdum the internal 
relevance of rules which have been shaped with the full consent of the EC inside GATT and 
the WTO”. 
Pierre Pescatore, former Judge of the European Court of Justice499  
 
I. Conclusions from Multi-Level Governance for the Solution of Constitutional Con-
flicts between the between the WTO and its Members’ Legal Orders 
A reconceptualisation of the relationship between the WTO and the legal orders of its 
Members along the lines of multi-level governance again requires an exercise of optimising 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of both legal orders. As regards effectiveness, one may, just 
as with the relationship between EU and national law, first think of the Pure Theory of Law 
concept of effectiveness focusing on the “stronger” legal order, capable of fully subjecting 
the other. According to this, the relationship between the WTO and the legal orders of its 
members may also be characterised as pluralistic in principle.  
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First, the possibility of a monistic super-ordination of WTO law above EU and national law may 
clearly be dismissed. Its successful start notwithstanding, the WTO is still fighting for the estab-
lishment of a supranational acquis and its recognition as a genuine legal system endowed with 
autonomous effectiveness. Under these conditions, it would seem to be clearly premature to view 
WTO law as dominating effectively, and as imposing its criteria of legal validity upon, all EU 
and national law.500 Second, despite the “thinner” normative quality of WTO law, it is on ac-
count of the basic degree of autonomous effectiveness entailing compliance with DSB rulings in 
the vast majority of cases that a subordination, in Pure Theory concepts, of the WTO system un-
der the various Grundnormen of the legal orders of its members should also be dismissed. It is 
true that the EU, and within their field of competence also the Member States, have the factual 
power to disrespect WTO law and dispute settlement findings altogether in a first step. However, 
under the new WTO system, the disrespect of DSB findings entails sanctions which the WTO 
may authorise its other Members to impose. As the Banana conflict has shown, whereas the 
“(voluntary) compliance pull” of WTO law may be argued to be existent, but is much smaller 
than that of EC law on account on its lesser internalisation into its Members’ legal systems, these 
sanction powers are enormous, in particular in the frequent case in which these are imposed by 
powerful other WTO members such as the US, Canada or Japan. These sanctions, or their mere 
“shadow”, are likely to lead, if not to full compliance, at least to compromises in which WTO 
law will be able to preserve a considerable degree of autonomous effectiveness. One might ob-
ject further that, in cases of highest political importance – such as, e.g., the Hormones case –, a 
Member State might be prepared to accept even massive sanctions rather than any compromise, 
or leave the WTO altogether, even if this entailed massive political and financial costs. At this 
stage, it again becomes clear that the Pure Theory framework is not fully adequate in that the 
overall effectiveness of a system can hardly be assessed on the sole ground that sanctions might 
not lead to compliance in rather rare and extreme cases coming close to a revolution-type situa-
tion, while, in the vast majority of cases, Member States do comply with DSB rulings. Such an 
extreme model inevitably leads to normative distortions and is not able to provide adequate 
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guidelines for a State’s or the Community’s behaviour towards the GATT/WTO system, in par-
ticular for the interconnection of the legal systems to be established.  
Just as in the European vs. national law relationship described above, the pluralistic model 
also corresponds much better to the basic feature of the overall network of governance, in 
which hierarchical relationships are displaced by heterarchical ones, as all constitutive ele-
ments, sub-systems and interconnecting mechanisms are mutually interdependent, with none 
of them being able to deploy a meaningful degree of effectiveness autonomously. Whilst it is 
established on the basis of such a dualist framework that no unconditional hierarchies exist, 
the central task remains to interconnect the two legal orders effectively. In this context, it 
may be stated that the current interconnection - which, apart from the constellations in which 
indirect effect is admitted, relies mainly on the dispute settlement system - works well, but its 
potential is quite limited, which is also due to the restricted personal and logistic resources of 
the system. However, any attempt to further enhance the WTO’s effectiveness should again 
be made dependant on the WTO’s legitimacy.  
In this context, important significance should be attached the above findings. As regards 
governance processes, it was found that, while the legitimacy of intergovernmental policy 
making is as yet rather limited (classical diplomatic intransparent decision-making among 
trade specialists with limited access of civil society), the deliberative legitimacy of the adju-
dicative system is substantial. In a substantive law perspective, the WTO, like the EU, has, 
on the one hand, the legitimacy potential of correcting Nation State or Community failures; 
blatant trade protectionism as practised by the EU in the Banana conflict is certainly among 
these and would give the supranational system the legitimacy to interfere. On the other hand, 
there is the huge deregulatory potential immanent to hierarchically superior WTO rules, 
which is not balanced by an effective political system as it exists at national level and could, 
therefore, easily lead to a free trade bias. On these grounds, one is again facing the “capacity 
surplus” typical for governance by law, and a careful balancing of effectiveness and legiti-
macy rationales is necessary.  
It is against this background that the following analysis will deal with various potential 
options of enhancing the effectiveness of the interconnection among WTO and EU law. First, 
the most prominent possibility of awarding direct effect to WTO rules will be examined (II). 
Clearly, this would enable an effective decentralised enforcement of WTO rules, which 
would thereby metamorphose into subjective rights just as advocated by neo-liberalism. As 
important legitimacy objections will, however, be raised against such an unlimited direct ef-
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fect, at least in actions by private persons as opposed to those of Member States govern-
ments, it will be further analysed whether direct effect could be limited to DSB findings. This 
would exclude WTO rules from being directly enforceable before domestic courts, and thus 
preserve the State’s predominant role in the system (III). Finally, the possibility will be ex-
amined of rendering the DSB procedure more effective on the example of the EC by intro-
ducing a “reference procedure” as in Article 177 EC in which the consistency of national 
measures could be controlled at an early stage. Such a scrutiny, which would take place be-
fore economic operators may have relied on it, would reduce the economic stakes of proceed-
ings, thereby reducing their adversarial nature and promoting compliance (IV). 
II. Interconnection through Direct Effect of WTO Rules 
As has become clear from the above presentation of the ECJ jurisprudence in Bananas 
and Portugal v. Council,501 and, in particular in Advocate General Saggio’s opinion, two ver-
sions of the internal applicability of WTO law should be distinguished. Firstly, full direct ef-
fect in its most common understanding, meaning the right of private parties to invoke WTO 
rules against national or European legislation before domestic courts. Secondly, a much 
weaker version of direct effect entailing that WTO rules may only be used as a basis for a 
challenge to the legality of Community acts in actions brought by Member States – as a “pa-
ramètre de légalité” in the words of Advocate General Saggio.  
1. Full Direct Effect: Creating Individual Rights? 
a) Adverse Implications 
As the European experience shows, the granting of direct effect, which renders WTO law 
directly enforceable by private parties before national and supranational courts, would cer-
tainly be the best means to enhance its effectiveness. As advocated by neo-liberalism, such 
action would take WTO law away from the control of national governments, elevate WTO 
rules to the status of subjective fundamental economic rights and thereby render the WTO 
legal order a widely effective international constitution of free trade.  
However, the legitimacy objections just alluded to need to be considered in more detail. It 
seems, at first, to be useful to remind the subtle general arguments against the domestic status 
of international treaties given in a famous article by John Jackson, one of the architects of the 
 269 
new GATT/WTO system.502 His view focuses on detrimental effects on a State’s internal in-
stitutional and constitutional structure. Thus, direct effect would considerably strengthen the 
role of the judiciary to the detriment of other powers, and thereby effect the institutional bal-
ance as foreseen in the national constitution. More importantly, a directly effective interna-
tional treaty superior to ordinary State legislation would even be dangerous to the idea of 
democracy and the democratic representation of individuals. This is because most constitu-
tions provide for little democratic participation in the treaty-making process by confining the 
role of parliament to approve or disapprove (with mostly negative consequences) the ratifica-
tion of a treaty as a whole. 
Secondly, according to John Jackson, national legislatures should be given the discretion 
of integrating and adapting the treaty into the national system, in order to guarantee a smooth 
interaction. In particular, they may have a legitimate interest to adapt international treaty lan-
guage to the domestic legal system - which may also allow them to add some protectionist 
safeguards, especially when the act of implementation becomes part of an internal power 
struggle among political parties or institutions. Even the latter option may be legitimate, 
since some breaches may be minor and therefore preferable to the alternative of refusing to 
join the treaty altogether. Otherwise, in the event that direct effect is explicitly provided for 
in an international treaty, it would even be possible that courts, for reasons of judicial self 
restraint towards the legislator, will find other ways to prevent individuals from invoking a 
treaty, such as denying them standing or holding that the relevant provision is exclusively 
addressed to government bodies and not to private litigants. 
These arguments against unlimited direct effect may be further strengthened by a com-
parison of the situation within the WTO and the EU. This shows that the granting of direct 
effect would meet considerable obstacles based on democratic legitimacy.503 First, whereas 
the European integration project is based on a “unique combination of ideological conver-
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gence and ideological concessions after the war and to this day”, giving rise, as shown, to the 
emergence of a thin, but nonetheless perceivable, European demos, the same cannot be said 
about the WTO. To show this, one must not even resort to the lack of public discourse let 
alone solidarity among its Members’ peoples; it is already sufficient to point to this organisa-
tion’s lack of a social agenda, and the precarious status of human rights in it. Furthermore, in 
the EU context, economic rights have not been created and justified on their own merit as 
neo-liberals would have it, but have, instead, been framed by the Court as a by-product and 
tool of the pursuit of the common collective goal of the establishment of a Single Market; 
this was legitimated by the general consensus of all participating governments and enshrined 
as the primary objective of the EC Treaty. This consensus already explicitly foresaw, albeit 
in a much lesser extent as actually happened in the constitutionalisation process, regulations 
as directly effective pieces of EC secondary legislation. Beyond this, European judge-made 
economic rights were, and are, embedded in the wider institutional and political context of 
the Community and its Member States, which has extremely important implications. Eco-
nomic rights could, thus, never claim a monopoly of constitutionality; Instead, the recogni-
tion of European human rights by the ECJ was famously traced back to the common constitu-
tional traditions of Member States, which, of course, included all kinds of human rights, eco-
nomic rights playing even a minor role. In this sense, the ECJ balanced European individual 
social rights against Member States interests and policies in famous decisions such as Wa-
chauf.504 This would not be possible in the WTO context. More generally, the constitutionali-
sation of EU law was accompanied and stabilised by the existence and gradual extension of 
positive integration devices, i.e., active regulative policy-making, which could, to a certain 
extent, – albeit not completely as shown by Fritz Scharpf’s lucid analysis referred to above – 
compensate for the deregulatory effect of the constitutionalisation of economic freedom 
rights. In sum, European constitutionalisation was a highly complex, mutually reactive proc-
ess of judicial and political integration, which significantly included national judges, admini-
strations and citizens, and in which the ECJ’s role was frequently limited to triggering politi-
cal initiatives through a combination of threat of future censure and argumentation. This 
would not, to a comparable degree, be possible at WTO level, either; not only because it 
lacks effective law-making powers, but more importantly because it would not have, as 
shown, sufficient legitimacy to harmonise and unify wide areas of economic law at global 
scale in the first place. Therefore, the granting of direct effect to WTO rules might have a 
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one-sided deregulatory effect which might gravely impair national political problem-solving 
capacity in social regulation. 
b) An Alternative Differentiated Approach 
As a first reaction one might, therefore, restrict direct effect to cases of clear “Nation State 
or Community failures” such as Bananas, in which the legitimacy of a supranational negative 
intervention may be assumed as given. Unfortunately, so far, such a solution seems to be 
barely practicable. A convincing distinction between the constellations of “Nation State or 
Community failures” and of a deregulatory bias would be extremely difficult. Thus, in Ba-
nanas, the Community might have invoked its Lomé obligations in order to justify the re-
gime, at least on the “honourable” ground of helping its former colonies, and its characterisa-
tion as a protectionist “Community failure” would, therefore, remain hugely controversial. 
Assuming that it should be impossible to circumscribe such situations with enough precision 
in pre-established legal – WTO or EU/national law – rules, the distinction line would need to 
be drawn by judges on a case-to-case basis. Yet, there is no judge, nor, respectively, any in-
stitution among the three constitutional levels which could legitimately do so. The WTO ad-
judicative bodies, the only ones, in practice, capable of deciding this question, have already 
deliberately dismissed the idea of reading a direct effect obligation into WTO law – precisely 
because of the legitimacy objections just mentioned. As a result, it may be concluded that 
direct effect of WTO law could not legitimately be imposed on the EC in politically contro-
versial cases. 
Yet, it is exactly this finding that points to the possibility of how the effectiveness of 
WTO law could still be considerably improved with regard to the present situation. As the 
Hermès case has shown, there are also instances of a more technical nature, particularly as 
regards the TRIPS agreement, in which there is no “sovereignty issue” at stake, and the 
granting of direct effect would not entail any deregulatory risk, either. On the basis of this 
finding, the ECJ might develop a more flexible approach by granting direct effect in such 
cases only, i.e., as long as it deems the European executive’s prerogatives in foreign trade 
policy not to be at risk. Yet, this approach would offer more flexibility not only in technical 
issues. Comparable to what was proposed by Advocate General Tesauro in Hermès, it could 
also enable the ECJ, possibly after enquiring of the executive’s view, to grant direct effect in 
favour of certain countries only if reciprocity is ensured or if the sovereignty implications of 
a certain matter are minor. 
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It should be noted, though, that this solution would still need to be fine-tuned with the 
functioning of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. In particular, the political room for 
decision making by WTO Members in this procedure might be illegitimately curtailed, and 
the delicate balance between diplomatic and legal means of dispute resolution provided for in 
the DSU disturbed, if national courts or European courts were encouraged to make decisions 
on WTO rules at any moment of an ongoing dispute settlement procedure. Thus, at the con-
sultation stage before the formal establishment of a panel, it is obvious that any directly ef-
fective court decision might be counterproductive. It might largely restrict the scope of ma-
noeuvre in the consultations accorded to the parties in Article 4 DSU; in particular it might 
gravely affect the balance achieved by means of member-to-member trade-offs which fre-
quently involve cross-sector bargaining. It is true that, if no third party feels affected by such 
measures and initiates a panel procedure (which is, however, quite unlikely), there is no con-
trol that WTO law is respected is being in such settlements, ex officio control being inexist-
ent. However, the DSU’s preference for political negotiation is absolutely clear and un-
equivocal at this point. Beyond this, a directly effective domestic court decision should be 
avoided also because it might be inconsistent with a later panel report; and a possible internal 
res iudicata effect of that court decision might deprive the State in question from even the 
possibility of complying, and expose it to sanctions. As a result, directly effective court deci-
sions should at any rate be excluded whenever a dispute settlement procedure has been initi-
ated or this may be expected to happen. 
To sum up, while direct effect should not be imposed on the EC against its will, the ECJ 
might consider granting direct effect to WTO law in cases of no “sovereignty relevance” and 
as long as interference with WTO dispute settlement procedures is not to be expected. 
2. WTO Law as “Paramètre de Légalité” in Community and Member State Actions 
It has already been mentioned several times that the justiciability of WTO law as a “pa-
ramètre de légalité” in Community and Member State actions raises questions which are dif-
ferent from those entailed by the full direct effect of WTO law in individual suits. This is par-
ticularly so as both the EC and its Member States are externally liable for full compliance 
with the agreements, and may also be exposed to retaliation by third parties for violations 
occurred only in other Member States. Moreover, under the premise of the characterisation of 
GATT/WTO as a predominantly legal, and not only diplomatic, system, there is a strong ar-
gument that the Community and its Member States should have at their disposal a legal 
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means to control that it is respected. The situation in which a legal international agreement by 
which the Community is bound by public international and primary law (Article 300 (7) EC), 
but which can generally not be invoked by anyone as a legality requirement for internal legis-
lation, should simply not exist in a Community governed by the Rule of Law.  
As regards actions by the EC against Member States, the power of the Commission under 
Article 226 (ex 169) EC to force Member States to comply with GATT/WTO may be well 
justified on account of the EC’s own liability for the implementation of all WTO law. As the 
EC possesses only weak direct implementation mechanisms, the infringement procedure 
does, indeed, constitute a legitimate enforcement tool in these cases. As regards the Member 
States, the possibility of bringing a legal action also represents a constitutional counterbal-
ance to the majority principle in the Council; the only means of defence for the Member 
States against European law breaching international law.505 An action by a Member State 
serves therefore not only as an individual remedy, but also as a control of legality.506  
This conclusion is further confirmed by the distinction between the reliance on a superior 
rule of law as a source of rights and the reliance on such a rule in view of the control of the 
compatibility of legislation. This is usually made in national constitutional procedural law,507 
and might, therefore, by regarded as a common constitutional tradition of Member States 
which the ECJ generally accepts as a legitimate source of EC primary law, too.508 A similar 
approach seems to underlie the ECJ’s own famous Simmenthal509 decision. There, the Court 
held that the very nature of Community law - without any extra conditions comparable to 
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those required for direct effect needing to be fulfilled - rendered “automatically inapplicable 
any conflicting provision of current national law”. All in all, the wholesale refusal of the ECJ 
to examine the compatibility of the Regulation with GATT’ 47 may, indeed, be alleged to 
represent a déni de justice, as former EC judge Ulrich Everling did.510 Compared to these 
powerful arguments, the possible danger that, in some cases, private lobby groups will induce 
a government to file suit needs to be accepted.511 However, in such instances, it should be up 
to the national government’s responsibility to decide whether such action is really in the in-
terest of the State and the Community and whether it will not lead to unacceptable deregula-
tory consequences. Finally, it is also obvious that, even if some industry-induced government 
actions were to be filed, these would be much fewer than private actions. 
Whilst the justiciability of WTO law in Member State and Community actions should 
therefore be ensured, the crucial question is whether a “sovereignty exception”, as described 
above in the context of individual suits, should also be possible here in exceptional cases. In 
deciding this question, not only the legality arguments just outlined, but also the legitimacy 
arguments invoked against direct effect should be balanced. Specifically, it should be noted 
that the deregulatory risk for the Community as a whole is, of course, equally present in cases 
of government suits, in which one or several Member States might gain from deregulation in 
a particular area. On these grounds, a compromise solution should again be envisaged. Whilst 
it is clear that a “sovereignty exception” left to the Court’s discretion as in individual suits is 
insufficient, such an exception should be still possible if it is adopted in the Council with the 
necessary majority in the policy field at stake – hence mostly qualified majority, which is the 
rule for both the common agricultural and the common commercial policy. Technically, in 
such cases, the ECJ would then need to suspend the procedure and refer the matter to the 
Council. 
This solution may also be argued to be compatible with Article 300 (6) EC, even though 
this question is not an easy one. It is true that this provision entails, as shown, that legal re-
view of the respect of the EC’s international legal commitments should always be possible at 
least in Member State actions. However, there are two possibilities for motivating an excep-
tion. First, one might argue that GATT/WTO is not a “100% legal” agreement, but also con-
                                                 
510
 This objection is raised by Everling, op. cit., 409; H.-D. Kuschel, “Die EG-Bananenmarktordnung vor 
deutschen Gerichten”, EuZW 1995, 689; and Pescatore, op. cit. 
511
 M. Hilf and F. Schorkopf, “WTO und EG: Rechtskonflikte vor den EuGH?”, EuR 2000, 74 
 275 
tains elements of diplomatic bargaining and reciprocity, which might be taken to justify oc-
casional “sovereignty exceptions” barring legal review. The second argument goes back to 
legal structural findings derived from the pluralistic model and the network concept. Accord-
ingly, similar to what was postulated above for the conflict among national constitutional and 
European law, supremacy of international treaties over EC law must not be unlimited under a 
pluralistic model, either. This would mean that an implicit “constitutional identity limit” or 
“substantive ordre public” exception should be read also into the whole EC treaty, which 
would also justify the exceptional restriction of Article 300 (6) EC.512 
To sum up, WTO law should generally be invocable as “paramètre de légalité” in Member 
State and Community actions. However, in exceptional cases in which the EC’s or a Member 
State’s identity is deemed threatened, the Council should have the right to adopt a “sover-
eignty exception” by the necessary majority. This solution might represent an adequate com-
promise by taking the legitimacy concerns of both sides into account. 
III. The Direct Effect of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports within the European Legal 
Order 
1. Conspectus 
If the granting of direct effect to WTO law in private actions might overburden the rela-
tionship between WTO and national/EU law, the remaining possibility of granting direct ef-
fect to adopted dispute settlement reports alone deserves attention. Technically, this could be 
done whenever a report contains clear, unconditional and technically immediately imple-
mentable findings, such as, most importantly, the finding of a violation of WTO law.513 An 
assessment of this solution should again be informed by effectiveness and legitimacy ration-
ales. Regarding the former, it is obvious that this approach would mean an important step 
forward for the compliance with WTO law. As to the latter, it would also have considerable 
advantages. In fact, it is only the sensitive and cautious balancing of WTO and national law 
by the specialised and experienced WTO adjudicators who respect procedural fairness, meth-
odological coherence and integrity, and show a sufficient degree of institutional sensitivity 
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and deference towards higher legitimated national and supranational measures that enjoys 
sufficient deliberative legitimacy as to justify interventions in EU/national law. Beyond this, 
the interconnection of the dispute settlement procedure with EU/national law is nowhere near 
as “brutal” as the immediate avoidance of a European or national provision following the 
granting of unlimited direct effect to WTO rules. Instead, it would enable smoother co-
ordination of both legal orders, offering possibilities for conciliation, more flexible time-
frames for compliance, and the transitory possibility of compensation as an alternative to full 
compliance. 
Moreover, this solution also seems to fit the legal character of the dispute settlement pro-
cedure and thus the Rule of Law principle in general.514 Indeed, with a finding of breach by 
an international dispute settlement body, the binding character of WTO law and the legality 
principle in general carry much greater weight since existing points of dispute with regard to 
the compatibility of relevant domestic measures with WTO law have been decided in a de-
finitive and authoritative manner. Finally, it should be recalled that direct effect of DSB deci-
sions also seems to be a recommendable solution from a doctrinal view. Thus, this solution is 
backed up by the ECJ’s findings in its first opinion on the European Economic Area on the 
internal Community status of the decisions of international courts.515 As reported, the ECJ 
held, in that opinion, that legal decisions taken by an international court established by an 
international agreement into which the Community has lawfully entered are also binding for 
itself.516 Against this background, it should not be easy to distinguish a denial of direct effect 
to adopted dispute settlement report. 
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2. Fine-Tuning Direct Effect with Political Elements in the Dispute Settlement En-
forcement Procedure 
If direct effect of adopted dispute settlement reports should thus be recognised as a princi-
ple, its granting must still be cautiously fine-tuned with the political-diplomatic elements of 
the DSU in order not to disturb the sensitive balance of legal and political elements provided 
for in the dispute settlement procedure. These problems have first been addressed in two pio-
neer studies by Thomas Cottier.517 As a baseline, it seems to be clear that a dispute settlement 
report must not be granted direct effect before the expiry of the period accorded to a State for 
the implementation of the panel or appellate body report. In fact, only then does the interna-
tional law command actually become effective, as ex tunc avoidance does not exist in WTO 
procedural law. Beyond this, several other scenarios need, however, to be distinguished: the 
case of controversies about the WTO-consistency of implementation measures (a), compen-
sation wrongly used as a definitive remedy (b), and the simple disregard of dispute settlement 
decisions (c). 
a) Controversies about the WTO-Consistency of Implementation Measures 
First, as happened in the Banana case, when national or European implementation legisla-
tion is enacted, doubts may emerge as to whether this is now compatible with WTO law. In 
these cases, Thomas Cottier has suggested the following distinction. Whenever WTO-
consistent interpretation allows gaps to be filled and possible inconsistencies in national leg-
islation to be avoided, this may be done de lege lata by the judge. By contrast, in situations 
where this is not possible, as the wording of the implementation norms is unequivocal and 
leaves no interpretative space,518 “judicial policy may develop a later-in-time rule, which re-
quires respect for national measures and practices adjusted based on the WTO report”, as 
these have not yet been subjected to a new panel review. In addition, courts should, however, 
also be allowed to address manifest shortcomings without a new panel procedure being initi-
ated.  
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This assessment may be largely approved, even though the last finding should be relativ-
ised. As a general rule, the higher legitimacy of national or European measures should, in-
deed, entail that these are respected as a rule, even if one party raises doubts about their 
WTO-consistency and their consistent interpretation is not possible. However, one should 
also examine the effects of a Article 21 (5) DSU procedure, which is the specific WTO law 
device to deal with doubts on the WTO-consistency of an implementation measure. If such a 
procedure has been started, the national legislation should not be disapplied domestically, as 
this would interfere with it. If, however, no such procedure has been initiated – which means 
that the other WTO parties which have started the original procedure are satisfied with the 
implementation measures taken to remedy the breach - it appears to be barely imaginable that 
a national court or the ECJ will find a major inconsistency with WTO law, which would 
amount to a massive shortcoming. So, as a rule, the national/European implementation legis-
lation would need to be applied in that case too, without European or national courts having 
the right to address shortcomings. 519 
b) Compensation wrongly used as a Definitive Remedy 
The second possible scenario is that of a compensation. To this effect, the DSU allows a 
decision, to be taken within 20 days of the expiry of the implementation period, to grant tem-
porary compensation (Article 22 (2) DSU). In order not to interfere with the parties’ right to 
reach such a political solution, internal judicial action should also be suspended for the pe-
riod for which compensation is granted. However, there is a serious lacuna in the DSU sys-
tem: it is not stated how long temporary compensation may last, and there appears to be no 
procedural device in the DSU capable of preventing temporary compensation from becoming 
definitive. For, if the Member States disadvantaged by the measures in question are satisfied 
with the compensation offered, no further steps will be taken. Without a request by a State, 
the DSB is not authorised to enact any measure of retaliation in order to achieve full compli-
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ance. Now, the question is, whether such a settlement praeter legem - which may be signifi-
cantly disadvantageous for private parties – would need to be accepted by national and Euro-
pean courts, too. 
In this situation, it should first be recalled that, according to Article 22 (1) DSU, obser-
vance of the DSB decision is clearly preferable and that, as a consequence, the possibility of 
compensation is not a legally admissible alternative to full compliance. Instead, it is the es-
sential legal remedy of international law in the sanctioning of a breach of an agreement be-
fore the ultimate suspension of concessions. On a different line of argumentation, the direct 
effect of agreements in international law would always be excluded on account of the alterna-
tive of compensation. Nevertheless, it is realistically barely possible for domestic courts to 
revolt against their governments and to disrespect a political settlement reached with third 
States by granting direct effect to the dispute settlement decision which has established the 
violation. Even though such a definitive settlement of the dispute would constitute a clear 
violation of the wording and spirit of the DSU, its challenge should be left to WTO bodies 
and procedures and not to domestic courts. 
c) The Complete Disregard of a Dispute Settlement Decision and its Consequences 
The third possible scenario arises when a party simply ignores the panel report and ex-
poses itself to the suspension of concessions by other parties. In this situation, Thomas Cot-
tier has submitted that a distinction should be introduced according to whether the State in 
question or the Community just remains passive (e.g., because implementation legislation 
could not be enacted due to resistance in the Council of Ministers) or deliberately chooses to 
ignore the panel decision and to accept the risk of incurring retaliation measures by third 
States upon authorisation of the DSB.520 In the first case, which is alleged to amount to the 
most flagrant violation of international law, direct effect should be granted on grounds of le-
gality and the protection of individuals. By contrast, the second case is argued to be much 
more complex. Here, solutions should be made dependent on the motives and reasons stated 
in support of the resistance against the report; at any rate, arbitrary non-compliance and mere 
political expediency should not be judicially protected. 
This reasoning may again be approved in general, but it might be somewhat more elabo-
rated in the context of the EU. As a general rule, it should be recognised that – even though 
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this may again be contrary to WTO law – national or European courts must not prevent the 
executive from deciding against the implementation of a dispute settlement report. As stated, 
reasons of internal legitimacy, in particular protecting the social Welfare State against far-
reaching deregulatory constraints, may justify such behaviour, and it can only be up to the 
political branch to decide upon it. However, whereas a Nation State executive may simply 
choose not to comply in this case and to accept possible sanctions, the situation of the EU is 
different on various important grounds. First, as repeatedly stated, all Member States are 
WTO Members and may incur sanctions for non-compliance; second, as in the case of the 
Banana regulation enacted by qualified-majority decision in the Council, one or more Mem-
ber States may themselves suffer economic damage from a piece of EU legislation violating 
the GATT/WTO rules, and the legitimacy rationales for exceptionally disapplying a dispute 
settlement finding would not apply to them.  
On these grounds, while the disregard of a dispute settlement decision on account of 
paramount Community interests should not be completely excluded, Member States’ inter-
ests would need to be taken into consideration, too. Thus, one may develop a compromise 
proposal similar to the construct of “sovereignty exceptions” to the internal justiciability of 
WTO law suggested above. This could be as follows: since the ratification of the WTO by 
both the EC and its Member States should be read as implying a principal decision in favour 
of the acceptance of dispute settlement findings, too, it would need to be revoked by actus 
contrarius - i.e., by a “non-implementation” Council decision. To this, the same procedural 
rules as for the European act found in violation of WTO law should apply, which would 
again mean that qualified majority would be the rule, as it applies to common commercial 
policy (Article 133 (4) EC). By contrast, if no such “non-implementation decision” is taken 
by the Council, national and European courts should be entitled and obliged to grant direct 
effect to the dispute settlement decision after the expiry of the deadline set for its implemen-
tation.521 
A somewhat different assessment should apply to the second scenario in which the Com-
munity initially declares its willingness to comply with the ruling in the DSB session subse-
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quent to the adoption of the report (Article 13 (3) DSU), but then fails to implement the re-
port in the established time-frame. In this situation, the granting of direct effect to a DSB de-
cision by domestic courts should be possible provided that no “non-implementation” decision 
by the Council is taken. It would, indeed, be unacceptable if economic operators, who have 
relied on a certain internal measure to be withdrawn at the time announced by the EC in the 
DSB, were further disadvantaged for the simple reason that the European legislator was not 
able to do his or her job in time. This result would be parallel to the famous internal ECJ ju-
risprudence on the direct effect of directives; in this situation, the principle of estoppel - ac-
cording to which no one is allowed to invoke their own illegal behaviour against another per-
son - prevents a Member State from invoking national provisions against a directive after the 
expiry of the time-frame set for its transposition into national law. Even if internal EC legis-
lation cannot, of course, be compared in all circumstances to the implementation of a dispute 
settlement decision, the rationale of the estoppel and reliance principles should be of decisive 
weight even in the latter case. 
III. “Reference Panels” among the Community and its Member States 
1. Conspectus 
Summarising the above findings, two fundamental findings on the interconnection of EU 
and GATT/WTO law have been made so far: first, whilst in individual actions direct effect 
should be granted to WTO law only in cases without incisive domestic legitimacy implica-
tions, in government actions, WTO law should generally be invocable as a legal basis for the 
challenge of a piece of EC legislation, unless a “legitimacy exception” is adopted with the 
necessary majority in the Council. Second, it has been found that dispute settlement report 
findings should, in principle, enjoy direct effect, though only after the expiry of the imple-
mentation deadline and without prejudice to the EC’s capacity to enact a “non-
implementation” Council decision. 
It is obvious that tension leading to potentially divergent decisions may exist between 
these two options: whilst, normally, the WTO procedures are much speedier than actions be-
fore the ECJ on account of their tighter time-frames, it is by no means excluded that a panel 
is initiated by a third State when the ECJ is about to give its own decision on the WTO-
consistency of a European measure. Yet, this is not even the main problem: even if no panel 
procedure is initiated or foreseeable at the time of an ECJ decision, this may always happen 
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later. If the ECJ is bound to examine the consistency of European measures as advocated 
here, the danger of diverging decisions is always present. This possibility would be even 
more precarious as GATT/WTO is most complex and many central rules such as MFN leave 
a wide huge scope of interpretation – as evidenced, for example, by the frequent divergences 
between the panels and the appellate body or the fundamental disagreements among the ECJ 
and the WTO adjudicative bodies on the interpretation of the Article 23 GATT exception for 
free trading areas and customs unions.522 In particular, it might be expected that the ECJ 
would take a more generous stance towards the compatibility of EC measures with 
GATT/WTO provisions such as the free trade area or customs union exception. As a conse-
quence thereof, economic operators may have relied on the validity of an EC measure after 
an EC decision stating its consistency with GATT/WTO law, whilst a later contrary finding 
by WTO dispute settlement bodies might force the EC to revoke them. At European level, 
this might also give rise to damage claims by private parties against the EC, whose wholesale 
refusal by the ECJ, as in several Banana follow-up cases, again undermines the Rule of Law 
in the EC and thus the legitimacy of European governance. Clearly, this danger is even 
higher in the present scenario in Portugal vs. Council in which the ECJ refuses to deal with 
the WTO consistency of EC measures altogether. 
To avoid contradictory decisions as far as possible, a closer procedural interconnection 
among European courts and WTO adjudicative bodies would be desirable. In this context, it 
is obvious that in the current a posteriori type of WTO procedures, the economic and finan-
cial stakes are often very high, which increases the controversial character of the dispute and 
the adversarial character of the procedure, and ultimately puts WTO’s legitimacy under addi-
tional strain. The possibilities of realising a priori procedures should therefore be explored. 
In particular, a dispute settlement procedure might seem opportune when a panel has not, or 
not yet, been convened, but with a view to the importance, complexity, controversiality or the 
economic stakes of a particular dispute, an authoritative finding would seem to be needed in 
order to provide Member States and economic operators with legal certainty at an early stage 
- in particular, when a Community act has been planned or enacted, but not yet entered into 
force. The same may be true when, already, at the drafting stage of a European measure, it 
appears likely that a third State might convene an ordinary panel against the EU and/or a 
Member State immediately after its formal enactment. 
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The procedural device most adequate for such cases would be a sort of “reference proce-
dure” following the model of Article 234 (ex 177) EC. This has not just proven to provide a 
most effective and well-functioning interconnection between the EU and national legal sys-
tems. In a wider analysis, it has also been shown by Meinhard Hilf that a reference procedure 
is actually the most effective tool for the interconnection of international and national law.523 
It should, therefore, be examined whether a similar procedure could also be established at 
WTO level. 
As no a priori reference procedure is currently provided for in the DSU, it would clearly 
be the best solution if its establishment could be achieved by the “WTO legislator” through a 
reform of the DSU. In order not to overburden the relationship between WTO and EU law 
and the resources of the DS bodies, only WTO Members, and not national courts dealing 
with private actions, should have the right to refer questions on the compatibility of domestic 
measures with WTO law at the present stage. However, as long as the device of reference 
panels is not formally introduced into the DSU by the “WTO legislator”, “reference panels” 
might also be possible de lege lata in the EU context. For, according to standing law, ordi-
nary panels might be convened between the Community and one or several Member States or 
vice versa, which might simply take on the function of references panels. In this way, the fact 
that both the Community and its Members are full WTO Members might be rendered fertile. 
Whilst their membership should, in principle, also authorise them to initiate proceedings 
against each other, the compatibility of such use of the panel procedure with WTO and EU 
law needs to be examined in more detail.  
2. Consistency with WTO law  
Under WTO law, reference panels between the EU and a Member State do not seem to 
meet major obstacles, the Community and all its Member States being, individually, full 
Members of the WTO. This means that they are liable for the full implementation of the 
agreement; as equally mentioned, the internal distribution of competencies is in principle ir-
relevant on the international plane and must, therefore, not be invoked against other States. 
Thus, “intra-European panels” should be possible on any subject matter. 
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Moreover, irrespective of the apparently unsettled question whether an actio popularis is 
always admissible in the dispute settlement system or not,524 the issue of legal interest 
(gravamen) should not be too huge a problem, either. According to Article XXIII GATT, re-
sponsibility arises when a “Member should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any 
objective of the Agreement is being impeded (...).” In the Banana case, the appellate body 
emphasised that the wording “if any Member should consider” is consistent with Article 3.7. 
DSU which reads pertinently: “Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment 
as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful.” Against this background, the 
appellate body concluded that a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a 
case against another Member under the DSU. It found that the language of the quoted provi-
sions suggests that a Member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding whether 
any such action would be useful.525 Therefore, the quoted provisions might be supposed to be 
wide enough to encompass even panels against measures which have already been decided, 
but not yet entered into force. Such interpretation would also conform to the general principle 
of “timely and effective prevention and resolution of trade disputes” which underlies the 
whole DSU system, as may be inferred, in particular, from the DSU’s tight time schedules. 
Furthermore, it is generally recognised that panels may be initiated irrespective of whether 
any existing internal remedies are exhausted. Finally, the fact that a potential future enforce-
ment of the panel report within the EU by means of compensation or sanctions would not fit 
the peculiarities of the EC as an integration community may be deemed irrelevant. A panel 
may also be initiated with the mere intention of ensuring compliance with WTO law - as this 
is, indeed, its primary purpose. The factual possibility or the intention of a State to impose 
sanctions in a case of non-compliance is not a binding requirement for the admissibility of a 
panel procedure. 
3. Consistency with EU Law 
The consistency of “reference panels” between the EU and a Member State with EU law 
is far less clear. Here, a distinction should be made as to whether such panels are initiated by 
mutual agreement or on a unilateral basis. 
                                                 
524
 See, on this, Kuyper, op. cit., 239f. 
 285 
a) Panel Initiation by Mutual Agreement 
It would, clearly, be the preferable option if a reference panel procedure between the EU 
and a Member State could be initiated by mutual agreement. Such action would be possible 
when a Member State raises a WTO law objection in the EC legislation procedure, and the 
Council decides to clarify the legal position before the relevant agreed measure enters into 
force. Technically, then, the Council would have to request the State in question to initiate 
proceedings against the EC or vice versa.  
Furthermore, a panel might also be initiated after seizure of the ECJ with an annulment 
action brought by a Member State under Article 230 (ex 173) EC (the scenario of Bananas 
and Portugal v. Council), if the parties and the court agree that the risk of divergent views by 
European courts and the dispute settlement bodies is too high. Then, the ECJ would need to 
suspend the procedure and ask the parties to initiate a panel against each other. A panel might 
equally be considered, either at the request of a party or by the ECJ on its own motion, in a 
Treaty infringement procedure brought under ex–Article 226 (ex 169) EC by the Community 
against a Member State for the violation of a WTO law provision pertaining to the Commu-
nity’s sphere of internal competence (the Dairy Agreement scenario). Finally, in a reference 
procedure pursuant to Article 234 (ex 177) EC involving a private action, a reference panel 
should be reserved to most exceptional event that the private claim coincides with important 
interests of one or several EU Member States. 
b) Unilateral Panel Initiation by a Member State 
Whether a panel unilaterally initiated by a Member State against the EU as ultima ratio to 
guarantee the EU’s respect for WTO law would be possible is a highly controversial issue. 
For it would obviously put at risk the requirement of unity in the international representation 
of the Community, frequently emphasised by the ECJ.526 Moreover, such action might be 
perceived as a disloyal act of a Member State against the Community, and should, therefore, 
be generally discarded on account of Article 10 EC. 
However, following the multi-level governance concept, an exception might be conceiv-
able if, as in Portugal vs. Council, the ECJ were to continue the blockage of the interconnec-
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tion between WTO and EU law on account of its allegedly lacking legal character, without 
such action being backed by a “legitimacy exception” adopted by Council decision as sug-
gested above. In such a situation, effectiveness and legitimacy rationales militate in favour of 
forcing the ECJ to take GATT/WTO seriously as a legal system; these should exceptionally 
override the requirement of unity in international representation. As regards effectiveness, if 
a “gateway” or interconnection within the overall network is blocked to the detriment of 
overall effectiveness, it is the systemically adequate answer to circumvent the blocked link 
and force its re-opening. With respect to legitimacy, it has already been stated that the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence amounts to a déni de justice, which puts the Rule of Law at risk and triggers a 
Member State’s liability in international law towards third States, which should justify such a 
drastic countermeasure as a unilateral panel. 
The exceptional admissibility of unilateral panels in such situations may also be shown to 
be compatible with EC law.527 To be sure, it has been sustained that the initiation of a panel 
by a Member State would violate Article 298 (ex 219) EC, according to which the “Member 
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided therein”.528 This objection is, 
however, hardly tenable, since a panel procedure does not concern the interpretation or appli-
cation of the EC Treaty, but rather that of WTO law. Even the Haegeman-formula according 
to which the ECJ’s jurisdiction extends to international treaties as acts concluded by a Com-
munity institution may barely be interpreted as precluding Member States’ access to a dis-
pute settlement procedure established in a mixed international agreement for whose imple-
mentation the EC and its Member States are jointly liable. 
A more serious argument against the exceptional initiation of a unilateral panel would be 
that, in the EC sphere of competencies within the WTO framework as delimited in opinion 
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1/94, the EC is alone competent to implement the respective agreements or parts thereof. To 
reply to this objection, it is necessary to resort to the reasoning presented in the context of 
constitutional conflicts between the EC and a Member State. There it has been shown that the 
EC is bound to respect constitutional essentials of the Member States as far as possible ac-
cording to the solidarity and loyalty duty laid down in Articles 10 EC and 6 (1) EU. Now, the 
respect for the Rule of Law is undoubtedly among these constitutional essentials, and it 
should be considered as comprising the general justiciability of the EC’s international legal 
commitments, unless an exception is explicitly adopted by the Council. Just as in the rela-
tionship between the EC and a Member State, the Rule of Law also comprises the availability 
of a judicial action in case the latter deems its legal position to have been violated, this find-
ing should also be true for the control of compliance with a mixed agreement for whose im-
plementation the EC and its Member States are jointly liable. Therefore, an exception from 
the exclusive competence may be claimed to lie in these cases pursuant to Articles 10 EC and 
6 (1) EU. 
Yet, another consideration establishing a cross-interconnection among the three constitu-
tional levels seems to be important in the present context. If, as advocated here, the wholesale 
denial of justiciability to WTO law in government actions constitutes a violation of a na-
tional constitutional essential, it would, as shown with respect to the interface of European 
and national constitutional law, also entitle a Member State to a separate conciliation proce-
dure under general international law (Article 46 VCLT). Now, WTO law being a specialised 
sub-system of international law, its adjudicative mechanism may claim priority as regards 
WTO law questions with respect to a conciliation procedure under general international law 
on account of the lex specialis rule. This would mean that the complaining EC Member State 
is even obliged to make first use of the WTO’s adjudicative mechanism before requesting a 
conciliation procedure pursuant to general international law. 
In a final step, this conclusion may be extended further in the following way: where a na-
tional constitutional right or principle of substantive law (such as the freedom of property, 
the freedom to pursue a business or general principles such as equality in the Bananas con-
flict) is deemed to have been violated by an EC measure, and this right or principle has inter-
national law correlates (such as the WTO law non-discrimination provisions) which are so 
similar that a violation of one typically also constitutes a violation of the other, a State may, 
for reasons of practicability, first choose to proceed on the international law avenue rather 
than asking for a conciliation procedure in the relationship between EU and national constitu-
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tional law. Such preference for an international solution would fit the “international open-
ness” of the national constitutions of all the EC Member States well. However, it would seem 
to go too far to state an obligation for a State to opt for the international avenue; instead, as-
sessing the similarity of national and international rights and principles should depend on a 
State’s discretion. This notwithstanding, making use of an existing procedure, even though in 
a legally and politically highly controversial way, should, generally, seem to be preferable to 
the establishment of a completely new one as the conciliation body recommended above. 
Thus, in Banana type situations which might arise in the future, a Member State should, after 
exhausting European law remedies, seriously consider to seek redress from WTO bodies if 
the Community institutions, including the ECJ, were to prove unable to protect its constitu-
tional identity, and if the EC refused to establish a panel by mutual agreement. To move even 
one step further in cross-interconnecting the three constitutional systems, it is also according 
to national constitutional law that a resort to WTO adjudicative bodies would be prior-
ranking in comparison to the unilateral disapplication of European measures as unconstitu-
tional by the BVerfG, as it would be a less incisive measure, doing less damage to legal unity 
within the EU.  
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Summary and Conclusion 
Viewed in a more general perspective, the analysis of the three constitutional levels’ inter-
connection in the Banana conflict has impressively shown to what degree the two involved 
supranational regimes, the EU and the WTO, have become independent from the Nation 
States which have established them and deployed autonomous effectiveness. Not only are 
they influencing and taking over ever more policy fields; their autonomous power is so high 
that they are, to a wide degree, able to impose their law on their Member States. Whereas this 
insight is hardly controversial for the EU, the Banana conflict has shown that it applies, albeit 
to a lesser degree, also to the WTO. Indeed, it was WTO rules and institutions which finally 
forced the EU to abandon its blatantly protectionist import regime; by comparison, the na-
tional constitutional attack was perhaps even more vociferous, but proved much less effective 
in the end. These experiences confirm the basic postulates of this thesis, the necessity of 
adopting a constitutional perspective towards the EU’s and the WTO’s basic rules, institu-
tions and structures, if democratically legitimate governance is not to vanish in the age of 
globalisation; and the necessity of reading the three levels together in a multi-level constitu-
tionalist way with a view to establishing a functioning and mutually reinforcing relationship 
between them. 
In the first part of this thesis, the autonomy of the EU and the WTO towards the national 
constitution became visible when all three were shown to reach completely different results 
on the identical facts of the Banana import regime. Substantively, the divergences between 
the national and European reading of the scope of economic freedoms and between the free 
market vs. planified economy principles proved to be huge; equally huge divergences could 
be found in the EU vs. WTO law scenario between regionalism vs. universalism and free 
trade vs. protectionism. In procedural law, the differences were even bigger: whereas EU and 
national constitutional law disagree on the ultimate arbiter to decide on constitutional con-
flicts, the national side reserving to itself the possibility of disapplying European law inter-
nally, the EU does not even take the WTO as a legal system seriously and therefore denies, 
with a few minor examples, any judicial control of the compatibility of EU measures with 
WTO law. Yet, the legal positions of all three levels should be viewed from their internal 
perspectives as doctrinally coherent and persuasive. From this finding, it has been deduced 
that the resources of legal doctrine are exhausted for the solution of constitutional conflicts 
among the three levels of governance.  
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Against this background, a proposal for a convincing solution could only be made on the 
basis of a theoretical model describing the functions and the possible interaction of the three 
levels. To this end, various theoretical concepts were analysed in the second part of this the-
sis. The first of them, realism, which is the conventional model of international relations the-
ory and focuses on the central position of the Nation State, was shown to be no longer well 
defendable on account of the massive loss of power to the supranational level by the State, 
even though its newer offspring, such as regime theory, provides useful insights. The two 
contrary theories, functionalism and neo-liberalism, which both advocate legitimate suprana-
tional governance on functional grounds and claim supremacy of supranational law in limited 
fields, were equally shown to be inadequate. The basic functionalist claim of legitimate ex-
pert governance endowed with higher rationality in limited “technical” policy fields is con-
tradicted by the predominantly political character of supranational governance and its exten-
sion far beyond limited policy fields with technical character into the realm of “high poli-
tics”. Similar objections were pronounced against neo-liberalism. This theory generally dis-
trusts the legislator interfering in the free play of market forces and wants to establish a pow-
erful constitutional counterdevice against the protectionist instincts of States and their vul-
nerability to rent-seeking lobby activities. Whilst this is, indeed, an important function of su-
pranational constitutionalism, it has also proved undercomplex. For, in the real world, the 
more difficult conflicts are on competing principles and values such as free trade vs. social 
and environmental protection - and consequently, the viability and legitimacy of modern so-
cial States require active governance fulfilling tasks of social regulation and redistribution, 
tasks which the market cannot achieve and whose realisation should not be thwarted by the 
selective constitutionalisation of free trade values only. 
The theory which has been advocated here, multi-level governance, is more complex and 
tries to avoid these shortcomings. Starting off from the basic insight that the essence of all 
governance is political, it puts central weight on the principles of effectiveness and democ-
ratic legitimacy for the allocation of competencies and powers between national and suprana-
tional levels. This analysis led to a differentiated assessment. As regards effectiveness, the 
relationship of the three constitutional levels should be considered as “pluralistic”, as neither 
level has the institutional capacity to subjugate the others completely; attempts at hierarchical 
imposition rather diminish the effectiveness of all levels. Moreover, the effectiveness of one 
level’s influence on another is highest when the former seeks to understand and respect the 
other’s constraints and functioning conditions, including its substantive “ordre public”, i.e., 
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the principles and rules that form its very identity. As regards legitimacy, the result is again 
multi-faceted, even though two main lines of argument may be individualised. On the one 
hand, supranational governance in its substantive version is capable of correcting “Nation 
State or Community” failures, i.e., the well-known proneness of these polities towards im-
posing economic, social or political externalities on their neighbours; in its procedural ver-
sion, it subjects power-dominated relationships to the Rule of Law with its deliberative po-
tential, which acts as a strong legitimating device. On the other, it also bears in itself a strong 
deregulatory potential or “effectiveness surplus”. This is due to the fact that the constitutional 
invalidation of national (or European) laws can be relatively easily achieved by adjudication, 
which functions as a form of hierarchical direction, whereas the establishment of regulatory 
structures and regimes at supranational level, indispensable as they are for its legitimacy, 
generally requires political consensus and is therefore often difficult or impossible to 
achieve. 
It is on the basis of these findings derived from multi-level governance theory that con-
crete proposals de lege lata for a more effective and legitimate interconnection of the three 
constitutional orders has been developed in the last chapters. As regards the ultimate arbiter 
conflict among EU law and national constitutional law, a two step solution has been sug-
gested. This includes, first, the optimisation of the existing interconnecting mechanisms by 
introducing deliberative constraints for each constitutional level to take the identity, i.e., the 
intra-systemic ordre public of the other seriously. If such efforts fail, a third level conflict 
resolution through a public international law conciliation body is recommended. It has been 
shown that this solution could already be realised de lege lata by cautiously resorting, as a 
gap-filling device within EU law, to general international law, specifically Articles 46 and 65 
of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which foresee an independent conciliation 
procedure in the event of manifest violations of essential internal law by an international 
treaty. Even though such a conciliation decision would not be formally binding either for EC 
or for national constitutional law, its “legitimacy appeal” should be substantial, with the ef-
fect that it should normally be obeyed. As a result, this mechanism would indirectly re-
establish a form of weak three-tier monistic relationship in the Kelsenian sense between the 
two levels. 
As regards the conflict about an adequate interconnection between EU and WTO law, di-
rect effect has, in principle, been excluded for politically relevant issues on account of the 
legitimacy problems relating to the hardly avoidable deregulatory effect of WTO rules. How-
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ever, contrary to the ECJ’s jurisprudence, it has been admitted for technical issues such as 
procedural law questions which came to the fore, for example, in the Hermès case. Beyond 
this, three other proposals for a better interconnection were developed which go far beyond 
the status quo. First, it has been argued that WTO law should be able to be invoked as a “pa-
ramètre de légalité” of European measures in nullity suits initiated by Member State govern-
ments and in treaty infringement procedures brought by the Commission against a Member 
State. As a security valve alone, a “legitimacy exception” should be possible, which would, 
however, require a Council decision to be taken with the necessary (normally qualified-) ma-
jority. Second, the general granting of direct effect to WTO dispute settlement decisions after 
the expiry of the implementation period has been recommended. Here, too, a “non-
implementation” decision by the Council should be possible to obviate otherwise unavoid-
able legitimacy dangers in the wake of deregulatory pressures. Thirdly and perhaps most un-
conventionally, panels between the EU and a Member State have been suggested in order to 
clarify the WTO-consistency of European measures at an early stage before economic opera-
tors rely on them, and in order to avoid potentially conflicting decisions between the WTO 
and EU adjudicators. 
Whilst all these proposals are, clearly, open to debate and should be further refined and 
tested in practice, the aim of this thesis would be largely achieved, if its central premises 
were followed by others: attributing constitutional status to all three levels, reading them to-
gether as a meaningful whole, and, last but not least, accepting theoretical guidance in the 
face of the impossibility of reaching convincing solutions at legal-doctrinal level. 
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